IPO valuation and performance: evidence from the UK main market by Hutagaol, Yanthi
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hutagaol, Yanthi (2005) IPO valuation and performance:evidence from 
the UK main market. PhD thesis.
  
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1674/
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk IPO  VALUATION  AND  PERFORMANCE: 
EVIDENCE  FROM  THE  UK 
MAIN  MARKET 
Yanthi  Hutagaol 
A  thesis  submitted  in  fulfilment  of  the  degree  of  Doctor  of 
Philosophy  in  the  Department  of  Accounting  and  Finance, 
University  of  Glasgow 
2005 , 
7v1y  comfort  in  my  suffering  is  this: 
'Your  promise  preserves  my  life. 
(Psalm  199:  50  -  New  Internationa('ersion) 
In  memory  of  our  6e(oved  fattier 
, 
JintarJ-(utagao( Acknowledgement 
Know  therefore  that  the  LORD  your  God  is  God  he  is  tfie  faitffuCGod,  keeping  his 
covenant  of  love  to  a  tuiousandgenerations  of  those  who  love  him  and  keep  his  commands 
(Deuteronomy  7:  9) 
I  would  like  to  offer  my  sincere  gratitude  and  appreciation  to  many  people 
who  made  this  thesis  possible.  Special  thanks  are  due  to  my  supervisor,  Professor  Jo 
Danbolt  for  his  patience,  diligence,  perseverance  and  faithfulness  in  helping  me 
through  this  PhD.  I  am  highly  indebted  to  my  advisers,  Professor  Bill  Rees,  who 
helped  me  with  amazing  ideas  on  the  early  stage  of  the  thesis,  and  Professor  Rob 
Watson,  who  guided  me  to  put  together  the  pieces  of  my  `jigsaw'  thesis. 
I  also  would  like  to  thank  Wards  Trust,  Department  of  Accounting  and 
Finance,  University  of  Glasgow,  and  Universitas  Kristen  Indonesia  that  have  provided 
financial  supports  during  my  PhD  periods 
I  dedicate  this  thesis  for  my  late  father,  who  could  not  see  the  end  of  my  PhD, 
but  had  set  an  example  of  hard  work  and  been  a  wonderful  and  blessed  inspiration  for 
me.  I  would  like  to  thank  my  husband,  Anton  and  my  daughter,  Lia,  who  have  shared 
all  the  laughs  and  tears  and  been  a  truly  God's  bless  for  me  throughout  the  years. 
Special  thanks  to  my  mother,  for  her  loves,  patience,  and  prayers,  and  to  my  sisters 
and  brothers  for  their  prayers,  encouragements  and  supports. 
I  extend  my  sincere  thanks  to  all  staffs  in  Department  of  Accounting  and 
Finance,  especially  Kirsty  Husband,  Veda  Smillie,  Julie  Cairns  for  their  kindly  helps. 
I  also  want  to  thank  Niklas  Kreander  who  has  been  my  sincere  friend  in  Christ.  Last 
but  not  least,  I  would  like  to  thank  all  of  our  friends,  especially  Susan  and  John 
Rushton,  Jean  and  George  Chalmers,  Selvy  and  Matthew  Warrens,  and  many  who  are 
not  mentioned  here,  for  their  prayers  and  their  friendships. 
However  many  blessings  we  expect  f  rom  God,  Mils  infinite  liberality  wilfafways  exceed  a!  f 
our  wishes  and  our  thoughts  (Mohn  Calvin) Contents 
Page 
Abstract 
Chapter  1  Introduction  1 
Introduction  1 
1.1.  IPO  anomalies  2 
1.2.  The  IPO  pricing  process  6 
1.3.  The  offering  prospectus  10 
1.4.  The  scope  of  research  14 
1.5.  Research  methodology  and  method  16 
1.6.  Research  questions  and  hypotheses  17 
1.6.  Organisation  of  thesis  19 
Chapter  2  Literature  review  22 
Intro  duction  22 
2.1.  The  underpricing  anomaly  22 
2.1.1.  The  winner's  curse  hypothesis  24 
2.1.2.  The  underwriter  reputation  hypothesis  26 
2.1.3.  The  signalling  hypothesis  32 
2.1.4.  The  insurance  hypothesis  38 
2.2.  Underpricing  phenomenon  in  the  UK  42 
2.3.  The  long  run  underperformance  anomaly  46 
2.3.1.  Fad  hypothesis  47 
2.3.2.  Heterogeneous  expectations  hypothesis  49 
2.3.3.  Agency  hypothesis  50 
2.3.4.  Signalling  hypothesis  51 
2.3.5.  Problem  with  long  run  returns  measurement  52 
2.4  IPO  long  run  performance  in  the  UK  54 
2.5.  Hot/cold  market  anomaly  55 
2.6.  Equity  valuation  57 
2.6.1.  Non-IPO  valuation  58 
2.6.2.  IPO  valuation  61 
2.7  Risk  68 
2.7.1.  Risk  conceptualisation  69 
2.7.2.  Some  important  studies  70 
2.7.3.  The  Capital  asset  pricing  model  72 
2.7.4.  Accounting-based  risk  measure  75 
2.7.5.  Risk-return  relationship  80 
2.7.6.  Risk,  IPO  valuation  and  performance  82 
Conclusion  88 Chapter  3  Research  design  90 
Introduction  90 
3.1  Research  models  90 
3.1.1.  Theoretical  foundations  91 
3.1.2.  The  basic  IPO  valuation  model  94 
3.1.3.  The  IPO  valuation  model  102 
3.1.4.  The  IPO  initial  returns  model  111 
3.1.5.  The  IPO  long  run  return  model  116 
3.2.  Hypothesis  development  122 
3.2.1.  Hypotheses  regarding  IPO  valuation  123 
3.2.2.  Hypotheses  regarding  IPO  initial  returns  126 
3.2.3.  Hypotheses  regarding  IPO  long  run  performance  129 
3.3.  Research  methods  135 
3.3.1.  UK  institutional  framework  135 
3.3.2.  Research  sample  137 
3.4.  Content  analysis  of  the  Arthur  Andersen  Business  Risk  Model  152 
Conclusion  159 
Appendices  for  chapter  3  161 
Chapter  4  IPO  valuation  analysis  168 
Introduction  168 
4.1.  Data  170 
4.2.  Univariate  analysis  174 
4.3.  Basic  valuation  analysis  179 
4.4.  IPO  full  valuation  analysis  191 
4.4.1.  Ex-ante  risk  factor  analysis  193 
4.4.2.  Signalling  analysis  203 
4.5.  Privatisation  207 
4.6.  Validity  of  the  IPO  valuation  model  209 
4.7.  Sensitivity  analyses  210 
4.7.1.  Forecasted  earnings  vs  Historic  earnings  210 
4.7.2.  Pro-forma  book  value  vs  Pre-IPO  book  value  as  a  deflator  214 
4.7.3.  Ex-ante  risk  factors  vs  Risk  disclosure  index  218 
4.7.4.  Industry  ß  vs  Industry  dummy  219 
4.7.3.  Rank  regression  analysis  220 
Conclusion  220 
Appendices  for  chapter  4  224 
Chapter  5  IPO  initial  returns  analysis  236 
Introduction  236 
5.1.  Data  240 
5.1.1  IPO  initial  returns  241 5.1.2  Fundamental  and  Residual  analyses  243 
5.2.  Univariate  analysis  246 
5.3.  IPO  initial  returns  analysis  250 
5.3.1  Fundamental  analysis  252 
5.3.2  Ex-ante  risk  factors  analysis  254 
5.3.3  Signalling  analysis  257 
5.3.4  Analysis  in  respect  of  the  control  variable  -  Privatisation  260 
5.3.5  Analysis  of  offer  price  underpricing  (residual)  263 
5.4.  Validity  of  the  IPO  short  run  performance  models  265 
5.5.  Sensitivity  analysis  267 
Conclusion  269 
Appendices  for  chapter  5  272 
Chapter  6  IPO  long  run  performance  analysis  275 
Introduction  275 
6.1.  Data  278 
6.2.  Univariate  analysis  286 
6.3.  IPO  long  run  performance  analysis  288 
6.3.1  IPO  abnormal  returns  analysis  289 
6.3.2  Fundamental  analysis  289 
6.3.3  Ex-ante  risk  factor  analysis  293 
6.3.4  Signalling  analysis  298 
6.3.5  Privatisation  and  IPO  long  run  performance  analysis  301 
6.3.6  Valuation  residuals,  initial  returns  and  long  run  performance  303 
6.4.  Sensitivity  analysis  308 
6.5.  Validity  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  models  316 
Conclusion  318 
Appendices  for  chapter  6  322 
Chapter  7  Conclusion  329 
Introduction  329 
7.1.  IPO  valuation  analysis  331 
7.2.  IPO  performance  analysis  333 
7.3.  Research  limitations  337 
7.4.  Possible  future  research  339 
Concluding  remarks  340 
Bibliography  343 List  of  tables 
Page 
Table  1.1.  Comparative  evidence  of  IPO  underpricing  2 
Table  1.2.  Comparative  evidence  of  IPO  long  run  performance  3 
Table  1.3.  Time  table  for  the  issuers  and  sponsors  to  the  admission  7 
week 
Table  2.1  The  IPO  first  day  returns  in  LSE,  2001  43 
Table  3.1  Research  variables,  measures,  and  data  sources  110 
Table  3.2.  Main  differences  in  the  admission  criteria  for  the  Min  136 
market  and  the  AIM 
Table  3.3.  The  distribution  of  research  population  138 
Table  3.4.  The  distribution  of  actual  and  expected  initial  sample  of  141 
200  IPOs 
Table  3.5  Results  of  Goodness  of  fit  test  for  the  initial  sample  of  144 
200  IPOs 
Table  3.6  Final  sample  derivation  147 
Table  3.7  The  distribution  of  actual  final  sample  of  161  IPOs  148 
Table  3.8  The  results  of  Goodness  of  fit  test  for  the  final  sample  149 
Table  3.9  IPO  sample  derivation  151 
Table  3.10  The  results  of  content  analysis  of  180  IPO  prospectuses  155 
Table  3.11  Correlation  matrix  of  6  risk  factors  157 
Table  A.  3.1.  Working  hypotheses  for  the  IPO  valuation  model  161 
Table  A.  3.2.  Working  hypotheses  for  the  IPO  initial  returns  model  163 
Table  A.  3.3.  Working  hypotheses  for  the  IPO  long  run  performance  165 
model 
Table  A.  3.4.  Privatisation  IPOs  in  the  research  sample  167 
Table  A.  3.5.  The  Arthur  Andersen  Business  Risk  Model  168 Table  4.1  a.  Descriptive  statistics  of  research  variables  in  IPO  171 
valuation  models 
Table  4.1b.  Correlation  matrix  for  IPO  valuation  model  175 
Table  4.2.  Regression  results  on  the  basic  IPO  valuation  model  180 
Table  4.3.  Testing  the  difference  of  regression  coefficient  in  the  188 
basic  1PO  valuation  model  results 
Table  4.4.  Regression  analysis  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model  for  192 
the  offer  price  (Pc/pBP) 
Table  4.5.  Regression  analysis  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model  for  194 
the  initial  market  price  (Pl/pBk) 
Table  4.6.  Regression  analysis  of  the  full  valuation  model  for  non-  196 
privatisation  IPOs 
Table  4.7.  Testing  the  difference  of  regression  coefficients  in  full  200 
IPO  valuation  model  (full  IPO  sample  and  non 
privatisation  sample) 
Table  4.8.  Regression  results  on  the  basic  IPO  valuation  model  211 
using  the  historic  earnings  and  dividends 
Table  4.9.  Regression  results  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model  using  213 
the  historic  earnings  and  dividends 
Table  4.10.  Regression  results  on  the  basic  IPO  valuation  model  215 
using  book  value  of  equity  pre-IPO  as  a  scale  factor 
Table  4.11.  Regression  results  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model  using  217 
book  value  of  equity  pre-IPO  as  a  scale  factor 
Table  A.  4.1a  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  offer  price  on  the  reduced  224 
model  for  full  IPO  sample 
Table  A.  4.  lb  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  initial  market  price  on  the  225 
reduced  model  for  full  IPO  sample 
Table  A.  4.2  Stepwise  regression  analysis  for  the  full  valuation  model  226 
Table  A.  4.3  Descriptive  statistics  of  the  disclosure  index  of  AABRM  228 
Table  A.  4.4a  Regression  analysis  results  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  228 
model  for  the  offer  price  (Po/pBV)  using  the  disclosure 
index  of  AABRM. Table  A.  4.4b  Regression  analysis  results  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  229 
model  for  the  offer  price  (Pt/pBV)  using  the  disclosure 
index  of  AABRM. 
Table  A.  4.5  Regression  analysis  results  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  230 
model  using  the  industry  dummy 
Table  A.  4.6.  Rank  regression  result  for  full  valuation  model  231 
Table  A.  4.7  Summary  of  IPO  valuation  hypothesis  testing  233 
Table  5.1.  Descriptive  statistics  for  IPO  initial  returns  analysis  241 
Table  5.2.  Descriptive  statistics  of  IRs  across  the  research  sub-  242 
samples 
Table  5.3.  The  IRs  for  full  sample  by  year  244 
Table  5.4.  The  IPO  performances  of  the  Fundamentals  groups  245 
Table  5.5  Correlation  matrix  for  IPO  IR  analysis  247 
Table  5.6.  Regression  analysis  on  the  IPO  initial  returns  model  251 
Table  5.7  Regression  analysis  on  the  IPO  initial  returns  model  for  262 
non  privatisation  IPOs 
Table  5.8  The  IR  average  and  the  offer  price  (Po)  distribution  264 
Table  5.9.  Robust  regression  analysis  on  the  IPO  initial  returns  268 
model 
Table  A.  5.1  Summary  of  IR  analysis  hypothesis  testing  273 
Table  6.1.  Descriptive  statistics  for  long  run  returns  analysis  279 
Table  6.2.  IPO  performance  of  PIPOs  and  non-PIPOs  sub  sample  280 
Table  6.3.  IPO  performance  of  survivors  and  non-survivors  sub-  281 
sample 
Table  6.4.  Performances  of  full  sample  by  year  283 
Table  6.5.  Correlation  matrix  for  the  IPO  long  run  performance  287 
models 
Table  6.6.  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  on  290 
the  prospectus  information  (Model  I) Table  6.7  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  on  302 
the  prospectus  information  and  privatisation  dummy 
(Model  II) 
Table  6.8.  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  on  305 
the  prospectus  information,  privatisation  dummy, 
valuation  residuals,  and  initial  returns  (Model  III) 
Table  6.9.  The  BHARs  averages  on  the  IR  distribution  306 
Table  6.10  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  on  310 
the  prospectus  information  (Model  I)  for  non-PIPOs  sub- 
sample 
Table  6.11  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  on  311 
the  prospectus  information,  valuation  residuals,  and 
initial  returns  (Model  III)  for  non-PIPOs  sub-sample 
Table  6.12  Robust  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long  run  313 
performance  on  the  prospectus  information  (Model  I) 
Table  6.13  Robust  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long  run  314 
performance  on  the  prospectus  information  and 
privatisation  dummy  (Model  II) 
Table  6.14  Robust  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long  run  315 
performance  on  the  prospectus  information,  privatisation 
dummy,  valuation  residuals,  and  initial  returns  (Model 
III) 
Table  A.  6.1  The  reason  for  non-survivor  IPOs  322 
Table  A.  6.2a  Performance  of  non-privatisation  sub-sample  by  year  323 
Table  A.  6.2b  Performance  of  survivor  sub-sample  by  year  323 
Table  A.  6.3  Correlation  matrix  for  non-PIPOs  sub-sample  326 
Table  A.  6.4  Summary  of  long  run  performance  analysis  hypothesis  327 
testing Chapter  1 Chapter  1 
Introduction 
Introduction 
Selling  stock  to  the  general  public  is  one  important  method  by  which  firms 
are  able  to  raise  new  equity  capital.  If  the  firm  sells  stock  for  the  first  time  to  the 
general  public,  it  is  called  an  initial  public  offering  (IPO).  Subsequent  to  the  IPO, 
firms  may  seek  to  raise  further  equity  capital  by  offering  to  sell  new  shares 
through  a  seasoned  equity  offering  (SEO). 
In  the  UK,  most  young/small  firms  initially  raise  equity  capital  from  a 
small  number  of  investors  through  private  placements.  If  a  firm  prospers  and 
needs  additional  equity  capital,  it  may  choose  at  some  point  to  go  public  by  selling 
stock  through  an  IPO.  By  issuing  publicly  traded  equity,  the  firm  establishes  both 
a  market  value  for  the  firm  and  a  market  for  its  common  stock. 
There  have  been  many  IPO  studies  that  record  the  so-called  "Underpricing 
anomaly"  as  a  primary  stylised  fact  of  IPOs.  The  underpricing  refers  to  the 
significance  increase  of  the  IPO  market  price  over  the  first  few  days  after  the 
initial  listing.  This  fact  suggests  that  the  IPO  pricing  is  not  simple  very  few 
information  about  the  issuing  firm  is  available  to  the  market  prior  to  IPO.  This 
study  is  to  examine  the  IPO  valuation  based  on  the  prospectus  information,  which 
is  perceived  as  comprehensive  information  about  the  firm  prior  to  the  IPOs. 
Furthermore,  this  study  is  also  to  observe  the  impact  of  the  prospectus  information 
on  the  IPO  after  market  performances. 
This  chapter  introduces  the  background  and  the  motivation  behind  the 
study,  the  research  questions,  and  the  organisation  of  the  thesis. 1.1.  IPO  Anomalies 
Many  studies  have  documented  apparent  anomalies  in  the  pricing  of  initial 
public  offerings  (IPOs).  Several  academic  hypotheses  have  been  posited  to 
explain  these  anomalies.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  so-called  `Underpricing 
phenomenon'  was  the  first  and  most  researched  IPO  anomaly  found  by  scholars. 
The  underpricing  phenomenon  refers  to  the  statistically  and  economically 
significant  positive  initial  returns  characteristic  of  IPOs  over  the  first  few  days 
after  the  initial  listing  of  the  shares.  Given  the  large  degree  of  uncertainty 
regarding  the  true  value  of  the  newly  listed  shares,  some  significant  degree  of 
mispricing  is  to  be  expected.  However,  the  typically  large  price  increases  of  IPO 
shares  in  the  immediate  post-listing  period  suggest  that  IPOs  are  systematically 
underpriced.  Underpricing  was  first  documented  in  the  late  1960s  in  the  US 
market  (Reilly  and  Hatfield,  1969).  These  authors  found  that  from  53  sample 
firms  that  went  public  in  1963-1965,  the  initial  (first-day)  return  ranged  from  18.3 
to  20.2%.  Eventually,  other  researchers  also  discovered  much  the  same 
underpricing  phenomenon  in  other  countries.  Jenkinson  and  Ljungqvist  (1996) 
summarise  the  evidence  of  IPO  underpricing  in  a  large  number  of  countries.  (see 
table  1.1).  In  this  study,  the  underpricing  issue  is  addressed  later  in  the  Initial 
returns  analysis  chapter  (Chapter  5).  It  discusses  the  impact  of  the  IPO  valuation 
(Chapter  4)  on  the  underpricing. 
The  second  anomaly  is  the  long-run  underperformance  of  IPO  shares.  This 
phenomenon  was  first  documented  by  Aggarwal  and  Rivoli  (1990)  who  found 
evidence  of  substantial  negative  abnormal  returns  over  longer  time  horizons.  By 
examining  the  IPO  prices  after  the  first  250  trading  days,  they  find  that  on 
2 Table  1.1.  Comparative  evidence  of  IPO  underpricing 
Country  Study  Sample  Period  Initial  Return 
(%) 
USA'  Ibbotson  et  al  (1994)  1960-1992  15.3 
UK2  Jenkinson  and  Mayer  (1988)  1983-1986  10.7 
Australia  Lee  et  al.  (1994)  1976-1989  11.9 
Canada  Manigart  &  Rogiers  (1992)  1984-1990  13.7 
Finland  Keloharju  (1993)  1984-1992  14.4 
Germany  Ljungqvist  (1996)  1970-1993  9.2 
Japan  Kaneko  and  Pettway  (1994)  1989-1993  12.0 
Sweden  Rydqvist  (1993)  1970-1991  39.0 
Brazil  Aggarwal  et  al  (1993)  1979-1990  78.5 
Hongkong  McGuiness  (1992)  1980-1990  17.6 
Malaysia  Dawson  (1987)  1978-1983  166.6 
Singapore  Koh  and  Walter  (1989)  1973-1987  27.0 
Source:  Jenkinson  and  Ljungqvist  (2001) 
average,  IPO  prices  underperform  the  market  index  by  13.73%.  It  means  that 
investors  who  purchase  IPOs  on  the  first  trading  day  and  hold  them  for  a  period  of 
250  trading  days  would  have  underperformed  the  market  by  13.73%.  Like 
underpricing,  the  IPO  long  run  underperformance  also  exists  in  other  markets. 
Levis  (1993)  claims  that  in  the  UK,  on  average,  IPOs  underperform  the  market  by 
-8%  to  -23%  on  their  3`d  anniversaries,  depending  on  the  benchmark  used.  Unlike 
the  persistence  of  the  underpricing  anomaly,  the  evidence  for  the  long  run 
underperformance  is  mixed  (see  table  1.2).  There  have  been  several  theoretical 
explanations  to  account  for  this  anomaly,  which  later  are  reviewed  in  the 
Literature  review  (Chapter  2). 
1  Ritter  and  Welch  (2002)  note  that  during  the  period  1999-2000,  the  underpricing  level  was  as 
high  as  65.0%  on  average,  as  a  result  of  Internet  stock  IPOs. 
2  In  2000,  on  average,  the  level  of  underpricing  in  UK  markets  (Main,  Techmark,  and  AIM)  was 
60.1%  (Levis,  2001) 
3 Table  1.2.  Comparative  evidence  of  IPO  long  run  performance 
Country  Study  Sample  period  IPO  long-run 
abnormal  returns 
(%) 
Australia"  Lee  et  al  (1996)  1976-1989  -51 
Brazil21  Aggarwal  (1994)  1980-1990  -47.0 
Chile2'  Aggarwal  (1993)  1982-1990  -23.7 
Finland2'  Keloharju  (1993)  1984-1989  -26.4 
Germane'  Loughran  &  Ljunqvist  (1994)  1974-1989  -12.8 
Sweden  Loughran  &  Ljunqvist  (1994)  1980-1990  +1.2 
Tunisia2'  Ben  Naceur  (2000)  1992-1997  +5.7 
UKZ'  Levis  (1993)  1980-1988  -8.1 
US"  Loughran  &  Ritter  (1995)  1970-1990  -17.1 
Note:  "Source:  Ibbotson  &  Ritter  (1995) 
21Source:  the  corresponding  studies 
Similar  to  the  underpricing,  this  study  also  presents  and  discusses  the  IPO 
long-run  performance  of  the  research  sample  in  the  IPO  long  run  performance 
analysis  (Chapter  6).  In  particular,  this  study  tries  to  examine  the  impact  of  the 
prospectus  information  on  the  IPO  long-run  performance.  The  results  are  expected 
to  provide  additional  information  and  evidence,  such  as  the  impact  of  the  earnings 
forecast  on  the  IPO  performances,  to  what  is  already  included  in  the  existing 
literature. 
The  third  anomaly  is  the  hot/cold  market.  This  phenomenon  was  first 
documented  in  the  US  by  Ibbotson  and  Jaffe  (1975).  According  to  the  efficient 
market  hypothesis,  the  timing  of  a  financing  decision  should  not  matter  since  any 
offering  will  be  fairly  priced.  This  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  IPOs  occur 
randomly  over  time.  However,  evidence  shows  that  there  are  sustained  periods 
when  the  number  of  offerings  is  so  immense  and  the  volume  of  trading  is  very 
heavy.  These  periods  are  called  `hot  issue'  markets.  On  the  other  hand,  evidence 
also  records  the  periods  when  only  very  few  firms  go  public  and  the  volume  of 
trading  is  small.  These  periods  are  called  `cold  issue'  markets.  Although  this 
4 phenomenon  is  very  interesting,  very  few  explanations  have  been  suggested.  This 
study  does  not  intend  to  examine  the  hot/cold  IPO  market;  however,  a  brief 
discussion  about  the  states  of  the  UK  market  during  the  research  period  is 
provided  and  this  discussion  will  include  consideration  of  the  hot/cold 
phenomenon. 
While  the  evidence  for  the  second  and  third  anomalies  (the  long-run 
underperformance  and  hot  market)  is  mixed,  scholars  have  observed  the 
persistence  of  the  underpricing.  Ritter  and  Welch  (2002)  indeed  argue  that  the 
explanations  behind  the  IPO  anomalies  lie  between  the  offering  day  and  the  first- 
trading  day.  Some  studies  even  suggest  that  the  IPO  long-run  underperformance  is 
a  mean  reversion  of  the  underpricing  (e.  g.,  Ritter,  1991).  Other  studies  also 
examine  the  relationship  between  the  hot  market  and  the  underpricing  and  find 
that  there  is  a  significant  difference  in  the  degree  of  underpricing  between  the 
`hot'  and  the  `cold'  period  in  the  market  (e.  g.,  Ibbotson  and  Jaffe,  1975). 
Therefore,  it  is  sensible  to  draw  the  focus  of  the  research  to  the  IPO  pricing 
process  among  the  market  participants  (issuers,  sponsors,  and  the  investors).  This 
issue  would  be  the  main  objective  here. 
This  study  focuses  on  the  pricing  of  the  IPOs  in  the  UK  main  market,  on 
both  the  issuers/sponsor  level  and  the  market  level.  It  is  argued  that  the  IPO 
prospectus  information,  to  some  degree,  has  considerable  explanatory  power  to 
the  IPO  pricing.  This  study  will  contribute  to  the  knowledge  of  the  usefulness  of 
the  prospectus  information  to  price  the  IPOs.  Later  in  the  research  design,  it  is 
argued  that  the  determining  factors  affecting  both  levels  of  IPO  prices  may 
explain  the  underpricing  as  well  as  the  long-run  performance  facts.  Therefore,  this 
5 study  also  may  contribute  to  the  knowledge  of  the  impact  of  the  prospectus 
information  on  the  IPO  after  market  performance. 
1.2.  The  IPO  pricing  process 
As  mentioned  above,  going  public  is  a  very  important  stage  of  the  life 
cycle  of  a  firm.  After  deciding  to  list  its  shares  on  the  stock  exchange,  a  firm 
should  follow  a  two-stage  admission  process  applied  to  any  firm  that  want  to  be 
listed  in  the  London  Stock  Exchange  (LSE).  In  the  first  stage,  companies  need  to 
apply  to  the  UK  listing  Authority  (UKLA)  for  the  security  to  be  approved  by 
being  admitted  to  the  UK  Authority's  Official  List  (the  UKLA's  list  of  approved 
companies).  Then,  they  also  need  to  apply  to  the  Exchange  to  be  admitted  for 
trading.  The  UKLA  has  set  a  number  of  basic  requirements  that  must  be  met 
before  listing  can  be  granted  and  the  exchange  can  admit  the  shares  to  trading. 
The  requirements  include  the  sponsor,  trading  records,  minimum  shares  in  public 
hands,  the  controlling  shareholders,  the  prospectus,  and  the  continuing 
obligations. 
The  estimated  timetable  for  a  firm  and  its  sponsors  to  the  admission  day  is 
shown  on  the  following  table  (Table  1.3).  The  table  shows  that  the  issuers  and  the 
sponsors  spend  some  considerable  time  to  set,  review,  and  finalise  the  offer  price 
and  the  prospectus.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  examine  the  IPO  pricing  process 
and  how  the  issuers  and  the  sponsors  use  the  prospectus  for  their  benefit. 
6 Tables  1.3  Time  table  for  the  issuers  and  sponsors  to  the  admission  week 
Weeks  to  the 
admission  week 
Events  Firms  Sponsors 
Appoint  advisers  ￿  ￿ 
12-24  weeks  Instruct  all  advisers  ￿  ￿ 
Agree  timetable  -  ￿ 
Produce  draft  prospectus  ￿  ￿ 
Produce  other  documents  in  first  draft  -  ￿ 
Initial  review  of  pricing  issues  ￿  ￿ 
Hold  first  draft  meetings  ￿  ￿ 
6-12  weeks 
Submit  draft  documents  to  the  UKLA  -  ￿ 
Hold  initial  meeting  with  the  Exchange  ￿  ￿ 
Review  PR  presentations  ￿  ￿ 
Host  analyst  presentations  ￿  ￿ 
Continue  draft  meetings  ￿  ￿ 
Carry  out  due  diligence  ￿  ￿ 
1-6  weeks  Hold  PR  meetings  and  roadshows  ￿  ￿ 
Submit  documents  to  the  UKLA  -  ￿ 
Bulk  print  pathfinder  prospectus  -  ￿ 
Approval  all  documents  by  the  UKLA  ￿  ￿ 
Pricing  and  allocation  of  the  offer  ￿  ￿ 
1  week  Register  prospectus  -  ￿ 
Sign  subscription  agreement  ￿  ￿ 
Bulk  print  final  prospectus  -  ￿ 
Make  the  formal  application  for  listing 
and  admission  to  trading  -  ￿ 
ission  week  Ad 
Pay  UKLA  and  Exchange  fees  ￿  ￿ 
m 
Listing  and  admission  to  trading  granted  The  UKLA  & 
Trading  begins  Exhange 
Source:  A  practical  guide  to  listing  (LJL,  2UU3) According  to  the  UKLA  (2003),  the  IPOs  could  be  offered  at  a  fixed  price 
or  tender,  depending  on  the  flotation  methods  used.  There  are  three  methods  of 
flotation;  public  offer,  placing,  and  introduction3  In  a  public  offer,  the  adviser 
offers  the  company's  shares  to  private  and/or  institutional  investors  and  usually 
arranges  for  the  offer  to  be  underwritten.  It  is  normally  the  most  expensive  route 
to  market,  often  used  by  larger  companies  or  those  looking  to  raise  substantial 
amounts  of  capital.  A  placing  usually  involves  the  offering  company's  shares  to  a 
selected  base  of  institutional  investors.  This  allows  the  firms  to  raise  capital  with 
lower  costs  and  greater  freedom  and  it  gives  the  firms  more  discretion  to  choose 
its  investors  (UKLA,  2003).  The  result,  however,  is  a  narrower  shareholder  base 
and  consequently  there  may  be  lower  liquidity  in  the  shares  once  a  firm  has  been 
admitted  to  the  markets.  In  an  introduction,  the  least  expensive  and  easiest  of  the 
three  methods,  the  company  joins  our  markets  without  raising  any  capital.  In 
general  a  company  can  do  this  if  over  25%  of  its  shares  are  already  in  public 
hands  and  there  is  a  fair  spread  of  shareholders.  An  introduction  involves  no 
underwriting  fees  and  little  requirement  for  advertising;  the  opportunities  for 
boosting  the  company's  profile  and  visibility  are,  however,  more  limited.  Since 
this  study  attempts  to  examine  the  IPO  pricing,  which  lead  to  the  IPO  anomalies, 
this  flotation  method  is  considered  not  to  be  suitable  for  this  study.  Therefore, 
IPOs  that  flotate  with  this  method  are  excluded  from  the  research  sample. 
In  conjunction  to  the  IPO  pricing,  in  public  offer  IPOs,  the  shares  could  be 
offered  at  fixed  price  and/or  tender.  In  a  fixed  price  offer,  the  sponsor  (and  the 
3  Under  the  previous  listing  rules,  the  methods  of  flotation  for  equities  are  offer  for  sale,  offer  for 
subscription,  placing,  and  introduction.  The  public  offer  method  includes  the  offer  for  sale  and 
offer  for  subscription  methods  (FSA,  2002) 
8 issuer)  fixes  the  offer  price  about  a  week  before  the  admission  date  and  undertakes 
the  distribution  of  the  shares  at  this  price.  In  a  tender  offer,  the  offer  price  is  set  in 
a  certain  range  and  investors  are  invited  to  bid4.  Except  in  privatisations,  most 
public  offer  IPOs  in  the  UK  market  use  the  fixed  price  method.  In  that  case, 
applications  for  the  public  offer  are  invited  from  the  public;  the  issue  is  also  sub- 
underwritten,  at  the  same  price,  by  a  group  of  financial  institutions.  The  IPOs 
brought  to  market  by  the  placing  method  are  usually  offered  at  a  fixed  price.  The 
sponsor  underwrites  the  entire  issue  for  a  short  period  and  distributes  them  to 
specified  persons  or  its  clients.  Although  it  has  not  yet  been  a  popular  method  in 
the  UK,  there  is  an  increasing  trend  to  use  the  book-building  approach.  This 
approach  is  used  extensively  for  IPOs  in  a  number  of  markets,  such  as  the  US 
markets.  Basically,  the  IPO  final  offer  price  is  set  up  after  examining  the  market 
demand  during  the  `roadshow'  period.  This  study  includes  the  IPOs  that  are 
brought  to  the  market  by  this  method. 
Although  the  IPO  offer  price  categorisation  is  clearly  described,  the  setting 
of  the  initial  IPO  offer  price  has  been  a  challenging  intersection  between  valuation 
theory  and  practise.  While  classic  Finance  theory  suggests  the  use  of  discounted 
cash  flow  (DCF)  as  the  conceptual  foundation  of  valuation  (see  Brealey  and 
Myers,  2002),  McCarthy  (1999)  argues  that  the  most  common  IPO  pricing  method 
used  by  issuers  and  sponsors  is  the  comparable  firm  multiples  methods. 
Additionally,  Kim  and  Ritter  (1999)  find  that  estimating  future  cash  flows  and 
discount  rates  for  IPOs  are  imprecise,  suggesting  that  the  DCF  method  appears  to 
be  used  very  little  by  the  practitioners.  This  study  particularly  employs  the 
°  The  privatisation  of  British  Airports  Authority  (BAA)  in  1987  was  split  into  two  categories  with 
regard  to  pricing:  (1)  75%  of  the  equity  was  offered  at  fixed  price  and  (2)  25%  of  the  equity  was  a 
tender  offer  to  institutional  investors. 
9 accounting-based  valuation  model.  This  model  is  widely  used  in  the  non-IPO 
cases  (e.  g.,  Easton  and  Harris,  1991,  Rees,  1999,  Francis  et  al.,  1999)  to 
investigate  the  value  relevance  of  the  accounting  numbers.  The  evidence  shows 
that  the  accounting-based  valuation  model  works  very  well.  To  the  researcher's 
knowledge,  very  few  IPO  studies  use  the  accounting-based  valuation  model.  Kim 
and  Ritter  (1999)  indeed  mention  the  Ohlson's  model;  yet,  they  do  not  use  it  as  the 
research  model.  Keasey  and  McGuiness  (1992)  examine  the  usefulness  of  the 
forecasted  earnings  disclosed  in  the  prospectus;  however,  they  do  not  include 
other  fundamental  variables,  such  as  book  value  of  equity  and  dividend.  This 
study  develops  the  research  models  based  on  the  accounting-based  valuation 
model,  which  includes  the  important  firm  fundamentals,  such  as  earnings,  book 
value  of  equity,  and  dividend. 
Since  the  IPO  could  be  priced  with  any  method,  the  circumstance  is  even 
more  difficult  for  the  investors  to  value  the  offer.  Assuming  that  the  issuing  firms 
and  their  sponsors  know  better  about  the  firm's  value,  the  UKLA  requires  the 
firms  to  publish  the  prospectus,  which  complies  with  the  Listing  Rules. 
1.3.  The  offering  prospectus 
The  UKLA  expects  that  the  prospectus  provides  potential  investors  with 
the  information  they  need  to  make  an  informed  decision  on  the  firm  and  its  shares. 
Besides  the  information  of  the  offer,  the  prospectus  should  also  cover  general 
information  of  the  firms  and  the  audited  financial  statements  for  minimum  the  last 
3  years  audit.  It  is  expected  that  such  information  could  be  used  to  estimate  the 
firm's  value  on  the  date  of  the  IPO.  However,  the  issuers  and  sponsors  could  also 
10 exploit  the  prospectus  as  a  media  to  signal  important  insider  information.  Having 
assumed  that  the  firm  and  its  sponsor  have  better  knowledge  of  the  firm's  value 
than  other  market  participants,  the  IPO  signalling  theory  argues  that  the  good 
firms  use  some  variables  to  signal  the  value  and  the  prospectus  is  a  very  good 
media  to  send  the  signals. 
The  information  of  the  offer  includes  the  advisers  (sponsor,  brokers, 
auditor,  and  PR),  the  offer  price,  the  number  of  shares  sold  at  the  IPO  and  the 
percentage  to  the  enlarged  total  shares,  the  use  of  the  proceeds,  and  the 
management  forecasts.  Such  information  is  very  important  to  the  investors  as  well 
as  the  issuers.  Since  prior  studies  shows  the  effectiveness  of  the  agent  reputation 
to  the  IPO  valuation  (e.  g.,  Byrne  and  Rees,  1996),  disclosing  the  group  of  the 
adviser  is  a  way  chosen  by  the  firms  to  signal  their  value.  The  other  thing  is  the 
voluntary  disclosure  of  the  management  forecasts.  The  rational  of  disclosing  such 
information  is  that  the  firms  try  to  persuade  investors  to  value  the  IPO  as  a  firm 
after  the  IPO  (with  proceeds  as  additional  fund  to  the  firms).  Therefore,  variables 
such  as  pro-forma  book  value  of  equity  and  the  earnings  forecasts  have  been 
widely  used  in  the  IPO  prospectus.  However,  this  kind  of  practice  is  prohibited  in 
the  tighter  legal  environment  market,  such  as  in  the  US. 
The  other  information  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  is  the  nature  and 
organisation  of  the  business.  It  is  important  for  the  investors  to  know  the  nature  of 
the  business  of  the  issuing  firms.  Therefore  in  the  US  market,  the  Securities  and 
Exchange  Committee  (SEC)  requires  the  issuing  firms  to  disclose  the  business 
risk  statement  in  the  prospectus.  This  is  aimed  to  inform  the  investors  thoroughly 
about  the  natural  business  risk  faced  by  the  firms  that  could  affect  the  post-IPO 
11 firm's  performance.  Furthermore,  in  practice,  the  issuing  firms  even  highlight  the 
high  business  risk  by  using  the  bold  type  face  of  the  statement  (Klein,  1996)). 
Prior  studies  also  show  that  the  share  performance  varies  across  different 
industries,  hence  knowing  the  business  of  the  firms  enables  investors  to  value  the 
IPO  better. 
The  third  part  of  the  prospectus  is  the  firm's  financial  statement  for  the  last 
3  years.  Although  some  studies  in  non-IPO  shares  find  that  the  historic  accounting 
information  has  little  explanatory  power  to  the  shares  performance,  Klein  (1996) 
finds  that  such  information  could  be  used  to  price  the  IPOs.  Moreover,  the 
financial  statements  could  provide  the  accounting-based  risk  assessment. 
Bildersee  (1970)  argues  that  the  accounting  data  can  be  considered  as  a  summary 
of  all  company  events  and  decisions.  So,  it  summarises,  in  some  form,  information 
basic  to  the  measurement  of  total  risk  associated  with  the  firm  and  with  the 
securities  supporting  firm. 
The  data  of  this  study  relies  heavily  on  the  information  disclosed  in  the 
offering  prospectus.  A  number  of  variables  are  chosen  as  proxies  to  the  prospectus 
information.  Furthermore,  the  information  is  categorised  into  fundamentals,  ex- 
ante  risk  factors,  and  signals.  The  fundamentals,  here,  is  defined  as  the  accounting 
fundamentals,  such  as  earnings  and  book  value  of  equity.  In  most  UK  IPO 
prospectuses,  the  issuers/sponsors  try  to  draw  the  potential  investors'  attention  to 
the  future  accounting  fundamentals.  This  is  demonstrated  by  highlighting  the 
information  regarding  the  earnings  forecasts  and  the  pro-forma  book  value  of 
equity  in  the  offering  information,  which  is  presented  on  the  very  first  page  of  the 
12 prospectus.  Therefore,  in  particular,  this  study  investigates  the  impact  of  the 
accounting  fundamentals  on  the  IPO  pricing. 
The  next  prospectus  information  category  is  the  ex-ante  risk  factors.  There 
have  been  a  number  of  business  risk  models  developed  by  academics  and 
practitioners.  Arthur  Andersen  developed  the  so-called  `Arthur  Andersen  Business 
Risk  Model'  (AABRM)  in  1997.  The  model  is  usually  used  to  assess  the  business 
risks of  their  clients.  ICAEW  (1998)  used  the  AABRM  as  a  framework  for  their 
research  on  financial  reporting  of  risk  of  the  newly  listed  firms,  in  which  they  try 
to  assess  the  business  risks  of  the  firms  through  their  IPO  prospectuses.  The 
AABRM  includes  55  risk  factors.  However  after  a  systematic  content  analysis 
through  the  IPO  prospectuses  of  the  sample  for  this  study,  only  5  risk  factors  that 
are  consistently  reported  in  the  documents.  Therefore,  since  only  5  out  of  55  risk 
factors  identified  in  the  AABRM  are  employed  in  this  study,  it  does  not  claim  the 
AABRM  framework  is  used,  although,  the  terms  and  definitions  of  the  risk  factors 
used  here  are  adopted  from  the  AABRM.  The  literature  review  chapter  presents  a 
discussion  on  the  risk  concept  and  measures,  on  which  this  study  tries  to  develop 
the  proxies  to  the  risk  factors  used,  as  defined  in  the  AABRM. 
The  other  prospectus  information  examined  in  this  study  is  the  signals. 
Potentially,  the  issuers/sponsors  value  the  signals  as  importantly  as  the  accounting 
fundamentals,  since  they  place  the  signal  information,  such  as  the  sponsor  name, 
and  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  in  the  first  section  of  the  prospectus. 
13 1.4  The  scope  of  research 
Having  highlighted  the  persistence  of  the  underpricing  fact  in  the  IPO 
market,  this  study  focuses  on  the  IPO  valuation.  It  could  be  argued  that  the 
underpricing  phenomenon  is  a  result  of  the  decisions  made  by  the  market 
participants  during  the  period  between  the  admission  day  and  the  first  trading  day. 
Ritter  and  Welch  (2002)  also  encourage  other  scholars  to  focus  on  the  IPO  early 
pricing,  as  they  argue  the  IPO  anomalies  are  the  result  of  events  between  the  day  0 
and  day  1.  The  IPO  pricing  process  has  been  examined  in  section  1.2  above  and 
also  the  role  of  prospectus  as  the  investors'  main  source  of  the  firm's  information 
prior  to  the  IPO. 
Klein  (1996)  examines  the  importance  of  the  prospectus  to  price  the  IPOs. 
She  finds  that  accounting  information,  such  as  the  earnings,  is  strongly  related  to 
both  the  offer  price  and  the  first-day  market  price.  However,  Kim  and  Ritter 
(1999)  do  not  find  a  similar  result;  instead  they  find  that  the  future  earnings 
figures  explain  more  of  the  variations  in  the  IPO  prices  than  the  historical  figures. 
Using  the  data  from  thinner  markets  (Singapore  and  Korea),  Firth  et  al.  (1995) 
and  Firth  (1998)  find  a  robust  relationship  between  the  management  earnings 
forecasts  and  the  IPO  valuation. 
Keasey  and  McGuiness  (1991)  examine  the  relationship  between  the 
management  earnings  forecasts  in  the  prospectus  and  the  pricing  of  IPOs  in  the 
USM.  They  find  that  the  prospectus  earnings  forecasts  are  significantly  more 
accurate  than  time-series  forecasts.  Additionally,  they  find  a  positive  association 
between  the  information  content  of  the  earnings  forecasts  to  the  IPO  market  price, 
although  no  significant  relationship  is  found  to  the  offer  price. 
14 Having  examined  the  IPO  prospectus  in  the  UK  main  market,  it  could  be 
argued  that  the  issuers  and  their  sponsors  have  a  tendency  to  disclose  and 
emphasize  the  fundamental  accounting  information,  such  as  the  management 
earnings  forecasts,  the  pro-forma  book  value  of  equity,  and  the  dividend  forecasts 
in  the  prospectus.  Therefore,  this  study  attempts  to  analyse  the  role  of  the 
fundamental  information  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  in  the  IPO  valuation  (Chapter 
4). 
Prior  studies  also  show  that  the  IPO  underpricing  is  positively  related  to 
uncertainty.  However,  the  measure  of  uncertainty  itself  has  been  a  long-standing 
debate  in  the  research  area.  Most  IPO  studies  examining  the  uncertainty  employ 
an  ex-post  measure,  such  as  the  variance  of  the  IPO  market  prices  for  the  first  5 
days  (Beatty  and  Ritter,  1986).  Very  few  studies  employ  ex-ante  measures,  such 
as  the  business  risk  (Klein,  1996).  This  study  tries  to  propose  new  measures  for 
the  ex-ante  uncertainty  by  employing  accounting-based  risk  measures.  Beaver  et 
al.  (1970)  argue  that  the  accounting  measures  are  used  widely  by  investors  as 
proxies  for  company  risk.  Thus,  accounting  measures  reflect  both  the  systematic 
and  unsystematic  risk.  By  combining  the  offer  information  and  the  historical 
financial  statement  data  in  the  prospectus,  this  study  develops  a  number  of  risk 
factors,  which  could  be  used  as  proxies  for  company  risk. 
Other  important  information  in  the  prospectus  is  the  signals,  which  are 
defined  as  the  firm's  decision  as  to  its  advisers,  the  time  for  when  to  go  public, 
and  the  ownership  structure.  The  relationship  between  the  signals  and  the  IPO 
valuation  and  performance  has  been  examined  by  other  scholars,  as  discussed  later 
in  the  Literature  review  chapter.  The  results  vary  across  the  markets,  time  periods, 
15 and  the  proxies  used.  This  study  includes  those  variables  in  the  assessment  of  the 
IPO  valuation. 
The  IPO  valuation  is  defined  as  the  IPO  pricing  at  the  firm  and  market 
level.  First,  this  study  investigates  the  valuation  of  the  IPO  offer  price.  Very  few 
IPO  studies  have  examined  the  offer  price  valuation  (Klein,  1996;  Beatty  et  al., 
2002).  To  my  knowledge,  none  has  been  done  using  the  UK  market.  Hence,  this  is 
one  of  the  study's  contributions  to  the  research  area.  Most  IPO  valuation  studies 
try  to  analyse  the  determining  factors  of  the  initial  market  price.  This  study  also 
examines  the  valuation  of  the  initial  market  price.  By  doing  so,  it  is  expected  the 
results  may  highlight  the  different  explanatory  power  of  prospectus  information,  if 
any,  on  both  prices  (the  offer  and  initial  market  prices).  Then,  any  different 
behaviour  of  any  prospectus  information  may  explain  the  `mispricing'  of  IPO, 
which  is  commonly  known  as  the  underpricing 
Prior  studies  in  the  UK  have  found  evidence  of  the  long  run 
underperformance  following  IPOs.  This  study  extends  the  analysis  by 
investigating  the  impact  of  the  prospectus  information  to  the  IPO  performance  in 
the  long  run.  In  doing  so,  the  analysis  also  attempts  to  examine  whether  the  IPO 
`mispricing'  in  the  early  days  of  trading  affect  the  IPO  long-run  performance. 
1.5.  Research  methodology  and  method 
This  study  consists  of  three  empirical  studies  that  are  categorised  in  the 
positivist  methodology.  The  simplification  process  is  used  by  developing  two 
main  empirical  models;  the  IPO  valuation  model  and  the  IPO  performance  model. 
The  IPO  valuation  model  adopts  the  accounting-valuation  model  as  the  basic 
16 theoretical  model.  This  comes  as  another  contribution  of  the  study.  To  the 
researcher's  knowledge,  no  prior  IPO  valuation  study  has  used  the  accounting- 
based  valuation  model.  The  model  has  been  widely  used  for  seasoned  and  found 
to  work  very  well.  Therefore,  this  study  is  a  test  of  the  model  of  whether  it 
performs  well  with  the  IPO  sample.  Then,  the  model  is  developed  to  several 
empirical  models  by  including  other  prospectus  information,  such  as  the  risk 
factors  and  signals.  The  IPO  performance  model  is  the  OLS  regression  model  that 
is  modified  into  a  number  of  operating  models. 
The  sample  of  161  IPOs  is  taken  from  the  UK  main  market  during  period 
1987-1997.  The  sample  is  the  IPO  that  are  brought  to  market  by  public  offer  and 
(or)  placing  methods.  The  information  of  fundamentals,  risk  factors,  and  signals 
are  drawn  from  the  IPO  prospectus. 
1.6  Research  questions  and  hypotheses 
This  study  examines  the  IPO  valuation  and  performance  in  the  UK  main 
market  during  the  1987-1997  period.  It  is  argued  that  at  the  admission  day  (To)  the 
issuers/sponsors  set  up  the  IPO  offer  price  based,  partially,  on  the  prospectus 
information  (fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals).  Then,  it  is  also 
observed  whether  the  `initial'  investors/brokers  use  the  prospectus  information  to 
value  the  IPO  on  the  first  trading  day  (T1).  This  objective  leads  to  the  first 
research  question:  Is  the  prospectus  information  useful  to  price  the  IPOs? 
Then  this  study  investigates  whether  the  `mispricing'  is  identified  on  Ti.  If 
there  is  any  mispricing,  a  further  examination  is  carried  out  to  observe  whether  it 
is  due  to  the  different  perception  towards  the  prospectus  information  or  to  the 
17 unobservable  factor,  which  is  defined  as  the  error  terms  of  the  IPO  valuation  at  To. 
This  argument  leads  to  the  second  research  questions:  Does  the  prospectus 
information  have  a  predictive  power  towards  the  IPO  short  run  performance? 
Based  on  the  IPO  literature,  which  finds  the  persistence  of  the 
underpricing,  this  study  also  argues  that  if  the  issuers/sponsors  underprice  the 
IPOs  relatively  to  the  accounting  fundamental,  the  greater  the  valuation  residuals, 
the  lower  the  initial  returns5.  Therefore  it  is  hypothesised  that  the  initial  returns  is 
negatively  related  to  the  valuation  residuals. 
Prior  studies  also  provide  evidence  of  the  IPO  underperformance  in  the 
long  run,  which  is  also  examined  in  this  study.  It  is  expected  that  the  prospectus 
information  has  limited  impact  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance  since  other 
information  is  available  in  the  market  to  price  the  IPOs.  The  IPO  long  run 
performance,  here,  is  defined  as  the  abnormal  returns  for  the  investors,  who  buy 
the  IPOs  at  day  2  and  hold  them  up  to  the  15`,  2nd,  and  3rd  listing  anniversary.  This 
argument  leads  to  the  third  research  question:  Does  the  prospectus  information 
still  have  any  impact  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance? 
Many  IPO  studies  find  that  the  IPOs,  which  are  less  underpriced,  perform 
better  in  the  long  run.  This  suggests  that  in  the  long  run,  the  market  correct  any 
mispricing  identified  in  the  short  run.  This  study  posits  the  similar  hypothesis, 
which  expects  a  negative  association  between  the  initial  returns  and  the  long  run 
abnormal  returns. 
5  Valuation  residual  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  actual  offer  price  and  the  model 
predicted  offer  price.  The  initial  returns  is  defined  as  the  percentage  of  the  price  changes  from  the 
offer  price  to  the  initial  market  price  on  the  close  of  the  first  trading  day. 
18 A  number  of  IPO  studies  attempt  to  examine  the  relationship  between  the 
IPO  valuation  and  the  underpricing  phenomenon  (Welch,  1989;  Klein,  1996; 
Byrne  and  Rees,  1996,  Beatty  et  al.,  2002).  Other  studies  try  to  investigate  the 
IPO  underpricing  and  the  long  run  performance  (Ritter,  1991;  Levis,  1993).  This 
study  analyses  the  three  different  aspects  of  IPO  valuation:  the  initial  valuation, 
the  underpricing,  and  the  long  run  performance,  which  comes  as  a  unique 
contribution  of  this  study. 
A  summary  of  the  research  main  hypotheses  and  the  research  method  used 
is  presented  in  a  diagram  in  Figure  1.1  below. 
1.7.  Organisation  of  the  thesis 
The  rest  of  the  thesis  is  organised  as  follows.  The  next  chapter  is  the 
literature  review.  The  chapter  critically  reviews  the  influential  papers  on  the  IPO 
studies,  particularly  for  the  IPO  valuation  and  performance.  It  also  discusses  a 
number  of  leading  papers  on  the  accounting-based  risk  measures. 
The  literature  review  is  followed  by  the  research  design  chapter,  which 
describes  how  this  study  is  carried  out.  First,  it  introduces  the  theoretical  models 
and  is  followed  by  the  empirical  models  used  in  this  study.  This  is  followed  by  a 
discussion  of  the  working  hypotheses  development.  After  that,  the  research 
sample  derivation  is  explained.  Finally,  the  chapter  is  closed  by  a  brief 
presentation  of  the  UK  institutional  framework. 
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N The  next  three  chapters  provide  a  discussion  of  the  empirical  results.  The 
first  empirical  chapter  presents  the  analysis  of  the  IPO  valuation.  Firstly,  it 
discusses  the  descriptive  statistics  of  all  variables  employed  in  the  valuation 
model.  It  continues  with  a  discussion  of  the  empirical  results  of  the  IPO  valuation 
models.  It  also  includes  a  section  of  sensitivity  analysis,  which  examines  the 
sensitivity  of  the  IPO  valuation  models  to  the  choice  of  measures  (proxies).  This 
chapter  aims  to  answer  the  first  research  question:  Is  the  prospectus  information 
useful  to  price  the  IPOs? 
The  second  empirical  chapter  includes  the  discussion  of  the  result  of  the 
IPO  short  run  performance  model.  It  presents  the  evidence  of  the  underpricing  in 
the  research  sample.  Furthermore,  it  aims  to  answer  the  second  research  question 
-  Does  the  prospectus  information  have  a  predictive  power  towards  the  IPO 
short  run  performance?  -  and  provides  a  discussion  on  what  drives  the 
underpricing.  The  final  empirical  chapter  addresses  the  third  research  questions  - 
Does  the  prospectus  information  still  have  any  impact  on  the  IPO  long  run 
performance?  -  and  demonstrates  the  discussions  of  the  result  of  the  IPO  long 
rung  performance.  Splitting  the  sample  into  the  privatisation  vs  non-privatisation 
sub-samples,  and  survivors  vs  non-survivors  sub-samples,  provides  evidence  of 
the  different  IPO  long  run  performance.  Moreover,  the  chapter  also  includes  a 
discussion  of  the  factors  that  are  related  to  the  IPO  long  run  performance. 
Finally,  the  summary,  conclusion  and  the  possible  future  research  are 
presented  in  the  last  chapter. 
21 Chapter  2 Chapter  2, 
Literature  Review 
Introduction 
The  previous  chapter  provides  a  brief  overview  of  the  research  area  of  the 
Initial  Public  Offerings  (IPO),  particularly  of  its  three  well-known  anomalies.  In 
the  first  edition  of  their  book  on  "going  public",  Jenkinson  and  Ljungqvist  (1996) 
predict  that  IPOs  would  continue  to  be  the  subject  of  intense  academic  debate.  Five 
years  later,  in  their  second  edition  (2001),  they  show  how  the  research  on  IPOs  has 
taken  a  number  of  significant  steps  forward  over  the  years. 
This  chapter  reviews  a  wide  range  of  significant  IPO  literatures.  Firstly,  it 
will  evaluate  the  IPO  anomaly  literatures.  This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  IPO 
valuation.  Finally,  this  chapter  will  review  some  studies  of  firm  specific  risk  and 
its  relation  to  IPO  valuation  and  performance. 
2.1.  The  underpricing  anomaly 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  there  have  been  many  studies 
investigating  the  three  well-known  IPO  anomalies.  The  first  anomaly  found  is  the 
underpricing  phenomenon.  Reilly  and  Hatfield  (1969)  are  the  first  scholars  who 
document  the  underpricing  in  new  issues.  They  find  that  from  53  sample  firms 
that  went  public  in  the  US  during  1963-1965,  the  initial  return  range  from  18.3%  to 
20.2%.  After  that,  there  have  been  other  studies,  which  find  similar  results  using 
different  time  periods  and  samples  (e.  g.,  McDonald  and  Fischer,  1972;  Logue, 
1973;  Neuberger  and  Hammond,  1974).  Following  those,  many  studies  record  the positive  initial  return  of  the  IPOs  in  a  large  number  of  countries,  as  summarised  by 
Jenkinson  and  Ljungqvist  (2001)  (see  table  1.1  in  chapter  1). 
However,  it  is  Ibbotson  (1975)  who,  among  the  firsts,  provides  a 
comprehensive  explanation  of  the  underpricing  evidence.  He  attempts  to  measure 
initial  performance  of  new  issues  and  to  examine  the  aftermarket  performance  to 
test  for  departures  from  market  efficiency.  The  result  is  six  possible  explanations 
for  the  observed  underpricing  in  the  IPO  market.  They  are: 
1.  Underwriters  are  required  by  US  securities  regulation  to  price  the  IPOs  below 
their  expected  value. 
2.  It  may  be  issuers  that  underprice  IPOs  intentionally  in  order  to  `leave  a  good 
taste  in  investors'  mouths'  to  make  subsequent  offering  at  attractive  price. 
3.  Underpricing  may  be  the  result  of  underwriters'  colluding  to  favour  their 
investor  clients. 
4.  Underpricing  is  used  to  reduce  the  risk  that  underwriters  bear,  if  their 
commissions  are  not  enough  to  cover  the  risk. 
5.  There  may  be  some  undisclosed  mechanism  by  which  investors  compensate 
issuers  for  the  discount  on  offering  price. 
6.  Underpricing  may  serve  as  a  form  of  insurance  to  protect  issuers  and 
underwriters  from  lawsuit. 
However,  he  concludes  that  all  of  these  suggested  explanations  are 
inadequate  as  they  involved  `unknown  legal  constraints,  needlessly  complicated 
indirect  compensation  schemes,  or  irrational  behaviour'. 
Additionally,  in  their  recent  paper,  Loughran  and  Ritter  (2002)  explain  that 
the  IPOs,  which  leave  so  much  money  on  the  table,  are  generally  those,  whose  the 
offering  price  and  market  prices  are  higher  than  had  originally  been  anticipated. 
Thus,  the  issuers  losing  wealth  are  simultaneously  discovering  they  are  wealthier 
than  they  expected  to  be.  Their  explanation  emphasises  the  covariance  of  issuers' 
loss  and  the  changes  in  their  wealth. 
23 Since  Ibbotson's  paper  (1975),  many  models  have  been  developed  to 
explain  the  underpricing  anomaly.  Several  noble  models  attract  scholars  to 
undertake  further  investigations.  The  discussions  of  them  are  presented  next 
2.1.1.  The  Winner's  Curse  Hypothesis 
The  most  popular  model  was  developed  by  Rock  (1986).  This  study  offers 
a  theoretical  analysis  of  the  IPO  underpricing.  In  his  model,  he  assumes  that 
underpricing  is  the  result  of  information  asymmetry  among  market  participants. 
He  argues  that  among  the  market  participants,  investors  have  superior  information 
about  new  issues.  Investors  themselves  can  be  split  into  two  categories  regarding 
the  information  that  they  hold.  Investors  who  have  more  information  are  called  the 
informed  investors  (II)  and  investors  who  hold  less  information  are  called 
uninformed  investors  (UI).  As  a  consequence  of  this  asymmetry,  Its  compete  with 
UIs  only  for  `good'  issues,  creating  an  adverse  selection  mechanism  in  which  UIs 
obtain  `bad'  issues  with  greater  probability.  Thus,  `good'  issues  will  have  excess 
demand,  and  `bad'  issue  will  have  excess  supply.  In  the  IPO,  if  an  offering  faces 
excess  demand,  the  shares  will  be  distributed  to  investors  by  rationing.  Since  Its 
can  differentiate  the  quality  of  issues  from  the  beginning,  they  register  a  `good' 
issue  earlier.  Thus  the  Uls  receive  disproportionate  levels  of  `bad'  issues.  This 
condition  is  well  known  as  winner's  curse.  Therefore,  in  order  to  induce  Uls' 
participation  in  the  market,  issuers  underprice  their  IPOs  deliberately.  In  other 
words,  participation  by  UIs  must  require  underpricing. 
Nevertheless,  this  conclusion  itself  is  insufficient  to  explain  why 
underpricing  actually  occurs.  First,  reducing  the  price  results  in  offer  proceeds 
falling,  which  in  turn  increases  IIs'  demand  for  a  larger  portion  of  the  offering. 
24 This  increases  adverse  selection,  discouraging  Uls  from  placing  orders.  Second,  it 
can  be  argued  whether  price  decreases  have  their  expected  effect  of  stimulating 
Uls'  demand.  This  is  important  because  one  must  explain  why  participation  by  UI 
is  valuable  to  the  issuers.  (Anderson  et  al.,  1995).  In  spite  of  this,  Rock's  study 
has  been  a  major  innovation  regarding  the  IPO  underpricing  explanation,  and  many 
scholars  attempt  to  extend  the  work. 
Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  are  among  others  who  develop  Rock's  model. 
They  propose  another  explanation  of  IPO  underpricing.  In  their  model,  they  keep 
Rock's  assumption  on  information  asymmetry,  which  then  leads  to  ex  ante 
uncertainty  faced  by  investors.  Ex  ante  uncertainty  is  the  uncertainty  about  issue 
value  before  the  offering.  They  argue  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
the  degree  of  uncertainty  over  share  value  and  the  extent  of  underpricing.  In 
particular,  as  share  value  becomes  more  uncertain,  the  differing  probabilities  of 
getting  good  versus  bad  issues  become  more  important  since  bad  issues  become 
even  worse.  The  ex  ante  uncertainty  is  not  the  same  as  systematic  risk  measured  by 
the  Beta  coefficient  in  capital  market.  They  use  two  proxies  for  ex  ante  uncertainty, 
the  number  of  uses  of  the  proceeds  and  the  inverse  of  the  gross  proceed.  For  these 
proxies,  Beatty  and  Ritter  argue  that  many  issuers  appear  to  be  reluctant  to  give 
highly  detailed  specification  of  what  they  will  do  with  the  proceed  because  it  may 
increase  exposure  to  legal  liabilities  and  disclosure  proprietary  information  to 
competitors.  Then  they  conclude  that  there  is  a  robust  relationship  between  ex  ante 
uncertainty  and  the  degree  of  underpricing.  The  greater  the  ex-ante  uncertainty  of 
the  issue,  the  greater  the  underpricing.  This  result  has  inspired  many  studies  to 
develop  alternative  explanation  for  the  IPO  underpricing. 
25 Using  Finnish  market  data,  Keloharju  (1993)  conducts  a  test  for  the 
winner's  curse  hypothesis.  The  evidence  confirms  the  presence  of  the  winner's 
curse.  Michaely  and  Shaw  (1994)  also  find  that  consistent  with  the  hypothesis,  the 
result  shows  that  in  markets  where  investors  know  a  priori  that  they  do  not  have  to 
compete  with  informed  investors,  IPOs  are  not  underpriced.  They  test  two  IPO 
samples,  the  first  is  a  sample  of  relatively  homogenous  IPOs,  and  the  second  is  a 
sample  of  `general'  IPOs.  The  homogenous  sample  reflects  the  lower  level  of 
asymmetric  information  in  IPOs.  They  find  a  significantly  different  level  of 
underpricing  between  the  two  samples,  with  the  homogenous  sample  significantly 
lower  than  the  second  sample.  This  result  is  a  support  for  the  winner's  curse 
hypothesis. 
Despite  evidence  found  to  support  the  winner's  curse  hypothesis  in  a 
number  of  empirical  studies,  Keasey  and  Short  (1992)  argue  that  the  model  suffers 
from  conflicting  assumptions  and  untestable  proposition.  They  suggest  that  the 
underpricing  is  a  simple  reflection  of  the  fact  that  the  issuers  are  uncertain  of  the 
demand  for  IPOs  and  they  underprice  to  ensure  sufficient  demand. 
2.1.2.  The  Underwriter  reputation  hypothesis 
This  hypothesis  holds  Rock's  assumptions  on  asymmetric  information. 
However,  it  assumes  that  the  information  asymmetry  exists  among  the  market 
participants,  and  it  is  the  investment  bankers,  who  have  superior  information  about 
the  market  to  that  of  the  issuers  or  investors. 
This  hypothesis  is  firstly  suggested  by  Baron  (1982).  Based  on  the  agency 
theory,  his  model  focuses  on  the  optimal  behaviour  of  issuers  as  the  principals  and 
investment  banker  as  the  agent  that  is  hired  to  execute  the  offering.  The  model 
26 demonstrates  a  positive  demand  for  investment  bank  advising  and  distribution 
services.  It  also  provides  an  explanation  of  the  underpricing  of  new  issues. 
However,  empirical  evidence  does  not  support  the  model's  proposition.  Muscarella 
and  Vetsyupens  (1989)  find  that  investment  bankers  that  underwrite  their  own  IPO 
also  experience  underpricing. 
Although  Baron's  model  has  been  a  major  contribution  to  the  underwriter 
reputation  model,  it  does  not  discuss  the  role  of  underwriter  reputation.  Among  the 
first  studies,  Logue  (1973)  conducts  research  that  proposes  the  effect  of 
underwriter  reputation  on  IPO  performance.  Using  250  IPOs  in  the  US  market 
during  1965-1969,  he  finds  that  there  is  a  negative  relation  between  underwriter 
reputation  and  the  degree  of  underpricing.  After  that,  Neuberger  and  Hammond 
(1974)  conduct  a  study  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  underwriters  of 
unseasoned  offerings.  The  study  concludes  that  the  underwriter  reputation  is  a 
significant  variable  in  the  valuation  of  new  issues. 
Following  those  studies,  Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  argue  that  underpricing 
equilibrium  is  enforced  by  investment  bankers.  In  addition,  it  is  explained  that 
since  the  issuers  cannot  make  a  credible  commitment  by  themselves,  they  should 
hire  investment  bankers  to  take  the  firm  public.  Therefore,  investment  bankers  are 
in  a  position  to  enforce  the  underpricing  equilibrium  because  it  will  be  involved  in 
many  IPOs  over  time.  For  an  investment  bank  to  find  that  it  is  in  their  interests  to 
enforce  the  underpricing  equilibrium  there  are  three  necessary  conditions.  The  first 
condition  is  that  the  investment  bankers  are  uncertain  about  the  market  price  of  the 
issue  when  it  starts  trading.  Secondly,  the  investment  bankers  have  non-salvage 
reputation  capital  at  stake,  on  which  investment  bankers  earn  a  return.  Thirdly,  the 
investment  bankers  may  lose  their  earnings  if  they  cheat  by  underpricing  too  much 
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literature  on  reputation  and  product.  Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  also  argue  that  to  be 
categorised  as  having  good  reputation,  the  investment  bankers  should  have 
willingness  to  not  behave  opportunistically.  From  this  argument,  they  put  forward 
a  proposition  that  any  investment  banker  that  cheats  will  lose  customers,  issuers 
and  investors. 
To  test  the  hypothesis,  they  use  the  underwriter's  standardised  average 
residual  as  a  proxy  for  reputation  measure.  Underwriters  that  had  greater  average 
residual  than  standard  are  referred  to  as  pricing  `off-line'  and  known  as  non- 
prestigious  underwriters,  whereas  underwriters  that  have  less  average  residual  were 
referred  as  pricing  `on-line'  and  known  as  prestigious  underwriters.  Then,  they 
analyse  changes  in  underwriter's  market  share  following  the  IPOs.  The  empirical 
evidence  shows  a  robust  support  for  the  proposition. 
After  Beatty  and  Ritter's  study,  there  have  been  many  studies  on  the 
relationship  between  the  underwriter  reputation  and  the  degree  of  underpricing. 
Most  of  them  have  obtained  similar  results  that  show  that  there  is  a  negative 
relationship  between  the  prestige  of  investment  bankers  and  the  underpricing.  The 
more  prestigious  the  underwriters,  the  less  the  degree  of  underpricing.  (e.  g., 
Johnson  and  Miller,  1988;  Carter  and  Manaseter,  1990;  Megginson  and  Weiss, 
1991;  Carteret  al.,  1998). 
Moreover,  Johnson  and  Miller  (1988)  expand  their  investigation  by 
proposing  another  hypothesis.  They  argue  that  once  the  ex  ante  uncertainty  has 
been  taken  into  account,  the  level  of  investment  banker  prestige  should  not  offer 
any  incremental  explanation  of  the  degree  of  underpricing.  If  more  information 
regarding  the  issue  value  is  available  to  investors,  then  a  smaller  number  of 
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underwriters.  They  also  argue  that  the  prestigious  investment  bankers  are 
associated  with  lower  risk  issues  than  non-prestigious  investment  bankers.  The 
explanation  behind  this  idea  is  that  because  of  the  mean-variance  efficiency 
assumption,  a  high  risk  firm  could  not  reduce  total  underwriting  costs  by  selecting 
a  more  prestigious  investment  bank,  since  Any  underpricing  savings  realised  would 
be  offset  by  a  higher  underwriting  commission.  Therefore,  the  issuing  firm 
hypothesis  posits  that  total  underwriter-related  costs  are  positively  related  to  the 
degree  of  uncertainty  regarding  firm's  value  and  unrelated  to  underwriter  prestige. 
They  test  hypotheses  that  the  degree  of  underpricing  and  underwriter- 
related  costs  are  positively  related  to  the  degree  of  uncertainty  regarding  the  issue's 
value,  and  is  unrelated  to  underwriter  prestige.  They  use  two  different  proxies  for 
underwriter  reputation.  The  first  proxy  applied  by  Johnson  and  Miller  (1988)  is 
using  three  different  cut-off  points  to  dichotomise  underwriters  into  prestigious  and 
non-prestigious  groups.  The  first  cut-off  is  that  prestigious  underwriters  are  only 
members  of  the  bulge  brackets,  while  members  of  other  brackets  are  assigned  non- 
prestigious.  Secondly,  they  include  members  of  major  bracket  in  the  prestigious 
group.  Thirdly  they  add  members  of  the  sub-major  bracket  into  the  prestigious 
group.  The  second  method  is  prestige-ranking  system.  They  assign  underwriters 
in  the  bulge  bracket  as  rank  3,  those  in  major  bracket  as  rank  2,  those  in  the  sub 
major  bracket  as  rank  1,  and  the  rest  as  rank  0. 
Using  a  total  of  962  IPOs  in  the  US  market  during  the  1981-1983  period, 
they  find  the  negative  relationship  between  level  of  investment  bank  prestige  and 
the  degree  of  underpricing.  However,  once  initial  returns  are  adjusted  for  risk,  this 
relationship  becomes  insignificant.  Thus,  they  conclude  that  investors  have  no 
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utility.  On  the  issuer  side,  they  conclude  that  issuers  have  no  incentive  to  seek  out 
high  prestige  investment  banks,  since  the  choice  of  underwriters  does  not  appear  to 
influence  underwriter's  total  cost. 
Similar  to  Johnson  and  Miller's  study  (1988),  Carter  and  Manaster  (1990) 
assign  underwriters'  reputation  into  rank,  by  examining  the  tombstone 
advertisements.  Based  upon  the  location  of  each  investment  bank  in  ads, 
investment  banks  are  given  a  rank  from  one  to  nine.  By  examining  the  relative 
placements  of  underwriters  with  respect  of  their  peers,  each  investment  bank  is 
assigned  a  rank.  Those  underwriters  appearing  at  the  top  of  the  ads  would  be  the 
most  prestigious  and  would  receive  the  highest  ranking.  Those  underwriters  at  the 
bottom  of  the  ads  would  receive  the  lowest  ranking.  The  result  of  this  method  is  a 
prestige  rating  for  each  investment  bank  on  a  scale  from  zero  (representing  least 
prestige)  through  nine  (most  prestige).  Since  then,  there  have  been  many  studies 
implement  this  measure  of  underwriter  reputation. 
Using  501  firm  commitment  US  IPOs  during  1979-1983,  Carter  and 
Manaster  (1990)  offer  some  empirical  support  for  the  argument  that  a  desire  to 
protect  their  reputation  induces  prestigious  underwriters  to  select  only  less  risky 
offerings.  Hence,  lower  risk  firms  can  try  to  signal  their  high  quality  by  selecting 
prestigious  underwriters  who  underprice  less  than  non-prestigious  underwriters, 
and  underwriter  reputation  should  be  a  credible  guarantee  of  limited  informed 
trading. 
While  previous  studies  try  to  measure  the  underwriter  reputation  using 
industry  information,  Megginson  and  Weiss  (1991)  and  Kumar  and  Tsesekos 
(1993)  propose  a  different  approach  to  measure  the  underwriter  prestige. 
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proxy  for  underwriter  reputation.  The  relative  market  share  for  each  underwriter  is 
determined  by  dividing  the  underwriter's  total  credits  by  the  industry's  total. 
When  a  syndicate  manages  an  offering,  it  is  the  lead  manager  that  is  given  full 
credit  for  the  total  amount  underwritten.  The  lead  manager  maintains  the  `books' 
and  its  name  is  the  very  first  one  at  the  top  of  the  tombstone  advertisements.  In 
their  study,  they  also  offer  the  presence  of  venture  capital  that  could  perform 
certification  function  as  a  complement  to  the  certification  provided  by  prestigious 
investment  banks. 
Kumar  and  Tsesekos  (1993)  argue  that  the  use  of  the  over  allotment  option 
gives  an  advantage  to  the  underwriter  to  build  and  maintain  the  underwriter- 
investor  relationship  and  reputation.  If  the  issue  contains  the  over  allotment  option 
provision,  the  underwriter  has  the  option  of  purchasing  additional  shares  from  the 
issuer  at  a  discounted  price.  Therefore,  the  over  allotment  option  allows  the 
underwriter  to  satisfy  more  of  the  original  demand  from  clients  in  the  event  that  the 
issue's  after  market  price  appreciates  in  value  above  the  offer  price.  The  less 
prestigious  underwriter  appear  to  have  more  interest  in  building  client  relationship, 
hence  it  is  expected  that  the  over  allotment  option  would  be  more  beneficial  in 
creating  a  solid  investor  base.  Therefore  they  posit  that  the  relative  size  of  the  over 
allotment  options  is  negatively  related  to  the  underwriter  reputation. 
Moreover,  they  also  examine  the  relationship  between  the  investment  bank 
reputation  and  the  type  of  underwriting  contract.  They  argue  that  the  role  of  the 
underwriter  is  to  certify  that  the  issue  price  is  consistent  with  insider  information 
regarding  the  future  earning  prospects  of  the  firm.  The  issuing  firm  is  viewed  as 
effectively  `leasing'  the  brand  name  of  an  investment  bank  to  certify  that  the  issue 
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investment  banking  contract  determines  the  level  of  certification  provided  by  the 
investment  bank.  They  define  investment-banking  contract  as  negotiated  or 
competitive  and  firm  commitment  or  best  effort. 
Recently,  Logue  et  al.  (2002)  examine  the  interaction  between  underwriter 
reputation  and  market  activities.  They  find  that  underwriter  reputation  is  a 
significant  determinant  of  pre-market  underwriter  activities,  however  weakly 
related  to  after-market  price  stabilization  activities,  and  unrelated  to  issuer  returns. 
They  also  find  that  underwriter  activities  prior  to  IPO  date  are  significantly  related 
to  the  underpricing,  but  unrelated  to  IPO  long-run  performance.  Finally,  they  find 
underwriter  activities  after-market  is  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  long-run 
performance.  The  results  suggest  that  there  is  a  sequence  of  activities  in  the 
underwriting  process,  which  could  give  some  impact  to  the  IPO  return  both  in  the 
short  and  the  long  run. 
In  sum,  the  underwriter  hypothesis  posits  that  the  investment  bankers  have 
an  important  role  in  underpricing  equilibrium.  The  result  shows  the  more 
prestigious  the  underwriter,  the  less  the  degree  of  underpricing.  In  many  cases, 
`good'  firms  tend  to  hire  the  prestigious  underwriter  in  order  to  give  signal  about 
their  value  to  investors.  On  the  other  hand,  the  prestigious  investment  bankers  tend 
to  select  `good'  issues  to  be  brought  to  market. 
2.1.3  The  Signalling  hypothesis 
Another  model  developed  to  explain  the  underpricing  anomaly  is  the 
signalling  model  (Allen-Faulhaber  [1989],  Grinblatt  and  Hwang  [1989],  Welch 
[1989]).  Similar  to  Rock's  and  Baron's  models,  the  signalling  model  also  assumes 
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of  investors  or  underwriters,  this  model  presumes  that  it  is  issuers  who  know  more 
about  the  firm  value  in  the  future.  The  model  also  assumes  that  there  are  two  types 
of  firms,  good  firms  and  bad  firms  (this  assumption  is  excluded  from  the  Grinblatt- 
Hwang  model).  However,  investors  do  not  know  about  firm  quality  until  it  is 
revealed  in  the  market.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  the  good  firms  to  reveal  their 
firm  value  to  potential  investors  before  the  flotation  date.  To  avoid  mimicking 
action  from  the  bad  firms,  the  good  firms  need  a  signal  to  reveal  this  value 
information.  This  model  argues  that  good  firms  may  employ  underpricing  as  a 
signal  to  the  firm  value. 
In  the  context  of  IPO,  firms  typically  can  signal  their  quality  with  several 
variables,  such  as  the  firm's  choice  of  underwriter  or  auditors,  quality  of 
management,  quality  of  bank  loans,  and  others.  However,  in  these  particular 
signalling  models,  scholars  argue  that  the  offering  price  at  IPO  is  a  credible  signal, 
since  it  requires  no  monitoring,  therefore  it  will  be  beneficial  to  investors.  For  an 
action  to  succeed  as  an  effective  signal,  it  should  satisfy  two  conditions.  Firstly,  it 
is  not  too  costly,  and  secondly,  it  is  unlikely  to  be  imitated  by  low  quality  firms 
that  aim  to  mislead  investors.  If  the  signal  works  effectively,  high  quality  firms 
may  separate  themselves  from  low  quality  firms. 
The  high  quality  firm  underprice  shares  in  the  first  issue  to  reveal  the  firm's 
true  value  and  to  credibly  separate  itself  from  low  quality  firms.  In  Ibbotson's 
words,,  issuers  underprice  the  IPO  in  order  to  `leave  good  taste  in  investor's 
mouths',  thus  this  will  support  the  accomplishment  of  subsequent  seasoned 
offerings  in  the  open  market.  Therefore,  signalling  true  value  is  beneficial  to  high 
value  firms  as  it  allows  a  higher  price  to  be  fetched  at  the  second  stage  sale 
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costly,  the  high  quality  firm  can  afford  it  because  such  a  firm  can  recover  its  loss  in 
the  subsequent  seasoned  equity  offerings  (SEOs)  after  their  true  quality  is  revealed. 
As  a  consequence,  low  quality  firms  are  deterred  from  imitating  this  action  because 
they  are  less  likely  to  reap  the  benefits  of  underpricing  by  selling  their  seasoned 
issues  at  higher  prices  (Jegadeesh  et  al..,  1993). 
The  signalling  models  generate  a  rich  set  of  empirical  implications 
regarding  the  relationship  between  underpricing  and  the  value  of  the  firm,  the 
project  risk,  the  probability  of  a  firm  to  be  a  high  quality  or  low  quality,  the 
subsequent  offering,  and  the  hot  issue  market.  The  Grinblatt-Hwang  (GH)  model 
relates  the  project  risk  (here  means  IPO  risk),  to  the  degree  of  underpricing  and  the 
issuer's  fractional  holding.  It  claims  that  the  degree  of  underpricing  is  an 
increasing  function  of  project  risk.  In  other  words,  it  could  be  said  that  the-riskier 
the  firm,  the  greater  the  expected  degree  of  underpricing.  It  also  implies  that,  given 
the  issuer's  fractional  holding,  the  greater  the  degree  of  underpricing,  the  higher 
the  value  of  the  firm.  Allen-Faulhaber  (AF)  (1989)  and  Welch  (1989)  also  suggest 
a  positive  relation  between'IPO  underpricing  and  firm  value. 
The  AF  model  provides  other  implications.  The  model  is  applied  to  earlier 
studies  (Ibbotson  &  Jafe,  1975;  Ritter,  1986).  Regarding  the  hot  issue  in  IPO,  the 
model  suggests  that  hot-issue  markets  may  occur  in  specific  industries  whenever 
an  exogenous  shock  substantially  improves  expected  profitability.  This  is  related  to- 
how  the  AF  model  explains  revelation  of  firm  value  that  is  determined  by  expected 
dividend.  Duplicating  the  winner's  curse  implication,  signalling  models  also 
suggest  that  the  greater  the  ex  ante  uncertainty,  the  higher  must  be  the  expected 
underpricing.  This  relationship  is  implied  by  signalling  models  since  the  noisy 
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of  underpricing. 
Welch's  model  assumes  the  probability  of  one  firm  categorised  to  one  type 
(lower  quality  or  high  quality)  relates  to  the  underpricing  phenomenon.  It  implies 
that  the  lower  the  probability  that  a  firm  is  of  high  quality,  the  higher  the 
probability  that  it  underprices  at  IPO.  It  also  implies  that  as  the  cost  of  imitation 
increases,  there  will  be  more  firms  underpriced  at  IPO.  Since  the  Welch  model 
assumes  that  IPO  is  always  followed  by  the  seasoned  offering,  it  suggests  that  the 
value  of  the  outstanding  shares  falls  less  upon  news  of  a  seasoned  offering  when  a 
firm  has  played  an  underpricing  equilibrium  in  order  to  adjust  investors'  prior 
belief  about  firm  value  to  true  value  revealed. 
There  are  a  number  of  empirical  studies  regarding  the  signalling  models  in 
IPO.  The  first  hypothesis  tested  is  that  if  firms  do  underprice  to  condition 
investors  favourably  for  subsequent  offerings,  it  is  expected  that  firms  who  reissue 
in  open  market  will  experience  greater  underpricing.  However,  the  evidence  on 
this  is  mixed.  Welch  himself  (1989)  finds  that  there  is  a  significant  positive 
relation  between  the  degree  of  underpricing  and  the  probability  of  firms  to  undergo 
the  SEOs.  Moreover,  he  also  finds  that  many  IPO  firms  that  are  more  underpriced 
indeed  choose  to  issue  a  substantial  amount  of  public  SEOs.  Using  a  different  time 
period,  Michaely  and  Shaw  (1994),  find  that  the  empirical  results  do  not  support 
the  signalling  models.  In  fact,  they  find  that  firms  that  underprice  more  return  to 
the  reissue  market  less  frequently  and  for  lesser  amounts  than  firms  that  underprice 
less  do.  Further,  they  also  find  that  firms  that  underprice  less  experience  higher 
earnings  and  pay  higher  dividends,  contrary  to  the  models'  predictions.  Most  of  the 
GH  model's  predictions  are  not  supported  by  Michaely  and  Shaw's  findings.  They 
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firm  value  and  risk.  The  evidence  also'  does  not  support  a  positive  relationship 
between  underpricing  and  subsequent  dividend  policy  that  is  suggested  by  the  AF 
model.  Regarding  IPO  long  run  performance,  Michaely  and  Shaw's  study  indicates 
that  firms  that  reissue  in  the  open  market  outperform  non-issuing  firms.  However, 
they  do  not  find  a  relationship  between  underpricing  and  the  degree  of  fractional 
holding  with  superiority  of  share  performance  in  the  long  run. 
Jegadesh  et  al..  (1993)  find  supporting  evidence  for  the  signalling  models. 
Regarding  the  seasoned  offering,  they  argue  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship 
between  underpricing  and  the  probability  of  seasoned  equity  offering  or  open 
market  insider.  Using  1,985  IPOs  (1980-1986)  with  firm  commitment  offering 
method  in  the  US  market,  they  find  evidence  that  supports  the  proposition 
suggesting  that  the  more  underpriced  IPOs  tend  to  go  back  to  the  market  sooner 
than  the  less  underpriced  IPOs.  However,  they  do  not  find  a  significant  difference 
when  they  use  the  aftermarket  returns  (returns  after  20  days  of  the  issue). 
Therefore,  they  conclude  that  the  evidence  to  support  the  signalling  theory  is  weak. 
Using  UK  data,  Espenlaub  and  Tonks  (1998)  empirically  test  the  signalling 
hypothesis  by,  in  particular,  examining  the  relationship  between  the  post-IPO 
directors'  sales  and  the  SEOs.  They  argue  that  there  is  an  incentive  to  the  initial 
owners  (including  the  directors)  to  deliberately  undepricing  the  IPOs  to  recoup  the 
profits  in  the  SEOs.  Therefore,  they  include  the  post-IPO  director's  sales  in  the 
SEOs.  They  hypothesise  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  the 
undepricing  and  the  probability  (the  relative  volume)  of  the  directors'  sales  after 
the  IPO.  They  find  mixed  results.  They  do  not  find  a  significant  relationship 
between  the  underpricing  and  the  probability  of  the  post-IPO  directors'  sales. 
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related  to  the  underpricing,  as  a  support  to  the  signalling  hypothesis. 
Although  the  main  implication  of  the  signalling  hypothesis  is  a  positive 
relationship  between  the  firm  value  and  the  underpricing,  none  of  the  studies 
reviewed  above  empirically  test  this  proposition.  Keasey  and  McGuiness  (1992) 
directly  investigate  the  underpricing  and  firm  value  relationship.  Using  UK  USM 
data,  they  find  a  positive  relationship  between  the  firm  market  value  -  proxied  by 
the  firm's  market  capitalisation  on  the  fifth  day  of  trading  post-flotation  -  and  the 
underpricing  as  predicted  by  the  signalling  hypothesis.  Using  Australian  data,  How 
and  Low  (1993)  also  find  support  for  the  hypothesis. 
Another  empirical  implication  of  the  IPO  signalling  model  is  the  ownership 
retention  at  the  IPO.  The  model  argues  that  the  issuers  deliberately  underprice  the 
issues  at  the  IPO  in  expectation  to  get  profits  later  from  their  selling  at  the 
subsequent  SEOs.  Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  the  firms  that  are  more  underpriced 
tend  to  have  a  higher  percentage  of  equity  retained  at  the  IPOs.  In  line  with  that, 
Leland  and  Pyle  (1977)  propose  that  retained  equity  is  used  as  a  signal  to  the  firm 
value.  They  argue  that  the  percentage  of  equity  retained  at  the  IPO  conveys  the 
insiders'  believes  in  the  firm's  future  value.  A  discussion  of  ownership  retention  is 
presented  later  in  the  IPO  valuation  section  (section  2.6.2) 
The  other  issue  that  has  received  much  attention  from  scholars  is  whether 
there  are  other  means,  in  addition  to  underpiricing,  that  effectively  signal  the  value 
of  the  firm.  Slovin  and  Young  (1990)  analyse  the  relationship  between  issuer  and 
banks  as  a  signal  of  firm  value.  They  argue  that  bank  processing  of  asymmetric 
information  and  external  monitoring  of  corporate  activities  reduces  the  ex  ante 
uncertainty  of  investors  about  firm  value.  They  demonstrate  that  the  existence  of 
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IPOs.  The  empirical  result  is  robust  regarding  the  inclusion  of  variables  that 
reflect  other  mechanisms  that  can  improve  ex  ante  uncertainty.  Concerning  the 
conditions  of  effective  signals,  it  seems  that  banking  relation  is  dominated  by 
underpricing,  since  it  needs  monitoring  cost  and  can  be  easily  imitated  by  other 
firms.  However,  it  is  beneficial  to  investors  because  it  may  reveal  the  type  of  firm 
before  the  IPO. 
In  sum,  the  signalling  hypothesis  posits  that  in  order  to  reveal  their  true 
value,  issuer  deliberately  underprice  the  issue.  This  signal  is  observable  by 
investors  but  it  is  costly  for  low  value  firms  to  imitate  the  action.  Although  the 
model  is  theoretically  convincing,  the  evidence,  as  discussed  above,  shows  mixed 
result. 
2.1.4  The  insurance  hypotheses 
In  addition  to  information  asymmetry,  underpricing  is  also  explained  by 
institutional  aspects.  Another  underpricing  explanation  proposed  by  Ibbotson 
(1975)  is  that  underpricing  serves  as  an  insurance  against  legal  liabilities.  Later, 
this  hypothesis  was  developed  by  Tinic  (1988)  and  Hughes  and  Thakor  (1992). 
They  argue  that  both  issuers  and  underwriters  underprice  the  IPOs  deliberately  in 
order  to  avoid  the  lawsuits  from  investors. 
Tinic  (1988)  offers  the  insurance  hypothesis,  which  is  also  well  known  as 
the  lawsuit-avoidance  hypothesis.  She  argues  that  the  expected  cost  of  legal 
liability  would  be  particularly  high  for  IPOs  because  performing  the  due-diligence 
investigations  is  fraught  with  difficulties  and  uncertainties.  Therefore,  both  issuers 
and  underwriters  attempt  to  avoid  this  situation. 
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requirements.  What  to  them  may  seem  to  be  an  inconsequential  piece  of 
information  to  be  disclosed  may  be  judged  a  material  omission  in  a  civil  action.  On 
the  underwriters'  side,  they  argued  that  the  most  important  part  of  their 
investigation  centres  on  the  quality  of  management  and  forecasting  future  earning 
capacity  of  the  firm.  Both  are  frequently  based  on  subjective  evaluation  and 
judgement.  Although  the  risks,  uncertainties,  and  speculative  qualities  of  the 
securities  are  frequently  stated  in  the  registration  statements  and  prospectuses,  they 
do  not  seem  to  deter  investors  from  bringing  civil  suits  against  the  issuers  and 
investment  banks. 
Since  issuers  and  investment  banks  both  are  vulnerable  to  legal  liabilities,  it 
may  seem  that  an  obvious  means  of  protecting  themselves  would  be  to  purchase 
jointly  an  insurance  policy  against  potential  damages.  However,  since  there  is  a 
moral  hazard  problem,  there  will  be  no  insurance  policy  available. 
With  insurance  against  legal  damages,  the  issuer  and  investment  bank 
would  have  incentives  to  shirk  their  responsibilities  to  produce  information  about 
the  firm.  This  would  increase  the  probability  of  post-offering  lawsuits  and  the 
expected  losses  for  the  issuer.  To  protect  itself  against  this  event,  the  issuer  would 
have  to  incur  costs  in  verifying  the  quality  of  the  investigations  conducted  by  the 
investment  bank  and  charge  a  predetermined  penalty  to  the  investment  bank 
whenever  it  is  found  to  be  shirking.  If  an  investment  bank  can  establish  easily 
verifiable  standards  for  a  diligent  investigation,  beforehand,  then  the  cost  of  the 
policy  can  include  a  premium  for  the  moral  hazard. 
Since  there  is  no  insurance  policy  to  cover  such  lawsuits,  Tinic  argues  that 
underpricing  serves  as  an  efficient  form  of  insurance  against  potential  legal 
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legal  liability  for  `insufficient'  information  disclosure  in  the  prospectus,  both  the 
issuer  and  the  investment  bank  intentionally  underprices  an  issue.  This  lawsuit- 
avoidance  hypothesis  posits  three  implications.  Firstly,  underpricing  reduces  the 
probability  of  litigation.  Secondly,  underpricing  reduces  the  conditional 
probability  of  an  adverse  judgement  if  litigation  occurs.  And  thirdly,  underpricing 
reduces  the  amount  of  damages  in  the  event  of  an  adverse  judgement. 
Hughes  and  Thakor  (1992)  argue  that  since  it  is  the  underwriter  who  sets 
the  offering  price,  it  is  his  or  her  responsibility  if  investors  claim  that  there  is  a 
mispricing  in  the  IPO.  They  argue  that  the  underwriter  sets  the  issue  price 
knowing  that  he/she  will  be  sued  in  the  future  if  there  is  evidence  that  the  court 
will  judge  as  indicative  of  overpricing.  There  is  a  perfect  sequential  equilibrium  in 
which  some  issues  are  overpriced,  some  are  underpriced.  There  is  underpricing  on 
average,  and  there  exists  a  positive  probability  of  successful  litigation  against  the 
underwriter.  Lawsuits  are  obviously  costly  to  underwriters,  not  only  direct  cost, 
such  as  legal  fees,  but  also  in  terms  of  the  potential  damage  to  their  reputation 
capital. 
They  also  postulate  a  trade-off  between  minimising  the  probability  of 
litigation,  which  means  minimising  these  costs  on  the  one  hand,  and  maximising 
flotation  revenue  on  the  other.  In  their  model,  they  assume  that  minimising  the 
probability  of  litigation  increases  the  offering  price,  implying  that  the  more 
overpriced  an  IPO,  the  more  likely  is  a  future  lawsuit.  In  addition,  underpricing 
reduces  not  only  the  probability  of  a  lawsuit,  but  also  the  probability  of  an  adverse 
ruling  conditional  on  a  lawsuit  being  filed  and  the  amount  of  damages  to  other 
assets,  such  as  reputation  capital  in  the  event  of  adverse  ruling. 
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and  take  the  year  1933  as  the  cut-off  point  in  time  regarding  the  1933  Securities 
Act.  She  splits  the  sample  into  two  groups.  The  first  group  consists  of  70 
flotations  during  1923-1930,  and  the  second  group  consists  of  134  flotations  during 
1966-1971.  Prior  to  the  1933  legislation,  the  principle  of  caveat  emptor  applied  to 
the  securities  industry  in  an  almost  open  way,  so  that  issuers  and  investment  banks 
faced  no  litigation  risk.  Since  1933,  underpricing  should  have  been  rising  in 
parallel  to  increased  risk  of  future  litigation.  Evidence  supports  the  hypothesis  that 
in  order  to  avoid  legal  liability  for  mis-statements  in  the  IPO  prospectus, 
underwriters  and  issuers  rationally  choose  to  underprice  IPOs  (Tinic  [1988], 
Ibbotson  [1975]  and  Hughes  and  Thakor  [1992]).  However,  Drake  and  Vetsuypens 
(1993)  using  a  longer  time  line  do  not  find  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the 
hypothesis.  Moreover,  using  data  from  other  markets  (Finland  and  UK),  Keloharju 
(1993)  and  Jenkinson  (1990)  also  do  not  find  evidence  for  the  hypothesis. 
The  most  thorough  evidence  is  due  to  Drake  and  Vetsuypens  (1993),  who 
among  other  things  find  that  underpricing  does  not  reduce  the  probability  of  a 
lawsuit.  They  examine  93  IPOs  by  issuers  who  were  subsequently  sued  under  the 
provisions  of  the  1933  Securities  Act  in  the  period  1969-1990.  They  find  that 
purchasers  of  underpriced  IPOs  are  just  as  likely  to  sue  as  purchasers  of  overpriced 
ones.  Moreover,  issuers  that  are  sued  are  no  more  or  less  underpriced  than 
comparable  firms  that  are  not  sued.  Therefore,  they  conclude  that  underpricing  is 
not  a  sufficient  condition  to  avoid  lawsuits.  Furthermore,  their  analysis  shows  that 
underpricing  is  an  expensive  form  of  insurance  against  future  lawsuit.  However, 
they  do  not  test  the  second  and  third  implications  of  the  lawsuit-avoidance 
hypothesis  proposed  by  Tinic  (1988),  which  relate  the  underpricing  and  the 
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of  damages  in  such  an  event. 
In  sum,  the  lawsuit-avoidance  hypothesis  argues  that  the  issuers  and  the 
investment  bankers  deliberately  underprice  the  issues  in  order  to  avoid  the  lawsuit 
from  investors  regarding  the  information  disclosure  prior  to  flotation.  Since  this 
model  involves  the  institutional  aspect,  in  this  case  the  securities  regulation,  the 
empirical  result  only  supports  the  US  cases.  While  different  countries  may  set 
different  regulation,  the  relationship  between  underpricing  and  legal  liabilities  is 
rarely  proved  in  other  countries. 
In  contrast  to  the  insurance  hypothesis,  Ruud  (1993)  argues  that 
underwriters  do  not  underprice  IPOs  deliberately.  What  they  do  is  to  support 
offerings  whose  prices  fall  below  the  offering  price  in  after-market  trading.  Price 
support  is  underwriters'  intervention  in  the  market  by  repurchasing  a  fraction  of 
shares  in  after-market  trading.  Therefore,  the  share  price  could  go  up  higher  than 
the  offering  price  and  leave  positive  returns  to  investors.  This  hypothesis  has  some 
support  from  empirical  evidence.  It  is  recorded  that  about  half  of  all  US  IPOs  in 
1982-1983  must  have  been  supported.  While  price  support  action  is  illegal  in  some 
markets,  it  is  legal  in  many  countries,  including  UK,  France,  Germany,  Greece, 
Hong  Kong,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  US.  (Jenkinson,  1996). 
2.2.  Underpricing  phenomenon  in  the  UK 
Among  the  first  scholars  examining  IPO  performance  on  the  London  Stock 
Exchange  is  Dimson  (1979).  His  study  finds  robust  evidence  of  underpricing  in  the 
UK  market.  Levis  (1990)  verifies  that  some  studies  find  existence  of  underpricing 
in  LSE  (Buckland  et  al..,  1981;  Bank  of  England,  1986).  The  studies  indicate 
42 average  first  day  abnormal  return  ranging  from  8.5%  to  17%.  A  recent  working 
paper  by  Levis  (2001)  exhibits  the  persistence  of  underpricing  in  the  main  market, 
techmark  market,  and  AIM.  Levis  shows  that  on  average  IPOs  listed  on  AIM  tend 
to  be  more  underpriced  than  the  ones  listed  on  the  main  and  techmark  markets. 
Table  2.1  below  shows  the  performance  of  first  day  return  in  each  market  in  2001. 
Table  2.1.  The  IPO  first  day  returns  in  LSE,  2001 
The  table  contains  a  number  of  descriptive  statistics  of  the  first  day  returns  of  UK 
IPOs  in  2001,  which  took  place  in  the  Main  market,  Techmark  market,  and  AIM 
Main  Techmark  AIM  All 
Average  first  day  return  (%)  5.9  39.5  72.6  60.1 
Median  first  day  return  (%)  6.8  15.7  13.3  11.4 
Standard  deviation  6.9  102.2  245.9  214.2 
Largest  first  day  return  (%)  16.7  658.8  2,775.0  2,775.0 
Lowest  first  day  return  (%)  -9.3  -43.4  -32.1  -43.4 
Total  amount  left  on  the  229.6  1,335.2  644.6  2,229.4 
table  (£m) 
Source:  Levis  (2001) 
In  his  study,  Levis  (1990)  aims  to  test  Rock's  model  under  the  British 
institutional  framework.  In  particular,  he  attempts  to  explain  the  underpricing 
phenomenon  as  a  combined  effect  of  Rock's  models  and  the  particular  nature  of 
the  settlement  mechanism  applicable  in  the  UK  new  issues  market.  For  this 
purpose,  he  argues  that  new  issues  would  be  considered  to  be  underpriced  only  if 
the  `net  expected  return'  is  significantly  different  from  zero.  3  Similar  to  previous 
studies,  Levis'  study  finds  positive  abnormal  returns  on  the  first  trading  day. 
However,  it  does  not  support  the  main  proposition.  It  is  apparent  that  the  positive 
3  Net  expected  return  is  the  abnormal  return  on  the  first  trading  day  after  subtracting  the  interest 
cost  that  occurred  on  the  over-subscribed  offers  and  the  loss  from  the  under-subscribed  offers. 
43 abnormal  return  is  just  sufficient  to  cover  the  losses  incurred  in  undersubscribed 
and  the  interest  costs  involved  in  the  over-subscribed  offers. 
Another  study  by  Keasey  and  McGuiness  (1992)  also  attempts  to  explain 
the  underpricing  in  the  UK  market,  in  particular  on  the  USM.  They  propose  a 
signalling  model,  which  employs  multi  signals.  They  argue  that  to  be  a  credible 
signal,  the  variable  should  be  observable  by  investors.  They  propose  five 
observable  actions  as  signals  to  the  IPO  value,  they  are:  (i)  the  percentage  of  shares 
retained  by  entrepreneurs,  (ii)  the  levels  of  planned  post-flotation  capital 
expenditure,  (iii)  the  quality  of  the  advising  agents,  (iv)  the  disclosure/non- 
disclosure  of  forecasted  earnings,  and  (v)  the  level  of  underpricing.  They  derive  a 
total  of  12  proxies  for  these  signals  and  test  them  against  the  dependent  variable, 
the  market  capitalisation  of  issuers  at  the  close  of  the  fifth  day  of  trading.  The 
result  confirms  previous  signalling  models.  They  find  that  the  underpricing  serves 
as  a  signal  to  the  market  value  of  a  firm.  Along  with  that,  they  also  find  that  the 
percentage  of  shares  retained,  net  proceeds,  and  the  auditor  quality  significantly 
signal  the  firm  value. 
Using  a  different  set  of  data  from  the  UK  Main  market  and  USM,  Byrne 
and  Rees  (1994)  also  find  a  significant  positive  return  for  five  days  after  the  IPOs 
are  first  traded.  Moreover,  the  result  also  shows  significant  relations  between  the 
underpricing  and  the  sponsor  reputation,  equity  retained  and  dividend  per  share. 
Consistent  with  previous  studies,  they  find  a  negative  relation  between  the 
underpricing  and  the  equity  retained  by  old  shareholders  on  the  flotation  day. 
Contrary  to  previous  studies,  they  find  that  IPOs  brought  to  market  by  a  prestigious 
sponsor  tend  to  be  more  underpriced  than  other  IPOs.  The  result  of  the  relation 
between  the  underpricing  and  dividend  per  share  comes  as  a  unique  part  of  this 
44 study.  None  has  incorporate  dividends  in  the  underpricing  model  before  this  study. 
The  result  shows  a  robust  significant  negative  coefficient  on  dividends.  Based  on 
the  signalling  argument,  it  is  argued  that  dividends  may  have  a  role  as  a  signal,  so 
that  investors  require  a  lower  mark-up  for  IPOs  with  high  dividend  payout. 
Using  a  sample  of  222  IPOs  on  the  USM  market  during  1984-1988,  Keasey 
and  Short  (1992)  investigate  the  relationship  between  the  underpricing  and  the  ex- 
ante  uncertainty  surrounding  IPOs.  The  underpricing  is  measured  by  the  initial 
returns  on  the  fifth  day  of  trading.  They  employ  a  number  of  prospectus 
information  as  proxies  to  the  ex-ante  uncertainty.  They  find  that  the  level  of  IPO 
undepricing  on  the  USM  is  significantly  related  to  a  few  factors,  such  as  the 
percentage  of  equity  retained  in  the  firm  by  the  original  entrepreneurs,  the  amount 
of  new  money  raised  on  flotation  and  the  presence  of  an  earnings  forecast. 
Dewenter  and  Malatesta  (1997)  examine  public  offerings  of  state-owned 
enterprise  and  their  difference  to  privately  owned  ones.  According  to  the 
government,  the  UK  privatisation  policy  objectives  are  to  promote  efficiency  in  the 
business,  and  to  spread  share  ownership  as  widely  as  possible  among  the  UK 
population  (Bishop  and  Kay,  1989).  Moreover,  it  is  also  emphasised  that  the 
concern  is  with  economic  efficiency  and  not  the  intention  of  raising  money  for  the 
UK  Exchequer.  However,  Dewenter  and  Malatesta  (1997)  argue  that  in  order  to 
ensure  the  achievement  of  the  second  objective,  the  privatisation,  IPOs  are 
deliberately  underpriced.  Furthermore,  they  also  attempt  to  examine  the 
undepricing  deliberation  with  the  motive  to  raise  fund  for  the  government.  I 
Using  a  total  sample  of  38  UK  privatisations  and  2,100  private  company 
IPOs  obtained  from  Loughran  et  al.  (1994),  Dewenter  and  Malatesta  find  that 
privatisations  are  significantly  more  underpriced  than  private  company  IPOs  are. 
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they  do  not  find  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  the  privatisation  IPOs  are 
deliberately  underpriced. 
2.3.  The  long-run  underperformance  anomaly 
The  second  anomaly  is  the  long-run  underperformance  of  IPO  shares. 
Firstly,  Aggarwal  and  Rivoli  (1990)  find  evidence  of  substantial  negative  abnormal 
returns  over  longer  time  horizons.  They  refer  to  this  phenomenon  as  a  fad.  They 
suggest  that  if  IPOs  are  systematically  overvalued  in  early  trading,  investors  who 
purchase  shares  at  the  first  after  market  price  will  underperform  the  market  index. 
How  IPOs  perform  in  the  long  run  was  examined  formally  by  Ritter  (1991). 
He  points  out  several  reasons  why  the  long-run  performance  of  IPO  is  of  interest. 
Firstly,  from  an  investor's  viewpoint,  the  existence  of  price  patterns  may  present 
opportunities  for  active  trading  strategies  to  produce  superior  return.  Secondly,  a 
finding  of  non-zero  after-market  performance  calls  into  question  the  informational 
efficiency  of  the  IPO  market.  Thirdly,  the  volume  of  IPOs  displays  large 
variations  over  time.  Finally,  the  cost  of  external  equity  capital  for  companies 
going  public  depends  not  only  upon  the  transaction  costs  incurred  in  going  public, 
but  also  upon  the  returns  earned  in  the  after  market. 
Ritter's  study  is  motivated  by  several  prior  studies  [Ibbotson  (1975),  Stoll 
and  Curley  (1970),  Stern  and  Bornstein  (1985)),  which  suggest  that  at  some  point 
after  going  public  the  abnormal  return  on  IPO  may  be  negative.  After  Ritter's 
study,  there  have  been  many  studies  attempting  to  assess  the  IPO  long-run 
performance  [Loughran-Ritter  (1995),  Levis  (1993),  How  (2000)].  However,  other 
studies  show  that  IPOs  outperform  the  market  as  summarised  in  table  1.2  in  the 
46 introduction  chapter.  The  evidence  demonstrates  the  mixed  results  of  the  IPO  long- 
run  performance  relative  to  the  market.  The  hypotheses  and  results  regarding  the 
IPO  long-run  performance  are  discussed  below. 
2.3.1.  Fad  hypothesis 
This  hypothesis  is  proposed  firstly  by  Aggarwal  and  Rivoli  (1990).  As 
mentioned  above,  they  find  evidence  of  IPO  shares  undeperforming  the  market 
over  longer  time  horizons.  They  could  not  find  any  rational  explanation  to  this 
phenomenon.  Therefore,  they  refer  to  this  situation  as  a  fad  in  the  IPO  market. 
Ritter  (1991),  drawing  a  sample  of  1,526  firms  that  went  public  in  the  US 
during  1975-1984,  examines  their  performance  after  three  years  trading,  and 
finally  compares  them  to  the  performance  of  matching  firms  by  industry  and 
market  capitalisation. 
He  finds  evidence  that  is  consistent  with  the  notion  that  many  firms  go 
public  near  the  peak  of  industry-specific  fads.  Further,  he  also  finds  that  a  strategy 
of  investing  in  IPOs  at  the  end  of  the  first  day  of  public  trading  and  holding  them 
for  3  years  would  have  left  the  investors  with  only  83  cents  relative  to  each  dollar 
from  investing  in  a  group  of  matching  firms  listed  on  the  US  markets.  Moreover, 
younger  firms  and  firm  that  went  public  in  heavy  volume  years  did  even  worse 
than  average.  Thus,  it  can  be  argued  that  while  new  issues  are  a  profitable 
investment  opportunity  if  bought  at  flotation,  they  should  not  be  held  long  beyond 
the  first  few  weeks  or  months  of  trading. 
Ritter  suggests  three  possible  explanations  for  the  long-run 
underperformance:  risk  mismeasurement,  bad  luck,  and  fads.  However,  the 
empirical  evidence  does  not  support  the  first  two  explanations.  It  shows  that  there 
47 is  a  robust  tendency  that  firms  go  public  when  investors  are  overoptimistic  about 
firms'  prospects  so  that  investors  overpay  initially.  Then,  share  prices  are  corrected, 
as  more  information  becomes  available.  Therefore,  expected  long-run  returns 
decrease  in  initial  investors'  sentiment.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  result  of 
Aggarwal  and  Rivoli's  study. 
Later,  Loughran  and  Ritter  (1995)  extend  Ritter's  study.  They  argue  that 
firms  tend  to  make  IPOs  when  they  see  firms  in  the  same  industry  trading  at  high 
earnings  and  market-value  to  book-value  multiplies.  This  effect  is  reinforced  by 
the  positively  biased  marketing  campaign,  which  accompanies  the  share  offering. 
Investors  appear  to  value  issuing  firms  as  if  the  rapid  earning  growth,  which  they 
experience  in  the  period  before  the  offering,  will  continue  forever.  However,  in 
fact  this  rapid  growth  often  ends  shortly  after  the  offering.  They  also  suggest  that 
it  is  difficult  for  more  rational  investors  to  exploit  other  investors'  overvaluation  of 
IPO  stocks.  Other  explanations  are  firstly,  that  when  the  price  support  provided  by 
underwriters  are  withdrawn,  the  market  will  make  an  adjustment  and  this  result  in 
underperformance  of  IPO;  and  secondly,  it  is  difficult  at  the  best  of  times  to  control 
correctly  for  risk  over  long  time  horizons. 
Replicating  Ritter's  study,  Levis  (1993)  finds  that  the  pattern  of  returns  on 
UK  IPOs  is  remarkably  similar  to  that  of  US  issues.  This  phenomenon  is  also 
found  in  some  other  countries,  such  as  Finland,  Australia,  Brazil,  and  Canada, 
[Jenkinson  (1993),  Lee  et  al..  (1996)]. 
In  sum,  the  finding  that  IPOs  underperform  implies  that  the  costs  of  raising 
external  equity  capital  are  not  inordinately  high  for  these  firms.  The  high 
transaction  costs  of  raising  external  equity  capital  are  partly  offset  by  the  low 
realised  long-run  returns,  at  least  for  those  firms  going  public  at  times  when 
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predominate  among  firms  going  public  do  not  necessarily  face  a  higher  cost  of 
equity  capital  than  that  faced  by  more  established  firms. 
2.3.2.  Heterogeneous  expectations  hypothesis 
This  proposition  is  firstly  proposed  by  Miller  (1977).  In  his  theoretical 
explanation,  he  relaxes  the  assumption  of  homogenous  expectations  of  investors, 
hence  a  divergence  of  opinion  among  investors  arises.  He  argues  that  in  markets 
with  restricted  short  selling,  such  as  IPOs,  share  prices  are  determined  by 
overoptimistic  investors.  Over  time,  as  the  restriction  weakens  and  more 
information  becomes  available,  share  prices  are  corrected.  Hence,  he  posits  that  the 
greater  the  divergence  of  opinion  among  investors  will  translate  into  greater  short 
run  overvaluation  and  therefore  greater  long  run  underperformance. 
Using  three  proxies  of  divergence  of  opinions  (the  percentage  opening  bid- 
ask  spread,  the  time  of  the  first  trade,  and  the  flipping  ratio),  Houge  et  al..  (2001) 
examine  the  relation  between  the  divergence  of  opinion  and  the  long  run  return  of 
IPOs.  They  argue  that  these  variables  describe  the  uncertainty  faced  by  a  wide 
spectrum  of  IPO  market  makers,  which  in  turn  lead  to  opinion  deviation.  Using  a 
sample  of  2,025  US  IPOs  during  the  1993-1996  period,  they  find  that  IPOs  with  a 
high  proportion  of  flipping  activity,  wider  opening  spreads,  or  long  opening  delays, 
significantly  underperform  the  market  for  up  to  three  years  after  the  offering.  So, 
they  conclude  that  IPOs  with  greater  uncertainty,  will  exhibit  poor  long  run  return. 
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Carter  et  al.  (1998)  conduct  a  study  on  several  proxies  used  to  measure 
underwriter  reputation,  using  data  from  a  sample  of  IPOs  in  the  US  market  during 
1979-1991.  They  only  take  firm  commitment  offerings  with  domestic  offerings  of 
at  least  $2,000,000.  The  primary  method  used  to  examine  the  explanatory  power  of 
underwriter  reputation  measures  is  the  OLS  regression  with  initial  return  as 
dependent  variable  in  model  1  and  long-run  performance  as  dependent  variable  in 
model  2.  In  each  model,  they  run  a  number  of  underwriter  reputation  measures 
(from  Carter  and  Manaster  (CM),  1990;  Johnson  and  Miller  (JM),  1988;  and 
Megginson  and  Weiss  '  (MW),  1989)4  individually  as  well  as  simultaneously. 
Results  of  model  1  show  that  each  reputation  measure  is  significantly  related  to  the 
initial  return.  However,  only  the  CM  measure  remains  significant  when  evaluated 
simultaneously.  From  the  analysis  of  model  2,  they  also  find  that  on  average,  the 
long-run  performances  of  IPOs  are  less  negative  for  the  IPOs  that  are  brought  to 
market  by  more  prestigious  underwriters.  In  other  words,  they  find  that  the 
underperformance  of  IPO  stocks  relative  to  the  market  over  a  3-year  holding 
period  is  less  severe  for  IPOs  handled  by  more  prestigious  underwriters.  In  their 
recent  paper,  Logue  et  al.  (2002)  find  that  regardless  its  reputation,  underwriter 
activities  after-market  is  significantly  related  to  IPO  long-run  performance. 
4  Johnson  and  Miller  (JM)  measure  the  underwriter  reputation  based  on  their  descriptions,  such  as 
the  IPO  size,  the  number  of  IPOs  that  have  been  underwritten  since  Securities  Act  1933.  They 
categorise  the  investment  bankers  into  four  groups.  Megginson  and  Weiss  (MW)  use  the 
underwriter's  relative  market  sabre  as  a  proxy  for  underwriter  reputation.  Carter  and  Manaster 
(CM)  develop  ten-tier  reputation  measure  based  on  the  rank  of  the  underwriters  in  the  syndicate, 
which  is  presented  in  the  tombstone  advertisement. 
so The  role  of  another  agent  regarding  the  IPO  long-run  performance  has  been 
examined  by  Brav  and  Gompers  (1997).  They  investigate  the  long-run 
underperformance  of  US  IPO  firms  in  a  sample  of  934  venture-backed  IPOs  during 
1972-1992  and  3,407  nonventure-backed  IPOs  from  1975-1992.  It  is  found  that 
venture-backed  IPOs  outperform  nonventure-backed  IPOs  using  equal  weighted 
returns.  Value  weighting  significantly  reduces  performance  differences  and 
substantially  reduces  underperformance  for  -  nonventure-backed  IPOs.  They 
conduct  further  tests  using  several  comparable  benchmarks  and  the  Fama-French 
3-factor  asset-pricing  model.  They  find  that  venture-backed  companies  do  not 
significantly  underperform,  while  the  smallest  nonventure-backed  firms  do. 
However,  the  long-run  underperformance  is  not  an  IPO  effect  as  they  find  that  the 
matching  firms  with  similar  size  and  book-to-market  that  have  not  issued  equity 
perform  as  poorly  as  the  IPO  firms. 
In  sum,  the  agents  seemingly  have  an  important  role  in  affecting  the  IPO 
valuing  process  by  investors.  Previous  studies  show  that  prestigious  investment 
bankers  and  venture  capital  backing  of  IPOs  have  affected  the  IPO  valuation  in  the 
long-term. 
2.3.4.  Signalling  hypothesis 
As  mentioned  above,  the  signalling  hypothesis  demonstrates  that  in  order  to 
reveal  their  true  values,  firms  need  to  employ  some  signals  to  the  investors  prior  to 
flotation.  Although  it  is  meant  to  explain  the  IPO  puzzle  in  the  early  days  of 
trading,  there  are  some  implications  to  the  longer  time  horizons. 
As  the  signalling  models  assume  that  the  IPOs  are  followed  by  seasoned 
equity  offerings,  Jegadeesh  et  al.  (1993)  argue  firstly,  that  firms  raising  further 
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firms  in  the  long-term.  Secondly,  firms  that  underprice  exhibit  superior  post  listing 
returns  relative  to  those  that  do  not,  and  finally,  the  greater  their  quality,  the  more 
capital  firms  retain  initially,  and  the  better  they  perform  in  the  long-term. 
Therefore,  it  implies  that  there  are  at  least  three  testable  implications.  The  first  is 
that  there  is  a  positive  association  between  the  underpricing  and  the  long-run 
performance.  Secondly,  a  positive  relation  is  expected  between  the  quality  of  the 
firm  and  its  long-run  performance.  Finally,  there  is  an  expectation  of  a  negative 
relation  between  percentage  of  equity  retained  on  the  flotation  and  the  long-run 
performance. 
The  empirical  evidence  shows  mixed  results.  Using  US  data,  Welch  (1989) 
finds  that  firms  that  underprice  the  IPO  are  more  likely  to  return  to  the  market  for 
further  issues.  Further  more,  he  finds  that  those  IPOs  outperform  the  non-issuing 
firms.  However,  some  studies  show  that  firms  that  underprice  do  not  exhibit 
superior  post-listing  returns  relative  to  those  that  do  not.  (Ritter,  1991;  Jain  and 
Kini,  1994;  Ljunqvist,  1996). 
Using  Singaporean  data,  Koh  et  al.  (1996)  demonstrate  that  the  more  equity 
retained  by  the  old  shareholders  on  the  flotation,  the  better  the  IPO  long-run 
performance.  However,  based  on  Germany  data,  Ljungqvist  (1996)  fails  to  find 
support  for  that  proposition. 
2.3.5.  Problem  with  long-run  returns  measurement 
The  mixed  results  regarding  the  IPO  long  run  performance  may  be 
attributable  to  several  factors.  One,  which  is  debated  widely,  is  the  proper 
measurement  method  for  share  long  run  return.  A  growing  amount  of  literature 
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there  are  two  choices  of  long  run  return  measurement;  Cumulative  Abnormal 
Return  (CAR)  and  Buy  and  Hold  Return  (BHR). 
Testing  for  the  fairness  of  both  methods,  Barber  and  Lyon  (1996)  find  that 
the  CAR  method  suffers  from  measurement  bias,  as  it  is  a  biased  predictor  for 
BHR.  Consequently,  they  favour  the  use  of  the  BHR  method  in  tests  designed  to 
detect  long  run  abnormal  stock  returns. 
The  second  issue  in  long  run  performance  measurement  is  the  choice  of 
benchmarks.  There  are  several  benchmarks  used  in  such  event  studies;  the 
matching  control  firm  portfolios,  the  market  index,  and  Fama-French  three-factors. 
Barber  and  Lyon  (1997)  specify  some  biases  of  using  market  indices.  They  argue 
that  using  market  indices  would  lead  to  some  biases:  rebalancing  bias,  skewness 
bias,  and  new  listing  bias.  They  suggest  the  use  of  matching  control  firm  as  a 
benchmark,  as  a  control  firm  matched  to  sample  firms  on  the  basis  of  specified 
firm  characteristics.  However,  Kothart  and  Warner  (1997)  argue  that  the  use  of 
matching  control  firm  may  lead  to  another  bias,  referred  to  as  pre-event 
survivorship  bias. 
Finally,  scholars  also  discuss  the  power  of  statistical  tests  for  the  long  run 
abnormal  returns.  Loughran  and  Ritter  (1995),  and  Brav  (2000)  argue  that  the  test 
statistics  suffer  from  failure  of  independence  of  observations,  as  the  long-run 
performance  of  different  firms  may  be  correlated  in  calendar  time.  Jenkinson  and 
Ljunqvist  (2001)  take  an  example  of  internet  companies  during  the  bubble  period. 
This  will  tend  to  reduce  the  cross  sectional  variance  in  abnormal  returns. 
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A  study  on  IPO  long  run  performance  based  on  UK  data  is  conducted 
firstly  by  Levis  (1993).  He  investigates  the  UK  long-run  performance  of  a  sample 
of  712  UK  IPOs  floated  during  1980-1988.  He  recognizes  the  importance  of  the 
size  effect  for  UK  stocks  and  reports  long-run  abnormal  returns  based  on  three 
alternative  benchmarks:  the  Financial  Times  Actuaries  All  Shares  (FTA)  index,  the 
Hoare  Govett  Smaller  companies  (HGSC) index,  and  a  specially  constructed  all- 
shares  equally-weighted  index.  The  result  confirms  that  over  3  years  after  the 
flotation,  -IPOs  suffer  from  underperformance  of  between  -8%  and  -23% 
depending  on  the  market  benchmark.  Using  a  similar  method,  but  a  longer  time 
period  to  Levis'  study,  Khurshed  et  al.  (1999)  examine  the  UK  IPO  long-run 
performance  during  1991-1995.  They  find  an  average  of  -17.8%  abnormal  returns 
over  5  years  after  the  IPOs. 
Espenlaub  et  al.  (2000)  re-examine  the  long-run  performance  of  UK  IPOs. 
Using  more  up  to  date  data  (1985-1995),  they  compare  the  IPO  long-run  abnormal 
returns  based  on  a  number  of  alternative  methods:  CAPM,  Size  control  portfolio 
(SD),  Value  weighted  multi-index  using  HGSC  index,  Fama-French  value 
weighted  three  factor  model,  and  Ibbotson  Returns  Across  Securities  and  Times 
(RATS)  approach.  In  line  with  other  studies,  they  find  that  the  long-run  abnormal 
returns  vary  across  the  benchmarks.  The  result  shows  a  range  of  negative  and 
statistically  significant  abnormal  returns  over  60  months  after  the  IPO  dates  for 
CAPM,  SD,  Fama-French  factor,  and  RATS.  Slightly  negative  and  statistically 
insignificant  abnormal  returns  are  found  when  using  the  HGSC  index. 
In  addition  to  examining  the  UK  IPO  long-run  performance,  Khurshed  et 
A  (1999)  also  investigate  the  relationship  between  some  firms'  conditions  pre-IPO 
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IPO  is  a  function  of  the  managerial  decisions  and  performance  of  the  firm  prior  to 
going  public.  Similar  to  other  studies,  they  find  a  negative  and  strong  relation 
between  the  IPO  underpricing  and  the  long-run  performance  for  the  sample  as  a 
whole.  However,  when  the  sample  is  split  into  small  and  big  firms,  the  significance 
disappears  in  the  small  firm  sample.  They  also  find  a  negative  relationship  between 
the  firms'  pre-tax  profit  for  the  last  three  years  before  listing  and  the  long-run 
performance.  This  implies  that  firms,  which  gained  more  profits  before  the  listing, 
tend  to  underperform  the  market  after  3  years  traded.  Moreover,  they  find  some 
moderate  relations  between  the  IPO  long-run  performance  and  flotation  cost,  net 
asset  a  year  before  listing,  and  the  percentage  of  equity  retained  at  the  flotation 
date.  Interestingly,  they  find  that  the  long-run  performance  of  multinational 
companies  (MNCs)  is  better  than  domestic  companies.  However,  in  contrast  to 
other  studies  they  do  not  find  significant  evidence  for  the  relation  between  the 
underwriter  reputation,  firm  size,  and  the  long-run  performance. 
2.5.  Hot/Cold  market  anomaly 
The  last  anomaly  is  the  hot/cold  market  issue.  This  phenomenon  was  first 
documented  in  the  US  by  Ibbotson  and  Jaffe  (1975).  Besides  the  fact  that  there  are 
'hot/cold  issues'  markets,  they  also  examine  the  relationship  between  new  issue 
performance  in  a  calendar  month  and  the  performance  of  other  new  issues  in  the 
previous  calendar  month.  The  result  is  that  the  first  month  series  exhibits  strong 
serial  dependency,  indicating  that  'hot  issue'  markets  are  predictable.  Although  it  is 
sensible  for  the  issuers  to  go  public  in  the  `hot'  market  (as  the  investment  bankers 
often  advise  their  clients),  Ibbotson  and  Jaffe  argue  that  the  issuers  would  be  better 
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minimise  the  `amount  of  money  left  on  the  table'.  The  implication  to  the  investors 
is  to  avoid  IPOs  following  the  `cold'  market,  and  concentrate  their  investment  in 
those  months,  which  have  the  largest  premia. 
They  also  examine  the  relationship  between  the  number  of  offerings  and 
IPO  returns.  They  hypothesise  that  the  number  of  offerings  may  be  related  to  the 
past  level  of  returns.  The  regression  model  results  in  insignificant  regression 
coefficient.  Therefore  the  result  does  not  suggest  that  the  timing  of  new  issue 
offering  is  related  to  the  first  month  performance  of  the  IPO. 
Additionally,  they  examine  the  relationship  between  past  market 
performance  and  new  issue  returns.  However,  the  result  shows  there  is  not  any 
relationship.  Therefore,  the  market  index  cannot  be  expected  to  serve  as  a  useful 
guide  to  issuers  in  selecting  a  month  to  offer  their  issues. 
The  Ibbotson  and  Jaffe's  study  is  extended  by  Ibbotson  et  al.  (1994)  using 
longer  periods,  and  Ritter  (1984).  The  evidence  is  consistent  with  the  prior  study. 
Ritter  attempts  to  explain  the  `hot'  issue  using  Rock's  implication.  He  argues  that 
if  the  risk  composition  through  time  of  firms  going  public  is  correlated  then  this 
can  explain  the  time  series  correlation  of  initial  returns.  Hot  issue  markets  would 
be  a  result  of  a  higher  than  usual  proportion  of  risky  firms  coming  to  market  a  in 
given  period. 
Another  possible  explanation  for  hot  issue  markets  relies  on  irrationality  on 
the  part  of  investors  rather  than  issuers  and  their  advisers.  Hot  issue  markets  may 
exist  because  there  are  periods  when  investors  are  particularly  receptive  to  new 
issues.  During  these  periods,  investors  are  willing  to  pay  a  high  price  for  earnings 
and  market  to  book  multiples  for  new  issues.  Firms  rush  to  the  market  to  exploit 
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of  investors  regarding  the  prospects  of  these  firms  results  in  aftermarket  prices 
being  bid  above  intrinsic  values  and  high  initial  returns  are  observed.  (Byrne  and 
Rees,  1994) 
The  recent  studies  conducted  by  Loughran  and  Ritter  (2000)  has  given  a 
valuable  contribution  to  the  IPO  hot  market  puzzle.  They  argue  that  existing 
literatures  offer  no  explanation  that  is  consistent  with  investors'  rational  behaviour. 
Therefore,  they  propose  an  explanation  that  is  called  prospect  theory.  It  predicts 
that  when  the  market  rises,  there  will  be  an  increase  in  the  expected  underpricing 
of  all  IPOs  that  are  in  the  selling  period.  It  implies  that  short-term  abnormal  returns 
will  be  higher  following  market  rises,  and  this  effect  will  be  present  in  all  IPOs 
where  the  selling  period  includes  the  period  of  the  market  rise. 
2.6  Equity  Valuation 
Equity  valuation  models  in  the  finance  literature  are  generally  based  on 
Miller  and  Modigliani  (1961).  Miller  and  Modigliani  (MM)  posit  that  the  market 
value  of  a  firm's  common  equity  is  equal  to  the  discounted  value  of  present  and 
future  economic  earnings.  They  define  economic  earnings  as  earnings  minus  net 
investments,  and  the  discount  rate  as  the  required  rate  of  return  for  that  level  of 
risk. 
After  MM's  model,  equity  valuation  has  been  an  important  issue  both  in 
academia  and  practice.  Most  finance  textbooks  discuss  several  valuation  models, 
including  the  comparable  firm  approach,  the  discounted  cash  flow  (DCF) 
approach,  and  the  asset-based  approach  (Benninga  and  Sarig,  1997).  The 
comparable  firm  approach  is  typically  implemented  by  capitalising  the  earning  per 
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earnings  (P/E)  ratio  of  comparable  publicly  traded  firms.  Among  other  comparable 
multiples  usually  used  in  this  approach  are  market-to-book,  price-to-sale,  and 
price-to-operating  earnings.  The  DCF  approach,  which  is  heavily  based  on  the 
MM  model,  uses  the  future  cash  flow  and  appropriate  discount  rate  to  determine 
the  market  value  of  a  firm.  The  asset-based  approach  looks  at  the  underlying  value 
of  the  company's  assets  to  indicate  value. 
Based  on  the  residual  income  model  (RIM),  Ohlson  (1995)  propose  an 
alternative  valuation  model,  which  links  the  fundamental  accounting  information 
to  the  value  of  the  firm.  The  model  has  been  extensively  discussed  among 
accounting  and  finance  scholars.  Since  it  was  published  in  1995  up  to  1999,  an 
average  of  9  annual  citations  in  the  social  science  citation  index  (SSCI)  has  been 
found  (Lo  and  Lys,  2000).  Basically,  this  model  provides  a  simple  accounting 
based  equivalent  to  the  traditional  dividend  discounting  approach.  Its  contribution 
comes  from  his  modelling  of  the  information  dynamics.  Empirical  studies  using 
this  model  seem  to  work  very  well  (Lo  and  Lys,  2000). 
2.6.1.  Non-IPO  valuation 
The  Ohlson's  valuation  model  has  been  used  widely  for  non-IPO  'cases. 
Based  on  US  data,  Frankel  and  Lee  (1996)  find  a  robust  result  with  very  high  R2, 
suggesting  that  for  non-IPO  cases,  the  market  value  of  a  firm  is  strongly  related  to 
equity  value  and  earnings.  More  robust  evidence  is  found  by  Hand  and  Landsman 
(1998),  who  show  that  dividends  also  take  a  major  role  in  setting  the  market  price. 
Using  time  series  data,  Collins  et  al.  (1997)  examine  systematic  changes  in 
value  relevance  of  earnings  and  book  values  over  time.  In  contrast  to  practitioners' 
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earnings  and  book  value.  Although  they  vary over  time,  in  fact  they  appear  to  have 
increased  slightly.  The  empirical  result  also  shows  that  when  value-relevance  of 
earnings  decline,  it  is  replaced  by  increasing  value-relevance  of  book  values. 
Moreover,  they  find  that  among  other  factors,  the  increasing  frequency  of  negative 
earnings  explains  the  shift  in  value-relevance  from  earnings  to  book  values.  This 
confirms  previous  work  by  Hayn  (1995)  that  demonstrates  that  stock  prices  are 
affected  differently  by  negative  income,  as  compared  to  positive  income. 
The  impact  of  negative  earnings  (income)  on  valuation  is  also  observed  by 
Rees  (1999).  Using  UK  data,  he  corroborates  that  negative  income  affect  the  firms' 
values.  He  also  shows  that  incorporating  the  negative  income  variables  into  the 
valuation  model  results  in  shifting  the  value-relevance  from  net  incomes  to  equity. 
While  Collins  et  al.  (1997)  show  that  the  value-relevance  of  earnings  and 
book  values  vary  over  time,  Rees  (1998)  finds  that  they  also  vary  across  countries. 
Many  scholars  have  tried  to  simplify  the  Ohlson's  model  and  examine  the  impact 
of  different  firm  characteristics  on  the  parameter  estimates.  Fama  and  French 
(1998)  investigate  the  value  relevance  of  dividend  taxation  and  debts.  While  many 
capital  market  research  studies  offen  exclude  financial  firms  in  research  samples, 
Danbolt  and  Rees  (2002)  particularly  investigate  the  valuation  of  financial  firms  in 
Europe.  Using  some  fundamental  accounting  information,  they  find  that  the 
accounting  valuation  models  works  well  to  explain  the  variation  in  the  market  to 
book  ratio. 
Other  valuation  methods  used  widely  in  practice  are  the  comparable 
multiple  and  the  DCF  methods.  Kaplan  and  Ruback  (1995)  investigate  the 
accuracy  of  the  DCF  methods  to  estimate  firms'  market  values.  Using  3  CAPM- 
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reliable  estimation  of  firms'  value.  Moreover,  they  also  compare  the  result  with 
one  using  the  comparable-based  methods.  The  evidence  shows  that  the  DCF 
methods  perform  as  well  as  the  comparable-based  methods. 
Focusing  particularly  on  bankrupt  firms,  Gilson  et  al.  (2000)  employ  the 
DCF  and  comparable  multiple  methods.  They  find  that  these  methods  generally 
yield  unbiased  estimates  of  value,  however  the  range  of  valuation  errors  is  very 
wide.  They  argue  that  the  sources  of  errors  could  be  attributed  to  finding  the  proper 
discount  rate  or  the  long-term  growth  rate  as  well  as  the  lack  of  information  about 
bankrupt  firms. 
Assuming  that  greater  information  about  a  stock  increases  the  market's 
precision  in  valuing  stocks,  Ebenhart  (2001)  argues  that  the  comparable  multiples 
methods  facilitate  the  market  for  more  information  access.  Instead  of  using 
commonly  used  multiples  such  as  book-to-market,  price-to-cash  flow,  etc,  he 
proposes  a  new  simple  proxy  for  differential  information,  a  number  of  multiples 
provided  by  comparable  firms.  He  finds  a  negative  relationship  between  the 
amount  of  information  provided  by  comparable  firms  and  a  firm's  stock  return 
volatility,  suggesting  that  the  more  information  about  comparable  firms  available 
to  the  market,  the  more  accurate  the  stock  valuation. 
Recently,  Liu  et  al.  (2002)  examine  the  valuation  performance  of  a 
comprehensive  list  of  value  drivers.  They  find  that  multiples  derived  from  future 
earnings  estimation  explain  stock  prices  remarkably  well.  Other  value  drivers, 
which  work  well  are  cash  flow  measures  and  the  book  value  of  equity.  In  contrast 
to  other  studies,  they  find  that  historic  earnings  also  have  been  a  proficient  driver, 
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complex  measures  of  intrinsic  value,  however  the  value  performance  declines. 
2.6.2  IPO  Valuation 
As  discussed  above,  for  non-IPO  shares  there  are  a  number  of  valuation 
methods  used.  However,  the  choice  becomes  limited  when  it  is  applied  to  IPOs. 
Since  very  little  information  is  available  in  the  market  prior  to  flotation,  the  DCF 
methods  are  seldom  suitable.  Usually,  the  prospectuses  enclose  up  to  three  years 
financial  statements,  which  are  not  sufficient  to  have  appropriate  cash  flow 
forecasts.  Additionally,  IPO  firms  are  typically  young  firms  with  high  prospective 
growth  rate.  This  makes  it  even  more  difficult  to  determine  an  appropriate  discount 
rate. 
Another  valuation  method  is  the  comparable  firm  multiples  methods. 
According  to  McCarthy  (1999),  this  is  the  most  common  method  used  by  issuers 
and  sponsors  in  setting  the  IPO  offer  price.  Kim  and  Ritter  (1999)  investigate  the 
usefulness  of  the  comparable  firm  multiples  method  to  value  IPOs.  Firstly,  they 
use  price-earnings  ratios  as  a  denominator  of  an  IPO  market  price.  This  approach 
results  in  very  poor  precision  when  historical  accounting  numbers  are  used. 
However,  the  accuracy  of  the  valuation  improves  substantially  when  forecasted 
earnings  are  used.  They,  then,  test  other  multiples,  such  as  the  market-to-book, 
price-to-sale,  enterprise  value-to-sales  and  enterprise  value-to-operating  cash  flow. 
They  find  these  multiples  are  somewhat  more  accurate  than  the  use  of  historical 
accounting.  Furthermore,  they  experiment  using  two  types  of  benchmarks;  recent 
IPOs  in  the  same  industry,  and  a  portfolio  of  firms  chosen  by  a  leading  investment 
banker.  The  result  shows  that  the  accuracy  of  valuation  increases  when  the  latter 
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approach  is  popular,  other  information,  such  as  the  underwriter's  information 
regarding  market  demand  results  in  much  more  accurate  pricing. 
Closely  related  to  Kaplan  and  Ruback's  study  (1995),  Berkam  et  al.  (2000) 
examine  the  -  accuracy  of  the  comparable  firm  multiples  methods  and  the  DCF 
methods  in  valuing  IPOs.  Using  a  data  set  from  a  relatively  thin  market  (New 
Zealand  Stock'  Exchange),  they  use  forecasted  accounting  information  on  both 
methods.  Unsurprisingly,  in  line  with  Kaplan  &  Ruback  (1995),  they  find  that  both 
methods  have  similar  accuracy  in  valuing  IPOs.  However,  the  empirical  result 
depends  highly  on  the  benchmark  used.  They  conclude  that  using  the  market-based 
benchmark  produces  more  accurate  estimation  than  using  the  industry-based 
benchmark. 
As  discussed  above,  the  signalling  hypothesis  has  been  notable  in  IPO 
theory.  Downes  and  Heinkel  (1982)  are  amongst  others  who  investigate  the 
valuation  of  new  equity  offerings  in  relation  to  signalling  the  firm  value.  They  test 
the  Leland-Pyle  model  (1977)  using  US  IPO  data  during  1965-1969  and  find  that 
the  firms,  which  retain  high  fractional  ownership,  do  indeed  have  higher  values. 
They  argue  that  the  ownership  retention  at  the  IPO  signals  the  old  shareholders' 
believes  in  the  firms'  future  value.  The  old  shareholders  of  the  `good'  firm, 
therefore,  tend  to  retain  a  high  fraction  of  shares  at  the  IPO.  Hence  a  positive 
relationship  is  expected  between  the  ownership  retention  at  the  IPO  and  the  value 
of  a  firm.  As  mentioned  earlier  in  the  underpricing  section,  one  implication  of  the 
signalling  models  is  that  the  owners  of  the  good  firms  are  likely  to  retain  a  high 
fraction  of  the  ownership  at  the  IPO.  The  argument  is  that  the  management  use  the 
underpricing  to  signal  the  firm's  true  value,  in  expectation  to  have  a  higher  price  at 
62 the  subsequent  seasoned  equity  offerings.  The  old  shareholders  (owners)  ought  to 
retain  a  high  fraction  of  shares  in  order  to  offset  the  cost  of  underpricing  at  the 
SEOs. 
Based  on  Leland  and  Pyle's  (1977)  model,  Krinsky  and  Rottenberg  (1989) 
argue  that  the  net  proceeds,  as  indicated  in  the  offering  prospectus,  might  also 
convey  the  insiders'  private  information  regarding  the  future  planned  -projects  in 
the  firms.  Therefore,  it  is  regarded  as  a  signal  to  the  firm  value.  In  their  empirical 
investigation,  Krisnky  and  Rottenberg  (1989)  find  positive  relationships  between 
the  proceeds  and  the  IPO  (subscription  and  market)  prices.  Using  the  UK  USM 
data,  Short  and  Keasey  (1997)  also  finds  a  support  for  the  positive  net  proceeds- 
firm  value  relationship. 
Other  variables  employed  as  signals  to  the  value  of  IPO  are  such  as  auditor 
quality  (Beatty,  1989;  Datar  et  al.,  1991;  Feltham  et  al.,  1991),  and  investment 
banker  quality  (Titman  and  Trueman,  1986),  and  the  relationship  between  the 
issuers  and  the  banks  (Slovin  and  Young,  1990).  Others  use  the  firm's  accounting 
information,  such  as  the  earnings  forecast,  to  value  the  issue  (Kim  and  Ritter, 
1999;  Firth  and  Liau-Tan,  1998;  Keasey  and  McGuinness,  1991). 
While  Heinkel  (1982),  Ritter  (1984),  and  Clarkson  et  A.  (1991)  use 
financial  information  in  order  to  control  for  the  effects  of  sample  heterogeneity, 
Kim  et  al..  (1995)  focus  on  the  value  relevance  as  well  as  the  predictive  ability  of 
the  -information 
in  Korean  IPOs.  They  develop  two  regression  models.  The  first 
model  is  based  on  the  pricing  -formulae  prepared  by  the  Korean  authority,  which 
was  heavily  dependent  on  future  earnings,  net  asset  value  after  the  offerings,  and 
industry  characteristics.  The  second  model,  called  the  augmented  model  is  an 
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ownership  retention,  underwriters'  quality,  and  investment  level. 
The  empirical  result  shows  that  earnings  and  industry  characteristics  have 
positive  and  significant  relationships  with  the  market  price.  It  also  indicates  that 
these  variables  tend  to  have  a  significant  role  in  explaining  and  predicting  the  after- 
market  price.  However,  the  evidence  fails  to  detect  any  significant  relationship 
between  the  potential  signals  and  the  market  price. 
How  and  Yeo  (2001)  investigate  the  impact  of  earnings  and  dividend 
forecasts  on  the  pricing  of  Australian  IPOs.  They  argue  that  earnings  and  dividends 
disclosure  in  the  prospectus  minimise  the  IPO  information  asymmetry. 
Consequently,  they  postulate  that  earnings  and  dividend  forecasts  disclosure  is 
related  to  IPO  initial  valuation.  However,  the  empirical  evidence  does  not  support 
the  hypothesis.  They  explain  that  Brown  et  al.  's  (2000)  study  on  Australian  non- 
IPO  cases  finds  that  earnings  forecasts  are  subject  to  error  as  they  are  noisy 
estimates  of  future  cash  flows.  They,  consequently,  question  the  relevance  of 
forecast  information  in  the  valuation  process. 
Firth  (1998)  examines  the  role  of  profit  forecast  published  in  the  prospectus 
as  a  signal'  of  IPO  value.  His  previous  study  (Firth  et  al..,  1995)  shows  that 
historical  earnings,  which  are  required  to  be  disclosed  in  the  prospectus,  are  poor 
predictors  of  future  earnings  because  of  typically  fast  growth  of  the  IPO  firms. 
Moreover,  they  also  do  not  incorporate  the  effects  of  the  expanded  activities  of  the 
firm  financed  by  the  new  issue  proceeds.  Using  the  forecasted  earnings  disclosed 
in  the  prospectus,  the  study  finds  a  strong  positive  relationship  between  earning 
forecasts  and  IPO  market  valuation.  This  result  is  consistent  with  Clarkson  et  A. 
(1992),  who  use  Canadian  data. 
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the  prospectus  and  the  pricing  of  IPOs.  Her  motivation  is  to  examine  whether 
investors  could  use  the  prospectus  to  price  an  IPO.  Based  on  Modigliani-Miller 
(1966),  she  argues  that  equity  value  is  a  linear  function  of  accounting  earnings, 
book  value  of  equity,  expected  earning  growth,  and  market  or  firm  specific  risk 
factors.  She  posits  the  hypothesis  that  the  IPO  price  is  an  increasing  function  of 
earning  per  share,  book  value,  expected  growth,  and  a  decreasing  function  of  risk. 
Using  the  pre-IPO  accounting  information,  such  as  earnings  and  book  value,  she 
finds  that  some  accounting  information  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  are 
significantly  related  to  both  offer  and  one-week  prices.  This  result  seems  to  be 
different  from  Kim  and  Ritter  (1999).  Furthermore,  Klein  finds  that  the  offer  and 
one-week  prices  appear  to  be  significantly  related  to  the  percentage  of  equity 
retained,  the  underwriter  reputation,  and  whether  the  offer  includes  a  warrant  or 
not  (usually  referred  to  as  unit  IPOs).  In  general,  the  result  confirms  findings  of 
other  studies.  Another  robust  finding  is  that  the  prospectus  information  explains 
the  variation  of  the  offer  price  more  than  it  does  the  one-week  price.  This  implies 
that  having  traded  one  week  in  the  market,  other  information  revealed  is  also  taken 
into  consideration  in  valuing  the  newly  listed  firms.  While  studies  -  mentioned 
above  exhibit  the  important  role  of  earnings  forecast  information  on  the  IPO 
pricings,  DuCharme  et  al.  (2001)  argue  that  since  so  little  information  about  the 
firm  is  available  pre-IPO,  there  is  an  incentive  for  issuers  to  manipulate,  or 
manage,  the  reported  earnings.  Therefore,  they  posit  that  pre-IPO  earnings 
management  by  issuers  is  positively  related  to  the  initial  firm  value. 
Since  earning  management  is  an  unobservable  variable,  they  use  a  number 
of  management  of  accruals  as  proxies.  Using  171  IPOs  that  went  public  in  the  US 
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of  the  positive  relationship  between  the  earnings  management  and  the  IPO  offer 
price.  The  result  implies  that  the  issuers,  who  try  to  manage  the  accounting 
accruals  prior  to  IPO,  report  better  earnings  forecasts,  and  thus  have  a  high  initial 
price  in  the  market. 
In  the  second  part  of  their  study,  they  also  test  a  hypothesis  regarding  the 
relationship  between  the  earnings  management  and  the  subsequent  performance  of 
IPOs.  They  posit  that  pre-IPO  earnings  management  is  negatively  related  to  IPO 
returns  in  the  after-market.  However,  they  find  no  evidence  to  support  the 
hypothesis. 
Recently,  Beatty  et  al.  (2002)  investigate  the  IPO  pricing  based  on 
accounting  information.  They  focus  their  investigation  on  the  explanatory  power  of 
revenue,  accounting  earnings,  and  book  value  as  cash  flow  surrogates,  to  the  three 
IPO  prices  (the  offer  price,  the  filing  price,  and  the  initial  market  price.  They  try 
several  models  and  find  that  changes  in  models  result  in  big  differences  in  the 
explanatory  power  of  the  models.  They  conclude  that  the  modelling  is  more  critical 
with  IPOs  than  with  establish  firms. 
In  their  study,  three  general  models  are  developed.  The  first  model  is  the 
offer  price  against  the  accounting  information.  They  use  5  different  proxies  for  the 
offer  price  (unscaled  per  share,  unscaled  total  value,  total  value  scaled  by  book 
value,  total  value  scaled  by  revenue,  and  natural  log  of  total  value).  They  employ 
pre-IPO  earnings  per  share  and  pre-IPO  book  value  per  share  as  the  predictors.  The 
empirical  results  show  that  earnings  and  book  value  is  positively  and  significantly 
related  to  all  offer  price  proxies.  The  explanatory  power  of  the  model  varies  among 
the  different  offer  price  proxies.  The  earnings  and  book  value  explain  as  much  as 
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model.  This  suggests  that  the  historical  accounting  information  does  provide 
information  to  explain  the  variability  of  the  offer  price. 
Using  the  natural  log  of  total  value,  they  expand  the  model  by  including  a 
number  of  predictors  (revenue,  IPO  year  dummy,  percentage  of  shares  retained  at 
the  IPO,  and  the  residual  from  the  previous  natural  long  model).  They  also 
transform  the  earnings  and  book  value  data  to  the  natural  log  form.  They  find  all 
predictors  are  significant  and  of  expected  signs,  and  the  explanatory  power  rises  to 
75.05%. 
The  above  model  is  then  expanded  by  adding  pre-IPO  market  return  and 
the  natural  log  of  the  filing  price  as  new  predictors.  Such  inclusion  makes  a  big 
impact  to  the  change  of  model  explanatory  power.  It  rises  up  to  98.18%. 
Interestingly,  the  earnings,  book  value,  and  retained  ownership  coefficients 
become  negative  and  lose  their  significance.  Since  the  inclusion  of  filing  value 
captures  what  the  underwriters  thought  the  offer  price  would  be,  the  result  suggests 
that  underwriters  tend  to  overweight  the  importance  of  these  fundamental  variables 
when  setting  the  filing  price. 
The  following  analysis  in  their  study  is  of  the  market  value  model.  This 
model  relates  the  initial  market  price  and  the  accounting  information  and  control 
variables.  The  empirical  evidence  shows  that  all  three  fundamentals  are  negatively 
related  to  the  market  price.  They  argue  that  the  result  indicates  that  firms  with  high 
fundamentals  are  underpriced  to  a  lesser  degree  than  those  with  weaker 
fundamentals.  To  examine  whether  the  lower  market  price  is  a  result  of  risk 
adjustment,  they  develop  a  proxy  for  the  ex-ante  risk  measure.  They  find  that  the 
standard  deviation  of  the  after  market  returns  for  1  year  is  an  unbiased  proxy  to  the 
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impact  of  the  accounting  information,  risk,  size,  industry  on  the  initial  returns.  In 
addition,  the  model  also  includes  the  offer  value  residuals  to  investigate  the  partial 
adjustments.  The  results  show  that  the  accounting  information  is  significantly 
related  to  the  initial  returns.  They  also  find  a  positive  relationship  between  the  risk 
and  the  initial  returns.  A  positive  and  significant  coefficient  of  offer  value  residual 
confirms  the  partial  adjustment  made  by  the  underwriters  during  the  marketing 
period. 
In  sum,  there  are  several  equity  valuation  models  applied  in  the  literature, 
however  the  choice  becomes  limited  when  it  is  applied  to  IPOs  since  very  little 
information  about  the  firm  is  available  to  the  market  prior  to  the  admission.  The 
prospectus  is  regarded  as  the  most  comprehensive  information  about  the  issuing 
firms,  which  is  available  prior  to  the  IPOs.  Using  US  data,  Klein  (1996) 
investigates  the  usefulness  of  the  prospectus  information  on  the  IPO  pricing.  In 
line  with  Klein's  study,  this  study  examines  the  impact  of  the  prospectus 
information  on  the  IPO  offer  price  and  market  price.  The  prospectus  information  is 
defined  as  the  firm  accounting  fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  the 
signals.  The  basic  model  used  is  the  accounting-based  valuation  model,  which 
analyses  the  impact  of  the  firm  accounting  fundamentals  on  the  IPO  prices. 
Following  prior  studies  (e.  g.,  Beatty  and  ritter,  1986;  Krinsky  and  Rottenberg, 
1989),  the  research  model  is  expanded  by  including  the  risk  factors  and  the  signals. 
2.7  Risk 
As  mentioned  in  the  Introduction  chapter,  one  of  this  study's  objectives  is 
to  investigate  the  relationship  between  the  IPO  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  its 
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studies  in  finance  regarding  risks. 
2.7.1.  Risk  conceptualisation 
The  two  key  factors  in  any  investment  decision  are  return  and  risk.  Under 
the  assumption  that  investors  are  risk-averse  and  seek  to  minimise  the  risk  for  any 
level  of  expected  return,  intuition  suggest  that  additional  return  must  compensate 
investors  for  assuming  additional  risk  (Aaker  and  Jacobson,  1987). 
In  classical  decision  theory,  risk  is  defined  as  reflecting  variation  in  the 
distribution  of  possible  outcomes,  their  likelihood,  and  their  subjective  values.  In 
statistical  term,  that  definition  is  known  as  variation,  or  its  derivative,  standard 
deviation. 
March  and  Shapira  (1987)  conduct  research  regarding  manager 
perspectives  on  risk.  They  argue  that  in  the  managerial  perspective,  the  managers 
see  risk  in  ways  that  are  less  precise  and  different  from  risk  as  it  appears  in 
decision  theory.  Firstly,  most  managers  do  not  treat  uncertainty  about  positive 
outcomes  as  an  important  aspect  of  risk.  They  treat  risk  as  a  danger  or  hazard  in 
their  businesses.  Secondly,  risk  is  not  primarily  a  probability  concept.  In  their 
study,  a  majority  of  managers  felt  that  risk  could  be  better  defined  in  terms  of 
amount  to  lose,  or  expected  to  be  lost.  Thirdly,  managers  seek  precision  in 
estimating  risk.  Most  managers  show  little  desire  to  reduce  risk  to  a  single 
quantifiable  construct. 
Although  definitions  of  risk  abound,  there  is  a  common  notion  that  these 
definitions  attempt  to  convey  that  risk  is  associated  with  the  chance  of  something 
undesirable  happening.  Mocks  and  Vertinsky  (1985)  argue  that  undesirable 
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as  zero  separating  gains  from  losses;  or  (2)  reference  points  provided  by  a  specific 
problem  context  and  rules,  perhaps  professional  standards  specifying  reasonable 
levels  of  report  accuracy;  or  (3)  programs  used  by  decision  maker  and  risk 
assessors  to  formulate  the  problem  while  solving  it  such  as  target  profits  set  by 
corporate  plans. 
2.7.2  Some  important  studies  on  risk 
The  study  regarding  risk  has  been  an  important  and  long  discussion  topic  in 
several  areas,  such  as  economic,  finance,  and  strategic  management.  In  the 
economic  area,  risk  is  usually  related  to  the  choice  under  uncertainty  conditions.  It 
is  Irving  Fisher  (1906)  who  firstly  discussed  the  uncertainty  of  future  asset  returns 
that  is  described  in  terms  of  a  probability.  However,  the  most  fundamental  theory 
on  risk  is  Knight's  study  (1921)  that  discusses  risk  versus  uncertainty.  The  theory 
says  that  risk  exists  when  the  economic  agent  can  assign  numerical  probabilities  to 
events  in  a  certain  situation.  If  the  probabilities  cannot  be  assigned,  then 
uncertainty  exists.  Referring  to  previous  studies,  Hicks  (1934)  suggests  that 
preferences  for  investments  could  be  represented  as  preferences  for  the  moments  of 
the  probability  distributions  of  their  returns.  He  also  proposes  that  preferences 
could  be  represented  by  indifference  curves  in  mean-variance  space.  Then,  this 
study  is  expanded  by  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern's  study  (1947),  which  is  well 
known  as  `The  Expected  Utility  Theory'.  Within  this  theory,  an  individual's 
attitude  towards  risk  is  reflected  in  the  shape  of  his  or  her  utility  function. 
Eventually,  Hick's  study  has  led  to  the  spread  of  risk  research  to  other  disciplines. 
(The  New  Palgrave  Dictionary  of  Money  and  Finance,  1994). 
70 In  the  finance  area,  risk  is  usually  discussed  in  the  context  of  modern 
portfolio  theory.  Markowitz  (1952)  assumed  explicitly  that  investor  preferences 
were  defined  over  the  mean  and  variance  of  the  aggregate  portfolio  return,  which 
could  be  referred  to  as  risk-return  analysis.  After  that,  several  studies  try  to  relate 
investor  preferences  with  the  expected  utility  theory  [Markowitz  and  Tobin  (1958), 
Merton  (1969),  Samuelson  (1970)].  They  find  similar  conclusions  that  the  investor 
preference,  which  is  known  as  the  mean-variance  preferences,  is  applicable  to  the 
certain  part  of  his  or  her  expected  utility  function. 
This  finding  leads  to  the  famous  Tobin's  analysis  (1958),  which  deals  with 
the  choice  between  a  single  risky  asset  and  cash.  He  demonstrates  that  there  is 
nothing  essential  changed  if  there  are  many  risky  assets  as  they  can  be  treated  as  a 
single  composite  asset.  Tobin's  theory  is  known  as  the  first  separation  theorem  in 
portfolio  theory.  Sharpe  (1964)  and  Lintner  (1965)  develop  the  Tobin's  theory. 
They  propose  the  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  (CAPM). 
In  his  study,  Sharpe  builds  a  model  that  explains  the  relationship  between 
the  risk  and  the  expected  return  of  a  risky  asset.  The  term  systematic  risk  was 
firstly  introduced  in  this  paper.  This  type  of  risk  describes  the  portion  of  an 
investment's  total  risk  that  cannot  be  avoided  by  combining  it  with  other 
investments  in  a  diversified  portfolio.  Because  it  cannot  be  avoided,  investors 
require  compensation  for  bearing  systematic  risk.  The  other  part  of  total  risk  is  the 
unsystematic  risk,  which  is  related  to  factors  that  are  unique  to  specific 
investments.  Investors  do  not  require  compensation  for  this  component  of  risk 
because  it  can  be  avoided  by  diversification. 
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The  CAPM  is  a  significant  asset  pricing  model,  not  only  because  it  was  the 
first  equilibrium  model  of  asset  pricing  under  uncertainty,  but  also  because  it 
shows  the  importance  of  portfolio  separation  for  tractable  equilibrium  models. 
Many  scholars  attempt  to  test  the  CAPM  empirically.  They  find  some  support  for 
the  theoretical  model.  (Black,  Jensen  and  Scholes,  1972;  Fama  and  Macbeth, 
1973).  However,  with  different  time  periods,  there  have  been  some  mixed  results 
as  well  (Banz,  1981;  Basu,  1983;  Rossenberg  et  al.,  1985;  Chan  et  al.,  1991).  Fama 
and  French's  study  (1992)  attempts  to  test  the  model  empirically.  Using  50  years 
of  data  on  stock  prices  on  three  major  US  exchange  markets,  they  find  mixed 
results.  There  has  been  a  positive  relationship  between  beta  and  stock  returns 
during  the  1926-1968  period,  however  for  the  entire  period  of  1926-1990  they  find 
no  relationship  between  beta  and  returns.  This  result  has  been  discussed  in  the 
Roll's  (1977)  analytical  study.  He  argues  that  the  positive  relationship  between 
beta  and  returns  will  be  obtained  if  and  only  if  the  market  proxy  is  exactly  on  the 
mean-variance  efficient  frontier.  If  the  market  proxy  is  off  the  efficient  frontier, 
that  relationship  may  be  null.  Since  the  exact  efficient  frontier  can  never  be 
verified,  he  concludes  that  CAPM  is  of  little  practical  use  in  explaining  stock 
returns. 
The  other  area  that  usually  involves  risk  in  the  studies  is  strategic 
management.  Many  scholars  use  the  CAPM  concept  in  strategic  management 
literature.  The  considerable  logic  in  directly  applying  CAPM  concepts  to  problems 
in  strategic  management  is  when  discussing  about  corporate  diversification 
strategy  or  in  situations  where  maximisation  of  stockholders  wealth  is  taken  as  the 
primary  objective  of  the  firm. 
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employed  one  or  more  of  the  measures  of  systematic  risk,  unsystematic  risk,  or 
alpha  to  represent  an  independent  variable  in  the  models  [Montgomery  &  Singh 
(1984),  Aaker  &  Jacobson  (1987),  Lubatkin  &  O'Neill  (1988),  Barton  (1988), 
Lubatkin  &  Chaterjee  (1991)].  They  directly  incorporated  the  CAPM  paradigm  of 
risk  in  research  directed  at  clarifying  the  relationships  among  diversification 
strategies  and  risk. 
In  their  study,  Montgomery  and  Singh  (1984)  find  that  related  and 
unrelated  diversifiers  differ  along  the  risk-return  relationship.  The  unrelated 
diversifiers  tend  to  have  higher  levels  of  systematic  risk  than  the  related 
diversifiers  do.  They  predict  that  high  systematic  risk  associated  with  the  unrelated 
diversification  might  be  attributed  to  low  market  power,  low  capital  intensity,  and 
high  debt  position.  Barton  (1988)  conducted  a  study  that  explicitly  tests  the 
relationship  between  those  three  variables  and  diversification  strategy.  The  result 
supports  the  previous  work. 
In  reviewing  strategic  management  articles  involving  risk  during  1980- 
1995,  Ruefli  et  al.  (1999)  find  there  are  53  studies  employing  the  CAPM 
systematic  risk  as  a  company  risk  measure.  This  shows  that  the  market  based  risk 
measure,  as  determined  in  the  finance  area,  is  generally  accepted  by  strategic 
management  scholars. 
The  CAPM  implies  that  unsystematic  risk  should  not  influence  investors' 
decision.  However,  in  a  strategic  context,  Aaker  and  Jacobson  (1987)  argue  that 
managers  should  not  ignore  this  type  of  risk.  The  justification  is  that  two  of  CAPM 
assumptions  are  inappropriate  to  strategy  decisions.  Firstly,  the  assumption 
regarding  investors  as  price  takers,  who  can  invest  as  much  as  they  like,  by  using 
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bounded  with  the  feasibility  of  the  portfolio  in  the  market.  This  implies  that  if 
investors  do  not  find  the  expected  returned  for  their  investment  by  diversification, 
they  might  take  the  unsystematic  risk  into  consideration  in  their  investment 
decisions. 
Secondly,  CAPM  assumes  that  bankruptcy  cost  is  zero  and  firms  can  sell 
their  assets  at  their  economic  value.  However,  if  a  firm  goes  bankrupt,  it  may  have 
to  sell  assets  at  prices  below  market  price  because  of  legal  fees,  expensive  delays, 
or  a  premature  collapse  of  sales.  Therefore,  in  turn,  investors  may  need  additional 
return  to  compensate  for  those  costs.  This  implies  that  to  avoid  bearing  those 
additional  costs,  investors  should  invest  in  low  unsystematic  risk  firms. 
Bettis  and  Hall  (1982)  argue  that  managers  should  be  concerned  primarily 
with  the  unsystematic  risk.  The  management  of  this  risk  is  at  the  heart  of  strategic 
management.  Further,  Aaker  and  Jacobson  (1987)  also  argue  that  there  are  some 
incentives  for  managers  to  reduce  unsystematic  risks,  such  as  bonuses  or  job 
security. 
In  their  study,  Aaker  and  Jacobson  (1987)  investigate  the  relationship 
between  systematic  risk,  unsystematic  risk,  and  firm  performance.  They  find  that 
both  components  of  total  risk  have  substantial,  significant,  and  different  effects 
upon  firm  performance.  The  relationship  between  performance  and  systematic  risk 
is  found  to  be  positive  and  significant,  while  the  relationship  between  performance 
and  unsystematic  risk  is  found  to  be  positive  but  not  significant. 
A  number  of  scholars  employ  Jensen's  alpha  [Johnson  et  al.  (1987), 
Lubatkin  &  Rogers  (1989),  Amit  &  Wernerfelt  (1990),  Nayyar  (1992),  Woo  et  al. 
74 (1992),  Hoskisson  (1993)].  They  have  similar  results,  which  show  that  business 
risk  has  a  negative  effect  on  firm  value. 
2.7.4.  Accounting-based  risk  measures 
Ruefli  et  al.  (1999)  also  record  the  variance  as  the  second  most  widely  used 
measure  of  risk  in  strategic  management  articles.  What  they  mean  with  variance  is 
simply  the  variance  of  time  series  of  accounting  returns.  Beaver  et  al.  's  study 
(1970)  is  among  the  first  articles  that  discuss  the  accounting  based  risk  measures. 
The  motive  behind  their  study  is  that  there  are  some  variances  in  security  prices, 
which  cannot  be  explained  by  CAPM.  They  argue  that  although  CAPM  provides  a 
measure  of  security  riskiness,  the  knowledge  of  risk  determination  is  incomplete  if 
the  exogenous  data  (non-price  data)  is  unknown.  Therefore,  by  examining  some 
accounting  based  risk  measures,  they  expect  to  shed  some  light  to  the  risk 
determination.  The  other  reason  why  they  investigate  the  accounting  risk  measures 
is  that  the  accounting  measures  are  used  widely  by  investors  as  proxies  for 
company  risk.  In  this  study,  they  also  attempt  to  know  to  what  extent  a  strategy 
selecting  portfolios  according  to  the  traditional  accounting  risk  measures  is 
equivalent  to  the  market  based  risk  measures. 
Unlike  CAPM,  which  can  divide  the  total  risk  into  its  two  important 
components,  the  accounting  risk  measures  can  be  viewed  as  surrogates  for  the  total 
variability  of  return  of  a  firm's  equity  securities.  Thus,  accounting  measures  reflect 
both  the  systematic  and  unsystematic  risk.  Additionally,  Bildersee  (1970)  argue 
that  the  accounting  data  can  be  considered  as  a  summary  of  all  company  events 
and  decisions.  As  such,  it  summarises,  in  some  form,  information  basic  to  the 
measurement  of  total  risk  associated  with  the  firm  and  with  the  securities 
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between  the  accounting  risk  measure  and  the  market  beta. 
The  study  using  accounting  data  faces  a  problem  of  selection  of  the 
appropriate  accounting  data  and  financial  ratios.  This  problem  arises  as  usually 
such  ratios  are  often  highly  correlated.  To  avoid  such  a  problem,  Bildersee  (1975) 
suggests  selecting  only  one  ratio  from  each  class  of  ratios.  In  their  study,  Beaver  et 
al.  (1970)  investigate  7  accounting  risk  measures:  dividend  payout,  asset  growth, 
leverage,  liquidity,  asset  size,  variability  of  earnings,  and  the  covariability  in 
earnings. 
It  is  often  affirmed  that  firms  with  low  dividend  payout  ratios  are  more 
risky.  This  can  be  justified  as  follows:  if  the  firm  sets  a  stable  dividend  payout 
policy,  then  firms  with  greater  volatility  of  earnings  will  pay  out  a  lower 
percentage  of  expected  earnings.  Therefore,  the  payout  ratio  can  be  viewed  as  a 
proxy  for  management's  perception  of  the  uncertainty  linked  to  the  firm's  expected 
earnings. 
Asset  growth  is  defined  as  the  average  of  the  annualised  rate  of  change  in 
assets  over  the  time  period.  Expectedly,  the  more  new  assets  invested  within  the 
firm,  the  more  earnings  they  produce.  However,  Beaver  et  al.  (1970)  argue  that  the 
addition  of  new  assets  to  the  firm  could  mean  an  increasing  uncertainty  in  expected 
returns.  Therefore,  they  presume  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  the 
asset  growth  and  company  risk. 
Modigliani  and  Miller  (1965)  show  that  the  introduction  of  debt  to  the 
firm's  capital  structure  induces  greater  volatility  of  the  firm's  earning  stream  for 
ordinary  shares.  It  could  be  inferred  that  the  firms'  debt  affects  the  riskiness  of  the 
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greater  the  risk. 
Compared  to  fixed  assets,  current  assets  can  be  reckoned  to  have  less 
volatile  return.  However,  the  relationship  between  current  assets  and  current 
liability  has  a  similar  pattern  to  that  of  leverage.  Therefore,  it  could  be  conjectured 
that  the  less  liquid  the  firm,  the  greater  the  risk.  However,  it  is  presumed  that  the 
relationship  between  liquidity  and  risk  tends  not  to  be  as  high  as  that  between 
leverage  and  risk  (Beaver  et  al.,  1970). 
It  is  widely  believed  that  larger  companies  are  less  risky  than  smaller 
companies.  In  term  of  default  risk,  the  evidence  shows  that  the  chance  of  failure 
has  been  lower  for  the  large  size  companies  (Assadian  and  Ford,  1997). 
Additionally,  Ballantine  et  al.  (1993)  argue  that  firm  size  reflects  the  uncertainty  in 
the  firm's  profit  and  loss  rates.  They  find  that  small  firms  have  greater  variations  in 
profits  than  large  firms  do.  In  their  seminal  paper,  Fama  and  French  (1993)  also 
identify  the  firm's  size  as  one  of  the  risk  factors  in  the  common  stock  returns. 
As  firm's  earnings  have  been  a  main  focus  in  risk,  Beaver  et  al.  (1970) 
include  the  variability  in  earnings  in  their  analysis  as  a  measure  of  risk.  The  proxy 
used  is  the  standard  deviation  of  the  earning  price  ratio.  The  higher  standard 
deviation  of  the  earnings  price  ratio  describes  increasing  risk.  They  also  include  the 
accounting  beta  into  the  analysis.  It  can  be  derived  in  a  similar  manner  to  the 
market  beta  with  the  earning  price  ratio  as  dependent  variable  and  the  market- 
earning  price  as  the  independent  variable  and  is  defined  as  the  sensitivity  of  firm's 
share  price  to  the  changes  in  the  market  index.  The  higher  value  of  accounting  beta 
infers  that  the  share  price  is  more  sensitive  to  the  market  index  changes,  which 
reflects  the  high  riskiness  of  the  firm's  value. 
77 In  his  study,  Bildersee  (1975)  employ  10  accounting-based  risk  measures: 
the  asset-to-equity  ratio,  the  debt-to-equity  ratio,  the  preferred-to-common  equity 
ratio,  the  current  ratio,  the  sales-to-equity  ratio,  the  cash  flow  per  debt  plus 
preferred  ratios,  equity,  asset  growth,  the  standard  deviation  of  the  earning-price 
ratio,  and  the  accounting  beta. 
In  terms  of  the  source  of  company  risk,  there  are  some  similarities  between 
the  approaches  used  by  Beaver  et  al.  (1970)  and  Bildersee  (1975).  Both  studies 
agree  with  leverage,  profitability,  "  liquidity,  asset  growth,  and  the  earnings  stream 
as  sources  of  company  risk.  However,  Bildersee  put  the  efficiency  and  coverage  of 
fixed  obligations  as  other  sources  of  risk.  They  also  differ  in  employing  financial 
ratios  to  those  sources  of  risk. 
Both  studies  also  end  up  with  similar  conclusions  regarding  the  association 
between  accounting-  and  market-based  measures  of  risk.  They  find  a  high  degree 
of  association  between  both  types  of  risk  measures.  Additionally,  Beaver  et  al. 
state  that  a  strategy  of  selecting  accounting  risk  measures  is  essentially  equivalent 
to  a  strategy  of  ranking  those  same  portfolios  according  to  market-determined  risk 
measures. 
Although  focusing  mainly  on  risk  with  regard  to  corporate  strategic 
management,  Miller  and  Bromiley  (1991)  also  employ  some  accounting  risk 
measures.  They  identify  nine  measures  of  risk  that  have  been  used  in  research 
relevant  to  the  strategic  management  area:  systematic  risk,  unsystematic  risk,  the 
debt  to  equity  ratio,  capital  intensity,  R&D  intensity,  the  standard  deviation  of 
return  on  assets  (ROA),  return  on  equity  (ROE),  stock  analysts'  earning  forecasts, 
and  the  coefficient  of  variation  of  stock  analysts'  earnings  forecasts.  They  group 
the  variables  into  three  categories:  stock  return,  financial  ratios,  and  income  stream 
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risk  most  relevant  to  general  management.  Factor  two,  stock  return  risk,  captures 
risk  from  the  perspective  of  shareholders.  Factor  three;  strategic  risk  has  risk 
implications  for  multiple  external  stakeholders  groups. 
Similar  to  previous  studies,  Miller  and  Bromiley  argue  that  the  debt-to- 
equity  ratio  is  a  standard  measure  of  corporate  financial  leverage,  which  reflects  a 
company's  risk  of  bankruptcy.  The  second  financial  ratio  employed  is  the  capital 
intensity.  This  measure  is  not  included  in  previous  studies.  Miller  and  Bromiley 
argue  that  capital  intensity  increases  company  risk  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  if  a  firm 
choose  to  produce  a  given  output  with  high  capital  intensity  and  low  amount  of 
labour,  it  increases  its  fixed  costs  and  lowers  its  variable  costs.  Thus,  it  increases 
company  risk.  Secondly,  a  firm  using  a  large  amount  of  capital  runs  a  high  risk  of 
capital  obsolescence.  There  have  been  some  studies  that  attempt  to  seek  the 
relationship  between  capital  intensity  and  variability  in  returns  (Lev,  1974;  Hurdle, 
1974).  Hurdle  finds  a  negative  association  between  capital  intensity  and  variability 
in  returns.  In  contrast,  Lev  (1974)  finds  a  positive  association  between  those 
variables.  The  different  findings  seem  to  stem  from  different  ratios  employed. 
While  Hurdle  uses  the  ratio  of  capital  to  sales  as  a  proxy  for  capital  intensity,  Lev 
uses  the  ratio  of  fixed  costs  to  variable  costs.  The  first  ratio  shows  that  the  higher 
the  ratio,  the  riskier  the  firm.  The  second  one  shows  the  higher  the  ratio,  the  less 
risky  the  firm.  In  Miller  and  Bromiley's  study,  the  ratio  of  total  assets  to  sales  is 
employed  as  a  proxy  for  the  capital  intensity. 
The  third  accounting  risk  measure  used  is  R&D  intensity.  This  reflects  the 
extent  to  which  a  company  chooses  to  develop  new  processes  or  products.  Miller 
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firm  face  some  level  of  uncertainty  regarding  its  investment  in  R&D. 
The  last  accounting  risk  measures  used  in  Miller  and  Bromiley's  study  are 
the  standard  deviation  of  ROE  and  ROA.  These  measures  are  used  in  some 
previous  studies  [Bowman  (1980),  Fiegenbaum  &  Thomas  (1985),  Woo  (1987)]. 
Moreover,  Miller  and  Bromiley  try  to  compare  the  risk  measures.  Before 
processing  the  risk  measures  into  the  model,  they  run  the  factor  analysis  method. 
The  result  of  the  principal  component  analysis  shows  that  several  distinct  empirical 
risk  factors  exist  and  are  stable  over  time.  Hence,  three  risk  factors,  income  stream 
risk,  stock  return  risk,  and  strategic  risk,  are  substantially  different  and  valid.  This 
result  implies  that  the  three  risk  factors  could  be  used  as  separate  independent  risk 
measures. 
Although  the  arguments  above  highlight  some  advantages  of  accounting  risk 
measures,  there  are  some  limitations  in  using  them  as  company  risk  measures.  The 
critiques  emphasise  that  a  mean-variance  approach  of  the  firms'  incomes,  to 
estimating  the  relationship  between  return  and  risk,  suffers  from  an  identification 
problem  (Ruefli,  1990).  Moreover,  the  accounting  returns  reflect  past  investment 
decisions.  They  also  do  not  appropriately  capture  the  expected  future  cash  flow 
that  a  firm's  stock  of  assets  could  generate.  Finally,  the  differences  in  tax  laws 
across  industries  and  in  accounting  conventions  regarding  R&D  and  advertising 
expenses  may  distort  accounting  based  measures  (Amit  and  Wenerfelt,  1990). 
2.7.5.  Risk-return  relationship 
Most  investment  textbooks  explain  the  positive  association  between  risk 
and  the  expected  return  of  an  asset.  The  riskier  the  assets,  the  higher  the  expected 
80 return.  However,  studies  of  the  influence  of  risk  and  performance  have  yielded 
mixed  result.  Bowman  (1980)  finds  a  negative  association  between  risk  and 
returns.  In  his  study,  he  employs  the  variance  in  returns  as  a  risk  measure.  Testing 
Bowman's  (1980)  risk-returns  paradox,  Fieganbaum  and  Thomas  (1985)  find  that 
the  risk-return  relationship  varied  over  time.  In  a  subsequent  study  in  1986,  they 
find  no  association  between  the  systematic  risk  of  a  firm's  stock  returns  and  returns 
that  is  measured  using  accounting  data.  Aaker  and  Jacobson  (1987)  find  a  positive 
relationship  between  firm  performance  and  its  total  risk.  In  this  research,  they  use 
an  accounting  risk  measure,  the  variance  of  the  firms'  earnings,  as  a  proxy  for  the 
risk,  and  the  return  of  the  firms'  share  in  the  market,  as  a  proxy  to  the  firm's 
performance. 
Using  different  explanatory  variables,  Miller  and  Bromiley  (1990) 
categorise  risk  into  three  groups  (income  stream  uncertainty,  stock  return  risk,  and 
strategic  risk).  They  also  use  industry  classification  as  a  dummy  variable  in  the 
model.  The  accounting  earnings  figure  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  firms'  performance. 
The  empirical  evidence  shows  that  there  is  a  negative  association  between  income 
stream  risk  variables  and  performance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  association  between 
the  strategic  risk  and  performance  varies  across  industries  and  performance  levels. 
They  find  no  relationship  between  the  stock  return  risk  and  performance. 
From  the  above  findings,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  risk-return 
relationship  depends  on  the  risk  and  returns  measures  employed  in  the  study.  This 
implies  that  different  measures  may  capture  different  dimensions  of  risk. 
Furthermore,  the  relations  among  risk  measures  and  between  risk  and  performance 
may  vary  over  time  and  across  industries. 
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There  have  been  few  IPO  studies  investigating  the  relationship  between  the 
risk  and  IPO  valuation  and  performance.  Based  on  the  timing  and  the  risk  measure, 
such  studies  could  be  classified  into  2  groups.  The  first  group  is  studies  that  use  the 
ex-ante  risk  and  the  second  is  ones  that  use  the  ex-post  risk.  Below  is  the  review  of 
such  studies.  The  former  group  of  studies  is  explained  after  the  review  of  the  latter. 
Ritter's  study  (1984)  is  the  initial  study,  which  examines  the  relationship 
between  uncertainty  and  IPO  underpricing  in  the  US  market.  In  this  study,  he 
argues  that  the  ex  post  uncertainty  is  positively  correlated  to  the  degree  of 
underpricing.  He  employs  the  standard  deviation  of  daily  returns  for  days  two 
through  five  as  a  proxy  for  the  ex  post  risk  measure.  The  empirical  result  to  this 
argument  finds  a  significant  positive  correlation  coefficient  between  this  risk 
measure  and  the  degree  of  underpricing. 
Using  a  sample  of  510  US  IPOs  that  went  public  in  1982-1983,  Miller  and 
Reilly  (1987)  also  investigate  the  relationship  between  the  uncertainty  and  the 
underpricing.  They  use  the  ex-post  and  ex-ante  measures  of  risk.  The  ex-post  risk 
employed  is  measured  by  two  proxies,  the  trading  volume  and  the  bid-ask  spread 
They  argue  that  the  level  of  trading  may  signify  the  extent  to  which 
investors  disagree  about  the  value  of  a  security.  If  the  underpriced  issues  are 
subject  to  the  greatest  uncertainty,  this  would  'imply  that  they  should  exhibit 
greater  trading  volume.  They  use  daily  trading  volume  as  a  proxy  for  the 
uncertainty.  The  empirical  result  is  robust.  The  evidence  shows  that  the 
underpriced  issues  experience  significantly  higher  volume  for  days  two  through 
five. 
82 The  bid-ask  spread  is  known  to  be  a  function  of  inventory  risk  and  adverse 
information  risk.  Inventory  risk  depends  upon  the  price  volatility  and  the  number 
of  trades  for  each  issue  in  inventory.  Adverse  information  risk  affect  the  bid-ask 
spreads  since  market  makers  are  obliged  to  trade  with  investors  who  might  possess 
superior  information.  The  larger  bid-ask  spread  exists  when  informed  investors  are 
present.  This  implies  that  the  initial  spread  should  be  greater  for  IPOs  that  are 
underpriced  because  informed  investors  are  involved  in  these  offerings. 
In  order  to  examine  the  relationship  between  the  inventory  risk  and  the 
underpricing,  they  use  the  absolute  value  of  daily  returns  as  a  proxy  for  price 
volatility  and  the  daily  volume  as  a  proxy  for  the  frequency  of  trades.  The  result 
shows  that  on  day  one  the  underpriced  issues  have  a  significantly  larger  positive 
price  volatility  coefficient  and  a  larger  negative  trading  volume  coefficient. 
However,  this  result  is  not  significant  for  days  two  through  five.  As  there  is  no 
explicit  measure  of  adverse  information  risk  in  the  model,  they  do  not  test  this  risk. 
In  addition  to  the  ex-post  risk  measure,  Miller  and  Reilly  (1987)  also 
employ  the  ex-ante  risk,  which  is  proxied  by  the  use  of  the  inverse  of  gross 
proceeds.  They  likewise  find  a  significant  positive  correlation  between  the  ex  ante 
uncertainty  and  the  degree  of  underpricing.  They  also  find  a  significant  positive 
correlation  between  the  ex  ante  uncertainty  and  the  degree  of  underpricing. 
Carter  et  al.  (1998)  investigate  the  relationship  between  risk,  the  IPO 
underpricing  and  the  long-run  performance.  Using  the  standard  deviation  of  daily 
IPO  returns  for  a  year,  they  find  that  the  IPO  ex-post  risk  is  related  positively  to 
the  degree  of  underpricing  and  negatively  to  the  IPO  long-run  performance.  This 
result  implies  that  the  uncertainty  during  the  early  IPO  period  produces  the 
improper  pricing  in  this  period.  In  the  long  run,  with  more  information  available, 
83 the  pricing  error  is  corrected  by  the  market,  which  is  shown  by  the  declining  IPO 
returns. 
Based  on  the  source  of  risk,  the  above  studies  employ  measures  using  the 
IPO  prices,  returns,  and  trading  volume  data,  which  are  the  results  of  the  investors' 
actions.  However,  for  helping  investors  in  pricing  IPOs,  it  is  more  useful  to 
examine  the  ex-ante  risk.  Below  is  a  review  of  prior  IPO  studies  that  use  the  ex- 
ante  risk.  Most  of  the  risk  indicators  used  in  the  studies  is  related  to  the  firm 
specific  risk  or  business  risk. 
Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  attempt  to  relate  the  ex  ante  uncertainty  and  the 
IPO  performance.  They  argue  that  as  the  value  of  an  issue  would  not  be  revealed 
until  it  is  traded,  the  IPO  contains  ex  ante  uncertainty.  As  the  ex  ante  uncertainty 
increases,  the  winner's  curse  problem  among  investors  intensifies.  Following 
Rock's  study  (1986),  the  uninformed  investors  will  only  submit  purchase  orders,  if, 
on  average,  the  IPOs  are  underpriced.  Consequently,  in  the  case  of  an  issue  with 
greater  ex  ante  uncertainty,  the  uninformed  investors  demand  more  money  be  `left 
on  the  table'.  In  other  words,  the  greater  the  ex  ante  uncertainty,  the  greater  the 
degree  of  underpricing.  Furthermore,  they  emphasise  that  the  ex  ante  uncertainty, 
which  leads  to  the  underpricing,  does  not  correspond  to  the  CAPM  concept  of 
systematic  risk. 
In  order  to  test  the  hypothesis  empirically,  Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  employ 
two  proxies  for  the  ex  ante  uncertainty:  the  log  of  one  plus  the  number  of  uses  for 
the  proceeds,  and  the  reciprocal  of  the  gross  proceeds.  Most  issuers  disclose  their 
intention  of  the  usage  of  net  proceeds  received  from  the  flotation  in  their  IPO 
prospectuses.  In  the  UK  listing  rules,  the  Financial  Service  Authority  requires  the 
disclosure  of  such  information  in  the  prospectus  (FSA,  2001).  Following  Rock 
84 (1986),  Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  argue  that  providing  investors  with  the  number  of 
proceeds  usage  reduces  the  uncertainty,  which  leads  to  reduction  in  IPO  risk.  The 
evidence  shows  that  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  number  of 
proceeds  usage  to  the  degree  of  underpricing. 
The  second  proxy  for  the  ex  ante  uncertainty  is  the  reciprocal  of  the  gross 
proceeds.  They  argue  that  gross  proceeds  reflect  the  firm's  size.  It  is  understood 
that  large  firms  are  less  risky  than  the  small  ones.  The  results  confirm  the  positive 
relationship  between  the  uncertainty  and  the  degree  of  underpricing.  Moreover,  an 
implication  of  this  finding  is  that,  if  the  level  of  ex  ante  uncertainty  is  endogenous, 
an  issuer  has  an  incentive  to  reduce  this  uncertainty  by  voluntary  disclosing 
information. 
Recently,  Leone  et  al.  (2003)  investigate  the  disclosure  of  intended  use  of 
proceeds  and  the  underpricing  in  more  detail.  They  assess  the  paragraphs  in 
prospectuses,  which  explain  the  firms'  intentions  regarding  the  use  of  the  proceeds. 
They  categorise  the  IPOs  into  7  classes  of  usage,  such  as  paying  debt,  paying  old 
shareholders,  investment,  marketing,  working  capital,  R&D,  and  others.  Their  first 
interesting  finding  is  that  IPOs  that  disclose  higher  percentage  of  proceeds  to  any 
specific  use,  tend  to  have  lower  initial  return,  while  IPOs  that  vaguely  disclose 
such  information  tend  to  have  higher  initial  returns.  The  second  result  is  that  the 
use  of  proceeds  for  paying  debt  and  investment  is  significantly  related  to  the 
underpricing.  The  implication  of  this  is  that  specific  information  disclosed  prior  to 
the  IPO  leads  to  reducing  the  uncertainty  and  then  the  error  in  IPO  pricing. 
Other  studies  (Simunic  and  Stein,  1987;  Beatty  and  Welch,  1996)  employ 
the  number  of  risk  factors  provided  in  the  prospectus  as  a  proxy  to  IPO  risk. 
Usually,  the  risk  factors  mentioned  in  the  prospectus  are  firm  specific  risks,  such  as 
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means  reducing  uncertainty,  the  greater  number  of  risk  factors  shows  increasing 
firm  riskiness.  Both  studies  use  US  data  and  find  a  significant  positive  association 
between  the  number  of  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  initial  returns. 
Klein  (1996)  hypothesises  that  the  IPO  value  is  a  decreasing  function  of 
firm  risk.  This  implies  that  the  riskier  the  IPO,  the  lower  the  price.  Having 
examined  a  number  of  proxies  for  risk  used  in  the  IPO  studies,  she  claims  that  they 
may  mislead  the  result  interpretation.  In  contrast  to  Beatty  and  Welch  (1996),  she 
disagrees  with  the  use  of  the  number  of  risks  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  as  a  proxy 
for  firm  risk.  Such  a  proxy  implies  that  a  firm,  which  discloses  4  types  of  risk  in 
the  prospectus,  is  twice  as  risky  as  another,  which  reports  2  types  of  risk.  She 
argues  that  it  misleads,  as  it  is  not  always  the  case.  Therefore,  she  proposes  a 
dummy  variable  as  a  proxy  for  risk.  In  her  research  design,  she  assigns  dummy  1 
for  IPOs,  which  have  a  boldface  risk  reference  on  the  prospectus  cover,  and  0 
otherwise.  She  argues  that  the  disclosure  of  the  risk  reference  on  the  prospectus 
cover  shows  the  issuers'  concerns  of  the  business  risk  that  they  face.  Therefore,  it 
should  draw  the  investors'  attention  when  they  buy  the  IPOs. 
Using  a  sample  of  193  IPOs  during  the  period  1980-1991  on  the  NYSE,  the 
results  on  the  offer  and  market  price  show  support  for  the  hypothesis,  which 
confirms  the  negative  relationship  between  firm  risk  and  the  offer  and  market 
prices. 
The  studies  reviewed  above  use  risk  measures  derived  directly  from  the 
prospectus  provided  by  issuers.  There  are  a  couple  of  studies  that  try  to  use  several 
risk  measured  derived  from  the  accounting  information  which  is  also  disclosed  in 
the  prospectus. 
86 Myers  and  Majluf  (1984)  investigate  the  corporate  financing  and 
investment  decisions  under  information'  asymmetry.  For  their  IPO  sample,  they 
find  that  debt  does  not  play  a  signalling  role  to  the  firm's  value.  Their  analysis 
implies  that  leverage  increases  with  the  extent  of  information  asymmetry.  Since 
prior  studies  show  a  positive  relationship  between  underpricing  and  information 
asymmetry,  they  postulate  that  underpricing  is  positively  related  to  the  debt  ratio. 
In  line  with  Myers  and  Majluf  (1984),  Su  (1999)  examines  the  role  of  pre- 
IPO  leverage  in  explaining  the  underpricing  puzzle.  He  employs  three  different 
proxies  (the  debt  to  total  asset  ratio,  the  debt  to  equity  ratio,  and  the  debt  to  net 
asset  ratio).  Using  a  data  set  from  China,  he  finds  a  similar  result  to  the  above 
study.  The  evidence  shows  that  firm's  pre-IPO  leverage  is  positively  related  to  the 
degree  of  underpricing  (or  IPO  initial  returns).  However,  only  the  debt  to  net  asset 
ratio  is  found  to  be  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  initial  return. 
A  similar  study  using  UK  data  is  conducted  by  Khurshed  et  al.  (1999). 
They  use  the  pre-IPO  debt  ratio  as  a  proxy  for  the  firm  financial  "risk  among  other 
explanatory  variables  to  explain  the  variation  in  IPO  long-run  performance.  They 
find  a  negative  relationship  between  the  debt  ratio  and  IPO  buy  and  hold  returns. 
However,  the  relationship  appears  to  be  insignificant. 
In  contrast  to  the  two  studies  above,  Hedge  and  Miller  (1996)  argue  that  the 
firm's  pre-IPO  debt  has  an  important  role  in  signalling  the  firm's  value.  They 
argue  that  prior  to  going  public,  the  issuers  of  high-quality  firms  use  debt  to  signal 
inside  information  about  the  expected  value  and  standard  deviation  of  returns  on 
assets.  A  larger  debt  ratio  allows  the  issuers  of  high-quality  firms  to  increase  the 
expected  return  on  equity.  Therefore,  debt  is  a  credible  signal  of  firm  quality.  This 
87 argument  is  in  line  with  Slovin  and  Young  (1990),  who  find  that  low-risk  firms 
signal  their  type  by  borrowing  prior  to  IPO. 
Based  on  this  argument,  Hedge  and  Miller  (1996)  posit  three  hypotheses. 
Firstly,  they  expect  that  the  risk  of  a  firm  is  a  decreasing  function  of  its  pre-IPO 
debt  ratio.  Secondly,  the  expected  value  of  a  firm  is  an  increasing  function  of  the 
level  of  its  pre-IPO  debt.  And  thirdly,  the  degree  of  underpricing  is  negatively 
related  to  the  pre-IPO  debt  ratio.  To  test  these  hypotheses,  they  use  the  post-market 
value  of  equity  (i.  e.,  the  number  of  shares  outstanding  times  the  first  day  closing 
price)  as  a  proxy  to  the  firm  value,  the  standard  deviation  of  daily  share  returns 
over  the  first  15  trading  days  as  a  proxy  for  the  firm  risk.  They  employ  2  measures 
for  debt;  the  level  of  pre-IPO  book  value  of  debt  and  the  debt  ratio,  which  is 
computed  as  the  pre-IPO  book  value  of  debt  divided  by  the  sum  of  debt  and  post- 
market  value  of  equity. 
Using  890  IPOs  in  the  US  during  the  period  1981-1985,  they  find  that  there 
is  a  negative  and  slightly  significant  association  between  the  firm's  risk  and  the 
pre-IPO  debt  ratio.  Moreover,  they  find  robust  results  for  the  second  and  third 
hypotheses.  The  level  of  pre-IPO  debt  appears  to  be  positively  related  to  the  post- 
IPO  firm's  value,  and  the  pre-IPO  debt  ratio  is  negatively  related  to  the  degree  of 
underpricing.  This  result  implies  that  the  leverage  plays  a  significant  role  in  IPO 
signalling. 
Conclusion 
IPO  literature  documents  three  anomalies  in  the  market;  the  persistent 
underpricing,  the  long-run  underperformance,  and  the  hot  market.  There  is  no 
single  consensus  hypothesis  that  could  explain  the  anomalies.  The  current 
88 explanations  of  the  underpricing  are  mostly  based  on  the  information  asymmetry 
among  the  market  participants,  which  leads  to  mis-pricing  the  IPOs  on  the  early 
days  of  trading. 
Although  the  evidence  of  the  long-run  underperformance  of  IPOs  is  less 
consistent  than  the  underpricing  facts,  some  studies,  assuming  markets  are 
efficient,  suggest  that  the  anomaly  is  a  result  of  a  market  correction  of  the  IPO  mis- 
pricing.  The  hot  market  anomaly,  so  far,  is  only  confirmed  in  studies  of  the  US 
market.  The  current  explanations  are  also  related  to  the  investors'  behaviour  in 
certain  economic  states,  which,  in  turn,  results  in  the  underpricing  and  eventually 
in  the  long-run  underperformance. 
This  study  aims  to  fill  some  gaps  in  the  literature.  Firstly,  this  is  the  first 
UK  study  to  use  the  accounting-based  valuation  model.  Most  IPO  valuation  studies 
investigate  the  pricing  of  the  IPO  on  the  first  trading  day,  only  few  attempts  to 
examine  the  offer  price  (e.  g.,  Klein,  1996;  Beatty  et  al.,  2002).  This  study  offers  an 
explanation  of  the  pricing  of  the  UK  IPOs  both,  at  the  firm  level  and  the  market 
level.  Finally,  most  IPO  studies  try  to  examine  the  association  of  the  IPO 
underpricing  and  the  long  run  performance.  This  study  examines  the  relationship 
between  the  IPO  pricing  and  the  underpricing,  and/or  the  association  between  the 
IPO  pricing  and  the  underpricing  and  the  long  run  performance,  in  the  hope  that  it 
could  provide  new  explanations  to  the  IPO  anomalies. 
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Research  Design 
Introduction 
This  chapter  will  explain  the  research  methods  and  the  data  used  to  carry 
out  the  investigation  into  IPO  valuation  and  performance  in  the  UK  main  market. 
A  number  of  IPO  valuation  models  have  been  discussed  in  the  literature  review 
as  well  as  current  explanations  regarding  IPO  performance.  The  next  section 
outlines  and  discusses  the  research  models  used  in  this  study.  The  exposition 
includes  a  discussion  of  the  theoretical  foundations  of  the  models,  the  IPO 
valuation  models,  the  initial  return  models,  and  the  long  run  performance 
models.  This  chapter  also  describes  and  defines  each  research  variable  used  in 
the  empirical  models.  The  working  hypotheses  that  the  IPO  valuation  and 
performance  models  are  designed  to  evaluate  are  presented  in  the  second  section. 
This  is  followed  by  a  section  that  discusses  the  research  methods  used,  the  main 
features  of  the  UK  institutional  framework,  and  the  sample  of  IPOs  used  in  the 
empirical  analysis. 
3.1.  Research  models 
This  section  discusses  the  models  used  in  this  study.  The  section  starts 
with  a  discussion  of  the  theoretical  foundation  on  which  the  empirical  models  are 
based.  This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  empirical  models  for  IPO 
valuation,  short-run  performance  and  long  run  performance. 3.1.1.  Theoretical  Foundations 
Going  public  is  often  a  long  and  hectic  process  for  a  firm  that  wishes  to 
raise  funds  by  offering  its  shares  to  the  public.  There  is  a  long  list  of 
requirements  that  have  to  be  fulfilled  before  a  firm  can  obtain  permission  to  list 
its  shares  on  the  stock  market.  One  requirement  is  to  disclose  all  relevant 
information  to  the  public  in  a  document,  called  the  prospectus. 
According  to  the  UK  Listing  Authority,  a  prospectus  for  the  admission  of 
shares  must  contain  a  list  of  information  items,  including  the  issuer's  assets  and 
liabilities,  financial  position,  profit  and  losses,  and  also  the  recent  development 
and  prospects  of  the  f  irm.  (The  Listing  Rule,  Chapter  6). 
Prior  studies  have  examined  the  role  of  fundamental  accounting  figures 
(for  example,  pre-IPO  and  forecasted  earnings,  pre-IPO  and  pro-forma  book 
value,  pre-IPO  and  forecasted  dividend),  which  are  disclosed  in  the  prospectus, 
on  IPO  valuation  (Korean  market:  Firth,  1995;  Firth  et  al,  1998;  US  market: 
Klein  (1996);  Kim  and  Ritter,  1999).  From  both  regulatory  and  empirical 
perspectives,  the  impact  of  fundamental  analysis  on  IPO  valuation  and  long  run 
performance  is  of  central  importance  and  it  would  therefore  be  valuable  to 
undertake  further  examination  of  these  issues. 
As  discussed  in  the  literature  review,  most  IPO  studies  agree  that  the  IPO 
underpricing  is  an  increasing  function  of  risk  (Beatty  and  Ritter,  1986;  Clarkson 
and  Simunic,  1994;  Klein,  1996;  Houge  et  al,  2001).  Moreover,  it  can  also  be 
concluded  that  some  variables  reported  by  issuing  firms  can  serve  as  effective 
signals  regarding  firm  value  (see  Welch  (1989),  Carter  (1990)). 
This  study  aims  to  investigate  the  impact  of  prospectus  information  that  is 
proxied  by  the  firm's  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  signals,  which  are 
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in  the  UK  main  market.  The  IPO  valuation  is  examined  using  an  accounting- 
based  valuation  model.  To  the  researcher's  knowledge,  none  of  the  prior  IPO 
studies  employ  this  model.  This  study  also  examines  the  impact  of  IPO  pricing 
factors  on  the  performance  in  the  short  run  as  well  as  in  the  long  run.  Keasey  and 
Short  (1992)  investigate  the  association  between  the  degree  of  underpricing  and 
the  level  of  ex-ante  uncertainty  in  the  USM  market  during  1984-1988.  This  study 
will  analyse  the  impact  of  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals,  which 
are  disclosed  in  the  offering  prospectus,  on  the  initial  returns  (the  degree  of 
underpricing)  in  the  UK  main  market  during  1987-1997.  Additionally,  this  study 
also  investigates  the  relationship  between  the  prospectus  information  and  the 
long  run  performance,  which  are  defined  as  the  investors'  abnormal  returns  in 
subsequent  years.  Before  discussing  the  empirical  models  used  in  this  study,  the 
theoretical  foundation  will  be  explained  first. 
A  general  motivating  assumption  behind  this  and  most  other  models  of 
financial  decision  making  is  that  investors  are  risk  averse.  In  IPO  cases,  it  is  also 
usually  assumed  that  the  issuers'  objective  when  making  an  offering  is  to 
maximise  the  number  of  shares  sold  and  their  price  in  order  to  obtain  the 
maximum  possible  amount  of  funds  from  new  investors  (Loughran  and  Ritter, 
2002).  Based  on  those  assumptions,  the  pricing  of  IPOs  is  (or  should  be)  affected 
by  firms'  ex  ante  risk  characteristics.  In  order  to  persuade  investors  to  buy  riskier 
IPOs,  issuers  and  sponsors  need  to  offer  an  incentive,  which  is  a  lower  price. 
Therefore,  it  can  be  inferred  that  riskier  IPOs  are  priced  lower  than  less  risky 
IPOs. 
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based  on  their  assessment  of  a  firm's  ex  ante  risk  characteristics.  As  investors 
tend  to  avoid  buying  riskier  assets,  the  demand  for  riskier  IPOs  can  be  expected 
to  be  lower  than  the  demand  for  less  risky  IPOs.  Hence,  holding  the  supply  of 
IPOs  constant,  the  market-determined  price  of  riskier  IPOs  would  be  lower  than 
the  market  prices  of  their  less-risky  counterparts.  As  the  number  of  shares  of  all 
IPOs  is  limited,  there  are  some  investors,  who  will  be  left  with  riskier  IPOs. 
However,  they  would  not  be  prepared  to  bid  the  same  price  as  for  the  less  risky 
IPOs.  As  a  result,  the  market  determines  lower  prices  for  riskier  IPOs.  Therefore, 
in  line  with  Klein's  hypothesis  (1996),  it  could  be  posited  that  IPO  prices  (the 
offer  prices  and  the  market  prices)  are  a  decreasing  function  of  firms'  ex  ante 
risk  factors. 
Most  IPO  signalling  studies  show  evidence  of  the  role  of  underpricing  as 
a  signal  of  firm  value.  They  conclude  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
the  degree  of  undepricing  and  firm  value.  Based  on  the  risk-return  relationship 
theory,  in  order  to  be  induced  to  hold  riskier  assets,  investors  demand  a  higher 
return  from  such  investments.  Since  the  degree  of  underpricing  will  be 
negatively  related  to  the  expected  rate  of  return  for  investors  who  buy  the  shares 
at  the  offering  price  and  then  sell  them  at  the  first  day  closing  price,  it  could  be 
posited  that  investors  demand  a  higher  degree  of  underpricing  for  riskier  IPOs. 
In  the  long  run,  as  more  information  about  the  quality  of  the  firm 
becomes  available  in  the  market,  the  relationship  between  the  ex-ante  risk  factors 
and  IPO  pricing  is  anticipated  to  weaken.  However,  the  relationship  is  expected 
to  follow  the  general  risk-return  hypothesis,  which  posits  a  positive  association 
between  risk  and  expected  returns. 
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also  examines  the  relationship  between  a  number  of  signals  and  the  IPO  prices 
and  performance.  In  IPOs,  issuing  firms  try  to  reveal  the  firm  value  by 
signalling.  From  the  firms'  point  of  view,  firm  value  is  not  determined  solely  by 
reference  to  current  information,  but  rather  the  future  prospects  of  the  firm  is  also 
relevant.  Since  issuers  are  "insiders"  that  are  better  informed  about  the  firms' 
prospect  than  potential  outsider  investors,  the  insiders  of  firms  with  good 
prospects  will  be  motivated  to  reveal  (i.  e.,  signal)  this  valuable  inside 
information  to  prospective  investors.  If  the  signal  works  effectively,  it  should 
influence  investors'  decision  making  in  respect  of  IPO  pricing,  and  perhaps  be 
associated  with  reduced  mispricing.  If  the  signal  influences  the  IPO  pricing 
process,  it  can  be  expected  to  consequently  also  affect  IPO  performance  in  the 
short  run  and  possibly  also  in  the  long  run. 
3.1.2.  The  basic  IPO  valuation  model 
As  discussed  in  the  literature  review,  many  studies  use  different  methods 
in  valuing  IPOs.  From  a  practical  perspective,  McCarthy  (1999)  argues  that  the 
IPO  pricing  process  contains  both  science  and  art.  The  scientific  part  enters  the 
process  when  the  underwriters  and  issuers  utilise  historical  information  provided 
by  the  firm  to  set  the  IPO  price.  The  art  component  comes  when  market 
information  such  as  price-earnings  multiples  of  comparable  firms  are  taken  into 
consideration  to  value  the  IPO.  From  an  academic  point  of  view,  Kim  and  Ritter 
(1999)  analyse  the  usefulness  of  the  comparable  firms'  multiple  methods.  They 
find  that  the  comparable  firms  multiple  methods  are  helpful.  However,  they 
conclude  that  adding  the  information  regarding  market  demand  into  the  analysis 
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find  that  the  comparable  firms  multiples  and  the  DCF  methods  provide  similar 
accuracy  levels  in  explaining  the  IPO  prices.  Using  UK  USM  data,  Keasey  and 
Short  (1997)  examine  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  a  number  of 
signals,  in  particular  focusing  on  the  retained  equity. 
This  research  will  employ  different  valuation  methods  from  the  studies 
discussed  above.  Richardson  and  Tinaikar  (2004)  argue  that  the  role  of  the 
accounting  based  valuation  model  has  been  of  fundamental  interest  to  analysts, 
investors  and  researcher  alike.  The  accounting  based  valuation  model, 
principally,  argues  that  the  value  of  the  firm  is  a  function  of  its  book  value  of 
equity  and  the  earnings. 
There  have  been  many  empirical  models  based  on  the  accounting  based 
valuation  model  (e.  g.,  Easton  and  Harris,  1991;  Ohlson,  1995;  Francis  and 
Schipper,  1999).  Some  of  them  expand  the  model  by  including  a  number  of  firm 
characteristics,  such  as  negative  earnings  (Collins  et  al.,  1997;  Rees,  1999), 
capitalisation  and  leverage  level  (Rees,  1997),  or  taxes  (Fama  and  French,  1998). 
While  the  applications  of  the  accounting  based  valuation  model  have  been  used 
widely  in  non-IPO  cases,  to  date  it  has  been  relatively  little  used  in  IPO  studies. 
The  advantages  of  using  the  application  of  the  accounting-based 
valuation  model  to  IPOs  can  be  explained  as  follows.  Firstly,  unlike  the 
comparable  firms  multiples  and  the  DCF  methods,  this  model  is  much  simpler, 
as  it  does  not  require  information  regarding  other  firms  nor  cash  flow 
forecasting,  which  are  rarely  available  for  young  IPO  firms.  Secondly,  the  model 
allows  the  inclusion  of  other  characteristics  of  the  firms,  such  as  IPO  firms. 
95 The  basic  valuation  model  used  in  this  research  is  based  on  price  as  a 
function  of  book  value  of  equity  and  earnings  (Easton  and  Hams,  1991),  as 
expressed  below: 
P=f  (BV,  E)  (1) 
P  is  the  IPO  price  per  share.  Since  there  are  two  different  levels  of  IPO 
prices,  the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price,  P  is  defined  as  the  offering 
price  (Po)  and  the  initial  market  price  (P1).  BV  is  the  book  value  of  equity  and  E 
is  earnings. 
Prior  studies  show  that  the  inclusion  of  negative  earnings  to  the  valuation 
model  allows  us  to  differentiate  the  impact  of  the  loss  making  firms  on  the 
valuation  (Hayn,  1995;  Collins  et  al,  1997;  Rees,  1999).  Since  most  IPO  firms 
are  young,  it  is  expected  that  some  of  them  have  not  produced  profits  at  the  time 
of  the  IPO.  Hayn  (1995)  argues  that  firm's  losses  are  less  informative  than 
profits  about  firm's  future  prospects.  Her  study  also  proves  that  pooling 
profitable  and  loss  making  firm  observations  in  the  sample  leads  to  a  downward 
bias  in  the  estimated  earnings  response  coefficient.  Therefore,  it  is  reasonable  to 
control  for  the  negative  earnings  impact  byý  including  a  dummy  for  negative 
earnings  (D)  and  the  interactive  term  (D  *E)  into  the  model. 
Using  non-IPO  firm  data,  Rees  (1997)  finds  that  dividends,  as  a  proxy  for 
permanent  income,  give  a  significant  and  positive  signal  to  the  firm  value.  The 
research  sample  in  this  study  is  drawn  from  the  UK  main  market,  which  includes 
big  and  small  firms.  Most  big  firms  paid  dividends  prior  to  the  IPOs  and 
disclosed  the  dividends  forecast  in  the  prospectus,  while  most  small  firms  did  not 
pay  dividends  prior  to  the  IPOs  nor  promised  any  dividend  in  the  near  future. 
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examine  whether  the  dividends  contains  signalling  information  to  the  firm  value. 
With  inclusion  of  the  dummy  for  negative  earnings,  the  interactive  term 
and  the  dividends,  the  basic  valuation  model  could  be  expressed  as 
P=f(BV,  E,  D,  D*E,  Div)  (2) 
where  P  is  the  offer  (initial  market)  price,  BV  is  the  book  value  of  equity,  E  is 
earnings,  D  is  a  negative  earnings  dummy,  D*E  is  an  interactive  term,  and  Div  is 
the  proforma  dividends. 
To  implement  equation  (2)  to  the  empirical  model,  a  number  of 
considerations  are  taken  to  suit  the  IPO  firms.  Firstly,  when  the  issuers/sponsor 
set  up  the  offering  price,  they  base  the  pricing  on  the  enlarged  number  of  shares 
(the  number  of  firm  shares  following  the  admission),  and  so  does  the  market  on 
the  first  trading  day.  Therefore,  other  explanatory  factors  should  be  based  on  the 
enlarged  number  of  shares'.  Secondly,  prior  IPO  literature  show  that  the  future 
accounting  number,  such  as  book  value  of  equity  post  IPO  (Kim  and  Ritter, 
1999)  and  earnings  forecasts  (Firth  et  al,  1998)  have  a  higher  predictability 
power  to  the  valuation  than  the  historic  accounting  numbers.  Plausibly,  it  could 
also  be  argued  that  since  IPOs  are  typically  young  and  high  growth  firms,  the 
expected  future  figures  are  likely  to  be  more  important  than  the  reported  pre-IPO 
figures. 
Considering  the  arguments  above,  the  empirical  basic  IPO  valuation 
model  can  be  written  as, 
P;  =aopBV,  +alfE;  +  a2  D;  +  a3D*jEi+a4pDivl+e  (3) 
Thanks  to  Professor  Michael  Brennan  for  this  valuable  comment  in  an  informal  meeting  with 
PhD  students  at  Strathclyde  University,  2000. 
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pro-forma  book  value  of  equity  per  share  of  IPO  i,  fE1  is  forecasted  earnings  per 
share  (EPS)  of  IPO  i,  Di  is  a  dummy  variable  for  forecasted  negative  earnings,  it 
takes  1  where  EPS  is  negative,  D*JEI  is  an  interactive  term  between  the  negative 
earnings  dummy  variable  and  forecasted  EPS,  pDiv;  is  pro-forma  dividend  per 
share  of  IPO  i2,  and  61  is  the  error  term. 
It  is  mentioned  earlier  that  the  research  sample  that  is  taken  from  the  UK 
main  market  is  a  mix  of  big  and  small  IPO  firms.  The  market  capitalisation  -  as 
one  of  the  proxies  for  firm  size  -  of  the  research  sample  ranges  between  £4  and 
£5500  millions,  with  a  mean  of  £167.39  millions  and  a  standard  deviation  of 
539.86.  It  is  clear  that  among  the  IPO  firms  in  the  sample,  there  is  a  scale 
difference,  which  may  cause  problems  in  interpreting  the  results. 
Brown  et  al  (1999)  and  Rees  (1999)  argue  that  researchers  have 
recognized  the  presence  of  scale  effects  in  the  firm  level  analysis.  They  also 
argue  that  using  per  share  data  -  as  suggested  by  Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1996) 
and  Barth  et  al  (1992)  -  can  reduce  the  heteroscedasticity  problem,  but  does  not 
adequately  control  for  the  scale  effects,  as  shares  come  in  different  sizes.  Easton 
and  Sommer  (2003)  put  forward  arguments  for  the  need  to  overcome  the  scale 
effect.  Barth  and  Kallapur  (1996)  suggest  two  ways  for  dealing  with  the  scale 
effect:  deflation  by  a  scale  proxy  or  inclusion  of  a  scale'  proxy  as  an  additional 
independent  variable.  They  explain,  furthermore,  that  including  a  scale  proxy  as 
an  independent  variable  can  mitigate  coefficient  bias.  However,  researchers  often 
2  Pro-forma  book  value  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  is  the  firm's  book  value  after  the  inclusion  of 
net  proceeds  received  from  the  offering.  Forecasted  EPS  is  a  one  year  forecasted  EPS  disclosed 
in  the  prospectus.  Pro-forma  dividend  is  the  last  dividend  payout  ratio  employed  before  the 
offering  times  the  forecasted  EPS. 
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heteroscedasticity  as  well  as  coefficient  bias. 
Following  the  literature  as  discussed  above,  the  method  chosen  to  deal 
with  the  scale  effect  in  the  valuation  model  here  is  deflation  by  scale  proxy.  The 
justification  to  the  choice  is  firstly,  as  pointed  out  by  Barth  and  Kallapur  (1996), 
deflation  can  mitigate  heteroscedaticity  as  well  as  coefficient  bias  problems. 
Akbar  and  Stark  (2003)  identify  four  deflators  previously  employed  in 
cross-sectional  valuation  models  as  proxies  for  scale:  Sales  (used  in,  for  example, 
Hirschey,  1985);  Number  of  shares  (used  in,  for  example,  Rees,  1997;  Hand  and 
Landsman,  1999);  Opening  market  value  (used  in,  for  example,  Lo  and  Lys, 
2000);  and  Book  value  (used  in,  for  example  Green,  et  al,  1996;  Easton,  1998; 
Danbolt  and  Rees,  2002;  Core  et  al,  2003). 
Arguably,  not  all  four  deflators  identified  by  Akbar  and  Stark  (2003) 
above  are  appropriate  to  the  research  model  in  equation  (3).  The  data  used  in  this 
study  is  per  share  data,  which  automatically  is  deflated  by  a  number  of  shares. 
However,  as  argued  by  Brown  et  al  (1999)  per  share  data  does  not  adequately 
control  for  the  scale  effects,  as  shares  come  in  different  size.  Therefore,  the 
number  of  shares  is  not  an  appropriate  deflator  for  the  research  model. 
Using  the  opening  market  value  as  a  deflator  might  be  problematic  in  this 
study.  This  study  analyses  the  IPO  valuation  on  both  the  offer  and  initial  market 
prices.  Applying  the  opening  market  value  as  a  deflator  in  the  IPO  offer  price 
analysis  results  in  a  constant  dependent  variable  of  1  (Po/Po)-  then  the  analysis 
should  be  carried  out  using  more  complicated  model,  such  as  WLS  regression,  as 
suggested  by  Easton  and  Sommer  (2003).  Applying  the  opening  market  value  as 
a  deflator  in  the  IPO  initial  market  analysis  results  in  a  returns-form  dependent 
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IPO  initial  returns  analysis). 
Based  on  Barth  and  Kallapur's  (1996)  suggestion  on  dealing  with  the 
scale  effect,  it  is  clear  that  as  a  scale  factor,  book  value  is  more  appropriate  than 
the  opening  market  value  or  sales  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  is  included  as  an 
independent  variable  in  the  research  model  (equation  3),  which,  according  to 
Barth  and  Kallapur  (1996)  could  mitigate  the  coefficient  bias.  Secondly,  using 
the  book  value  as  a  deflator,  transform  the  dependent  variable  to  price  to  book 
ratio,  which  is  a  more  common  ratio  used  in  the  valuation,  rather  than  price  to 
sales  ratio,  or  a  constant  (price  to  price  ratio). 
If  the  book  value  is  used  as  a  deflator,  the  question  now  is  which  book 
value  (pre-IPO  book  value  or  pro-forma  book  value)  to  employ.  Prior  non-IPO 
valuation  studies  use  the  actual  book  value  of  equity  (BVt).  Using  IPO  data,  Kim 
and  Ritter  (1999)  find  that  using  the  market  to  book  value  post  IPO  increases  the 
predictive  power  of  their  valuation  model,  which  is  based  on  the  comparable 
multiple  within  industry.  The  book  value  post  IPO  used  in  Kim  and  Ritter  (1999) 
is  measured  by  adjusting  the  book  value  pre-IPO  with  the  net  proceeds  received 
from  the  offerings.  Keasey  and  McGuiness  (1992)  also  deflate  their  price  model 
by  the  net  assets  at  the  IPO  -  including  net  proceeds  -  as  disclosed  in  the 
prospectuses.  There  have  indeed  been  a  number  of  studies  using  the  book  value 
of  equity  post  IPO  -  which  is  measured  exactly  in  the  same  way  as  the  deflator 
used  by  Keasey  and  McGuiness,  1992  -  as  a  scale  factor  (e.  g.,  Firth  and  Liau- 
Tian,  1998;  Chen  and  Firth,  1999;  How  and  Yeo,  2000).  Since  the  objective  of 
this  study  is  to  value  the  IPOs  based  on  the  information  that  is  available  at  the 
IPO  date,  it  uses  the  pro-forma  book  value,  as  it  is  disclosed  in  the  prospectus. 
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value  of  equity  after  the  inclusion  of  net  proceeds  from  the  offering.  One  might 
argue  that  the  pro-forma  book  value  contains  a  signalling  attribute,  which  could 
lead  to  an  issue  of  whether  the  pro-forma  book  value  is  a  biased  factor.  However, 
having  taken  the  IPO  sample  that  was  brought  to  the  market  by  offer  for  sale 
and/or  placing  methods,  it  could  taken  as  virtually  certain  that  the  firms  get  the 
expected  net  proceeds  after  the  offerings.  Moreover,  the  empirical  data  shows 
that  only  3  out  of  161  IPOs  in  the  final  sample  actually-  received  a  different 
amount  of  money  from  -the  expected  net  proceeds3.  The  mean  value  of  the 
expected  net  proceeds  -  recorded  from  the  prospectus  -  is  £93.97  millions,  and 
the  mean  value  of  the  realised  net  proceeds  -  recorded  from  the  KPMG  new 
issues  statistics  -  is  £94.05  millions.  The  difference  is  small  and  a  statistical  test 
shows  that  it  is  not  statistically  different  to  zero,  which  implies  that  the  mean 
value  of  the  expected  net  proceeds  is  not  different  to  the  realised  net  proceeds4. 
Therefore,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  pro-forma  book  value  is  not  biased. 
The  basic  valuation  model  is  as  follows, 
BV  -  a° 
PBV 
+  a' 
JE' 
+  a2D1  +  a3 
D 
Br 
+  a4 
PBV` 
+  Er  (4) 
p,  P  V,  PBVr  piPI 
The  description  of  variables  is  similar  to  the  ones  in  equation  (3)  deflated  by  pro- 
forma  book  value  per  share.  Since  many  prior  valuation  studies  employ  the 
realised  book  value  as  the  scale  factor,  this  study  also  runs  equation  (4)  using  the 
book  value  pre  IPO  as  a  sensitivity  analysis.  This  is  discussed  further  in  section 
3  All  3  IPOs  received  more  net  proceeds  that  expected.  The  deviation  ranges  from  £700 
thousands  to  £4.30  millions,  or  approximately  about  0.5%  -  7.1% 
°A  statistical  test  for  a  mean  difference  of  paired  sample  is  undertaken.  The  result  cannot  reject 
the  null  hypothesis  of  the  equal  mean  of  the  expected  and  the  actual  net  proceeds  at  95%  level. 
101 4.7.2  of  Chapter  4.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  results  are  generally  insensitive  to 
the  choice  of  pro-forma  book  value  of  book  value  pre  IPO  as  scale  factors. 
3.1.3.  The  IPO  valuation  model 
The  main  objective  of  this  research  is  to  analyse  the  impact  of  risk  factors 
and  signal  variables  on  IPO  valuation  and  performance.  As  discussed  in  the 
literature  review  chapter,  to  some  extent,  firms'  ex  ante  risk  can  be  expected  to 
affect  the  IPO  valuation  as  well  as  its  subsequent  performance  (Johnson  and 
Miller,  1988;  Ritter,  1984;  Beatty  and  Ritter,  1986;  Klein,  1996).  Many  IPO 
signalling  studies  use  a  range  of  different  signals  to  value  IPOs  and'  find  that 
some  signals  have  been  very  significantly  related  to  IPO  valuation.  This  section 
presents  empirical  models,  which  are  used  to  test  the  research  hypothesis, 
particularly,  on  IPO  valuation.  The  empirical  models,  which  explain  the 
relationship  between  ex-ante  risk  factors,  signals  and  IPO  performance,  will  be 
presented  in  the  next  two  sections. 
Firstly,  using  equation  (4)  above,  the  model  tests  the  relationship  between 
the  fundamental  accounting  information  to  the  IPO  offer  price  (Po)  and  the 
closing  price  on  day  one  or  the  initial  price  (P1).  The  model  will  be  then  extended 
to  include  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  signals  variables.  As  explained  in  'the 
introduction  chapter,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  proxies  employed  in  this  study  are 
based  on  the  Arthur  Andersen  Business  Risk  Model  (AABRM).  However,  after 
doing  a  thorough  content  analysis  of  the  prospectus  obtained,  only  5  out  of  55 
risk  factors  identified  in  the  AABRM  appear  to  be  consistently  disclosed  and 
measured  in  the  documents.  A  detailed  content  analysis  of  the  prospectuses  on 
the  AABRM  is  presented  in  section  3.4  of  this  chapter.  The  5  ex-ante  risk  factors 
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factors.  The  financial  risk  factors  are  leverage  risk  and  capital  availability  risk. 
The  non-financial  risk  factors  are  efficiency  risk,  capacity  risk,  and  industry  risk. 
The  leverage  risk  factor  (Lev)  is  the  risk  that  occurs  because  of  the 
external  capital  used  by  firms.  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1966)  show  that 
introducing  debt  increases  the  systematic  risk  of  a  firm's  equity.  As  more  debt  is 
used  in  firms'  capital,  consequently  firms  are  liable  to  pay  more  interest. 
Moreover,  increasing  debt  in  a  firm's  capital  structure  means  a  higher  probability 
of  the  firm  going  bankrupt.  Therefore,  it  is  commonly  accepted  that  the  higher 
the  leverage,  the  riskier  the  firm's  equity.  As  discussed  in  the  literature  review 
chapter,  there  have  been  a  number  of  studies,  which  have  examined  the 
relationship  between  firm  leverage  and  valuation,  although  few  have  been  done 
for  IPO  samples.  Rees  (1997)  examines  the  value  relevance  of  debt  for  non-IPO 
firms.  Using  debt  to  book  value  as  a  proxy  for  leverage,  he  does  not  find  robust 
evidence  that  equity  value  is  affected  by  the  level  of  debt.  Still,  give  the 
possibility  of  leverage  increasing  the  risk  of  equity,  this  study  employs  the  debt 
ratio  as  a  proxy  for  firm's  ex-ante  leverage  risk.,  Since  the  listing  rules  require 
that  the  IPO  prospectus  should  disclose  at  least  three  years  pre-IPO  financial 
statements,  the  ex-ante  leverage  risk  employed  in  this  study  is  the  average  of  the 
pre-IPO  debt  ratios  from  all  financial  statements  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  to 
capture  the  information  content  of  all  disclosed  financial  statements5. 
The  other  financial  risk  factor  examined  in  this  study,  is  capital 
availability  (Cap).  There  are  two  sources  of  capital;  internal  and  external.  As 
5  Although  the  listing  rules  require  a  disclosure  of  at  least  the  last  three  years  pre-IPO  financial 
statements,  it  is  possible  to  present  less  than  three  years  statement  if  the  firms  are  young. 
103 described  above,  using  external  capital,  such  as  debt,  increases  the  firm's 
financial  risk.  Meanwhile,  internal  capital,  such  as  retained  earnings,  is  less 
risky.  Therefore,  a  larger  fraction  of  earnings  retained  in  the  firm  means  higher 
capital  availability  and  less  financial  risk.  The  capital  availability  risk  is 
measured  by  an  average  of  the  ratios  of  retained  earnings  over  net  income  from 
the  financial  statements  disclosed  in  the  prospectus.  Mathematically,  the  ratio  of 
retained  earnings  over  net  income  could  be  expressed  as  one  minus  the  firm's 
payout  ratio. 
Additionally,  the  IPO  valuation  model  also  includes  a  number  of  non- 
financial  risk  factors.  The  first  non-financial  risk  factor  examined  is  the 
efficiency  risk  (Effr),  which  describes  the  firms'  production  effectiveness.  In 
economic  terms,  production  effectiveness-is  measured  as  a  production  cost.  The 
more  efficient  the  firms'  operation,  the  less  is  the  production  cost  and  efficiency 
risk.  As  discussed  earlier  in  the  literature  review  chapter,  a  number  of  studies 
show  a  positive  relationship  between  the  production  effectiveness  and'  the 
economic  performance  of  the  firms.  Jain  and  Kini  (1994)  specifically  examine 
the  operating  performance  of  IPO  firms  after  listing.  They  find  that  IPOs,  which 
are  more  underpriced,  tend  to  have  worse  operating  performance.  The  inclusion 
of  the  efficiency  risk  factors  into  the  IPO  valuation  model  is  because  very  little 
information  regarding  a  firm  is  available  prior  to  the  offering.  Such  information 
can  help  investors  to  assess  the  IPOs  value.  The  efficiency  risk  is  measured  by  an 
average  of  the  pre-IPO  ratios  of  the  cost  of  good  sold  over  firm  sales  from  all 
financial  statements  disclosed  in  the  prospectus.  The  greater  ratio  describes  the 
larger  efficiency  risk,  which  means  that  the  IPO  firms  operate  less  efficiently. 
104 The  main  reason  why  firms  go  public  is  to  raise  more  funds  for  their 
operations.  Most  issuing  firms  claim  that  the  proceeds  received  from  the  offering 
is  proposed  to  fund  a  specific  investment  projects  for  business  expansion. 
However,  in  many  cases  part  of  the  IPO  proceeds  is  used  for  other  non- 
investment  activities,  such  as  to  redeem  preference  shares,  repaying,  debt  or  to 
provide  an  exit  of  the  pre-IPO  investors.  A  number  of  IPO  studies  investigate  the 
impact  of  the  IPO  net  proceeds  on  the  IPO  underpricing  or  prices  (e.  g.  Beatty 
and  Ritter,  1986;  Klein,  1996;  Espenlaub  et  al,  1999;  Leone  et  al,  2003).  This 
study  examines  the  impact  of  the  proportion  of  net  proceed  that  is  allocated  in 
the  investment  plan,  which  is  called  Capacity  risk  (Cpy)  on  the  IPO  values.  In  the 
AABRM,  capacity  risk  is  defined  as  the  risk  of  new  firm  projects  to  the  firm's 
capacity.  In  this  study,  Cpy  shows  the  risk  of  the  utilisation  of  the  IPO  net 
proceeds.  The  bigger  the  part  of  IPO  proceeds  used  for  investment  activities,  the 
bigger  uncertainty  of  the  return  of  the  investment,  hence  the  higher  the  capacity 
risk.  This  study  uses  the  ratio  of  proposed  investment  plan  over  IPO  proceeds  as 
a  proxy  for  capacity  risk.  The  greater  the  ratio  indicates  higher  capacity  risk.  To 
some  extent,  the  use  of  this  variable  is  unique,  since  none  has  ever  looked  at  the 
investment  plan  figures  that  are  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  as  a  research 
variable. 
Beaver  et  al  (1970)  argue  that  the  accounting  (firm)  Beta  (ß)  is  an 
essential  element  to  assess  the  riskiness  of  the  firm's  value.  The  firm  ß  is  defined 
as  the  sensitivity  of  the  firm's  share  price  to  changes  in  the  level  of  the  market 
index.  However,  due  to  limited  information  of  the  firms'  share  price  before  the 
admission,  the  industry  ß  used  here  provides  a  proxy  to  the  pre-IPO  firm  P. 
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riskiness  of  the  industry  as  the  firm's  risk  factor.  Therefore,  the  inclusion  of  the 
industry  ß  in  this  model  is  not  only  for  the  proxy  of  the  firm  ß,  but  also  as  a 
measure  of  the  industry  risk.  The  quarterly  ß  of  the  industry  on  the  offering  date 
is  used  as  a  proxy  for  industry  risk.  The  0  is  obtained  from  the  Quarterly  Risk 
Measurement  Service  from  London  Business  School. 
Signal  variables  used  in  the  models  are  the  commonly  used  variables 
from  previous  studies  of  IPO  signalling  models,  such  as  sponsor  reputation 
[Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986),  Byrne  and  Rees  (1994),  Keasey  and  McGuiness 
(1992)],  firm  age  (Feltham  et  al,  1991),  and  the  proportion  of  equity  sold  at  the 
flotation  [Welch  (1989),  Firth  and  Liau-Tan  (1998)]. 
In  addition  to  the  robust  empirical  evidence  from  previous  studies,  the 
inclusion  of  sponsor  reputation  into  the  IPO  valuation  model  also  has  a 
theoretical  foundation.  Baron  (1982)  explains  how  investment  bankers  take  a 
significant  role  in  determining  the  subscription  and  allocation  of  the  shares  on 
IPOs.  However,  the  underwriting  contract  also  reflects  a  certain  degree  of  firm 
quality  certification.  By  sponsoring  an  TO,  the  investment  banker  is  bound  into 
a  contract  with  the  issuing  firm  to  market  the  shares  being  offered.  If  the  issue  is 
fully  underwritten,  investment  bankers  will  make  great  efforts  to  sell  all  shares 
since  any  shares  that  are  left  unsold  will  become  their  responsibility.  Since 
investment  bankers  know  the  risk  of  underwriting  these  contracts,  the  prestigious 
investment  banker  will  only  sponsor  good  quality  firms.  Hence,  lower  quality 
firms  would  be  sponsored  by  less  prestigious  sponsors  since  they  could  not  bear 
paying  the  high  fee  for  the  prestigious  sponsor.  Therefore,  in  this  study,  sponsor 
106 reputation  is  chosen  as  one  among  other  credible  signals  of  firm  value.  It  is 
posited  that  IPOs,  which  are  sponsored  by  prestigious  sponsors,  will  be  priced 
higher  than  IPOs  brought  to  market  by  less  prestigious  sponsors.  In  this  study  a 
dummy  variable  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  sponsor  reputation  taking  the  value  of  1 
for  prestigious  sponsors  and  0  for  less  prestigious  ones.  The  reputation 
classification  is  a  modification  of  the  method  used  by  Keasey  and  McGuiness 
(1992).  The  classification  is  based  on  how  many  IPOs  were  sponsored  by  an 
investment  bank  in  a  preceding  quarter  period,  prior  to  an  IPO  comes  to  the 
market.  Investment  banks  that  sponsor  more  than  3  IPOs  during  the  specified 
quarter  are  classified  as  prestigious  sponsors  and  investment  banks  that  sponsor  3 
IPOs  or  less  are  classified  as  less  prestigious  sponsors. 
There  have  been  many  attempts  to  use  firm  age  as  a  variable  to  explain 
the  IPO  anomalies.  However,  very  little  empirical  evidence  shows  a  significant 
relationship  between  firm  age  and  the  IPO  anomalies.  In  this  study,  age  is  viewed 
as  a  non-financial  ex  ante  risk  factor.  It  is  presumed  that  firm  age  reflects  the 
extent  of  experience  gained  by  firms  regarding  the  business  operations,  which  in 
turn  indicates  the  stability  of  the  business.  In  terms  of  business  risk,  it  could  be 
said  that  more  stable  fines  have  lower  risk.  Older  firms  are  expected  to  have 
more  experience,  which  facilitate  the  business  stabilisation  and  thus  lower  risk. 
Hence,  firm's  age  could  influence  the  IPO  valuation.  Another  reason  for  the 
insertion  of  age  in  the  model  is  that  one  of  IPOs  main  characteristics  is  that  they 
tend  to  be  young  firms.  Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  examine  whether  firm  age 
explains  the  variability  between  the  offer  and  initial  IPO  prices.  A  proxy  for  fine 
age  is  measured  as  years  since  it  was  incorporated  up  to  the  flotation  date. 
107 Initially,  Leland  and  Pyle  (1977)  propose  that  the  proportion  of  shares 
retained  by  insiders  on  equity  offerings  contains  important  information  for 
investors.  This  is  even  more  important  for  IPO  cases  since  very  limited 
information  regarding  the  firm's  value  is  available  prior  to  the  offering.  Most 
stock  exchanges  (markets)  require  a  certain  minimum  fraction  of  shares  to  be 
sold  to  the  public.  This  also  means  that  there  is  a  maximum  proportion  of  shares 
that  could  be  retained  by  the  existing  shareholders  and  managers  (hereafter, 
insiders).  Leland  and  Pyle  (1977)  perceive  that  insider's  decision  on  ownership 
retention  indicates  insiders'  expectations  of  the  firm's  future  prospects.  When 
insiders  are  more  confident  regarding  the  firm's  prospects,  the  more  shares  they 
will  want  to  retain.  Alternatively,  it  could  be  said  that  the  greater  the  fraction  of 
shares  sold  at  the  IPO,  the  less  confidence  of  insiders'  in  the  firm's  prospects. 
The  prior  empirical  evidence  on  the  association  of  retained  ownership  and  IPO 
valuation  is  robust.  There  have  been  a  number  of  proxies  for  retained  ownership 
used  in  IPO  signalling  studies.  This  study  employs  the  percentage  of  shares  sold 
at  the  offering  as  an  inverse  proxy  for  the  retained  ownership  variable  since  this 
is  ready  information  available  in  the  prospectus. 
Previous  studies  show  that  privatisation  IPOs  have  significantly  different 
value  and  performance  in  the  market  [Keasey  and  McGuiness  (1992),  Dewenter 
et  al  (1997)].  According  to  Martin  and  Parker  (1997),  UK  privatisations  have  a 
significant  impact  on  corporate  performance.  They  find  that  there  is  an 
increasing  performance  after  privatisation.  Based  on  those  results,  it  is  important 
to  control  for  the  privatisation  IPOs  effect  on  the  research  sample.  Most  of  UK 
privatisation  IPOs  took  place  between  the  late  80s  and  early  90s,  which  overlaps 
with  the  research  period  used  in  this  study.  During  the  sample  period,  there  were 
108 23  privatisation  IPOs,  10  of  which  are  included  in  the  research  sample.  The 
model  includes  privatisation  as  a  control  variable.  A  dummy  variable  is  included, 
where  1  is  allotted  for  privatisation  IPOs  and  0  for  private  IPOs. 
The  empirical  model  used  to  test  the  relationship  between  the  IPO 
valuation  and  risk  factors  and  signal  variables  is  formulated  in  the  following 
equation: 
P' 
=  ao 
pBV' 
+  a,  r+  a2D,  +  a3 
D  fE' 
+  a4 
pDiy, 
+ 
pBV!  pBV,  pBV,  pBV,  pBV; 
+a5Levr  +a6Capj  +  a7Effr,  +  a8Cpy;  +ca9lndl  +  (5) 
+a,  oSpor  +a,  Age,  +a12Egt  +a13Priv,  +e; 
where  Levi  is  the  ex-ante  leverage  of  a  firm  proxied  by  the  average  of  the  natural 
log  of  the  pre-IPO  debt  ratios,  Cap;  is  the  availability  of  internal  capital  of  a  firm 
prior  to  flotation  proxied  by  the  average  of  the  ratio  of  retained  earnings  to  net 
income,  EJTh  is  the  ex-ante  efficiency  risk  proxied  by  the  average  of  the  ratio  of 
the  cost  of  goods  sold  to  sales,  Cpy;  is  the  IPO  proceed  utilisation  plan  proxied 
by  the  ratio  of  the  cost  of  specific  investment  plan  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  to 
net  proceeds,  hid;  is  the  industry  risk of  a  firm  at  the  flotation  proxied  by  industry 
j3 
, 
Spo;  is  a  dummy  variable  for  the  sponsor  reputation  taking  1  when  IPO  is 
sponsored  by  prestigious  investment  banks,  Age;  is  the  age  of  a  firm,  Eq;  is  the 
percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  flotation,  and  Priv;  is  a  dummy  variable  taking  1 
when  an  IPO  is  a  privatisation.  The  measure  of  each  risk  factors  and  signals  are 
described  above  and  summarised  in  table  3.1  below. 
109 Table  3.1.  Research  variables,  measures  and  data  sources 
Variables  Measure  Source 
PO1pBV  The  offer  price  scaled  by  proforma  book  value  Prospectus 
of  equity  per  share 
Pi/pBV  Share  price  on  the  1"  trading  day  scaled  by  Prospectus-Datastream 
proforma  book  value 
IR  Natural  log  of  Po/P1  Prospectus-Datastream 
BHRxy  Buy  and  hold  return  of  an  IPO  from  day  1  to  x  Datastream 
year  (x=1,2,3) 
fE/pB  V  Forecasted  EPS  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  Prospectus 
value  of  equity  per  share 
D  Dummy  variable  for  negative  forecasted  - 
earnings.  I  for  negative  earnings 
D*fE/pBV  Interaction  term  of  negative  forecasted  - 
earnings 
Leverage  (Lev)  An  average  of  the  natural  log  of  total  debt  to  Prospectus 
assets  ratio  for  all  financial  statements 
disclosed  in  prospectus 
Capital  availability  risk  An  average  of  the  ratio  of  retained  earnings  to  Prospectus 
(Cap)  net  income  for  all  financial  statements 
disclosed  in  prospectus 
Efficiency  risk  (Effr)  An  average  of  the  ratio  of  cost  of  good  sold  to  Prospectus 
sales  for  all  financial  statements  disclosed  in 
prospectus 
Capacity  risk  (Cpy)  An  average  of  the  ratio  of  investment  plan  cost  Prospectus 
to  IPO  net  proceed  ratio  for  all  financial 
statements  disclosed  in  prospectus 
Industry  risk  (Ind)  Beta  for  industry  on  the  yearly  quarter  when  Risk  Measurement 
IPO  taken  place  Services 
Sponsor  reputation  Dummy  variable  for  Sponsor  reputation.  1  for  KPMG  new  issues 
(Spo)  prestigious  investment  bankers  (underwrite  statistics 
more  than  3  IPOs  in  preceding  quarter) 
Firm  age  (Age)  Natural  log  of  company  age  at  the  IPO  Prospectus 
Equity  sold  at  the  IPO  %  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  to  the  post-  IPO  Prospectus 
(Eq)  (enlarged)  number  of  shares 
Privatisation  (Priv)  Dummy  variable  for  privatisation.  I  for  Prospectus 
privatisation  IPO 
110 3.1.4.  The  IPO  initial  returns  model 
The  IPO  valuation  model  aims  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  the 
issuers/sponsors,  and  investors  use  the  prospectus  information  to  price  the  IPOs. 
Moreover,  it  is  also  expected  to  highlight  the  divergence  of  opinion  among  the 
market  participants  regarding  the  usefulness  of  prospectus  information  in  pricing 
the  IPOs.  Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  analyse  whether  the  opinion  divergence 
has  any  significant  impact  on  the  IPO  performance  in  the  short  run  as  well  as, 
subsequently,  in  the  long  run. 
As  discussed  widely  in  the  IPO  literature,  the  persistence  of  underpricing 
on  the  first  day  is  still  an  unresolved  puzzle.  Many  studies  also  show  that  the 
underpricing  continues  up  to  5  days  after  the  first  trading.  The  IPO  initial  return 
model  tries  to  examine  whether  the  source  of  the  opinion  divergence 
(fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  signals)  could  resolve  the  underpricing 
problem. 
Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  argue  that  the  underpricing  degree  is  an 
increasing  function  of  IPO  ex-ante  uncertainty,  while  Feltham  et  al  (1991)  show 
that  the  firm  risk  characteristics  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  significantly 
influence  the  IPO  underpricing. 
The  role  of  earnings  forecasts  on  IPO  valuation  has  been  discussed 
widely  in  the  previous  section  and  the  literature  review  chapter.  However,  very 
few  scholars  examine  the  impact  of  earnings  on  the  IPO  after-market 
performance  (Firth,  1998).  Using  the  earning  forecasts,  Firth  (1998)  finds  that 
the  accuracy  of  earning  forecasts  is  positively  related  to  the  1-year  post-IPO 
cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CAR).  Furthermore,  he  expands  his  investigation 
up  to  3-year  returns  and  finds  that  the  impact  of  the  pre-IPO  earning  forecasts 
111 loses  its  significance.  Using  non-IPO  data,  Easton  and  Harris  (1991)  investigate 
the  earnings-return  relationship.  They  find  a  positive  and  significant  association. 
As  previous  studies  show  robust  evidence  of  the  role  of  earnings  on  returns,  this 
study  also  aims  to  investigate  the  earnings-returns  relationship  for  IPO  cases. 
While  a  number  of  studies  have  discussed  the  relationship  between  the 
earnings  forecasts  and  IPO  returns,  none  have  looked  at  the  impact  of  the  book 
value  of  equity  on  the  IPO  returns.  Therefore,  to  some  extent,  this  study 
contributes  a  new  insight  of  the  book  value  of  equity  role  in  IPO  performance. 
While  the  IPO  valuation  model  in  equation  5  includes  a  negative  earnings 
dummy  and  dividends  as  parts  of  the  fundamentals  information,  the  IPO  Initial 
Returns  (IR)  model  only  includes  the  forecasted  earnings  and  the  pro-forma  book 
value  of  equity  variables.  The  reason  for  the  exclusion  of  the  negative  earnings 
and  dividends  is  to  make  the  IR  model  simple.  Further  analysis  has  been 
undertaken  including  those  variables  into  the  IR  model,  however  the  result 
indicated  the  variables  were  not  significant.  Therefore,  the  IR  models  used  in  this 
study  exclude  the  negative  earnings  and  dividends.  Moreover,  it,  is  believed  that 
the  forecasted  earnings  to  price  ratio  and  the  pro-forma  book  to  market  ratio 
provide  adequate  information  for  the  fundamentals,  which  have  been  used  in 
prior  studies. 
The  ex  ante  risk  factors  mentioned  in  the  valuation  model  above  are  also 
expected  to  have  a  significant  relationship  with  the  IPO  initial  return.  Su.  (1999) 
finds  a  positive  relationship  between  a  firm's  pre-IPO  leverage  and  the  degree  of 
underpricing  (or  IPO  initial  returns).  However,  from  three  different  proxies  (debt 
to  total  asset  ratio,  debt  to  equity  ratio,  and  debt  to  net  asset  ratio),  only  the  debt 
to  net  asset  ratio  is  found  to  be  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  initial  return.  In 
112 line  with  general  hypotheses  on  the  risk  impact  on  initial  return,  this  study 
anticipates  a  positive  relationship  between  leverage  and  IPO  initial  return. 
As  explained  in  the  previous  section,  the  availability  of  internal  capital  is 
viewed  as  a  financial  risk  factor.  It  is  expected  to  influence  the  decision  on  IPO 
pricing  and  also  the  initial  return.  The  more  internal  capital  available  to  the  firms 
reflects  lower  risk,  so  lower  initial  return  is  expected. 
To  date,  no  study  has  discussed  the  relationship  between  the  IPO  initial 
returns  and  the  pre-IPO  operating  efficiency.  Jain  and  Kini  (1994)  examine  the 
after-market  operating  efficiency  of  IPO  firms.  They  find  that  IPOs,  which  have 
greater  initial  returns,  tend  to  be  less  efficient  after  the  offering.  Since  it  is  likely 
that  operation  efficiency  affect  the  whole  performance  of  the  firms,  it  exposes  the 
firm  to  a  degree  of  risk.  Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  the  efficiency  risk  is 
positively  related  to  IPO  initial  returns. 
A  number  of  IPO  studies  discuss  the  association  between  the  net  IPO 
proceeds  and  the  underpricing.  In  some  studies,  IPO  net  proceeds  are  also  used 
as  a  size  control.  However,  this  study  argues  that  it  is  more  important  to  view  the 
utilisation  of  the  IPO  proceeds  since  it  could  expose  a  degree  of  risk  in  the 
future.  As  disclosed  in  the  offering  prospectuses,  an  investment  purpose  is  the 
most  common  reason  why  firms  go  public.  The  fraction  of  the  IPO  net  proceeds 
proposed  for  investment  discloses  a  degree  of  risk,  so  called  capacity  risk.  The 
higher  fraction  reflects  the  lower  capacity  risk,  which  in  turn  is  expected  to  result 
in  a  lower  initial  return.  6 
6  As  part  of  the  robustness  check,  the  net  proceed  has  been  included  as  an  independent  variable  in 
the  IPO  valuation  model  in  Chapter  4,  section  4.7.2.  The  results  show  that  the  net  proceed  is  not 
significantly  to  the  IPO  prices. 
113 Many  IPO  studies  document  the  robust  industry  effect  on  the  underpricing. 
This  study  does  not  investigate  the  industry  effect  in  a  similar  way  to  the 
previous  studies.  The  reason  is  to  preserve  the  degree  of  freedom.  Since  the 
research  sample  is  restricted  to  161  IPOs,  using  the  industry  dummies  (5  standard 
industry  classifications)  reduces  the  model  degree  of  freedom  substantially. 
However,  this  study  examine  the  impact  of  the  industry  risk  on  the  IPO  initial 
returns.  As  discussed  earlier  in  the  previous  section,  the  quarterly  industry  ß  at 
the  IPO  date  is  used  as  a  measure  of  the  industry  risk  as  well  as  a  proxy  to  the 
firm  P.  The  higher  the  industry  ß,  the  riskier  the  industry,  and  the  higher  the 
initial  returns  is  expected. 
There  has  been  robust  evidence  on  the  underpricing  of  privatisation  IPOs. 
This  study  attempts  to  contribute  more  evidence  on  the  different  impact  of 
privatisation  IPOs  compared  to  other  IPOs.  Dewenter  and  Malatesta  (1997)  argue 
that  the  significant  underpricing  of  privatisations  could  lead  to  a  verdict  of 
government  deliberation  in  the  pricing  of  privatisation  IPOs.  However,  they  do 
not  find  any  evidence  to  support  their  hypothesis.  Although  this  study  does  not 
try  to  test  the  government  deliberation,  it  still  holds  that  there  is  a  positive 
relationship  between  privatisation  and  initial  returns,  as  a  result  of  underpricing. 
Johnson  and  Miller  (1988)  'investigate  the  relationship  between  the 
investment  banker  prestige  and  the  underpricing.  They  find  that  IPOs  brought  to 
market  by  prestigious  bankers  tend  to  be  less  underpriced  than  IPOs  brought  by 
less  prestigious  bankers.  Age  and  size  also  significantly  affect  the  degree  of 
underpicing  (Feltham  et  al.,  1991).  Finally,  Koh  and  Walter  (1992)  find  that 
equity  retained  by  shareholders  is  negatively  related  to  the  underpicing. 
114 In  addition  to  those  variables  mentioned  above,  this  study  also  considers 
unobservable  variables,  which  may affect  the  underpricing.  Although  this  study 
specifically  investigates  the  relationship  between  fundamentals,  a  number  of  risk 
factors  and  signals  and  IPO  initial  returns,  it  is  important  to  also  examine  other 
factors,  which  may  have  an  impact  on  IPO  performance.  Therefore,  similar  to 
Beatty  et  al  (2002),  this  study  includes  an  unobservable  variable  into  the  IPO 
initial  return  model.  Since  the  underpricing  happens  as  a  result  of  different 
valuation  on  the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price,  the  standardised  residual 
errors  from  the  IPO  valuation  model  on  offer  price  is  included  into  the  IPO  initial 
return  model.  It  is  expected  that  the  greater  the  residuals,  the  lower  the  initial 
returns.  In  other  words,  the  initial  return  is  expected  to  be  negatively  related  to 
the  valuation  residuals. 
Considering  the  possible  influence  of  fundamentals,  risk  factors,  signals, 
and  offer  price  residual  errors,  the  IPO  initial  return  model  is  formulated  as 
follows; 
+  IR,  =ao  +a, 
y 
+a2p'  +a3Lev,  +a4Cap,  +a5Efr,  +a6Cpy;  +a71nd, 
por 
or 
+a8Spo,  +a9Agee  +a,  oEq,  +a￿Privv  +a12  Res,  +a 
(6) 
IRi  is  the  initial  return  on  the  first  trading  day  of  IPO;,  which  is  measured  by 
the  natural  log  of  the  initial  market  price  (PI)  divided  by  the  offer  price  (Po),  or 
in  mathematical  term  it  could  be  expressed  as, 
IR!  =Ln(P,  IP0)  (7) 
115 The  fundamentals  used  to  explain  the  variation  in  the  IPO  initial  returns 
are  proforma  book  value  of  equity  and  forecasted  earnings,  both  scaled  by  the 
offer  price  (Po).  The  variables,  then,  become  the  book-to-market  and  the  earning- 
price  ratios. 
The  description  of  ex  ante  risk  factors  and  signals  are  as  explained  in  the 
IPO  valuation  model  section  above  and  summarised  in  table  3.1,  while  Res;  is  a 
proxy  to  unobservable  ex-ante  factors  of  firm  i,  and  measured  as  the  standardised 
residual  from  the  IPO  valuation  model  with  the  offer  price  as  the  dependent 
variable. 
3.1.5  The  IPO  long  run  return  model 
Besides  the  puzzle  relating  to  the  high  initial  market  return,  the  IPO 
market  is  also  perplexed  by  the  apparent  underperformance  of  IPOs  in  the  long 
run.  This  suggests  that  investors,  who  buy  the  IPO  shares  and  hold  them  for  up  to 
three  years,  will  benefit  less  than  investors  who  hold  comparable  firms  or  the 
market  index.  In  addition,  Ritter  (1991)  found  that  there  is  a  significant  negative 
relationship  between  the  degree  of  underpricing  and  the  long  run  performance.  In 
other  words,  it  could  be  said  that  IPOs  that  are  heavily  underpriced  tend  to  have 
lower  return  in  the  long  run,  which  implies  the  evidence  of  reversion  in  the  long 
run.  However,  the  empirical  evidence  show  mixed  results  (see  table  1.2) 
In  contrast,  signalling  theory  suggests  that  the  good  quality  firms  use 
underpricing  as  a  signal  of  their  true  values.  This  implies  that  the  good  quality 
firms  will  have  greater  initial  returns.  They  are  also  expected  to  perform  better  in 
the  long  run,  and  resulting  in  higher  long  run  returns. 
116 In  this  study,  it  is  realised  that  the  impact  of  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk 
factors  and  signals  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance  is  likely  to  be  weaker  than 
on  the  short  run  performance,  since  more  information  is  available  to  the  market 
to  price  the  IPOs  in  the  long  run.  However,  some  variables  may  still  have  an 
effect  in  the  long  run. 
Earnings  are  often  observed  as  signals  to  the  quality  of  firms  in  the 
valuation  process.  Usually,  the  earning  forecast  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  is 
supposed  to  reveal  the  insider's  information  about  the  firms'  prospects.  It  is 
assumed  that  the  higher  earning  forecasts  reflect  the  higher  quality  of  the  firms. 
The  high-quality  firms  are  expected  to  perform  well  in  the  long  run.  Therefore,  it 
could  be  hypothesised  that  the  disclosure  of  earning  forecasts  is  positively  related 
to  the  IPO  long  run  performance.  However,  such  impact  is  not  expected  to  last 
longer  than  1  year,  since  the  actual  earnings  figures  will  be  available  to  the 
market  after  that. 
It  is  also  interesting  to  examine  the  impact  of  the  pro-forma  book  value  of 
equity  on  the  IPO  long  run  returns.  Prior  studies  show  mixed  results  on  the 
relationship  between  the  book-to-market  ratio  and  share  returns.  Fama  and 
French  (1995)  argue  that  the  book-to-market  ratio  also  measures  the  riskiness  of 
the  shares.  They  find  that  there  is  a  positive  association  between  the  book-to- 
market  ratio  and  the  share  returns.  This  study  also  posits  the  similar  hypothesis, 
however  parallel  to  the  forecasted  earnings,  the  impact  of  book-to-market  on  the 
IPO  long  run  returns  is  not  expected  to  be  of  significance  on  the  IPO  returns  for 
2  and  3  years,  as  new  book-to-market  figures  become  available  to  the  market 
after  the  firms  publish  their  post-IPO  reports. 
117 In  this  study,  the  general  assumption  of  a  positive  risk-return  relationship 
is  used  to  investigate  the  association  between  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  IPO 
long  run  returns.  There  have  been  no  empirical  results  investigating  the  impact  of 
pre-IPO  firm's  leverage  to  IPO  long  run  performance.  However,  as  discussed  in 
the  previous  section,  leverage  is  a  common  variable  used  as  a  risk  indicator.  The 
higher  the  leverage,  the  higher  the  financial  risk  of  the  firm.  In  line  with  the 
theoretical  explanation  on  the  impact  of  risk  factors  on  IPO  long  run 
performance,  it  is  expected  that  higher  leverage  expose  the  firm  to  higher  risk, 
which  in  turn  is  expected  to  result  in  higher  long  run  returns.  Khurshed  et  al 
(1999)  are  among  the  first  to  investigate  the  impact  of  pre-IPO  firm's  leverage  on 
the  long  run  performance,  however,  they  do  not  find  any  significant  relationship. 
The  explanation  of  the  impact  of  other  risk  factors  (capital  availability 
risk,  efficiency  risk,  capacity  risk,  and  industry  risk)  on  IPO  long  run  returns  is 
similar  to  the  explanation  written  in  the  previous  section.  This  study  is  among  the 
first  to  examine  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  mentioned  above  in  relation  to  IPO  long 
run  performance.  Given  a  positive  risk-returns  relationship,  it  is  expected  that  the 
relationship  between  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  long  run  performance  is 
positive. 
Menyah  et  al  (1995)  present  evidence  on  the  long  run  performance  of  UK 
privatisations.  They  conclude  that  they  are  different  from  private  IPOs,  and 
privatisations  IPOs  do  not  underperform  the  market.  Martin  and  Parker  (1997) 
also  confirm  the  difference  in  corporate  performance  in  the  long  run  regarding 
UK  privatisations.  It  could  be  inferred  that  somehow  privatisation  has  a  different 
impact  on  long  run  performance. 
118 As  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  firm  age  could  be  a  proxy  for 
business  stability.  Rationally,  it  is  expected  that  a  stable  firm  could  perform 
better  in  the  long  run.  Therefore,  here  it  could  be  conjectured  that  firm's  age  has 
a  positive  relationship  with  the  IPO  long  run  performance.  Khurshed  et  al  (1999) 
investigate  the  impact  of  firm  age  on  IPO  long  run  performance.  However,  they 
find  an  insignificant  result  in  relation  to  a  statistical  association  between  firm  age, 
and  IPO  long  run  performance. 
Based  on  previous  studies,  a  number  of  signal  variables  seem  to  have 
some  impact  on  IPO  long  run  returns,  such  as  agent  reputation  (Brav  and 
Gompers,  1997),  and  equity  retained  by  insiders  at  the  flotation  (Koh  and  Walter, 
1992). 
Carter  et  al  (1998)  investigate  the  association  between  underwriter 
reputations  on  IPO  long  run  performance  and  find  a  robust  significant  positive 
relationship.  They  argue  that  in  the  long  run  as  more  information  becomes 
available  in  the  market,  there  are  adjustments  to  the  more  underpriced  IPOs  (as  a 
consequence  of  less  prestigious  underwriter  contract),  which  result  in  lower  long 
run  returns.  Therefore,  this  study  also  posits  a  positive  relationship  between 
sponsor  reputation  and  IPO  long  run  performance. 
Additionally,  this  study  also  re-examines  the  association  between  the 
ownership  and  IPO  long  run  performance.  Based  on  financial  signalling  theory, 
the  retained  ownership  is  an  effective  signal  regarding  the  firm's  true  value.  The 
higher  proportion  of  shares  retained  by  the  old  shareholders  reflects  their  insider 
information  regarding  the  firm's  good  prospects.  Therefore,  it  is  expected  that 
there  will  be  a  positive  relationship  between  the  retained  ownership  and  IPO  long 
119 run  performance.  The  inclusion  of  the  ownership  variable  in  the  IPO  long  run 
model  in  this  study  is  to  re-examine  such  a  relationship  with  UK  data. 
Considering  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals,  the  IPO  long  run 
return  model  is  as  follows: 
BHAR 
1= 
ao  +a, 
py 
+a2 
p' 
+a3Lev,  +a4Cap,  +a5Effr,  +a6Cpy;  + 
o,  o, 
+a7Indi  +a$Spo,  +a9Age,  +a,  oEq,  +a￿Priv,  +a12  Res,  +a  (8) 
where  BHARXY  1  is  the  market  adjusted  IPO  long-return  of  1PO;  from  day  1  to  x 
=1,2,  and  3  years,  which  is  measured  by  the  equation  below: 
nn 
BHARxt  =fl(1+Rr  )-fl(1+MR,  ) 
r-I  t  tat 
(9) 
where  Rt  i  is  the  monthly  dividend  adjusted  returns  of  IPO;  in  month  t,  MRt  is  the 
Financial  Times  Small  Companies  (FTSCO)  market  index  returns  in  month  t,  n  is 
12,24,  and  36  months.  When  IPOs  are  delisted  before  their  1S`22nd,  or  3rd 
anniversary,  the  buy  and  hold  returns  are  calculated  up  to  the  last  month  before 
they  were  delisted.  Other  variables  in  equation  (7)  are  as  described  on  the  initial 
return  model  and  summarised  in  table  3.1. 
As  discussed  earlier  in  the  literature  review  chapter,  both  buy  and  hold 
returns  (BHR)  and  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CAR)  have  some  limitations  in 
calculating  the  long  run  return.  However,  Barber  and  Lyon  (1997)  suggest  that 
BHR  is  a  better  measure  compared  to  CAR,  since  the  CAR  appears  to  be  a 
biased  predictor  for  the  BHR.  Therefore  the  BHR  is  used  in  this  study.  In 
120 addition,  FTSCO  is  used  here  as  a  benchmark.  This  index  is  replacing  the  Hoare 
Govett  index  for  small  companies,  which  is  used  by  others  (Levis,  1993; 
Khurshed,  1999).  Since  most  of  the  research  sample  are  small  companies,  using 
FTSCO  index  is  likely  more  appropriate  than  using  broader  indices  such  as  the 
FTSE  all  share  index7.  The  benchmark  choice  has  also  been  a  long-standing 
debate  in  the  IPO  literature.  Espenlaub  et  al  (2000)  re-examine  the  UK  IPO  long 
run  abnormal  returns  using  5  different  benchmarks.  The  results  show  that  the 
outcomes  are  very  sensitive  to  the  benchmark  used.  Therefore,  using  the  FTSCO 
index  as  the  benchmark  in  this  study  is  acknowledged  to  have  some  degree  of 
limitation.  To  minimize  such  effect,  a  control  variable,  Size,  is  used  in  the  IPO 
long  run  performance  models,  as  applied  in  other  studies  (e.  g.,  Gleason  and  Lee, 
2002).  In  this  study,  the  normal  log  of  the  market  capitalisation  at  the  IPO  is  used 
as  a  proxy  for  Size 
Many  IPO  studies  have  investigated  the  relationship  between  the  IPO 
underpricing  (initial  returns)  and  its  performance  in  the  long  run.  Based  on  the 
signalling  hypothesis,  the  high-quality  firms  use  the  underpricing  as  a  signal  of 
their  value.  It  is  also  anticipated  that  the  high-quality  firms  perform  well  in  the 
long  run,  which  results  in  higher  long  run  stock  returns.  Therefore,  signalling 
theory  suggests  a  negative  relationship  between  the  IPO  initial  returns  and  long 
run  returns.  However,  Welch  (1989)  does  not  find  any  support  for  this 
hypothesis.  In  fact,  Ritter  (1991)  and  Levis  (1993)  find  that  there  is  a  significant 
negative  relationship  between  the  IPO  underpricing  (initial  returns)  and  the  long 
run  performance.  They  argue  that  the  underpricing  is  a  result  of  optimistic 
7  The  analysis  is  also  done  using  the  FTSE  All  share  index  as  the  benchmark.  The  main  results 
remain  robust. 
121 investors,  and  then  as  more  information  becomes  available  in  the  wider  window, 
the  returns  are  corrected  by  the  market  as  a  mean  reversion  effect.  This  study 
also  tries  to  re-examine  such  a  relationship  and  seeks  to  narrow  the  divergence  of 
opinion  on  the  relationship  between  IPO  initial  returns  and  the  long  run  returns. 
The  inclusion  of  variables  Size  and  IR  in  the  long  run  model  is  expressed 
as  follows: 
a, 
pB  y+ 
a2 
t`+ 
a3Size,  BHARJ, 
1  =  ao  +a,  " 
Poi  Po, 
+a4Lev,  +a,  Cap,  +a6Effr,  +a7Cpyi  ++a8Ind1  (10) 
+a9Spo,  +a,  0Age,  +a￿Eq,  +a,  ZPriv1  +a13  Res  +a14IRl  +a 
where  BHARxr  is  the  buy  and  hold  returns  of  IPO;  for  period  x,  as  measured  in 
equation  (9).  IRr  is  the  initial  return  of  1PO;,  as  measured  in  equation  (7).  Other 
variables  are  identical  to  those  explained  and  measured  in  the  previous  section. 
3.2  Hypothesis  development 
This  section  tries  to  outline  the  development  of  testable  research 
hypotheses.  Based  on  the  literature  review  and  research  models  formulated 
above,  the  research  hypotheses  can  be  divided  into  three  main  hypotheses  as 
presented  in  figure  1  (see  Introduction  chapter).  The  first  main  hypothesis  is  that 
the  IPO  valuation  is  related  to  the  offering  prospectus  information.  It  is  also 
expected  that  such  information  may  provide  the  explanation  to  the  IPO  short  run 
performance,  however  it  is  anticipated  that  the  impact  of  the  prospectus 
information  in  the  long  run  is  minimal.  The  second  hypothesis  is  related  to  the 
underpricing  anomaly,  which  is  that  if  any  mispricing  is  identified  on  the  first 
122 trading  day,  it  is  expected  that  the  underpricing  is  negatively  related  to  the 
valuation  residuals.  The  last  main  hypothesis  is  related  to  the  IPO  long  run 
performance,  which  is  that  if  any  mispricing  is  identified  on  the  first  trading  day, 
the  market  corrects  the  IPO  prices  in  the  long  run. 
The  three  main  hypotheses  are  explained  in  more  detail  in  a  number  of 
working  hypotheses,  which  are  presented  and  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
3.2.1  Hypotheses  regarding  IPO  valuation. 
The  hypotheses  regarding  IPO  valuation  are  tested  using  the  models  in 
equations  (4)  and  (5).  Based  on  previous  empirical  studies  and  the  basic  model 
shown  in  equation  (1),  it  could  be  inferred  that  price  is  an  increasing  function  of 
the  book  value  of  equity  and  earnings.  This  leads  to  the  formulation  of  the  first 
two  hypotheses  (Hla  and  Hlb) 
Hl  a:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices  and 
pro  forma  book  value  of  equity, 
and 
Hl  b:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices  and 
forecasted  earnings. 
Next  are  the  dummy  variable  and  the  interactive  term.  Previous  studies 
show  that  negative  earnings  give  a  significantly  different  impact  on  share 
valuation.  Hayn  (1995)  argues  that  losses  (negative  earnings)  are  less  informative 
than  profits  (positive  earnings)  about  the  firm's  future  prospect.  Therefore,  the 
coefficient  of  interactive  term  (D*JE/BV)  in  the  valuation  model  is  expected  to  be 
more  or  less  equal  to  the  forecasted  earnings  (fE)  coefficient,  so  that  the  two 
offset  each  other,  and  the  negative  earnings  are  expected  to  have  little  impact  on 
the  IPO  prices.  When  earnings  are  negative,  the  book  value  of  equity  may 
123 become  more  important  as  a  predictor  of  firm  value.  Consequently,  the  negative 
earnings  dummy  is  expected  to  be  positive. 
H2:  The  negative  earnings  dummy  is  positively  related  to  the  IPO  prices, 
while  the  negative  earnings  interactive  term  is  expected  to  be 
negatively  related  to  the  IPO  prices  with  the  magnitude  approximately 
equals  to  the  forecasted  earnings  coefcient. 
The  last  variable  of  the  fundamentals  are  dividends.  Prior  studies  find  a 
significant  role  of  dividends  in  seasoned  stock  and  IPO  valuation.  Moreover,  as 
dividends  could  be  categorised  as  permanent  earnings,  the  inclusion  of  dividends 
describes  how  the  transitory  and  permanent  earnings  could  explain  the  variation 
in  share  price.  Similar  to  the  earnings  variable,  the  dividends  are  also  expected  to 
be  positively  related  to  the  1PO  prices  (H3) 
H3:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  the  offer  (market)  prices 
and  the  pro-  forma  dividends 
As  explained  earlier,  it  is  hypothesised  that  the  riskier  the  IPOs,  the  lower 
the  market  price  (H4).  The  rational  explanation  of  this  is  based  on  the  risk- 
aversion  assumption.  The  risk-aversion  assumption  holds  that  based  on  available 
information,  investors  attempt  to  avoid  risk.  This  implies  that  risky  assets  will 
face  low  demand  in  the  market  that  result  in  lower  market  price.  From  the 
issuers'  perspective,  in  order  to  sell  the  IPO  shares,  the  riskier  issuers  will  set  a 
lower  offer  price.  Below  are  working  hypotheses  on  the  association  between 
each  risk  factor  and  the  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices. 
H4a:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  leverage  and 
IPO  offer  (initial)  prices. 
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availability  and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices. 
H4c:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  efficiency 
risk  and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices. 
H4d:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  capacity  risk 
and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices. 
H4e:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  industry  risk  and  IPO  offer 
(initial)  prices. 
Based  on  previous  studies  and  the  discussion  in  section  3.1.2.2,  it  could 
be  posited  that  the  signals  are  expected  to  give  positive  impacts  on  the  IPO 
valuation  (H5).  A  number  of  working  hypotheses  regarding  the  relationship 
between  signal  variables  and  IPO  valuation  is  set  below. 
H5a:  Sponsor  reputation  is  positively  related  to  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices. 
H5b:  Firm  age  is  positively  related  to  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices. 
H5c:  Percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  is  negatively  related  to  IPO  offer 
(initial)  prices. 
Prior  studies  show  that  privatisation  IPOs  are  priced  differently  to  other 
IPOs.  From  the  government's  point  of  view,  privatisation  is  a  way  to  get  more 
funds  from  the  public.  In  order  to  ensure  that  privatisation  IPOs  could  achieve 
the  target  of  proceeds  received  and  to  ensure  that  investors  would  participate  in 
subsequent  privatisations,  government  may  have  underpriced  the  IPOs.  In  this 
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association  with  the  IPO  valuations  (H6) 
H6:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  privatisation  dummy 
and  the  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices. 
3.2.2  Hypotheses  regarding  initial  return  model 
Based  on  a  discussion  regarding  the  relationship  between  fundamental 
accounting  and  the  stock  returns  in  the  prior  section,  a  number  of  working 
hypotheses  of  such  a  relationship  are  set  out  below. 
In  the  IR  model,  the  pro-forma  book  value  of  equity  to  offer  price  ratio  is 
used.  Higher  value  of  this  ratio  implies  that  the  issuers/sponsors  set  the  offer 
price  at  a  low  multiple  to  the  book  value  of  equity.  Therefore,  it  could  be 
hypothesised  that  the  higher  book-to-market  ratio  may  suggest  greater 
underpricing  (H7a). 
H7a:  The  pro  forma  book  value  of  equity  to  offer  price  ratio  is  positively 
related  to  IPO  initial  returns 
Prior  studies  show  the  important  role  of  earnings  in  explaining  the  variance 
of  stock  returns  (e.  g.  Easton  and  Harris,  1991).  In  this  study,  it  is  expected  that 
the  earning  forecasts  is  positively  related  to  the  IPO  initial  returns  (H7b) 
H7b:  The  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  is  positively  related  to 
IPO  initial  returns 
Based  on  previous  studies  [Ritter  (1984),  Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986),  Miller 
and  Reilly  (1987)],  it  could  be  posited  that  the  riskier  firms  will  experience 
greater  initial  return  (H8).  A  number  of  testable  hypotheses  on  risk  factors  and 
IPO  initial  return  are  established  as  follows. 
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IPO  initial  returns. 
H8b:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  capital 
availability  risk and  IPO  initial  returns. 
H8c:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre  IPO  efficiency  risk 
and  IPO  initial  returns. 
H8d:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre  IPO  capacity  risk 
and  IPO  initial  returns. 
H8e:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  industry  risk  and  IPO  initial 
returns. 
A  number  of  signalling  studies  on  IPOs  show  that  the  signal  variables 
used  in  this  study,  to  some  degree,  are  expected  to  signal  the  true  value  of  the 
firms.  Therefore,  the  signals  are  expected  to  reduce  the  information  asymmetry 
and  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  probability  of  mispricing,  hence  lower  subsequent 
initial  returns  are  expected  (H9). 
Carter  et  al  (1998)  explicitly  test  the  relationship  between  the  underwriter 
reputation  and  the  underpricing.  They  find  that  the  more  prestigious  the 
underwriters,  the  less  the  underpricing.  Although  using  different  proxies  for 
underwriter  reputation,  other  studies  also  reach  similar  conclusions  (Johnson  and 
Miller,  1988;  Carter  and  Manaster,  1990).  From  the  investors'  point  of  view, 
the  sponsor  reputation  gives  a  particular  certification  to  the  offer.  Investors 
believe  that  prestigious  investment  banks  only  sponsor  good  firms'  IPOs. 
Regarding  the  pricing,  investors  believe  that  prestigious  sponsors  set  the  IPO 
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hypothesis: 
H9a:  Sponsor  reputation  dummy  is  negatively  related  to  IPO  initial 
returns. 
Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  find  that  the  firm's  age  is  significantly  related  to 
the  underpricing.  Here,  age  is  assumed  to  be  one  of  the  risk  factors  that  may 
affect  the  IPO  performance  in  the  short-run  and  long  run.  Age  describes  how 
long  a  firm  has  been  established  before  it  goes  public.  Older  firms  are  assumed  to 
have  more  business  experience,  which  in  turn  reducing  the  business  risk.  Hence, 
it  is  expected  that  older  firms  are  less  underpriced  than  younger  ones  as  it  states 
in  the  next  hypothesis. 
H9b:  Firm  age  is  negatively  related  to  IPO  initial  returns. 
The  very  well  known  signal  used  in  IPO  signalling  papers  is  the  insider 
retention,  which  in  this  study  is  proxied  by  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the 
flotation  (Eq).  Previous  studies  conclude  that  the  more  shares  retained  by 
insiders  at  the  flotation  give  a  good  signal  to  investors.  In  this  study,  the 
percentage  of  shares  sold  at  the  IPO  is  used  as  a  proxy  to  an  inverse  of  insider 
retention.  Therefore,  this  study  also  tests  the  following  hypothesis: 
H9c:  The  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  flotation  is  positively  related  to 
IPO  initial  returns. 
It  is  argued  in  section  2.1,  that  in  order  to  ensure  the  privatisation  IPOs 
achieve  the  target  proceeds,  government  set  the  IPO  offer  price  lower  than  its 
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initial  returns  than  private  IPOs  (H10). 
H10:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  the  privatisation  dummy  and 
the  IPO  initial  returns. 
The  initial  return  model  (Eq.  9)  includes  the  unobservable  variable,  Resi 
that  is  measured  by  the  residual  of  the  full  IPO  valuation  model  with  the  offer 
price  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  relationship  between  the  residual  and  the 
IPO  initial  return  is  explained  as  follows.  A  positive  residual  indicates  the  IPO 
was  offered  at  a  high  issue  price  relative  to  other  IPOs  in  relation  to  their 
fundamentals.  This  may  indicate  over  pricing  of  the  IPOs  and  hence,  it  is 
anticipated  that  the  residual  is  negatively  related  to  the  IPO  initial  return. 
H11:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  residuals  and  IPO  initial 
returns. 
3.2.3.  Hypotheses  regarding  the  IPO  long  run  performance 
The  hypotheses  relating  to  the  long  run  performance  model  are  tested 
using  equation  (9).  In  the  long  run,  more  information  is  available  in  the  market 
that  could  be  used  by  investors  in  their  pricing  decision.  Therefore,  as  argued 
previously,  the  impact  of  the  three  groups  of  variables  (fundamental,  ex-ante  risk 
factors,  and  signals)  prior  to  and  on  the  IPO,  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance, 
tends  to  be  weaker.  However,  prior  studies  also  show  that  the  impact  of  some 
variables  could  last  longer  than  others.  Therefore,  this  study  tries  to  examine  the 
relationship  between  the  three  groups  of  variables  and  the  IPO  long  run 
performance.  In  general,  it  is  expected  that  the  relationship  between  the  three 
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initial  return  model. 
Fama  and  French  (1995)  find  a  positive  association  between  the  book-to- 
market  ratio  and  stocks  returns.  They  argue  that  the  book-to-market  ratio  could 
be  used  as  a  proxy  to  risk  factors  in  returns.  The  high  book-to-market  ratio  is 
usually  related  to  a  distress  firm.  Therefore,  based  on  the  risk-return  relationship, 
it  is  posited  here  that  the  pro-forma  book-to-offer  price  ratio  is  expected  to  be 
positively  related  to  IPO  buy  and  hold  abnormal  returns. 
H12a:  The  pro  forma  book  value  of  equity  to  offer  price  ratio  is  positively 
related  to  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
The  disclosure  of  earnings  forecasts  in  the  prospectus  is  usually 
considered  as  a  way  by  which  a  firm  may  signal  its  future  prospect  to  the  market. 
It  is  shown  by  prior  studies  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  the 
earnings  forecasts  and  the  stock  valuation.  It  implies  that  the  higher  earnings 
forecasts  reflect  the  high-quality  firms.  It  is  presumed  that  high-quality  firms 
perform  better  in  the  long  run  than  their  counterpart  firms.  Therefore,  in  the  long 
run,  it  is  expected  that  firms  that  disclose  higher  earnings  forecasts  produce 
higher  returns. 
H12b:  The  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  is  positively  related  to 
IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
The  next  variable  in  the  IPO  long  run  performance  model  is  size.  Fama  and 
French  (1992)  argue  that  simultaneously  book-to-market  ratio  and  firm  size 
contain  information  of  the  riskiness  of  the  shares.  In  this  study,  firm  size  is 
proxied  by  the  normal  logarithm  of  the  market  capitalisation  at  the  IPO.  The 
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positive  risk-return  association,  it  is  posited  in  this  study  that  the  small  firms  are 
expected  to  produce  higher  returns  (H  13) 
H13:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  size  and  IPO  long  run 
abnormal  returns 
Based  on  previous  studies,  it  could  be  inferred  that  to  some  extent  the  firm 
specific  risk  factors  are  related  to  the  IPO  long  run  performance.  The  general 
risk-return  relationship  is  used  in  developing  the  hypotheses  of  the  relationship 
between  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  long  run  returns.  Thus,  it  is  posited 
that  the  buy  and  hold  returns  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors 
(H14) 
A  number  of  testable  hypotheses  regarding  risk  factors  and  IPO  long  run 
performance  are  set  below. 
H14a:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  leverage 
and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14b:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  capital 
availability  risk  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14c:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  efficiency 
risk  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14d:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  capacity 
risk  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14e:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  industry  risk  and  IPO  long 
run  abnormal  returns 
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performance  are  listed  below.  The  issuers/sponsors  employ  the  signals  to  reveal 
the  firm  true  value.  The  signals  are  aimed  at  making  a  separation  between  the 
good  firms  to  the  bad  ones.  Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  the  signals  affect  the 
firm  long  run  performance  in  positive  ways  (H15) 
Similar  to  the  explanation  above,  the  firm's  chosen  sponsor  is  also 
understood  as  a  way  to  signal  the  quality  of  the  firm.  Another  explanation  is  that 
investment  bankers  often  choose  the  firms  that  they  would  like  to  sponsor.  The 
prestigious  sponsors  may  tend  to  choose  sponsoring  the  high-quality  firms  in 
order  to  preserve  their  credibility  in  the  market.  Therefore,  in  the  long  run  the 
IPOs  that  are  sponsored  by  the  prestigious  investment  bankers  are  expected  to 
have  higher  long  run  returns. 
H15a:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  the  sponsor  reputation 
dummy  and  IPO  abnormal  long  run  returns 
As  discussed  earlier,  firm's  age  is  usually  used  as  a  proxy  for  the  firms 
experience  in  business.  It  is  anticipated  that  the  more  experienced  firms  tend  to 
have  stable  profits.  As  it  is  assumed  that  investors  are  risk  averse,  they  tend  to 
put  higher  demand  for  the  IPOs  of  the  more  experienced  firms,  which  results  in  a 
higher  market  price.  In  the  long  run,  if  the  perception  of  investors  regarding  the 
firms'  value  is  retained,  it  is  anticipated  that  the  IPOs  of  more  experienced  firms 
perform  better. 
H1  Sb:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm  age  and  IPO  long  run 
abnormal  returns 
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value.  It  is  presumed  that  the  higher  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  flotation 
reflects  the  old  shareholders'  doubts  regarding  the  future  value  of  the  firms, 
which  is  understood  by  investors  as  low-quality  firms.  Therefore,  it  is  posited 
that  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the 
flotation  and  the  IPO  long  run  returns. 
H15c:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  percentage  of  equity 
sold  at  the  flotation  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
Based  on  a  number  of  studies  of  UK  privatisations,  it  could  be  inferred 
that  on  average  privatisation  firms  show  better  performance  than  their 
counterpart  firms  (private  firms).  Using  two  measures  of  long  run  return  and 
three  types  of  benchmarks,  Saurat  (2000)  finds  that  privatisation  IPOs 
overperform  the  benchmarks.  While  Levis  (1993)  finds  that  all  IPOs  (private  and 
privatisation)  underperform  the  market,  it  could  be  conjectured  that  on  average 
the  long  run  performance  of  privatisation  IPOs  behaves  differently  to  the  private 
IPOs  (H  16). 
H16:  The  privatisation  dummy  is  positively  related  to  IPO  long  run 
abnormal  returns 
The  IPO  long  run  performance  models  include  the  valuation  residual 
(Resi)  in  the  analysis,  to  capture  any  "mispricing"  that  takes  place  on  the  first 
trading  day.  However,  this  study  assumes  that  the  market  is  efficient,  so  any 
"mispricing",  eventually  is  corrected  in  the  long  run.  Therefore,  it  is  expected 
that  the  IPOs  with  higher  residuals  (overvalued  relatively  to  their  fundamentals) 
on  day  1,  will  have  lower  returns  in  the  long  run.  (H17) 
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abnormal  returns. 
The  IPO  long  run  returns  model  includes  the  initial  returns  as  an 
explanatory  variable.  Prior  studies  show  that  a  mean  reversion  effect  takes  place 
in  the  IPO  market,  which  means  that  IPOs  that  are  more  underpriced  tend  to  have 
lower  long  run  returns.  However,  the  IPO  signalling  theory  argues  that  the  high- 
quality  firms  use  the  underpricing  as  a  signal  td  their  values.  Therefore  in  the 
long  run,  they  are  also  expected  to  perform  better  than  the  low-quality  firms  do. 
Thus,  the  increasing  initial  returns  reflect  the  higher  quality  of  the  firms,  and  in 
turn  result  in  higher  returns  in  the  long  run.  Based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
market  is  efficient,  this  study  posits  a  negative  association  between  IPO  initial 
returns  and  its  long  run  abnormal  returns. 
H18:  There  is  a  negative  association  between  IPO  initial  returns  and  the 
long  run  abnormal  returns. 
In  sum,  this  section  presents  the  development  of  a  number  of  testable 
hypotheses  in  this  study.  The  hypotheses  are  built  on  the  theoretical  framework 
considering  the  results  of  prior  studies.  Tables  summarising  the  working 
hypotheses  summary  are  presented  in  the  appendix  (see  table  A.  3.1,  A.  3.2,  and 
A.  3.3). 
The  next  section  presents  the  research  method,  which  includes  the  market 
institutional  framework  and  the  research  sample. 
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3.3.1.  UK  Institutional  Framework 
A  firm  seeking  admission  to  the  London  Stock  Exchange  (LSE)  before 
1995  could  choose  either  to  list  in  the  Unlisted  Securities  Market  (USM)  or  the 
official  list.  The  USM  was  created  in  1981,  prior  to  the  `Big  Bang'  in  1986.  It 
was  intended  to  accommodate  small  firms  looking  for  additional  funding  through 
providing  them  with  a  relatively  low-cost  method  of  seeking  outside  equity. 
These  firms  were  characterised  by  their  small  size,  unknown  and/or  risky  nature 
and,  often,  the  lack  of  an  earnings  record.  Conditions  for  listing  in  the  USM  were 
simpler,  cheaper,  and  less  onerous  than  on  the  official  list  (Michie,  1999). 
However,  in  the  wake  of  the  1987  stock  market  crash,  small  firms  listed 
on  the  USM  were  the  ones  that  suffered  most.  Faced  with  these  difficulties,  small 
firms  ceased  to  make  new  issues,  as  they  were  poorly  received.  Consequently, 
capital  raised  by  USM  firms  dropped  from  £  308m  in  1988  to  only  £  11.6m  in 
1991.  Due  to  fewer  firms  being  listed  and  less  capital  raised  on  the  USM,  the 
Stock  Exchange  announced  its  plan  to  close  down  the  USM  in  1993.  At  the  end 
of  1996,  the  USM  was  abolished  and  replaced  by  the  Alternative  Investment 
Market  (AIM),  which  had  been  launched  in  1995.  Similar  to  the  USM,  the  AIM 
was  designed  to  facilitate  small,  new,  and  growing  firms  to  seek  outside  equity 
investors.  Meanwhile  the  Stock  Exchange  continued  the  operation  of  its  global 
market  for  big  firms,  the  official  list,  which  eventually  was  renamed  as  the  main 
market  (Michie,  1999).  As  a  comparison,  table  3.2  below  highlights  the  main 
differences  in  the  admission  criteria  for  the  main  market  and  the  AIM. 
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for  the  Main  market  and  the  AIM 
Criteria  Main  market  AIM 
Minimum  shares  in  Minimum  25%  of  shares  No  minimum  shares 
public  hands 
Trading  record  Normally  3  year  trading  No  trading  record  required 
record  required 
Shareholder  approval  Prior  shareholder  approval  No  prior  shareholder 
required  for  substantial  approval  required  for 
acquisitions  and  disposals  transactions 
Admission  documents  Pre-vetting  of  admission  Admission  documents  not 
documents  by  the  UKLA  pre-vetted  by  Exchange  or 
(UK  Listing  Authority)  UKLA 
Minimum  market  Minimum  market  No  minimum  market 
capitalisation  capitalisation  of  £700,000  capitalisation 
Source:  Financial  Service  Authority  (2002) 
Besides  the  market  type,  the  issuing  firms  could  also  choose  the  marketing 
method  used  to  bring  the  offers  to  the  market.  The  most  common  methods  used 
in  the  UK  IPO  market  are  the  offer  for  sale  and  placing8.  In  an  offer  for  sale, 
issuers  could  offer  the  shares  at  fixed  price  or  tender.  In  a  fixed  price  offer,  the 
sponsor  (and  the  issuer)  fixes  the  offer  price  about  two  weeks  before  the 
admission  date  and  undertakes  the  distribution  of  the  shares  at  this  price.  In  a 
tender  offer,  the  offer  price  is  set  in  a  certain  range  and  investors  are  invited  to 
bid.  However,  most  offer  for  sale  IPOs  in  the  UK  market  use  the  fixed  price 
method.  While  applications  for  the  offer  for  sale  are  invited  from  the  public,  the 
issue  is  sub-underwritten,  at  the  same  price,  by  a  group  of  financial  institutions. 
The  placing  is  the  most  popular  marketing  method  used  on  the  LSE.  The  sponsor 
$  Other  marketing  methods  available  are  introduction,  offer  for  subscription,  and  intermediaries 
offer.  The  introduction  method  is  used  when  a  firm  simply  wishes  to  obtain  a  stock  exchange 
quotation  for  its  existing  shares  without  issuing  new  shares  to  the  market.  An  offer  for 
subscription  is  an  invitation  to  the  public  by  an  issuer  to  subscribe  for  shares  not  yet  in  issue  or 
allotted.  This  method  is  usually  used  for  investment  trust  IPOs.  An  intermediary  offer  is  a 
marketing  of  shares  already  or  not  yet  in  issue,  by  means  of  an  offer  by  the  issuer  to 
intermediaries  for  them  to  allocate  to  their  own  clients. 
136 underwrites  the  entire  issue  for  a  short  period  and  distributes  them  to  specified 
persons  or  its  clients. 
3.3.2.  Research  Sample 
The  research  sample  is  taken  from  UK  firms  that  went  public  by  either 
offer  for  sale  and/or  placing  between  1986  and  1997  in  the  Official  market.  A 
total  of  1653  equity  offerings  were  floated  on  the  LSE  during  the  period.  Similar 
to  other  IPO  studies,  the  research  sample  excluded  financial  firm  IPOs  and 
closed-end  mutual  fund  offerings.  This  results  in  a  total  of  811  IPOs.  In  relation 
to  the  marketing  method  description  that  is  discussed  in  the  UK  institutional 
framework  section,  only  offer  for  sale,  placing,  and  the  combination  of  both  are 
appropriate  to  be  included  in  the  research  sample.  The  reason  is  that  the 
Introduction  method  is  used  by  firms  wishing  only  to  have  a  quotation  on  the 
LSE  and  not  wanting  to  raise  any  funds  from  investors,  while  offers  for 
subscription  is  only  distributed  to  very  limited  institutional  investors.  Therefore, 
excluding  marketing  methods  other  than  offer  for  sale  and/or  placing  results  in 
492  IPOs,  which  spread  across  the  years  (Panel  -A  -  table  3.3),  industry  sectors 
(Panel  B-  table  3.3),  and  firm  size  (Panel  C-  table  3.3)  as  indicated  in  the  tables 
below. 
Panel  A  shows  the  distribution  of  the  IPO  population  over  the  research 
periods.  The  number  of  firms  that  went  public  during  the  period  varies  across  the 
years.  According  to  Michie  (1999)  after  the  `Big  Bang'  in  the  late  1980s,  many 
firms  went  to  the  market,  and  then  during  the  recession  period  in  the  early  1990s 
very  few  firms  went  public.  This  is  reflected  in  the  research  population 
distribution  as  shown  in  panel  A.  The  early  period  shows  a  reasonable  number 
137 Table  3.3.  The  distribution  of  research  population 
Panel  A 
Year  Number  of  IPOs 
1987  42 
1988  39 
1989  35 
1990  14 
1991  20 
1992  30 
1993  51 
1994  80 
1995  53 
1996  71 
1997  57 
Total  492 
Panel  B 
Industry  sector  Number  of  IPOs 
Consumer  goods  73 
General  Industries  124 
Mineral  extraction  36 
Services  226 
Utilities  33 
Total  492 
Panel  C 
Percentile  (£million)  Number  of  IPOs 
Smallest  50 
10.24-14.05  49 
14.05-18.67  49 
18.67-23.39  49 
23.39-29.80  49 
29.80-40.45  49 
40.45-53.64  49 
53.64-88.66  49 
88.66-224.09.  49 
Largest  50 
Total  492 
138 of  IPOs  taking  place  in  the  UK  main  market.  The  figures  went  down  in  the  later 
period  (early  1990s),  as  a  result  of  the  economic  recession.  Then,  in  the  late 
period,  the  data  shows  an  increasing  number  of  firms  that  went  public  on  the  UK 
official  market. 
Panel  B  shows  the  IPO  population  spread  over  the  main  industry  sectors. 
Each  firm  is  assigned  to  a  specific  industry  sector  according  to  the  1995  FTSE 
Actuaries  industry  classification.  Excluding  the  Financial  sector,  the 
classification  includes  the  Consumer  goods  sector,  the  General  industries  sector, 
the  Mineral  extraction  sector,  the  Services  sector,  and  the  Utilities  sector.  Panel 
B  demonstrates  that  the  number  of  IPOs  in  each  sector  varies.  Almost  half  of  the 
IPOs  (49.5%)  that  came  to  the  market  during  the  research  periods  were  firms  in 
the  Service  sector.  It  is  followed  by  the  General  industries  sector  (25.2%),  the 
Consumer  goods  sector  (14.8%),  the  Mineral  extraction  sector  (7.3%),  and  the 
Utilities  sector  (6.7%).  It  is  worth  noting  that  most  of  the  firms  (28  out  of  33 
firms)  in  the  Utilities  sector  were  the  UK  privatisation  IPOs,  such  as  the 
electricity  and  water  firms. 
Panel  C  shows  the  distribution  of  the  IPO  population  based  on  the  firm 
size.  The  market  capitalisation  of  the  IPO  firms  in  the  research  periods  ranges 
from  £1.05  to  £5,500  millions,  of  which  about  90%  of  the  population  are 
relatively  small  firms  with  a  market  capitalisation  below  £  224  million.  The 
privatisation  IPOs,  the  Utilities  firms,  the  Mineral  extraction  firms  are  among  the 
largest  50  firms. 
As  mentioned  earlier  in  the  Introduction  chapter,  one  of  the  study 
objectives  is  to  examine  the  impact  of  the  firms'  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  the  IPO 
valuation  and  the  long  run  performance.  Following  the  ICAEW  study  (1998),  the 
139 Arthur  Andersen  Business  Risk  Model  (AABRM)  is  used  in  this  study  as  a 
framework  to  assess  the  firms'  ex-ante  risk  factors.  The  risk  assessment  is 
conducted  by  undertaking  a  detailed  content  analysis  of  each  of  the  offering 
prospectuses,  to  try  to  identify  the  disclosure  regarding  each  of  the  55  risk 
factors.  This  is  discussed  further  in  section  3.4.  This  is  a  very  time  consuming 
task,  and  consequently  this  study  draws  a  research  sample. 
The  initial  sample  is  chosen  randomly  from  the  population,  by  numbering 
each  of  the  492  IPOs  consecutively,  and  then  using  the  three-digit  random 
numbers  table,  to  draw  a  random  sample  of  200  IPOs.  The  chosen  200  IPOs  are 
distributed  over  the  research  period,  industry  sectors,  and  firm  size  as  shown  in 
table  3.4  below.  The  table  shows  the  actual  number  of  IPOs  in  each  classification 
(year,  industry  sector,  and  firm  size)  in  the  initial  sample  together  with  the 
number  of  observations  one  would  have  expected  in  each  category  if  the  sample 
of  200  were  a  perfect  representation  of  the  overall  population  of  492  (i.  e.,  as  it 
would  have  been  drawn  using  the  stratified  sampling  method).  For  example,  in 
1987,  there  were  42  IPOs  out  of  492  IPOs  in  the  research  period  (about  8.54%  of 
the  population).  If  a  sample  of  200  IPOs  had  been  drawn  using  the  stratified 
sampling  method,  one  would  expect  to  have  the  same  population  proportion  of 
IPOs  in  the  sample  of  1987,  which  is  about  17  IPOs. 
Panel  A  shows  that  the  initial  sample  is  spread  across  the  years  in  a 
similar  fashion  to  that  found  in  the  underlying  population.  The  yearly  expected 
number  of  IPOs  based  on  200  IPOs  is  shown  in  column  3  of  panel  A.  Although, 
140 Table  3.4  The  distribution  of  actual  and  expected  initial  sample  of  200  IPOs 
Panel  A-  Year 
Year  Actual  number  of  IPOs  Expected  number  of  IPOs 
in  the  initial  sample  based  on  200  IPOs 
1987  16  17 
1988  15  16 
1989  16  14 
1990  7  6 
1991  8  8 
1992  12  12 
1993  20  21 
1994  33  33 
1995  21  22 
1996  31  29 
1997  21  22 
Total  200  200 
Panel  B-  Industry  sector 
Industry  sector  Actual  number  of  IPOs  Expected  number  of  IPOs 
in  the  initial  sample  based  on  200  IPOs 
Consumer  goods  31  30 
General  Industries  50  50 
Mineral  extraction  12  15 
Services  94  92 
Utilities  13  13 
Total  200  200 
Panel  C-  Firm  size 
Decile  (£million)  Actual  number  of  IPOs 
in  the  initial  sample 
Expected  number  of  IPOs 
based  on  200  IPOs 
Smallest  19  20 
10.24-14.05  19  20 
14.06-18.67  21  20 
18.68-23.39  19  20 
23.40-29.80  18  20 
29.81-40.45  20  20 
40.46-53.64  18  20 
53.65-88.66  21  20 
88.67-224.09  22  20 
Largest  23  20 
Total  200  200 
141 only  three  out  of  11  years  show  that  the  actual  number  IPOs  in  the  initial  sample 
match  the  expected  number  of  IPOs  based  on  the  underlying  population,  the 
deviations  in  the  remaining  8  years  are  trivial.  It  is  clear  that  the  overall  yearly 
distribution  of  the  number  of  IPOs  is  very  similar.  A  chi-square  test  is  carried  out 
to  check  the  similarity  of  the  distribution  of  the  actual  and  the  expected  initial 
sample.  The  result,  which  is  discussed  further  below,  shows  that  there  is  no 
significant  difference  in  the  distribution  across  years  of  the  population  and  the 
initial  sample. 
Panel  B  of  table  3.4  shows  the  distribution  of  IPOs  across  the  industry 
sectors.  Similar  to  the  population  distribution,  the  initial  sample  spreads  among 
the  5  non-financial  industry  sectors.  Moreover,  similar  to  the  order  of  the 
population  distribution,  the  firms  in  the  Service  sector  dominate  the  initial 
sample,  followed  by  the  General  industries  sector,  the  Consumer  goods  sector, 
the  Utilities  sector,  and  the  Mineral  extraction  sector.  Panel  B  also  exhibits  the 
expected  number  of  IPOs  in  each  industry  sector  based  on  the  characteristics  of 
population  distribution.  Although,  the  comparison  between  the  expected  and  the 
actual  distribution  demonstration  a  little  variation,  in  general  it  could  be  said  that 
the  initial  sample  is  distributed  across  the  industry  sectors  similarly  to  as  the 
expected  sample. 
Panel  C  shows  the  distribution  of  the  initial  sample  based  on  the  deciles 
of  firm  size.  The  deciles  classification  used  in  Panel  C  is  the  one  applied  to  the 
population  (see  table  3.3  Panel  Q.  The  number  of  IPOs  in  the  actual  initial 
sample  marginally  varies  across  the  percentile  groups.  Only  the  £29.80-40.45 
millions  group  perfectly  match  the  number  of  IPOs  in  the  actual  sample  and  what 
142 one  would  have  expected  if  the  sample  perfectly  matched  the  population. 
However,  the  variations  in  the  other  percentile  groups  are  small. 
Each  panel  in  table  3.4  shows  some  small  variation  between  the  actual 
and  the  expected  initial  sample.  According  to  Snedecor  and  Cochran,  (1989)  a 
goodness  of  fit  test  can  be  used  to  test  if  a  sample  of  data  comes  from  a 
population  with  a  specific  distribution.  Therefore,  a  number  of  goodness  of  fit 
tests  are  carried  out  to  verify  whether  the  initial  sample  of  200  IPOs  is 
statistically  representative  to  the  research  population.  The  general  null 
hypothesis  (Ho)  states  that  the  data  follows  a  specified  distribution.  Applied  to 
this  study,  the  null  hypothesis  states  that  the  distribution  of  the  actual  initial 
sample  is  similar  to  the  distribution  of  the  expected  initial  sample.  If  the  test 
cannot  reject  the  Ho,  then  it  could  be  concluded  that  the  actual  and  the  expected 
initial  samples  have  similar  distributions,  and  vice  versa. 
The  test  statistics  for  the  Goodness  of  fit  test  is  as  follows, 
k 
(D;  -E;  )2  /E; 
r=ý 
where, 
O;  is  the  observed/actual  frequency 
E;  is  the  expected  frequency 
k  is  the  number  of  classification 
x2  is  the  chi-square  score  with  the  degree  of  freedom  of  k-1 
Using  the  information  in  table  3.4,  the  results  of  the  goodness  of  fit  tests 
are  summarised  in  the  following  table: 
143 Table  3.5  Results  of  Goodness  of  fit  test  for  the  initial  sample  of  200  IPOs 
Distribution  Null  hypothesis  (Ho)  x2  score  Statistical 
base  (p-value)  conclusion 
Yearly  The  yearly  distribution  of  the  1.09  Cannot  reject  Ho 
actual  initial  sample  is  similar  (0.99) 
to  the  one  of  the  expected 
initial  sample 
Industry  The  distribution  of  the  actual  0.598  Cannot  reject  Ho 
classification  initial  sample  in  the  industry  (0.96) 
classification  is  similar  to  the 
one  of  the  expected  initial 
sample 
Firm  size  The  distribution  of  the  actual  1.228  Cannot  reject  Ho 
initial  sample  in  the  Size  (0.99) 
percentile  groups  is  similar  to 
the  one  of  the  expected  initial 
sample 
Since  the  tests  cannot  reject  the  null  hypotheses,  the  results  mean  that  the 
initial  sample  follows  the  distribution  of  the  population.  In  other  words,  the 
initial  sample  is  statically  representative  to  the  research  population. 
The  crucial  point  of  data  collecting  in  this  research  is  to  obtain  the 
offering  prospectuses.  The  main  source  to  obtain  the  prospectuses  is  the  Global 
Access  online  database.  However,  at  the  time  of  data  collection,  the  database 
only  provides  the  documents  from  1992  onwards.  Therefore,  other  means  of 
collecting  the  IPO  prospectuses  was  required  for  the  1986-1991  period.  The  first 
mean  used  is  to  contact  the  firms  directly.  Only  38  out  of  51  sample  firms  for 
year  1987  to  1991  were  still  in  business.  However,  only  35  prospectuses  could  be 
collected  from  those  firms.  Three  other  firms  replied  that  they  no  longer  hold  any 
copy  of  their  IPO  prospectuses. 
A  significant  effort  has  been  exercised  to  obtain  16  prospectuses  (for  3 
firms  were  in  business  and  13  firms  had  gone  out  of  business  at  the  time  of  data 
collection  the  prospectuses)  through  various  organisations,  such  as  Companies 
144 House,  the  Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  in  Scotland  (ICAS),  the  Institute  of 
Chartered  Accountant  sin  England  and  Wales  (ICAEW),  and  the  Mitchell  library 
in  Glasgow.  However,  they  do  not  keep  the  offering  prospectuses.  After 
undertaken  various  attempts  to  collect  the  prospectuses,  only  184  prospectuses 
from  200  IPOs  initially  planned,  are  available,  and  four  of  them  are  mini 
prospectuses  (pathfinders),  which  contain  very  limited  information  They  are, 
therefore,  considered  as  incomplete  prospectuses.  This  reduces  the  sample  to  180 
IPOs. 
Most  of  the  research  variables  are  drawn  from  the  prospectus  manually; 
however  there  is  still  a  number  of  missing  data  items,  such  as  forecasted  EPS. 
There  are  13  prospectuses  that  do  not  disclose  the  EPS  forecasts.  Because  of  the 
specification  of  the  research  model  that  employs  the  EPS  forecasts,  IPOs  that  do 
not  disclose  the  information  are  excluded  from  the  sample.  This  leaves  the 
sample  to  167  IPOs  (see  table  3.6). 
Similar  to  other  finance  research  using  accounting  numbers,  the  data  set 
contains  a  number  of  outliers,  which  results  in  skewed  distributions  of  some 
variables.  The  outlier  in  this  study  is  defined  as  any  observation  that  has  extreme 
values  in  any  research  variable9.  A  Trimming  method  is  used  to  treat  the  outliers. 
The  outliers  are  eliminated  with  a  cut-point  of  1.5%  at  the  top  and  bottom  of  the 
distribution  of  all  variables.  The  deletion  of  the  outliers  reduces  the  final  sample 
to  161  valid  cases  as  detailed  in  table  3.6  below. 
'After  examining  the  distribution  of  each  variable,  the  extreme  values  are  defined  as  observations 
that  have  values  within  1.5%  top  and  bottom  of  the  distributions.  In  this  study,  6  outliers  are 
detected  (2  observations  in  the  Po/pBV  and  Pl/pBV  distributions,  1  observation  in  the  Lev 
distribution,  1  observation  in  the  BHR1y  distribution  and  2  observations  in  the  BHR2y 
distribution). 
145 The  distribution  of  the  final  sample  over  the  research  periods,  the 
industry  sectors,  and  the  firm  size  percentile  is  as  shown  in  table  3.7  below.  For 
comparison,  the  table  also  includes  the  number  of  observation  one  would  have 
expected  in  each  category  had  the  final  sample  of  161  IPOs  been  distributed  in 
an  identical  fashion  to  the  underlying  research  population  of  492  IPOs. 
Panel  A  demonstrates  that  there  are  some  differences  between  the 
expected  and  the  actual  number  of  IPOs  in  the  different  years.  As  explained 
earlier,  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  prospectuses  are  not  available  in  the 
database.  Prior  to  1992,  prospectuses  had  to  be  hand  collected  from  various 
sources  (as  discussed  above).  However,  it  was  not  possible  to  obtain  all 
prospectuses,  particularly  when  firms  had  gone  out  of  business  when  the  data 
collection  took  place.  -Nonetheless,  from  1992  onwards,  the  actual  sample 
distribution  is  relatively  similar  to  the  expected  distribution. 
Since  the  final  sample  loses  39  cases  (about  19.5%  of  the  initial  sample 
of  200  IPOs),  another  goodness  of  fit  test  is  carried  out  to  verify  the 
representation  of  the  final  sample.  The  results  are  shown  in  table  3.8  below. 
Panel  A  of  table  3.8  shows  that  the  probability  of  the  actual  final  sample 
is  distributed  similarly  to  the  expected  one  is  98%,  which  leads  to  the  results  of 
acceptance  of  the  null  hypothesis.  Therefore,  it  can  be  clearly  concluded  that 
regarding  the  yearly  distribution,  the  final  sample  of  161  is  representative. 
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- Table  3.7.  The  distribution  of  actual  final  sample  of  161  IPOs 
Panel  A 
Year  Actual  number  of  IPOs 
in  the  final  sample 
Expected  number  of 
IPOs  based  on  161 
IPOs 
1987  7  14 
1988  13  13 
1989  6  11 
1990  2  5 
1991  6  7 
1992  10  10 
1993  17  17 
1994  31  26 
1995  19  17 
1996  29  23 
1997  21  19 
Total  161  161 
Panel  B-  Industry  sector 
Year  Actual  number  of  IPOs 
in  the  final  sample 
Expected  number  of 
IPOs  based  on  161 
IPOs 
Consumer  goods  23  24 
General  Industries  39  41 
Mineral  extraction  8  12 
Services  86  74 
Utilities  5  11 
Total  161  161 
Panel  C-  Firm  size 
Decile  (£million)  Actual  number  of  IPOs 
in  the  final  sample 
Expected  number  of 
IPOs  based  on  161 
IPOs 
Smallest  16  17 
10.24-14.05  14  16 
14.06-18.67  15  16 
18.68-23.39  15  16 
23.40-29.80  14  16 
29.81-40.45  16  16 
40.46-53.64  15  16 
53.65-88.66  20  16 
88.67-224.09  20  16 
Largest  16  16 
Total  161  161 
148 Table  3.8  The  results  of  Goodness  of  fit  test  for  the  final  sample 
Panel  A 
Distribution  Null  hypothesis  (Ho)  x2  score  Statistical 
base  (p-value)  conclusion 
Yearly  The  yearly  distribution  of  the  0.598  Cannot  reject  Ho 
actual  final  sample  is  similar  to  (0.98) 
the  one  of  the  expected  initial 
sample 
Panel  B 
Distribution  Null  hypothesis  (Ho)  x2  score  Statistical 
base  (p-value)  conclusion 
Industry  The  distribution  of  the  actual  6.383  Cannot  reject  Ho 
classification  final  sample  in  the  industry  (0.17) 
classification  is  similar  to  the 
one  of  the  expected  initial 
sample 
Panel  C 
Distribution  Null  hypothesis  (Ho)  x2  score  Statistical 
base  (p-value)  conclusion 
Firm  size  The  distribution  of  the  actual  2.694  Cannot  reject  Ho 
final  sample  in  the  Size  (0.97) 
percentile  groups  is  similar  to 
the  one  of  the  expected  initial 
sample 
Panel  B  of  table  3.7  exhibits  the  actual  and  the  expected  distribution 
based  on  the  industry  classification.  There  are  some  variation  between  the  actual 
and  the  expected  distribution;  the  order  of  the  IPOs  based  on  industry  sector  is 
similar  to  the  one  of  the  population.  There  are,  however,  more  services  firms  and 
fewer  mineral  extraction  and  utilities  firms  in  the  final  sample  than  one  would 
expect  based  on  the  underlying  population. 
The  largest  difference  in  the  proportion  of  IPOs  in  the  sample  and  the 
population  is  to  be  found  in  the  Utilities  sector.  From  13  Utilities  firms  that  are 
included  in  the  initial  sample,  only  6  prospectuses  can  be  obtained.  The  other 
seven  uncollectable  prospectuses  are  due  to  a  number  of  reasons,  such  as  merger 
149 after  the  offerings  (of  2  water  companies  and  2  regional  electricity  firms  -  these 
companies  refused  to  send  the  prospectuses)  or  no  respond.  From  6  Utilities 
firms  of  which  the  prospectuses  are  available,  1  firm  is  excluded  from  the  final 
sample  due  to  missing  data.  As  explained  earlier,  most  the  firms  in  Utilities 
sectors  are  privatisation  IPOs.  While  the  Utilities  may  be  somewhat  under 
represented,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  five  Utilities  firms  in  the  final  sample  are 
all  the  privatisation  IPOs.  Prior  literature  suggests  that  privatisation  IPOs  may  be 
priced  differently  to  other  IPOs.  Later  on,  in  the  research  analysis,  this  study 
conducts  separate  analysis  for  the  non-privatisation  IPOs  (Menyah  et  al,  1995; 
Dewenter  and  Malatesta,  1997).  This  effectively  restricts  the  analysis  to  the  other 
four  industries  represented  in  the  sample  for  which  the  actual  distribution  is 
closed  to  the  expected. 
A  goodness  of  fit  test  is  undertaken  for  the  final  sample  distribution  based 
on  the  industry  category.  The  result  of  the  test  (table  3.8  -  panel  B)  shows  that 
the  probability  of  the  actual  distribution  to  be  similar  to  the  expected  one  is  low. 
Nevertheless,  the  result  is  not  enough  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis.  Therefore, 
statistically  it  could  be  concluded  that  the  distribution  of  the  actual  final  sample 
is  similar  to  the  expected  one. 
The  distribution  of  the  final  sample  of  161  based  on  firm  size  is  shown  in 
panel  C  of  table  3.7.  The  distribution  of  the  final  sample  is  similar  to  that 
expected,  with  only  small  differences.  The  goodness  of  fit  test  (table  3.8  -  panel 
C)  confirms  that  the  differences  are  insignificant,  which  leads  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  actual  distribution  of  the  final  sample  based  on  the  firm  size  is  similar  to 
the  expected  one. 
150 In  sum,  during  the  research  period,  492  of  the  non-financial  firm  IPOs  in 
the  UK  official  (main)  market  are  identified  as  the  research  population.  Since 
most  of  the  research  data  are  collected  manually  from  the  offering  prospectus, 
the  research  sample  is  limited  to  200  IPOs.  An  initial  -sample  of  200  IPOs  is 
manually  and  randomly  selected  from  the  research  population.  A  number  of 
statistical  analyses  confirm  that  the  initial  sample  is  a  representative  sample  of 
the  research  population  across  the  years  and  industry  sectors. 
While  collecting  and  analysing  the  data,  the  initial  sample  loses  39  IPOs 
that  makes  a  final  sample  of  161  IPOs  due  to  various  reasons  (see  table  3.6  and 
table  3.9)  Although  there  are  some  differences,  statistical  analyses  confirm  that 
both  the  initial  and  the  final  samples  are  representative  samples  of  the  research 
population. 
Table  3.9  IPO  Sample  derivation 
All  new  listed  offerings  during  1987-1997 
Financial  firms  and  closed-end  offerings  during 
1987-1997 
Introduction  and  offer  for  subscription  IPOs 
Offer  for  sale  and  placing  IPOs 
Initial  sample  -  random  sample  from  492  IPOs  200 
Collected  Prospectus  184 
Unreadable  prospectus  4 
Final  sample  180 
Missing  data  12 
Outliers  deletion  7 
Valid  cases  161 
1653 
811 
319 
492 
151 3.4.  Content  analysis  for  the  Arthur  Andersen  Business  Risk  Model 
This  section  aims  to  provide  a  detailed  explanation  of  the  prospectus 
content  analysis  undertaken  to  assess  the  firms'  ex-ante  risk  factors.  As 
mentioned  in  the  introduction  chapter,  the  prospectus  information  is  categorised 
as  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  ex- 
ante  risk  factors  used  in  this  study  are  adopted  from  the  Arthur  Andersen 
Business  Risk  Modelf  (AABRM)  (Appendix  A.  3.5). 
The  AABRM  is  widely  used  by  practitioners  as  a  model  to  assess  the 
firm's  business  risk.  According  to  Mingay  (2003),  the  model  is  a  useful  generic 
framework  that  needs  to  be  customised  for  specific  industries  and  enterprises. 
Originally,  the  model  is  used  by  the  risk  auditors  of  Arthur  Andersen  to  help 
their  clients  to  self  assess  their  own  business  risk.  A  number  of  methods  of 
assessment  are  needed  to  apply  the  model,  such  as  analysing  the  firm's 
documents  (annual  reports,  company  circulars),  interviewing  managers  and 
employees,  and  observations  on  daily  activities. 
The  AABRM  has  not  attracted  much  academic  attention.  To  my 
knowledge,  there  have  been  2  studies  by  ICAEW  trying  to  look  at  the 
implication  of  the  model.  The  first  study  (ICAEW,  1997)  is  a  proposal  of 
reporting  risk  in  the  firm  annual  reports.  Having  examined  annual  reports  from  5 
firms,  they  find  that  to  some  extent  firms  do  report  their  business  risks  as  defined 
in  the  AABRM.  As  a  follow-up  to  the  results  found  in  the  first  study,  they 
conduct  another  study  (ICAEW,  1999)  to  compare  the  risk  reporting  in  the 
offering  prospectus  and  the  firms  annual  reports  published  after  the  IPOs.  The 
analysis  uses  the  AABRM  as  a  framework  to  assess  the  business  risks  of  5  non- 
financial  firms  from  different  industries  and  of  different  size.  The  method  used  is 
152 content  analysis  of  the  offering  prospectus  and  the  annual  reports.  The  result 
shows  that  firms  tend  to  disclose  business  risk  more  in  the  prospectus  than  in  the 
annual  reports.  It  also  finds  that  the  type  of  risk  factors  disclosed  vary  across  the 
firms  observed.  Examining  5  prospectuses,  they  find  only  a  total  of  23  risk 
factors  are  disclosed  in  the  documents,  of  which  only  18  factors  provide  the  risk 
measures.  The  number  of  risk  factors  disclosed  in  each  prospectus  ranges  from  9 
to  19  risk  factors. 
The  fact  that  more  risk  factors  are  found  in  the  offering  prospectus  than  in  the 
annual  reports  becomes  one  of  the  motivations  of  this  study  to  use  the  AABRM 
as  a  tool  to  assess  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  disclosed  in  the  prospectus.  A  number 
of  IPO  studies  find  a  positive  relationship  between  the  risk  and  the  underpricing 
(e.  g.,  Beatty  and  Ritter,  1996).  However,  they  use  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
IPO  prices  for  the  first  5  days  as  a  proxy  to  the  risk,  which  indicate  the  ex-post 
risk  of  the  IPOs.  One  objective  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  ex-ante  risk,  as 
part  of  the  prospectus  information,  which  is  available  to  the  market  at  the  IPO. 
Other  studies  use  the  number  of  risk  factors  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  as  a 
proxy  to  the  risk  factors  (e.  g.,  Feltham  et  al.,  1991).  However,  as  they 
acknowledge,  the  measure  is  a  "crude"  proxy,  which  could  lead  to 
misinterpretation  of  the  results.  This  measure  implies  that  the  more  risk  factors 
disclosed  in  the  prospectus,  the  riskier  the  firm,  which  is  questionable.  The 
AABRM,  as  it  is  shown  in  the  ICAEW's  study  (1999)  enables  the  users  to 
identify  the  risk  factors  and  the  measures.  In  this  study,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors 
should  be  identified  and  measured  based  on  the  prospectus  information,  as  it 
requires  the  ability  to  identify  which  firms  are  riskier  than  others. 
153 The  AABRM  identifies  three  main  sources  of  risk:  environment,  process, 
and  information  for  decision  making  risk.  Environment  risk  arises  from  external 
factors,  while  process  and  information  for  decision  making  arise  from  internal 
factors.  The  ICAEW  studies  find  that  the  process  risk  is  the  risk  most  reported  in 
the  offering  documents  and  the  annual  reports,  while  the  environment  risk  is  the 
one  least  reported. 
Using  the  AABRM,  this  study  conducts  a  content  analysis  of  the  180 
collectable  and  readable  prospectuses.  The  analysis  is  undertaken  in  two  stages. 
The  first  stage  is  to  identify  each  of  the  AABRM  risk  factors  in  the  prospectuses 
by  looking  at  any  statement  that  mentions  or  points  to  the  risk  factors.  For 
example,  the  Customer  satisfaction  risk  factor  is  derived  from  the  following 
quoted  statement:  "The  market  demand  for  most  of  the  Group's  existing  pottery 
products,  particularly  the  Botanic  Garden  and  Pomona  designs,  has  been  higher 
than  production  capacity  in  recent  years"  (page  6  of  the  offering  prospectus  of 
Portmeirion  Potteries,  1988).  The  statement  indicates  that  there  was  a  positive 
trend  of  market  demand  for  the  products,  and  possible  customer  satisfaction  risk. 
The  second  stage  is  to  look  whether  the  risk  factor  is  measured  or  not.  It  is 
important  to  have  a  measure  for  each  of  the  risk  factors  because  it  enables  me  to 
compare  the  risk  levels  of  each  firm  in  the  sample.  For  example,  the  Customer 
satisfaction  risk  factor  is  derived  from  the  following  quoted  statement:  "Unipalm 
currently  has  approximately  2,450  active  customers  with  between  80  and  100 
new  customers  being  added  each  month.  In  the  six  months  ended  31  S`  October 
1993,  the  ten  largest  customers  accounted  from  11.2  to  15.7  per  cent  of  sales  by 
Unipalm  ".  The  statement  indicates  growing  customer  satisfaction,  and  also 
154 provides  the  measure  (percentage  of  sales  from  the  largest  customers).  The  result 
of  the  content  analysis  is  shown  in  the  table  3.10  below. 
Table  3.10  The  results  of  content  analysis  of  180  IPO  prospectuses 
Risk  factors  Indentified?  Measured? 
Yes  No  Yes  No 
Environment  risk 
Competitor  31  149  11  20 
Sensitivity  0  180  -  - 
Shareholder  relations  5  175  0  5 
Catastrophic  loss  0  180  -  - 
Soveregin/Political  0  180  -  - 
Legal  0  180  -  - 
Regulatory  7  173  0  7 
Industry  180  0  180  0 
Financial  markets  0  180  -  - 
Process  risk 
Customer  satisfaction  91  89  72  19 
Human  resources  176  4  164  12 
Product  development  86  94  19  67 
Efficiency  180  0  180  0 
Capacity  180  0  180  0 
Performance  gap  0  180  -  - 
Cycle  training  0  180  -  - 
Obsolescence/Shrinkage  0  180  -  - 
Compliance  0  180  -  - 
Business  interruption  0  180  -  - 
Product/Service  Failure  0  180  -  - 
Health  and  Safety  75  105  0  75 
Leadership/Authority  17  163  0  17 
Performance  incentives  0  180  -  - 
Communications  0  180  -  - 
Relevance  0  180  -  - 
Integrity  0  180  -  - 
Access  0  180  -  - 
Infrastructure  0  180  -  - 
Fraud/Illegal  acts  0  180  -  - 
Reputation  23  157  0  23 
Interest  rate  169  11  169  0 
Currency  119  61  119  0 
Equity  180  0  165  15 
Financial  instrument  0  180  -  - 
Liquidity  180  0  180  0 
Capital  availability  180  0  180  0 
Default  credit  180  0  180  0 
Settlement  0  180  -  - 
Collateral  36  144  22  14 
155 Risk  factors  (continued)  Identified  ?  Measured? 
Yes  No  Yes  No 
Information  for  decision 
making  risk 
Pricing  0  180  -  - 
Performance  measurement  0  180  -  - 
Alignment  0  180  -  - 
Completeness  &  accuracy  0  180  -  - 
Budget  &  Planning  0  180  -  - 
Accounting  information  180  0  0  180 
Financial  reporting  evaluation  180  0  0  180 
Taxation  180  0  0  180 
Pension  fund  63  117  0  180 
Investment  evaluation  0  180  -  - 
Regulatory  reporting  0  180  -  - 
Environmental  scan  51  129  -  51 
Business  portfolio  123  57  101  22 
Valuation  -  180  -  - 
Organisation  structure  159  21  0  159 
Resource  allocation  0  180  -  - 
Planning  0  180  -  - 
Lifecycle  4  176  0  4 
In  general,  table  3.10  shows  that  not  all  the  risk  factors  in  the  AABRM 
are  disclosed  in  the  prospectuses,  particularly  for  the  environment  and  the 
information  for  decision  making  risks.  This  is  similar  to  the  results  found  by 
ICAEW  (1999),  as  discussed  previously. 
Table  3.10  demonstrates  that  from  the  prospectuses  examined,  only  4 
environment  risk  factors  are  found.  Additionally,  only  the  competitor  and 
industry  risk  factors  provide  measures  of  the  level  of  risk. 
Fifteen  process  risk  factors  are  identified  in  the  prospectus,  of  which  only 
12  risk  factors  are  measured.  From  the  information  for  decision  making,  8  risk 
factors  are  found,  and  only  the  business  portfolio  risk  factor  provides  a  measure 
of  the  level  of  risk. 
In  sum,  a  total  of  31  risk  factors  of  the  comprehensive  AABRM 
framework  are  identified  from  the  180  prospectuses,  and  of  those,  companies 
156 provide  a  measure  of  the  risk  for  only  15  risk  factors.  Therefore,  since  only  few 
of  the  AABRM  risk  factors  are  identified,  at  this  point  the  research  cannot  pursue 
the  application  of  the  AABRM  as  a  whole.  It  is,  therefore,  decided  to  focus  only 
on  the  15  measurable  risk  factors. 
Further  examination  shows  that  out  of  the  15  measurable  risk  factors, 
only  6  risk  factors  appear  to  be  consistently  identified  and  measured  in  the 
prospectuses.  The  other  risk  factors  are  identified,  however  few  prospectuses 
provides  the  risk  measures,  therefore  they  are  excluded  in  the  further  analysis. 
This  left  only  6  risk  factors  (industry  risk,  efficiency  risk,  capacity  risk,  liquidity 
risk,  capital  availability  risk,  default  credit  risk)  to  be  examined  further.  The 
correlation  analysis  among  the  6  risk  factors  is  carried  out.  The  result  shows  that 
the  liquidity  risk  is  highly  correlated  to  the  default  credit  risk  (see  table  3.11). 
This  is  understandable  as  both  risk  factors  measure  the  leverage  of  a  firm. 
Therefore,  only  one  leverage  risk  factor  will  be  used  in  the  research  model. 
Using  a  number  of  leverage  risk  measures,  Su  (1999)  finds  that  the  debt  ratio  is 
significantly  related  to 
Table  3.11  -  Correlation  matrix  of  6  risk  factors 
Industry  Efficiency  Capacity  Credit  Liquidity 
Efficiency  0.029 
Capacity  -0.119  0.154 
Credit  -0.007  -0.109  0.209 
Liquidity  0.016  0.083  -0.106  --0.797 
Capital  -0.013  -0.117  0.021  0.171  -0.218 
availability 
Note:  the  coefficients  in  bold  and  italic  are  significant  at  the  10%  level 
157 the  IPO  values  and  underpricing,  while  the  current  ratio  appears  to  be 
insignificantly  related  to  either  IPO  value  or  underpricing.  Therefore,  based  on 
the  prior  empirical  result,  this  study  chooses  the  default  credit  risk  factors  -  as 
proxied  by  debt  ratio  -  to  be  included  in  the  research  model. 
In  sum,  the  study  objective  is  to  examine  the  impact  of  the  prospectus 
information  on  the  IPO  valuation  and  performance.  The  prospectus  information 
is  defined  as  fundamentals,  risk  factors,  and  signals.  Motivated  by  prior  studies 
by  ICAEW,  initially  this  study  uses  the  AABRM  as  a  framework  to  identify  the 
firm's  risk  prior  to  the  admission.  However,  the  result  from  the  content  analysis 
of  180  prospectuses  shows  that  only  31  risk  factors  are  reported  in  any  of  the 
prospectuses,  and  only  15  risk  factors  are  measured.  It  is,  therefore,  decided  not 
to  pursue  the  whole  AABRM  application  in  this  study,  but  only  focus  on  the  risk 
factors  found  and  measured  in  the  prospectuses.  Due  to  the  sample  size  and  the 
further  statistical  limitation,  further  selection  of  risk  factors  is  undertaken.  The 
research  only  includes  the  risk  factors  that  are  consistently  found  and  measured 
in  all  prospectuses.  This  selection  results  in  6  risk  factors.  The  correlation 
analysis  of  the  risk  factors  shows  that  the  liquidity  and  the  credit  default  risk 
factors  are  highly  correlated.  Based  on  prior  study  (Su,  1999),  the  liquidity  risk 
factor  is  excluded  for  further  analysis.  The  results  in  a  final  selection  of  5  risk 
factors  (industry  risk,  efficiency  risk,  capacity  risk,  capital  availability  risk,  and 
default  credit  risk)  that  are  included  in  the  research  models  in  the  main  analysis. 
Later  in  the  analysis  (chapter  4-  IPO  valuation),  a  number  of  robustness 
tests  are  undertaken  to  examine  whether  the  number  of  risk  factors  disclosed  in 
the  prospectuses  affect  the  IPO  valuation.  These  tests  provide  evidence  as  to 
whether  the  more  risk  factors  could  be  identified  in  the  prospectuses  would  affect 
158 the  IPO  valuation.  The  disclosure  indices  are  developed  for  each  risk  factor 
group  (Environment  risk,  Process  risk,  and  Information  for  decision  making  risk) 
as  well  as  total  disclosure  index.  They  are  put  in  the  left  hand  side  of  the  model 
equations,  as  predictors,  to  substitute  for  the  5  ex-ante  risk  factors  included  in  the 
main  analysis. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  explains  the  methodology  applied  to  this  study.  Firstly,  a 
theoretical  explanation  is  presented  in  order  to  justify  the  inclusion  of  each 
variable  into  the  model  and  how  it  fits  to  the  objectives  of  the  study. 
The  explanatory  research  variables  can  be  grouped  in  to  three  groups  of 
variables;  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals.  In  addition,  two  more 
variables,  privatisation  and  firm  size,  are  also  included  as  control  variables. 
A  number  of  empirical  models  are  also  presented  in  this  chapter.  The 
three  general  empirical  models  are  the  valuation  model,  the  initial  return  model, 
and  the  long  run  performance  model.  The  valuation  model  analysis  is  developed 
in  two  stages.  Firstly,  the  analysis  only  includes  the  basic  fundamental 
information  and  the  IPO  offer  and  initial  price.  Secondly,  the  model  is  expanded, 
to  the  full  valuation  model,  by  an  inclusion  of  ex-ante  risk  factors,  signals,  and 
the  control  variables.  The  IPO  valuation  analysis  will  also  includes  a  number  of 
robustness  test  by  considering  alternatives  measures  (proxies)  for  predictors  as 
well  as  the  deflator. 
The  initial  return  model  analyses  the  relationship  between  the  initial 
return  and  the  three  group  variables.  Additionally,  it  also  examines  the  impact  of 
the  residual  from  the  IPO  valuation  model  on  the  initial  returns. 
159 The  long  run  returns  model  is  developed  to  investigate  the  relationship 
between  the  three  groups  of  variables  and  the  IPO  long  run  returns.  In  order  to 
re-examine  the  relationship  between  the  IPO  underpricing  and  the  long  run 
performance,  the  long  run  returns  model  is  expanded  by  including  the  initial 
return  to  the  model,  based  on  signalling  theory. 
This  chapter  also  describes  the  definition  and  the  measures  of  each 
research  variables  and  the  development  of  working  research  hypotheses  and  is 
followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  UK  institutional  framework.  A  detailed  sampling 
procedure  is  presented  the  research  sample  section.  Finally,  this  chapter  provides 
a  broad  discussion  of  the  use  of  the  AABRM  as  a  tool  in  the  prospectus  content 
analysis  to  identify  and  measure  the  IPO  ex-ante  risk  factors. 
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Table  A.  3.1  Working  hypotheses  for  the  IPO  valuation  models 
Hypothesis  Variables  Expected 
signs 
H1 
IPO  valuation  is  an  increasing  function  of  IPO  firms 
future  fundamentals 
Hla 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  IPO  offer  pBV/pBV 
(initial)  prices  and  proforma  book  value  of  equity 
Hlb 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  IPO  offer  fE^/pBV 
(initial)  prices  and  forecasted  earnings 
H2 
The  negative  earnings  dummy  is  positively  related  to  the  D/pBV 
IPO  prices,  while  negative  interactive  term  is  expected 
to  be  negatively  related  to  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices.  D*fE/pBV 
H3 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  IPO  offer  pDIV/pBV 
(market)  prices  and  proforma  dividend 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
H4 
IPO  valuation  is  a  decreasing  function  of  the  ex-ante 
risk  factors 
H4a 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre  IPO  Lev 
leverage  and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H4b 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Cap  + 
capital  availability  risk  and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H4c 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Effr 
efficiency  risk  and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H4d 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Cpy 
capacity  risk  and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H4e 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  industry  risk  Ind 
and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
161 Hypothesis  Variables  Expected 
signs 
H5 
Signals  are  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  valuation 
H5a 
Sponsor  reputation  is  positively  related  to  IPO  offer 
(initial)  prices  Spo  + 
H5b 
Firm  age  is  positively  related  to  IPO  offer  (initial  prices 
H5c 
Percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  is  negatively 
related  to  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
Age  + 
Eq  - 
H6 
Privatisation  IPOs  are  priced  lower  than  private  IPOs  Priv 
162 Table  A.  3.2  Working  hypotheses  for  the  IPO  initial  returns  model 
Hypothesis  Variables  Expected 
signs 
H7 
IPO  initial  return  is  an  increasing  function  of  IPO  firms 
fundamentals 
H7a 
The  pro  forma  book  value  of  equity  to  offer  price  ratio  is  pBV/Po  + 
positively  related  to  IPO  initial  returns 
H7b 
The  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  is  positively  fE/po  + 
related  to  IPO  initial 
H8 
IPO  initial  return  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  ex-ante 
risk  factors 
H8a 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Lev  + 
leverage  and  IPO  initial  returns 
H8b 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Cap 
capital  availability  risk  and  IPO  initial  returns. 
H8c 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Effr  + 
efficiency  risk  and  IPO  initial  returns 
H8d 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Cpy  + 
capacity  risk  and  IPO  initial  returns 
H8e 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  industry  risk  and  hid  + 
IPO  initial  returns 
163 Hypothesis  Variables  Expected 
signs 
H9 
Signals  are  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  initial  returns 
H9a 
Sponsor  reputation  is  negatively  related  to  IPO  initial  Spo 
returns 
H9b 
Firm  age  is  negatively  related  to  IPO  initial  returns  Age 
H9c 
Percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  flotation  is  positively  Eq  + 
related  to  IPO  initial  returns 
H10 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  privatisation  Priv  + 
dummy  and  IPO  initial  returns 
H11 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  residuals  Resi 
and  IPO  initial  returns 
164 Table  A.  3.3.  Working  hypotheses  for  the  IPO  long  run  performance 
model 
Hypothesis  Variables  Expected 
signs 
H12 
IPO  long  run  return  is  an  increasing  function  of  IPO 
firms  fundamentals 
H12a 
The  pro  forma  book  value  of  equity  to  offer  price  ratio  is  pBV/po  + 
positively  related  to  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H  12b 
The  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  is  positively 
related  to  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns  fE/po  + 
H13 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  size  and  IPO  Size 
long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14 
IPO  long  run  return  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  ex- 
ante  risk  factors 
H14a 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Lev  + 
leverage  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14b 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Cap 
capital  availability  risk  and  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14c 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Effr  + 
efficiency  risk  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14d 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm's  pre-IPO  Cpy  + 
capacity  risk  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H14e 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  industry  risk  and  Ind  + 
IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
165 Hypothesis  Variables  Expected 
signs 
H15 
Signals  are  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  long  run 
returns 
H15a 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  sponsor  spo  + 
reputation  dummy  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H15b 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  firm  age  and  Age  + 
IPO  long  run  abnormal  returns 
H15c 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  percentage  of  Eq  - 
equity  sold  at  the  flotation  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal 
returns 
H16 
Privatisation  dummy  is  positively  related  to  IPO  Priv  + 
abnormal  returns 
H17 
Valuation  residuals  is  positively  related  to  IPO  abnormal  Resi  + 
returns 
H18 
There  is  a  negative  association  between  IPO  initial  IR 
returns  and  the  long  run  abnormal  returns. 
166 Table  A.  3.4  Privatisation  IPOs  in  the  research  sample 
No  Company  name  IPO  date 
1  British  Airways  11-02-1987 
2  British  Airport  Authority  (BAA)  28-07-1987 
3  Corus  (British  Steel)  05-12-1988 
4  Kelda  (Yorkshire  Water)  12-12-1989 
5  Severn  Trent  12-12-1989 
6  International  Power  (National  Power)  12-03-1991 
7  Powergen  12-03-1991 
8  Viridian  (Northern  Ireland  Electricity)  21-061993 
9  British  Energy  15-07-1996 
10  AEA  Technology  26-09-1996 
167 Appendix  A.  3.5 
The  Arthur  Andersen  Business  Risk  ModelTM 
ENVIRONMENT  RISK 
Competitor  Sensitivity  Shareholder  Relations  Catastrophic  loss 
Sovereign/Political  Legal  Regulatory  Industry  Financial  Markets 
PROCESS  RISK 
OPERATIONS  RISK 
Customer  satisfaction 
Human  resources 
Product  development 
Efficiency 
Capacity 
Performance  gap 
Cycle  training 
Obsolescence/Shrinkage 
Compliance 
Business  interruption 
Product/Service  Failure 
Health  and  Safety 
EMPOWERMENT  RISK 
Leadership/Authority 
Performance  incentives 
Communications 
INFORMATION 
PROCESSING/ 
TECHNOLOGY  RISK 
Relevance 
Integrity 
Access 
Infrastructure 
INTEGRITY  RISK 
Fraud/ 
Illegal  acts 
FINANCIAL  RISK 
Interest  rate 
Currency 
Equity 
Financial  Instrument 
Liquidity 
Capital  Availability 
Default  credit 
Settlement 
Collateral 
INFORMATION  FOR  DECISION  MAKING  RISK 
OPERATIONAL  FINANCIAL  STRATEGIC 
Pricing  Budget  and  planning  Environmental  scan 
Performance  measurement  Accounting  information  Business  portfolio 
Alignment  Financial  reporting  Valuation 
Completeness  and  evaluation  Organisation  structure 
accuracy  Taxation  Resource  allocation 
Pension  fund  Planning 
Investment  evaluation  Life  cycle 
Regulatory  reporting 
168 Chapter  4 Chapter  4 
IPO  Valuation  analysis 
Introduction 
The  previous  chapter  outlined  how  the  empirical  analysis  in  this  research 
into  IPO  valuation  has  been  carried  out.  Chapter  3  provides  the  general  theoretical 
explanation  regarding  the  role  of  risk  factors  and  signals  in  the  IPO  valuation 
process  and  the  analysis  of  subsequent  IPO  performance.  This  was  followed  by  a 
presentation  of  the  empirical  models  used  in  this  study  and  the  working  hypotheses 
empirically  evaluated.  Finally,  the  chapter  discussed  the  criteria  and  the  process  of 
selecting  a  suitable  research  sample  for  the  study. 
This  chapter  discusses  the  research  data,  and  the  results  and  analysis  of  the 
IPO  valuation  model.  It  aims  to  answer  the  first  research  question  of  whether  the 
prospectus  information  is  useful  to  value  the  IPOs.  As  described  in  figure  1  in  the 
Introduction  chapter,  the  main  hypothesis  in  the  IPO  valuation  analysis  is  that  the 
IPO  price  is  related  to  the  prospectus  information.  As  explained  in  the  previous 
chapter,  the  prospectus  information  is  categorised  into  three  groups:  the 
fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  the  signals.  The  accounting  based 
valuation  model  is  used  to  analyse  the  IPO  valuation.  Thirteen  testable  hypotheses 
that  are  set  in  the  IPO  valuation  analysis  have  been  presented  in  the  Research 
design  chapter  (chapter  3).  The  empirical  models  used  in  this  chapter  are  the  basic 
valuation  and  the  IPO  valuation  models  as  set  out  in  equations  4  and  5  (see 
Research  design  chapter).  Two  levels  of  IPO  prices,  which  are  the  offer  price  (Po) 
and  the  initial  market  price  (P1),  are  examined.  A  summary  of  what  is  done  in  this 
chapter  is  presented  in  the  following  diagram  (figure  4.1). Ü- 
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N The  chapter  begins  by  presenting  descriptive  statistics  relating  to  the  variables  used 
in  the  valuation  models.  This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  hypotheses  and 
their  empirical  evaluation  using  the  basic  valuation  model.  The  next  section  is  a 
discussion  of  the  impact  of  a  number  of  ex  ante  risk  factors  and  signals  on  the  full 
IPO  valuations.  This  is  followed  by  a  section  that  reports  the  results  of  sensitivity 
analyses,  which  are  undertaken  to  examine  whether  the  main  analysis  is  sensitive 
to  the  choice  of  measures  (proxies)  used  in  the  IPO  valuation  models.  Finally,  a 
brief  summary  of  the  main  findings  of  this  chapter  is  presented. 
4.1  Data 
The  descriptive  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  the  valuation  models  are 
shown  in  table  4.1  below.  The  observations  for  the  IPO  sample  are  cross-sectional 
during  the  period  1987-1997.  For  the  IPO  sample,  the  offer  price  scaled  by  pro- 
forma  book  value  variable  (P-/pBk)  has  a  mean  value  of  3.15,  which  ranges 
between  0.858  and  9.274,  and  a  standard  deviation  of  3.136.  Compared  to  PQ/pBV, 
the  initial  market  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  variable  (PI/pBP)  has  a 
higher  mean  value  of  3.637,  which  ranges  between  0.874  and  10.454.  The  higher 
mean  value  indicates  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  the  underpricing  anomaly 
in  the  IPO  sample.  Furthermore,  the  simple  statistical  paired  t-test  shows  that  the 
IPO  offer  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  is  statistically  and  significantly 
lower  than  the  initial  market  price  scaled  by  pro  forma  book  value'.  This  result 
1  The  analysis  uses  the  hypothesis  testing  of  paired  sample.  The  Ho  is  that  the  mean  of  IPO  prices 
between  the  two  different  periods  (day  0  and  day  1)  is  equal,  with  the  mean  of  difference  of  -0.324, 
and  a  standard  deviation  of  0.453.  The  test  shows  that  a  mean  of  difference  between  PO/pBV  and 
P1/pBV  is  different  to  zero  with  the  t-statistics  of  -9.08,  and  p-value  of  0.00.  Hence,  it  rejects  the 
Ho. 
171 suggests  that  the  IPO  sample  is  underpriced  at  the  offering,  compared  to  the  initial 
market  price. 
Table  4.1a.  Descriptive  Statistics  of  research  variables 
in  IPO  valuation  model 
The  table  contains  descriptive  statistics  for  the  IPO  sample  of  variables  in  the 
valuation  analysis.  PO/pBV  refers  to  the  offer  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book 
value,  P1/pBV  to  the  initial  market  price  to  pro-forma  book  value,  fE/pBV  to 
forecasted  earning  per  share  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value,  D  to  a  negative 
forecasted  EPS  dummy  variable,  D*JE/pBV  to  the  interactive  term  between 
dummy  variable  and  forecasted  EPS  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value,  Div/pBV  to 
pro-forma  book  value,  Lev  to  ex  ante  leverage  risk,  Cap  to  ex-ante  capital 
availability  risk,  Effr  to  ex  ante  efficiency  risk,  Cpy  to  ex-ante  capacity  risk,  Ind  to 
ex  ante  industry  risk,  Priv  to  privatisation  dummy  variable,  Lii(age)  to  firm's  age, 
Spo  to  sponsor  reputation  dummy  variable,  and  Eq  to  percentage  of  equity  sold  at 
the  IPOs. 
Variables  N  Mean  Median  Std.  dev  Min  Max 
Po/pBV  161  3.150  2.732  1.981  0.858  9.274 
P1/pBV  161  3.474  3.050  2.241  0.799  11.861 
fE/pBV  161  0.189  0.183  0.183  -0.481  0.757 
D  161  0.087  -  -  -  - 
D*fE/pBV  161  -0.016  0.000  0.068  -0.481  0.000 
Div/pBV  161  0.037  0.013  0.056  0.000  0.331 
Lev  161  -0.444  -0.375  0.516  -3.730  1.506 
Cap  161  0.685  0.762  0.492  -1.213  3.063 
Effr  161  0.656  0.688  0.230  0.037  1.420 
Cpy  161  0.380  0.336  0.338  0.009  0.963 
Ind  161  0.898  0.900  0.068  0.740  1.090 
Priv  161  0.056  -  -  -  - 
Age  161  2.229  2.080  1.036  -2.300  4.200 
Spo  161  0.678  -  -  -  - 
Eq.  161  0.426  0.370  0.205  0.070  1.000 
The  descriptive  statistics  of  earnings  forecasts  (fE/pBT,  )  shows  that  on 
average  the  IPO  sample  takes  a  value  of  0.189.  The  descriptive  statistics  of  the 
172 negative  earnings  dummy  variable  (D)  and  the  interactive  term  (D  *JE/pB  P)  shows 
the  IPO  sample  records  8.7%  of  firm  reported  forecasted  losses.  The  dividends 
variable  (Div/pBP)  takes  a  low  average  value.  It  should  be  noted  that  only  99  out 
of  161  firms  paid  dividends  prior  to  the  admission. 
The  remaining  variables  reported  in  table  4.1  a  are  the  ex  ante  risk  factors 
and  signals.  These  variables  are  used  in  the  full  IPO  valuation  model  and  the  IPO 
performance  models.  As  explained  in  the  previous  chapter  and  summarised  in  the 
research  variables  table,  the  Lev  variable  is  measured  by  the  natural  log  of  the  3- 
year  arithmetic  mean  of  the  firm's  debt  ratios.  The  descriptive  statistics  show  high 
figures  of  mean  and  median  values,  of  -0.465  and  -0.393,  respectively 
(approximately  an  average  of  62.81%  and  67.51%  debt  ratios).  These  figures 
indicate  that  IPO  firms  are  typically  exposed  to  quite  high  financial  risks.  This 
sample  statistics  are  far  higher  than  prior  studies.  Using  US  data,  Miller  and 
Hedge  (1996)  find  an  average  of  17.86%  debt  ratios  across  their  sample,  while  a 
sample  of  Chinese  IPO  reports  a  37.0%  debt  ratio  (Su,  1999). 
The  next  variable,  Cap,  is  a  proxy  for  the  capital  availability  risk.  As  IPO 
firms  are  characterised  as  young  firms  that  need  more  investment,  the  availability 
of  capital  is  important  for  the  continuation  of  the  firms.  Cap  is  measured  by  an 
average  of  the  ratio  of  retained  earnings  over  net  income  for  the  last  3  years  prior 
to  going  public.  The  mean  value  is  0.653,  while  the  median  value  is  0.750.  These 
figures  show  that  most  IPO  firms  tend  to  retain  their  earnings  and  re-invest  in  the 
firm,  rather  than  distributing  it  as  dividends.  This  corroborates  the  reading  of  the 
pro-forma  dividend  statistics. 
173 Besides  the  financial  risks  mentioned  previously,  there  are  a  number  of 
non-financial  risk  measures  used  in  this  study.  Effr  is  a  proxy  for  production 
efficiency  risk,  which  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  cost  of  goods  sold  (production 
cost)  over  the  firm's  sales.  The  sample  mean  value  of  Effr  is  0.647  and  the  median 
value  is  0.673.  It  means  that  on  average,  the  production  cost  of  the  IPO  firms  is 
approximately  64.7%  of  the  sales  they  produce.  The  lower  the  Effr  value  shows  the 
more  efficient  production  system  and  the  less  efficiency  risk. 
As  described  in  the  previous  chapter,  most  firms  state  that  part  of  the  IPO 
proceeds  are  intended  to  fund  investment  activities  within  the  firms.  Cpy  is  a  proxy 
for  capacity  risk.  It  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  the  value  of  the  investment  plan 
disclosed  in  the  prospectus,  over  the  net  IPO  proceeds.  The  greater  the  fraction  of 
IPO  proceeds  planned  for  investment  activities  indicates  higher  capacity  risk.  The 
descriptive  statistic  table  shows  that  a  maximum  of  96.3%  and  a  minimum  of  0.9% 
of  net  IPO  proceeds  are  planned  for  the  investment  activities.  An  average  of  38.1% 
of  net  IPO  proceeds  is  proposed-for  investment  activities. 
The  Industry  risk  factor  is  surrogated  by  industry  beta  in  the  corresponding 
quarter  when  an  IPO  takes  place.  The  maximum  value  for  Ind  is  1.09  (British  Steel 
plc)  and  the  minimum  value  is  0.74  (Bum  Steward  Distillers  plc).  The  average 
value  for  Ind  is  0.896. 
As  described  in  the  literature  review  and  research  design  chapters,  most  UK 
privatisations  took  place  between  the  mid  1980's  up  to  the  mid  1990's. 
Additionally,  previous  studies  show  that  the  privatisation  IPOs  are  different  to 
private  IPOs.  There  are  10  privatisations  included  in  the  research  sample,  and  a 
dummy  variable  is  included  to  control  for  the  possible  privatisation  effect. 
174 Many  studies  refer  to  IPO  firms  as  young  firms.  In  this  research,  the  firm's 
age  is  measured  as  the  number  of  years  from  when  a  firm  was  incorporated  until 
the  IPO  date  in  year.  It  is  recorded  that  the  youngest  firm  in  the  research  sample 
was  only  incorporated  for  3  months  when  it  went  public,  while  the  oldest  was 
about  75  years.  Because  of  such  a  gap,  the  natural  log  of  firm  age  is  used  as  a 
proxy  for  the  age  risk  factor. 
The  sponsor  reputation,  as  a  signal  variable,  is  proxied  by  a  dummy 
variable.  The  investment  bankers,  which  sponsored  more  than  3  IPOs  in  the  quarter 
prior  to  the  quarter  when  an  IPO  took  place  is  categorised  as  a  prestigious 
investment  banker.  In  this  research  sample,  there  are  122  IPOs,  which  were 
sponsored  by  prestigious  investment  bankers. 
The  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  is  also  a  signal  variable.  The 
descriptive  statistics  of  Eq  show  that  on  average,  IPO  firms  sold  42.6%  of  the 
enlarged  number  of  outstanding  shares  to  the  public  at  the  IPOs.  However,  the 
median  value  is  lower,  at  only  37.0%.  The  mean  figure  above  is  affected  by 
privatisations,  which  most  sold  100%  of  equity  at  the  IPOs.  If  the  sample  excludes 
the  privatisations,  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  drop  to  38.89%  on  average. 
4.2.  Univariate  analysis 
Although  the  hypotheses  testing  will  be  based  on  the  valuation  models 
described  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  univariate  analysis  is  aimed  at  explaining  the 
simple  correlation  between  each  predictor  and  the  IPO  prices. 
Table  4.1b  exhibits  the  (Pearson)  coefficient  of  correlation  between  each 
variable  in  the  full  IPO  valuation  mode.  In  this  section,  the  discussion  focuses, 
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0 specifically,  on  the  correlation  between  the  predictors  (fundamental,  risk  factor, 
and  signals)  and  the  IPO  offer  (initial)  price. 
The  fundamental  univariate  analysis  shows  expected  correlations.  The 
correlation  coefficient  of  earnings  forecasts  (fE/pBP)  appears  to  be  positive  and 
strongly  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  offer  price  at  the  95%  level  of  confidence 
(and  to  the  initial  market  price  at  the  95%  level  of  confidence).  The  coefficient 
demonstrates  a  moderate  correlation  between  earning  forecasts  and  the  IPO  prices. 
This  implies  that  earnings  forecasts  figures  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  appear  to  be 
used  to  some  extent  by  the  issuers,  the  sponsors,  and  the  investors  in  their  pricing 
decision  process.  The  negative  earning  forecasts  dummy  (D)  and  negative  earnings 
forecasts  interactive  term  (D*fE/pBP)  are  correlated  to  the  IPO  prices  as  expected 
-a  positive  coefficient  of  D  and  a  negative  coefficient  of  (D*JE/pBV)  -  but  appear 
to  be  statistically  insignificant.  The  pro-forma  dividend  is  positively  correlated  to 
the  IPO  offer  (initial)  price.  The  coefficients  demonstrate  that  the  pro-forma 
dividend  has  a  weaker  correlation  to  the  IPO  prices  than  does  the  earning  forecasts, 
suggesting  that  the  earnings  forecasts  seem  to  be  more  important  than  the  dividend 
in  the  pricing  decision.  This  may  be  related  to  high-growth  IPO  firms  that  tend  to 
pay  small  dividends,  and  reinvest  the  remaining  incomes  within  the  firms. 
The  correlation  coefficients  of  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  prices  appear  to  be 
generally  insignificant.  Only  the  leverage  risk  seems  to  be  correlated  to  the  IPO 
offer  price,  while  the  leverage  risk  and  the  efficiency  risk  are  significantly 
correlated  to  the  IPO  initial  market  price.  However,  the  coefficients  of  correlation 
between  the  leverage  and  the  IPO  prices  are,  unexpectedly,  positive  and  significant 
at  95%  level  of  confidence,  suggesting  that  the  higher  leverage,  the  higher  the  offer 
(initial)  price.  This  contradicts  the  theoretical  expectation,  which  posits  that  the 
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is  in  line  with  the  theory  of  the  signalling  role  of  debt,  which  is  proposed  by  Slovin 
and  Young  (1990).  They  argue  that  prior  to  the  IPO,  firms  tend  to  increase  their 
borrowing  from  financial  institution,  such  as  bank.  This  action  is  observed  as  a 
third  party  certification  to  the  credibility  of  the  firms.  Additionally,  this 
corroborates  the  findings  by  Hedge  and  Miller  (1996). 
The  correlation  between  the  efficiency  risk  and  the  IPO  initial  market  price 
appears  to  be  negative  -  as  expected  -  and  slightly  significant.  This  implies  that 
firms  that  operate  less  efficiently  are  to  some  extent  priced  lower  in  the  market. 
Although  the  coefficient  is  insignificant,  the  correlation  between  the  capital 
availability  risk  and  the  IPO  prices  is  as  expected,  and  so  is  the  capacity  risk.  The 
correlation  between  the  industry  risk  and  the  IPO  prices  is  positive,  which  suggests 
that  the  IPO  firms  from  riskier  industries  are  priced  higher  by  issuers  and  sponsors 
and  also  in  the  market.  This  is  contrary  to  expectation,  although  the  correlation  is 
statistically  insignificant. 
The  correlation  between  the  signals  and  the  IPO  prices  are  as  expected,  but 
only  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  appears  to  be  significant.  Even 
though  the  correlation  coefficient  suggests  that  IPOs  brought  to  market  by 
prestigious  sponsors  are  priced  higher,  statistically,  the  sponsor  reputation  is  not 
significantly  related  to  the  IPO  prices.  Although  the  correlation  coefficient  is 
positive,  as  expected,  the  firm's  age  also  seems  insignificant  in  valuing  IPOs. 
The  correlation  matrix  (table  4.1b)  demonstrates  that  the  percentage  of 
equity  sold  is  negatively  related  to  the  IPO  offer  (initial)  price.  This  implies  that 
the  IPOs  that  sell  a  higher  percentage  of  equity  are  priced  lower  by  the  market. 
This  is  clearly  supporting  the  signalling  role  of  the  ownership  retained.  The 
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the  future  prospect  of  the  firm.  Therefore,  the  higher  percentage  of  equity  retained 
indicates  higher  firm  value. 
Finally,  table  4.1b  exhibits  the  correlation  coefficients  between 
privatisation,  and  IPO  prices.  Previous  studies  demonstrate  that  the  privatisation 
IPOs  are  priced  differently  to  the  private  IPOs.  In  this  study,  the  correlation 
between  the  privatisation  dummy  and  the  IPO  offer  (initial)  price  is  negative  and 
strongly  significant.  In  the  relation  to  the  IPO  offer  price,  the  result  suggests  that 
the  privatisation  IPOs  are  underpriced.  It  could  be  speculated  that  privatisation 
IPOs  are  underpriced  in  order  to  ensure  the  net  proceeds  is  achieved  and  to 
enhance  the  market's  participation  in  the  subsequent  privatisations.  However, 
while  the  result  shows  the  persistence  of  underpricing  in  privatisations,  no  one  has 
evidence  for  the  government's  deliberation. 
In  sum,  the  univariate  analysis  demonstrates  mixed  results  of  the 
correlation  between  each  predictor  and  the  IPO  prices.  The  fundamentals  are 
correlated  to  the  IPO  prices  as  expected.  Of  the  risk  factors,  only  leverage  and  the 
efficiency  risk  appear  to  have  significant  relations  to  the  IPO  prices,  while  of  the 
signal  variables,  only  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPOs  is  related 
significantly  to  the  IPO  prices.  However,  the  result  of  univariate  analysis  is  not 
aimed  to  test  the  research  hypotheses  listed  in  the  research  design  chapter.  The 
hypotheses  testing  are  based  on  the  proposed  valuation  models,  which  is  discussed 
in  the  next  three  sections. 
179 4.3.  Basic  valuation  analysis 
The  univariate  analysis  above  provides  a  description  of  the  relationships 
between  the  individual  predictors  used  in  the  valuation  model  (basic  and  full 
models).  However,  such  an  analysis  is  not  enough.  Since  this  study  tries  to 
examine  the  relationship  between  the  three  groups  of  prospectus  information 
(fundamentals,  risk  factors,  and  signals)  and  the  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices, 
multivariate  analysis  is  used  to  allow  the  interaction  of  a  group  of  predictors  in  IPO 
valuation.  This  section  discusses  the  results  of  the  basic  valuation  analysis,  while 
the  IPO  full  valuation  analysis  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
Principally,  the  basic  valuation  models  analyse  the  fundamental 
relationship  on  share  valuation.  This  kind  of  model  is  usually  used  in  non-IPO 
shares  valuation,  which  as  discussed  in  the  literature  review  tend  to  work  very 
well.  From  the  practical  point  of  view,  McCarthy  (1999)  argues  that  accounting 
data,  such  as  earnings  and  book  value  are  vital  information,  which  is  used  by  the 
investment  bankers  and  the  issuers  to  set  up  the  offer  price. 
The  basic  valuation  model  is  expressed  by  equation  (4)  in  the  research 
design  chapter.  The  empirical  results  of  the  basic  valuation  model  are  presented  in 
table  4.2  below.  The  table  itself  is  divided  into  2  panels.  The  first  panel  (Panel  A) 
exhibits  the  result  of  the  basic  valuation  model  for  the  entire  IPO  sample  on  both 
the  issue  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  Since  prior  studies  find  that  the 
privatisation  IPOs  are  somehow  differently  priced,  this  study  discusses  separate 
analyses  for  the  full  sample  and  the  non-privatisation  sample.  Panel  B  exhibits  the 
results  of  the  basic  valuation  model  for  the  non-privatisation  sample. 
180 Table  4.2.  Regression  results  for  Basic  IPO  valuation  model 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  of  the  offer  price  and  initial  market  price 
scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (Po/pBV  and  Pj/pBV)  on  pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by 
pro-forma  book  value  (pBV/pBV),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value 
(JE/pBV),  a  dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term  of  negative 
earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (D*JE/pBV),  and  pro-forma  dividend  scaled  by 
pro-forma  book  value  (Div/pBV).  All  variables  are  in  per  share  value.  Heteroscedasticity- 
adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Panel  A-  All  IPO  sample 
Variable  Po/pBV  Pt/pBV 
pBV/pBV 
fE/pB  V 
0.280* 
(1.96) 
12.345*** 
0.347* 
(1.88) 
13.128*** 
(16.66)  (14.51) 
D  2.524***  3.097*** 
(2.82)  (2.70) 
D*fE/pBV  -15.896***  -15.909*** 
(-4.53)  (-3.59) 
pDiv/pBV  1.508  3.075 
(0.75)  (1.24) 
N  161  161 
Adj.  R2  0.729  0.670 
Wald  1733.42  242.20 
(p-value)  (p-value=0.00)  (p-value=0.00) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1%;  *significant  at  10% 
Panel  B-  Non-privatisation  IPO  sample 
Variable  Po/pBV  P1/pBV 
pBV/pBV  0.354**  0.415** 
(2.33)  (2.07) 
fE/pBV  12.222***  13.033*** 
(15.96)  (13.88) 
D  2.763***  3.425*** 
(3.13)  (2.98) 
D*fE/pBV  -15.043***  -14.894*** 
(-4.32)  (-3.36) 
pDiv/pBV  1.211  2.765 
(0.59)  (1.09) 
N  151  151 
Adj.  R2  0.723  0.662 
Wald  304.79  219.28 
(p-value)  (p-value=0.00)  (p  -value=0.00) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1%;  **significant  at  5%;  *significant  at  10% 
181 In  each  panel  of  table  4.2,  the  first  column  lists  the  accounting  information 
variable  (pro-forma  book  value  of  equity,  forecasted  earnings  and  pro-forma 
dividends)  and  other  important  variables  (negative  earning  dummy  and  the 
interactive  term).  The  second  and  third  columns  demonstrate  the  regression 
coefficients  of  variables  listed  in  the  first  column,  with  two  levels  of  IPO  price;  the 
offer  price  (Po)  and  the  initial  market  price  (PI). 
The  second  column  of  table  4.2  panel  A  shows  the  results  of  the  basic 
valuation  model  with  the  offer  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  of  equity 
(Po/pBV)  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  intercept  is  positive  and  significantly 
related  to  the  offer  price.  Based  on  the  basic  model  discussed  in  the  research  design 
chapter,  the  intercept  coefficient  of  the  model  represents  the  impact  of  book  value 
of  equity  on  the  share  price  -  in  this  case,  it  would  be  the  impact  of  the  pro-forma 
book  value  of  equity  on  the  IPO  offer  price.  The  coefficient  shows  a  value  of  0.280 
(between  0  and  1),  which  is  both  theoretically  and  empirically  normal  for  the 
valuation  model.  The  impact  of  book  value  is  also  significant  at  the  10%  level. 
The  result  of  the  book  value  of  equity  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical 
model.  It  confirms  the  hypothesis  HI  a,  which  predicts  a  positive  relationship 
between  the  IPO  offer  price  and  the  book  value  of  equity.  Moreover,  since  the 
book  value  figures  used  in  this  study  are  the  pro-forma  book  values,  this  result 
evidences  the  usefulness  of  the  future  value  of  book  value  on  valuation  and 
confirms  the  findings  from  previous  studies  (e.  g.,  Firth,  1998). 
The  regression  coefficient  of  the  fE/pBV  exhibits  a  positive  impact  of 
forecasted  EPS  scaled  by  book  value  variable  on  the  dependent  variable,  Po/pBV. 
The  regression  coefficient  of,  fE/pBV  has  a  value  of  12.345,  which  is  somewhat 
182 higher  than  the  usual  empirical  figures  for  non-IPO  cases  from  prior  studies  (e.  g., 
Rees,  1997)2. 
The  high-growth  characteristic  of  IPO  firms  results  in  the  higher 
coefficient  of  earnings  than  what  is  normally  observed  for  non-IPO  firms. 
Moreover,  since  the  accounting  information  that  is  available  to  investors  prior  to 
the  IPO  is  very  limited,  it  is  possible  that  the  investment  bankers  and  the  issuers 
emphasise  the  potential  earnings  growth  in  the  IPO  valuation  and  put  a  greater 
weight  on  earnings  valuation  and  lesser  weight  on  book  value  of  equity.  The 
hypothesis  test  shows  a  robust  significant  result  offE/pBV,  which  also  confirms  the 
hypothesis  HI  b. 
As  discussed  in  the  literature  review  chapter,  prior  IPO  valuation  studies, 
which  examine  the  role  of  earnings  in  valuing  IPOs,  could  be  divided  into  two 
groups.  The  first  is  a  group  that  use  the  pre-IPO  accounting  earnings  (Klein,  1996; 
Beatty  et  al,  2002)  and  the  other  is  a  group  that  use  the  earnings  forecasts  disclosed 
in  the  prospectus  (Firth,  1995;  Kim  and  Ritter,  1999,  How  and  Yeo,  2001). 
Although  different  measures  of  earnings  are  applied  between  the  two  groups  of 
studies,  the  results  suggest  similar  conclusions,  in  that  earnings  (or  earnings 
forecasts)  could  explain  a  large  portion  of  the  variance  in  the  IPO  offer  (initial) 
price.  However,  a  sensitivity  analysis  is  undertaken  to  examine  whether  the 
historic  earnings  explains  the  IPO  valuation  better  than  the  forecasts.  The  results  - 
as  presented  later  in  the  sensitivity  analysis  section  (section  4.8)  -  shows  that  using 
2  Using  a  UK  non-IPO  sample,  Rees  (1999)  finds  an  average  earnings  response  coefficient  of  9.896, 
which  varies  yearly  between  6.530  and  12.257  during  the  1987-1997  period. 
183 historic  earnings  do  not  alter  the  implication  of  the  main  results,  but  it  produces  a 
substantially  lower  explanatory  power. 
Kim  and  Ritter  (1999)  find  a  mixed  result  when  they  deliberately  compare 
the  result  of  IPO  valuations  based  on  historical  earnings  and  the  analyst  earnings 
forecasts.  They  show  that  historical  earnings  figures  explain  little  of  the  variance  in 
the  IPO  initial  market  price  and  the  model  explanatory  power  increases 
significantly  when  the  earnings  forecasts  and  pro-forma  book  value  are  used. 
In  this  study,  the  measure  of  earnings  used  is  the  1-year  earning  forecasts. 
The  result  shows  the  important  role  of  forecasted  earning  on  the  IPO  valuation, 
confirming  the  results  of  prior  studies  (Keasey  and  McGuiness,  1992;  Firth,  1998; 
How  and  Yeo,  2001).  The  result  also  verify  the  findings  by  Kim  and  Ritter  (1999), 
who  conclude  that  using  the  forecasted  accounting  numbers  is  more  useful  than 
using  the  historical  numbers. 
The  signalling  theory  argues  that  a  good  firm  uses  signals  to  reveal  its  true 
value  to  the  market.  Prior  to  the  IPO,  the  issuers  have  an  option  to  disclose  the 
earnings  forecasts  in  the  prospectus  or  not.  When  they  decide  to  disclose  such 
information,  they  choose  to  employ  the  earning  forecast  as  a  signal  to  the  firms' 
true  values.  Moreover,  the  theory  also  argues  that  the  chosen  signal  is  credible  if  it 
could  separate  a  good  firm  from  the  bad  ones,  which  means  that  not  all  earning 
forecasts  are  a  credible  signal.  The  result  in  this  study  shows  the  robust 
relationship  between  the  earnings  forecasts  and  the  IPO  offer  price,  which  could  be 
inferred  that  the  earning  forecasts  serve  as  a  credible  signal  to  the  firm's  value. 
This  signalling  role  of  earnings  forecasts  is  even  clearer  in  the  discussion  of  the 
initial  market  price  (P1)  below. 
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earnings  forecasts  dummy  variable  and  the  interaction  terms.  These  variables  allow 
the  weighting  parameter  to  vary  for  cases  that  have  negative  earnings.  The  result 
appears  to  be  normal  -  the  coefficient  of  negative  earnings  forecasts  dummy  (D) 
takes  a  positive  value  of  2.524,  and  the  interactive  term  (D*JE/pBk)  coefficient 
takes  a  negative  value  of  15.896  -  which  is  more  or  less  similar  to  the  earnings 
forecasts  (fE/pBk)  coefficient.  The  result  indicates  that  earnings  forecasts  have 
limited  explanatory  power  when  negative  as  the  two  earnings  forecasts  coefficients 
approximately  offset  each  other.  In  these  circumstances,  the  importance  of  book 
value  of  equity  (here  the  pro-forma  book  value  of  equity)  increases,  as  reflected  in 
the  positive  coefficient  of  the  negative  earnings  forecasts  dummy  (D).  In  other 
words,  for  cases  where  negative  earnings  forecasts  appear,  the  investment  bankers 
and  issuers  tend  to  draw  attention  to  the  firm's  pro-forma  book  value  figures.  The 
statistical  results  on  the  negative  earnings  dummy  and  the  interactive  term  confirm 
the  hypothesis  H2.  Moreover,  the  result  also  corroborates  the  result  from  previous 
studies  using  non-IPO  (e.  g.,  Rees,  1999). 
The  coefficient  of  dividends  scaled  by  the  pro-forma  book  value  has  the 
expected  positive  sign,  but  appears  to  be  statistically  insignificantly  different  from 
zero.  The  lack  of  significance  of  the  dividends  in  this  valuation  model  suggests  that 
the  investment  bankers  and  issuers  consider  that  dividends,  which  feature 
permanent  incomes,  are  less  important  to  highlight  the  potential  growth  of  the 
firms  than  forecasted  earnings  itself.  The  empirical  result  indicates  that  in  the 
presence  of  the  forecasted  earnings,  dividend  becomes  less  important,  as  the 
manager  expectation  has  been  reflected  in  the  forecasted  earnings.  Additionally,  as 
185 many  IPOs  are  young  firms,  they  do  not  have  a  record  of  dividends3;  therefore 
dividend  becomes  irrelevant  to  most  IPOs.  The  result  does  not  support  the  working 
hypothesis  H3. 
One  might  argue  that  the  lack  of  significance  of  the  dividends  variable 
could  be  as  a  result  of  spurious  effect.  Small  firms  are  usually  trying  to  grow  and 
do  not  pay  dividends,  while  large  and  more  mature  firms  tend  to  pay  dividends.  To 
address  this  issue,  some  sensitivity  analyses  have  been  undertaken  and  the  results 
show  that  dividends  remain  insignificantly  related  to  the  IPO  prices  across  the 
firm-size  groups4.  Another  analysis  has  also  been  undertaken  by  restricting  the 
sample  to  the  99  firms  that  paid  dividends  prior  to  the  offering.  The  results  are 
similar  to  the  ones  using  the  full  sample  of  161  IPOs,  with  dividends  remaining 
insignificant. 
Overall,  the  basic  valuation  model  on  the  offer  price  seems  to  have  a  high 
explanatory  power.  The  adjusted  R-square  shows  that  the  fundamental  accounting 
information  (pro-forma  book  value,  forecasted  earnings,  and  pro-forma  dividends) 
explains  up  to  72.9%  of  the  offer  price  variance.  This  shows  that  the  accounting 
information  has  important  roles  in  the  IPO  pricing  process.  The  result  is  also 
supported  by  the  Wald  statistic,  which  demonstrates  the  validity  of  the  model  and 
the  robust  joint  impact  of  fundamentals  on  the  IPO  offer  prices.  In  sum,  the  result 
of  the  basic  valuation  model  on  the  offer  price  is  consistent  with  the  underlying 
3  From  161  IPO  sample,  62  firms  have  not  paid  any  dividend  in  the  year  prior  to  the  admission.  A 
value  of  zero  is  applied  to  the  proforma  dividends  for  those  firms. 
To  examine  whether  the  impact  of  dividends  may  be  different  across  the  firm  size  based  on  the 
firms'  market  capitalisation  at  the  IPOs,  the  sample  is  split  into  three  groups  (small,  medium,  and 
large).  There  is  approximately  43%  of  the  small  groups  are  zero  dividends  firms,  and  respectively, 
44%  and  28%  of  the  medium  and  the  large  firms.  The  results  of  the  basic  valuation  model  for  each 
firm-size  group  show  that  the  dividends  remain  insignificantly  related  to  both  IPO  offer  and  initial 
market  prices. 
186 model  where  the  pro-forma  book  value  and  positive  forecasted  earnings  are  value 
relevant.  The  result  also  shows  that  when  negative  forecasted  earnings  appear,  the 
investment  bankers  and  issuers  pay  more  attention  to  the  pro-forma  book  value 
figures. 
The  third  column  of  table  4.2  shows  the  empirical  results  of  the  basic 
valuation  on  the  initial  market  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (Pj/pBVI). 
Almost  all  variables  produce  slightly  higher  coefficients,  except  for  the 
interaction  term  (D*JE/pBk).  The  statistical  significance  of  each  variable 
remains  the  same  as  the  result  on  the  offer  price.  The  model  result  on  the  initial 
market  price  indicates  that  forecasted  earnings,  pro-forma  book  value  and  pro- 
forma  dividend  are  even  more  important  factors  used  by  investors  to  price  the  IPOs 
on  the  first  day  of  trading. 
The  intercept  coefficient,  which  represents  the  book  value  of  equity 
response  coefficient,  takes  a  positive  value,  implying  that  IPOs  that  report  higher 
pro-forma  book  value  of  equity  in  the  prospectus  are  priced  higher  in  the  market. 
This  result  verifies  hypothesis  HI  a  as  it  is  demonstrated  in  the  offer  price  (Po) 
result. 
The  forecasted  earnings  coefficient  also  shows  the  value  relevance  of  the 
earnings  on  the  initial  market  price.  This  result  is  consistent  to  findings  from  prior 
studies  (Firth  et  al,  1995;  Firth,  1998;  Ghikas,  2000).  The  negative  earnings 
dummy  and  the  interaction  terms  also  demonstrate  a  consistent  result  to  the 
theoretical  framework.  The  dividends  coefficient  appears  to  be  much  higher  for  the 
market  price  than  for  the  issue  price,  suggesting  that  in  fact  the  market  puts  more 
weigh  on  the  dividend  as,  other  studies  suggest  they  do  for  the  non-IPO  shares. 
187 The  t-statistics  also  shows  a  greater  value,  although  it  is  not  enough  to  reject  the 
null  hypothesis  in  the  hypothesis  testing. 
Although  the  results  of  the  basic  valuation  model  appears  to  be  similar  for 
both  IPO  price  levels,  the  coefficient  of  determination  for  the  basic  valuation 
model  on  the  initial  market  price  is  lower  (adjusted  R-square  =  67.0%).  It  implies 
that  although  fundamental  accounting  information  is  important  in  pricing  the  IPOs, 
investors  do  consider  other  factors'  influence  on  the  IPO  prices.  This  is  understood 
as  more  information  is  revealed  as  IPOs  are  traded  in  the  market. 
Similar  to  the  IPO  offer  price  results,  the  Wald  statistic  of  the  model  on  the 
initial  market  price  demonstrates  the  validity  of  the  model  and  the  strong  impact  of 
the  fundamentals  on  the  initial  market  price.  However,  the  magnitude  of  the  Wald 
statistics  on  the  initial  market  price  is  lower  than  the  one  on  the  offer  price,  which 
implies  that  the  fundamentals  affect  the  offer  price  more  robustly  than  they  do  on 
the  initial  market  price. 
Panel  B  of  table  4.2  demonstrates  the  result  of  the  basic  valuation  model 
using  the  non-privatisation  sample  of  151  IPOs.  It  shows  a  consistent  result  for 
both  the  issue  price  and  the  initial  market  price  to  the  previous  result  for  the  full 
IPO  sample.  All  the  fundamentals  coefficients  are  consistent  with  the  theoretical 
hypotheses,  however  similar  to  the  result  for  the  full  IPO  sample,  the  dividends 
coefficient  appears  to  be  statistically  insignificant.  Therefore  the  non-privatisation 
results  suggest  that  the  fundamentals  are  priced  similarly  in  PIPOs  as  well  as  in  the 
private  IPOs.  However,  as  demonstrated  by  the  Wald  statistics,  the  joint  restriction 
of  the  fundamentals  on  the  IPO  prices  is  less  for  the  PIPOs. 
Although  the  results  for  both  price  levels  (firm  and  market)  and 
segmentation  of  the  sample  (full  IPO  and  non-PIPO)  appear  to  be  similar,  further 
188 Table  4.3.  Testing  the  difference  of  regression  coefficient 
in  the  basic  IPO  valuation  model  results 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  of  the  difference  of  the  initial  market  price 
and  the  offer  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  [(Po  -  PI)/pBVJ  and  the  initial  returns 
(IR)  on  pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (pBY/pBTý,  forecasted 
earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (fE/pBTý,  a  dummy  variable  for  negative 
earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term  of  negative  earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value 
(D*JE/pBV),  and  pro-forma  dividend  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (pDiv/pBU),  for  all 
sample  and  non-privatisation  sample.  All  variables  are  in  per  share  value. 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Panel  A-  full  IPO  sample 
Variable  (PI-  Po)/pBV  IR 
(full  sample)  (full  sample) 
pBV/pBV  0.067  0.892*** 
(1.09)  (6.03) 
fE/pBV  0.782***  -0.097 
(2.74)  (0.33) 
D  0.573  -0.020 
(1.26)  (-0.67) 
D*fE/pBV  -0.013  -0.126 
(-0.01)  (-1.17) 
pDiv/pBV  1.567*  0.173 
(1.83)  (1.16) 
N  161  161 
Adj.  R2  0.124  0.002 
Wald  13.20  9.87 
(p-value)  (p-value=0.01)  (p-value=0.04) 
Panel  B-  non-PIPO  sample 
Variable  PI-P/PBV  IR 
(non-PIPO  sample)  (non-PIPO  sample) 
pBV/pBV  0.061  0.812*** 
(0.89)  (5.28) 
fE/pBV  0.811***  -0.012 
(2.75)  (-0.21) 
D  0.662  0.099 
(1.34)  (0.89) 
D*fE/pBV  0.149  0.295 
(0.09)  (0.84) 
pDiv/pBV  1.555*  0.230 
(1.79)  (1.58) 
N  151  151 
Adj.  RZ  0.128  0.008 
Wald  6.47  3.40 
(p-value)  (p-value=0.00)  (p-value=0.49) 
Note:  ***significant  at  1% 
189 analysis  is  examined  to  analyse  the  difference  between  the  two  price  levels,  and 
presented  in  Table  4.3.  The  analysis  is  undertaken  by  running  the  OLS  regression 
analysis  with  the  fundamentals  as  the  regressors  and  the  difference  between  the 
initial  market  and  the  offer  prices  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  full  sample  and 
the  reduced  non-PIPO  sample  demonstrate  similar  results. 
The  intercepts  take  positive  values  though  they  are  statistically 
insignificant.  It  implies  that  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  the  perception 
towards  the  value  relevance  of  the  book  value  of  equity  among  the  market 
participants  during  the  early  days  of  IPOs.  Interestingly,  there  is  a  significant 
difference  of  the  perception  regarding  the  value-relevance  of  the  forecasted 
earnings.  The  fE/pBV  coefficients  are  positive  and  significantly  different  to  zero  at 
the  99%  level  of  confidence.  This  suggests  that  although  both  the  issuers/sponsors 
and  the  market  believe  that  forecasted  earnings  could  be  used  as  a  signal  to  the 
firms'  true  value,  the  market  puts  more  weight  on  the  forecasted  earnings  than  the 
issuers/sponsors,  which  results  in  positive  coefficients  of  forecasted  earnings  in  the 
model. 
While  the  dividend  appears  to  be  insignificant  in  the  basic  valuation  model 
result,  surprisingly,  it  is  positively  and  significantly  related  to  the  difference 
between  the  two  levels  of  IPO  prices.  As  discussed  in  the  literature  review 
chapter,  many  IPO  studies  propose  a  number  of  explanations  to  the  IPO 
underpricing  anomaly.  Although  later  in  this  dissertation,  the  underpricing  (initial 
returns)  is  discussed  in  more  detail,  this  section  includes  an  analysis  of  the 
differential  impact  of  the  fundamentals  on  the  offer  and  initial  market  price. 
For  comparison,  table  4.3  also  includes  an  overview  of  the  initial  returns 
[(P1-Po)/Po]"  The  result  shows  that  the  fundamentals  do  not  work  on  the  IR  as  well 
190 as  on  the  IPO  prices.  The  constant  is  positive  and  strongly  significant,  suggesting 
the  underpricing.  However,  the  fundamentals  are  insignificant5.  The  result  also 
demonstrates  the  low  explanatory  power  of  the  fundamentals  to  explain  the 
variation  of  IRs.  Despite  the  lack  of  statistical  significance,  overall  the  Wald 
statistics  show  that  at  least  the  joint  restriction  of  the  fundamentals  on  the  IR  is 
significant  for  the  full  sample;  yet,  it  has  no  influence  in  the  initial  returns  of 
PIPOs. 
In  sum,  the  basic  valuation  model  appears  to  work  well  for  IPOs.  The 
future  numbers  of  fundamentals  (book  value  of  equity  and  earnings)  are  positively 
related  to  the  IPO  prices  both  at  the  issue  price  (Po)  and  when  initially  traded  (P1). 
The  model  featuring  the  role  of  negative  earnings,  also  demonstrates  their 
significance  in  valuing  the  IPOs.  However,  the  dividend,  which  usually  has  an 
important  role  in  non-IPO  share  valuation,  appears  to  be  insignificant  in  IPO  cases. 
Similar  results  are  found  when  applying  the  basic  valuation  model  for  the  non- 
privatisation  sample.  Further  analysis  shows  that  the  different  perceptions  towards 
the  valuation  exist  among  the  market  participants.  The  market  seems  to  put  more 
weight  on  the  future  incomes  (forecasted  earnings  and  pro-forma  dividends)  than 
the  issuers/sponsors  do. 
S  Sensitivity  analyses  have  been  undertaken  to  examine  whether  the  results  are  different  across  the 
firm-size  groups  by  splitting  the  research  sample  into  3  groups  (small,  medium,  and  large).  Overall, 
the  results  for  each  group  remain  the  same.  A  slightly  improved  result  of  dividends  is  found  in  the 
large  firms,  however  it  still  fails  to  obtain  a  significant  result  at  the  10%  level. 
191 4.4.  IPO  full  valuation  analysis 
The  basic  valuation  model  discussed  above  exhibits  a  high  explanatory 
power  of  the  fundamentals  on  the  IPO  valuation.  However,  there  are  many 
independent  variables  that  could  still  explain  the  variance  in  IPO  offer  and  initial 
market  prices.  The  main  objective  of  this  research  is  to  analyse  the  influence  of  a 
number  of  risk  factors  and  signals  to  IPO  valuation.  As  discussed  in  the  literature 
review  chapter,  there  have  been  various  studies  that  examine  the  relationship 
between  the  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  underpricing  and  long  run  performance, 
although  none  appears  to  have  been  done  on  the  IPO  valuation.  It  is  emphasised  in 
the  research  design  chapter  that  the  risk  factors  examined  in  this  research  are 
categorised  as  business  risk  prior  to  the  admission.  This  section  discusses, 
particularly,  the  impact  of  each  risk  factors  examined  on  the  IPO  prices.  The 
impact  of  signals  on  the  IPO  valuation  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
Table  4.4  and  4.5  below  present  the  results  of  the  full  valuation  models, 
both  on  the  offer  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (PQ/pBk)  and  the  initial 
market  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (PI/pBV),  as  the  dependent  variables. 
The  model  is  run  in  two  stages.  In  first  stage,  the  IR  model  only  includes  the 
prospectus  information  variables.  The  model  is  then  extended  to  incorporate  the 
privatisation  dummy,  to  examine  the  impact  of  the  PIPOs  on  the  results. 
Compared  to  the  results  of  basic  valuation  model  (table  4.2),  the  inclusion 
improves  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model  by  2.0%  and  2.6%,  respectively  for 
Po/pBV  and  P1/pBV  as  the  dependent  variables.  However,  the  inclusion  of  the 
privatisation  dummy  appears  to  have  no  impact  on  the  overall  explanatory  power 
of  the  model. 
192 Table  4.4  Regression  analysis  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model 
for  the  offer  price  (PdpPBV) 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression,  of  the  IPO  offer  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book 
value  (Po/pBV)  on  pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (pBV/pBi),  forecasted 
earning  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  ((E/pBV),  a  dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings  (D),  an 
interactive  term  of  negative  earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (D*E/pBV),  pro-forma 
dividend  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (Div/pBi7,  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk 
(Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy 
(Spo),  firm's  age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  and  privatisation  dummy  (Priv), 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  Po/pBV  Po/pBV 
(t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Fundamentals 
pBV/pBV  2.638**  2.546** 
(2.37)  (2.26) 
fE/pBV  11.899***  11.889*** 
(16.47)  (16.47) 
D  2.589***  2.590*** 
(3.05)  (3.08) 
D*fE/pBV  -14.059***  -14.133*** 
(3.73)  (-3.74) 
pDiv/pBV  0.544  0.454 
(0.30)  (0.25) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  0.161  0.145 
(0.86)  (0.77) 
Cap  0.131  0.144 
(0.75)  (0.82) 
Ef  r  -0.674*  -0.672* 
(-1.81)  (-1.81) 
Cpy  0.490**  0.531** 
(2.02)  (2.16) 
Ind  -1.416  -1.408 
(-1.31)  (-1.31) 
Signals: 
Spo  -0.041  0.029 
(-0.27)  (0.18) 
Age  0.084  0.081 
(1.18)  (1.10) 
Eq  -1.130**  -1.012 
(-2.86)  (-1.55) 
Priv  -  -0.321 
(-0.75) 
N  161  161 
Adj.  R-sq  0.749  0.748 
Wald  regression  (p-value)  591.16  (0.000)  566.11  (0.00) 
Wald  fundamental  (p-value)  314.52  (0.00)  318.17  (0.00) 
Wald  e-a  risk  firs  (p-value)  11.51  (0.04)  11.81  (0.04) 
Wald  signals  (p-value)  9.84  (0.02)  3.28  (0.35) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1  %;  **  significant  at  5%;  *  significant  at  10% 
193 The  coefficients  of  the  fundamentals  have  the  same  sign  as  in  the  analysis 
above;  however  their  magnitudes  change  with  the  inclusion  of  the  additional 
variables.  The  coefficients  of  book  value  of  equity  (the  constant)  increase  to  a 
value  exceeding  1,  while  the  forecasted  earnings  coefficients  decrease  slightly.  The 
inclusion  of  other  factors  appears  to  have  an  impact  on  the  importance  of  equity  as 
a  basis  for  IPO  valuation.  The  dividend  coefficients  are  smaller  in  value  and 
remain  insignificant. 
However,  the  impact  of  the  fundamental  accounting  information  on  IPO 
valuation  overall  is  robust,  so  the  inclusion  of  other  variables  barely  changes  their 
impact  on  IPO  valuation.  In  general,  it  is  clear  that  there  are  no  substantial 
differences  in  results  for  the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  All  variables 
appear  to  have  the  same  signs  and  significance  of  regression  coefficients. 
Prior  studies  (e.  g.,  Menyah  et  al,  1995)  show  that  privatisation  IPOs 
(PIPOs)  are  priced  differently  to  other  IPOs.  Since,  10  out  of  161  IPOs  in  the 
research  sample  are  PIPOs,  a  sensitivity  analysis  has  been  undertaken  by  running 
the  model  using  the  non-PIPOs,  as  presented  in  table  4.6  below.  The  results  of  the 
fundamentals  for  non-PIPOs  sub-sample  are  similar  to  the  ones  for  the  full  sample. 
4.4.1.  Ex-ante  risk  factor  analysis 
As  discussed  in  the  research  design  chapter,  the  hypotheses  developed  for 
the  risk  factors  are  based  on  the  risk  aversion  assumption.  It  is  posited  that  the  IPO 
value  is  a  decreasing  function  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factor.  Therefore,  at  the  firm 
level,  the  riskier  IPOs  are  priced  lower  at  the  offer  price  in  order  to  persuade  the 
investors  to  buy.  At  the  market  level,  as  the  investors  demand  a  compensation  for 
holding  the  riskier  investments,  they  are  also  priced  lower. 
194 Table  4.5  Regression  analysis  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model 
for  the  initial  market  price  (Pj/pPBV9 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression,  of  the  IPO  initial  market  price  scaled  by  pro-forma 
book  value  (Pj/pBV)  on  pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (pBV/pBV), 
forecasted  earning  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (fE/pBV),  a  dummy  variable  for  negative 
earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term  of  negative  earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (D*E/pBV), 
pro-forma  dividend  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (Div/pBV),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital 
availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor 
reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  and  privatisation 
dummy  (Priv),  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  Pj/pPBV  P1/PBV 
(t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Fundamentals 
pBV/pBV  4.150***  4.102*** 
(2.94)  (2.84) 
fE/pBV  12.633***  12.629*** 
(14.73)  (14.78) 
D  3.185***  3.186*** 
(3.02)  (3.03) 
D*fE/pBV  -13.653***  -13.689*** 
(-2.93)  (-2.92) 
pDiv/pBV  1.900  1.856 
(0.86)  (0.83) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  0.203  0.194 
(0.86)  (0.80) 
Cap  0.179  0.186 
(0.81)  (0.83) 
EEr  -0.779*  -0.778* 
(-1.82)  (-1.78) 
Cpy  -0.696**  0.717** 
(-2.39)  (2.41) 
Ind  -2.750*  -2.745* 
(-1.94)  (-1.94) 
Signals: 
Spo  -0.065  0.059 
(-0.33)  (0.30) 
Age  0.095  0.093 
(1.13)  (1.09) 
Eq  -1.362***  -1.235* 
(-2.89)  (-1.79) 
Priv  -  -0.165 
(-0.31) 
N  161  161 
Adj.  R-sq  0.696  0.695 
Wald  regression  (p-value)  464.94  (0.000)  440.31  (0.00) 
Wald  fundamental  (p-value)  240.49  (0.00)  242.63  (0.00) 
Wald  e-a  risk  ftrs  (p-value)  15.89  (0.01)  15.78  (0.01) 
Wald  signals  (p-value)  9.80  (0.02)  3.88  (0.27) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1%;  **  significan  t  at  5%;  *  significant  at  10% 
195 Table  4.4  shows  that  only  2  (Effr  and  Cpy)  of  the  5  ex-ante  risk  factors 
employed  appear  to  be  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  offer  price,  while  table  4.5 
shows  another  risk  factor  (Ind)  appears  to  be  related  to  the  IPO  initial  market  price. 
The  coefficients  for  leverage  (Lev)  variable  are  positive,  but  insignificant.  This 
result  is  inconsistent  to  findings  from  Fama  and  French  (1998),  who  find  a 
negative  relationship  between  debt  and  firm  values.  However,  they  acknowledge 
that  such  a  relation  is  sensitive  to  how  the  debt  is  measured.  Using  a  model  more 
similar  to  the  one  applied  here,  Rees  (1999)  also  fails  to  find  a  significant 
relationship  between  debt  and  firm  values. 
A  number  of  IPO  studies  examine  the  impact  of  debt  to  IPO  initial  returns 
(e.  g.,  Myers  and  Majluf,  1984;  Slovin  and  Young,  1990;  Hedge  and  Miller,  1996). 
However,  very  few  studies  investigate  the  impact  of  the  pre-IPO  debt  on  the  IPO 
valuation.  Empirically,  Hedge  and  Miller  (1996)  find  a  significant  positive 
association  between  the  pre-IPO  debt  and  the  after  market  IPO  values. 
The  positive  coefficients  for  leverage  found  in  this  study  imply  that  pre- 
IPO  debt  tend  to  have  a  signalling  role  rather  than  a  risk  factor.  However,  the 
impact  appears  to  be  insignificant.  This  result  cannot  confirm  the  previous  results 
that  show  the  impact  of  the  firm's  leverage  on  the  IPO  prices. 
The  next  risk  factor  examined  is  the  capital  availability  (Cap).  Table  4.4 
and  4.5  exhibit  positive  coefficients  of  Cap  on  both  price  levels,  although  its 
impact  on  the  IPO  values  is  statistically  insignificant.  As  explained  in  the  research 
design,  the  capital  availability  risk  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  retained  earnings 
over  net  income.  Fama  and  French  (1998)  argue  that  a  pecking  order  is  applied  to 
the  firms  prior  to  their  listings.  The  pattern  is  that  firms  finance  the  investments 
first  with  retained  earnings,  then  with  debt,  and  finally  by  issuing  stocks.  Greater 
196 Table  4.6  Regression  analysis  of  the  full  valuation  model 
for  Non  privatisation  IPOs 
The  table  contain  output  from  OLS  regression,  of  the  IPO  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price 
scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (P0/PBV  and  P,  /PBV)  on  pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by  pro- 
forma  book  value  (PBV/PBV),  forecasted  earning  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (E/PBV),  a 
dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term  of  negative  earnings  scaled  by  pro- 
forma  book  value  (D*E/PBV),  pro-forma  dividend  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (Div/PBV), 
leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy), 
industry  risk  (Inca),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age),  and  percentage  of  equity 
sold  (Eq).  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  P,  /pPBV 
(t-stat) 
PI/PBV 
(t-stat) 
pBV/pBV  2.322**  3.872*** 
(2.09)  (2.73) 
fE/pBV  11.917***  12.688*** 
(16.22)  (14.53) 
D  2.969***  3.663*** 
(3.53)  (3.49) 
D*fE/pBV  -13.225***  -12.543*** 
(-3.45)  (-2.94) 
pDiv/pBV  0.468  1.844 
(1.16)  (0.83) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  0.245  0.314 
(1.16)  (1.16) 
Cap  0.172  0.213 
(0.92)  (0.89) 
Effr  -0.736*  -0.872* 
(-1.95)  (-1.94) 
Cpy  -0.589**  -0.777** 
(-2.34)  (-2.59) 
Ind  -1.184  -2.470* 
(-1.06)  (-1.79) 
Signals: 
Spo  -0.043  -0.086 
(-0.26)  (-0.42) 
Age  0.113  0.124 
(1.40)  (1.32) 
Eq  -0.824  -1.189* 
(-1.42)  (-1.94) 
N  151  151 
Adj.  R-sq  0.738  0.685 
Wald  regression  (p-value)  569.04  (0.00)  440.20  (0.00) 
Wald  fundamental  (p-value)  319.37  (0.00)  240.46  (0.00) 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  (p-value)  13.02  (0.02)  16.49  (0.01) 
Wald  signals  (p-value)  3.88  (0.27)  4.40  (0.22) 
Note:  ***significantat  1%;  **significantat  5%;  *significantat  10% 
197 internal  capital  availability  to  the  firms  could  be  viewed  as  beneficial  to  the  firms 
to  continue  their  business.  Therefore,  the  greater  Cap  could  be  inferred  as  lower 
business  risk.  The  positive  coefficients  of  Cap  mean  that  higher  capital  availability, 
which  indicates  lower  risk,  results  in  higher  IPO  prices.  The  result  is  entirely 
consistent  with  the  theoretical  foundation  and  supports  the  working  hypothesis 
H4b.  However,  the  impact  of  Cap  on  IPO  valuation  seems  to  be  insignificant. 
Table  4.1b  detects  no  multicollinearity  problem  on  the  single  correlation  between 
Cap  and  any  other  predictor.  Moreover,  excluding  the  privatisation  IPO  from  the 
sample  (table  4.6)  does  not  change  the  statistical  significance.  Another  sensitivity 
analysis  (see  appendix  tables  A.  4.1a  and  A.  4.2b)  also  shows  that  Cap  keeps  the 
positive  coefficients  but  fails  to  exhibits  a  significant  impact  on  either,  the  offer  or 
the  initial  market  prices.  Thus,  the  lack  of  significance  of  Cap  is  robust. 
Besides  financial  risk  factors,  this  study  also  examines  the  non-financial 
risk  factors,  efficiency  risk  (Effr)  and  capacity  risk  (Cpy).  As,  explained  in  the 
research  design  chapter,  Effr  measures  the  firms'  operational  efficiency.  The 
rationalisation  is  that  the  more  efficient  the  firm  runs  its  business,  the  more  profit 
produced,  and  it,  in  turn,  may  increase  the  income  for  the  shareholders. 
The  ratio  of  the  cost  of  goods  sold  over  sales  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  Effr. 
The  result  (table  4.4)  shows  that  Effr  is  negatively  and  significantly  related  to  IPO 
prices.  This  means  that  less  efficient  IPO  firms  are  priced  lower  at  the  offering  date 
and  on  the  first  trading  day.  The  result  demonstrates  a  significant  impact  of  the 
firm's  operational  efficiency  on  the  IPO  prices,  on  both  the  offer  and  initial  market 
prices.  Hence,  it  supports  the  working  hypothesis  H4c.  In  relation  to  portfolio 
selection,  this  result  indicates  that  it  is  not  only  the  systematic  risk  that  matters  in 
198 the  pricing  of  securities,  but  also  the  unsystematic  risk.  By  assessing  the  firms' 
unique  risk  before  the  selection,  investors  could  have  better  portfolios. 
Table  4.4  and  4.5  show  that  the  Effr  coefficient  on  the  offer  price  is  smaller 
than  the  one  on  the  initial  market  price,  suggesting  that  the  market  price  is  more 
sensitive  to  the  efficiency  risk,  which  could  be  driven  either  by  the  operational 
efficiency  or  the  pre-IPO  sales.  However,  the  difference  between  the  coefficients 
appears  to  be  statistically  insignificant  (see  table  4.7). 
The  correlation  matrix  (table  4.1b)  shows  that  there  is  a  positive  and 
significant  correlation  between  Effr  and  Priv,  however  the  coefficient  demonstrates 
a  weak  relationship.  Therefore,  no  multicollinearity  problem  detected  regarding 
this  variable.  Consequently,  the  result  remains  unchanged  when  the  model  is 
analysed  using  the  non-privatisation  sample.  Another  sensitivity  analysis  that 
includes  only  Effr  into  the  model  (see  appendix  table  A.  4.1a  and  A.  4.  lb)  also 
exhibits  consistent  results  to  the  prior  analysis. 
The  capacity  risk  (Cpy)  shows  the  risk  associated  with  the  firms'  decision 
regarding  the  use  of  the  IPO  proceeds.  The  empirical  results  (table  4.4  and  4.5) 
shows  that  the  Cpy  coefficients  are  negative  and  significant  at  the  5%  level.  This 
implies  that  IPO  firms  that  propose  a  higher  portion  of  IPO  proceeds  for 
investment  activities  are  riskier;  therefore  they  are  priced  lower  by  market 
participants  (the  issuers,  the  investment  bankers,  and  the  investors).  In  such  a  way, 
it  also  reflects  the  negative  relationship  between  the  risk  factors  and  the  IPO 
valuation,  which  in  turn,  confirms  the  working  hypothesis  H4d. 
Using  a  different  proxy,  Keasey  and  Short  (1997)  finds  a  positive 
association  between  the  net  proceeds  and  the  IPO  market  value.  They  argue  that 
the  new  proceeds  (new  money)  as  it  is  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  is  a  signal  to  the 
199 firm's  value.  A  similar  result  is  also  found  by  Leone  et  al  (2003)  who  investigate 
the  impact  of  the  net  proceeds  usage  to  the  IPO  valuation.  They  use  the  amount  of 
net  proceeds  usage  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  as  a  proxy.  They  record  that  the  net 
proceed  usage  varies  from  the  investment  purpose  to  daily  operation  expenses. 
They  find  that  the  firms  that  disclose  a  greater  number  of  net  proceeds  usage  are 
priced  significantly  higher  in  the  market.  Since  this  study  is  interested  to  examine 
the  impact  of  the  risk  factors  on  the  IPO  valuation,  the  proxy  used  here  is  more 
fitting  than  the  Leone  et  al's  proxy  as  the  proxy,  particularly,  observes  the  risky 
investment  activities  proposed  by  the  firms. 
The  Cpy  coefficient  on  the  initial  market  price  is  somewhat  greater  than'the 
one  on  the  offer  price.  Furthermore,  table  4.7  shows  that  the  difference  between  the 
two  coefficients  is  significantly  different  to  zero,  suggesting  that  Cpy  is  priced 
differently  at  the  IPO  offer  price  and  at  the  initial  market  price.  Table  4.1b 
demonstrates  significant  positive  correlation  coefficients  between  Cpy  and  other 
predictors:  forecasted  earnings,  pro-forma  dividend,  privatisation,  sponsor 
reputation,  pre-IPO  leverage,  and  pre-IPO  efficiency  risk.  However,  they  show 
weak  relationship;  therefore  the  multicollinearity  problem  is  not  expected  in 
relation  to  the  result  of  Cpy.  A  sensitivity  analysis  using  the  non-privatisation 
sample  (table  4.6)  indicates  the  similar  result  to  the  main  analysis. 
The  last  risk  factor  is  the  industry  risk,  Ind.  This  risk  is  proxied  by  industry 
betas  (/1)  in  the  quarter  when  the  IPOs  took  place.  The  higher  8  suggests  riskier 
industry.  Therefore,  a  negative  Ind  coefficient  on  the  IPO  valuation  model  is 
expected  (H4e).  The  evidence  shows  negative  coefficients  for  Ind,  which  supports 
the  negative  relationship  hypothesis  between  the  pre-IPO  risk  factors  and  the  IPO 
valuation.  However,  the  impact  of  Ind  on  IPO  valuation  appears  to  be  mixed.  It  is 
200 statistically  insignificant  on  the  offer  price  (table  4.4),  but  significant  at  the  90% 
level  on  the  initial  market  price  (table  4.5).  This  suggests  that  the  market  put  more 
weight  on  the  industry  effect  than  the  issuers/sponsors  do.  The  coefficients  are 
significantly  different  to  zero  at  the  95%  level  of  confidence  (table  4.7). 
The  correlation  matrix  exhibits  no  multicollinearity  problem  between  Ind 
and  the  other  predictors.  Consequently,  the  result  remains  unchanged  when  the 
valuation  model  is  applied  using  the  non-privatisation  sample  (table  4.6).  Similar 
results  are  obtained  in  another  sensitivity  analysis  that  includes  one  ex-ante  risk 
factor  in  the  model  at  a  time  (see  appendix  tables  A.  4.  la  and  A.  4.  lb).  The  impact 
of  Lid  on  the  offer  price  is  negative  but  appears  to  be  insignificant,  although  it 
keeps  the  significance  on  the  initial  market  price. 
Despite  the  mixed  results  found  with  regard  to  the  relationship  between 
pre-IPO  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  valuations,  the  Wald  statistics  show  that  the  joint 
restriction  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  is  statistically  significant  at  the  95%  level  of 
confidence  (table  4.4  and  4.5).  Therefore  it  could  be  concluded  that  the  ex-ante  risk 
factors  have  small,  but  significant  impact  on  the  IPO  pricing. 
Although  the  impact  of  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  the  offer  price  appears  to  be 
similar  to  the  one  on  the  initial  market  price,  some  risk  factors  shows  a 
significantly  different  magnitude.  Table  4.7  below  presents  the  regression 
coefficients  of  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals  on  the  IPO  price 
difference.  The  results  of  the  fundamentals  show  an  interesting  difference  to  the 
prior  results  of  the  basic  valuation  model.  As  discussed  above,  the  inclusion  of  the 
ex-ante  risk  factors  and  signals  to  the  model  shifts  some  weighs  from  forecasted 
earnings  (fE)  to  the  pro-forma  book  value  of  equity  (pBII),  which  is  shown  in 
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valuation  model  (all-IPO  sample  and  non-privatisation  sample) 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression,  the  difference  of  the  initial  market  price  and  the 
offer  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  [(Po-  P,  )/pBV]  on  pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by  pro- 
forma  book  value  (pBV/pBV),  forecasted  earning  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (fE/pBV),  a 
dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term  of  negative  earnings  scaled  by  pro- 
forma  book  value  (D*JE/pBV),  pro-forma  dividend  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (pDiv/pBV), 
leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy), 
industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold 
(Eq),  and  privatisation  dummy  (Priv).  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in 
brackets. 
Variables  (PI  PQ)/PBV  (PI  PQ)/PBV 
(Full  IPO  sample)  (non-PIPO  sample) 
pBV/pBV  1.556***  1.551*** 
(2.95)  (2.96) 
f13/pBV  0.739***  0.771*** 
(2.77)  (2.81) 
D  0.59  0.693 
(1.36)  (1.44) 
D*fE/pBV  0.444  0.682 
(0.51)  (0.39) 
pDiv/pBV  1.402*  1.376* 
(1.74)  (1.67) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  0.049  0.069 
(0.58)  (0.71) 
Cap  0.042  0.041 
(0.65)  (0.59) 
Effr  -0.106  -0.136 
(-0.73)  (-0.86) 
Cpy  0.186**  0.189 
(2.08)  (1.61) 
Ind  -1.337**  -1.287** 
(-2.48)  (-2.36) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.029  0.043 
(0.49)  (0.54) 
Age  0.013  0.011 
(0.49)  (0.29) 
Eq  -0.352*  -0.364 
(-1.69)  (-1.51) 
Priv  0.156  - 
(0.97) 
N  161  151 
Adj.  R-sq  0.151  0.157 
Wald  regression  (p-value)  36.91  (0.00)  440.31  (0.00) 
Wald  fundamental  (p-value)  14.15  (0.01)  242.63  (0.00) 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  (p-value)  3.88  (0.27)  15.78  (0.01) 
Wald  signals  (p-value)  3.28  (0.35)  3.88  (0.27) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  ]Yo,,  **  significant  at  5%;  *  significant  at  10% 
202 decreasing  JE  coefficients  and  increasing  pBV  coefficients6.  Moreover,  the  pBV 
escalation  is  greater  on  the  initial  market  price  than  on  the  offer  price,  and  the 
difference  of  the  two  coefficients  appears  to  be  robustly  significant.  The  impacts  of 
the  other  fundamentals  appear  to  be  similar  to  the  previous  result  (table  4.3),  which 
shows  the  significant  difference  between  the  impact  of  forecasted  earnings  and 
pro-forma  dividends  on  both  the  IPO  offer  and  initial  market  prices. 
Leverage  (Lev),  Capital  availability  (Cap),  and  Efficiency  risk  (Effr)  appear 
to  have  similar  impacts  on  the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  However, 
Capacity  risk  (Cpy)  and  Industry  risk  (Ind)  demonstrate  significantly  different 
impacts  on  the  IPO  prices.  Both  risk  factors  are  significantly  related  to  the  IPO 
prices;  however,  the  market  appears  to  put  more  weighs  on  those  risk  factors  than 
do  those  determining  the  IPO  offer  price. 
In  sum,  mixed  evidence  is  found  on  the  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factor  on 
IPO  prices.  All  risk  factors  appear  to  be  of  expected  sign,  except  leverage  risk. 
However,  only  two  factors,  efficiency  risk  and  capacity  risk,  have  significant 
impact  on  both  levels  of  price,  while  Ind  has  a  significant  impact  only  on  the  initial 
market  price.  Although  prior  evidence  shows  that  the  privatisation  IPOs  are 
differently  priced,  the  sensitivity  analysis  using  the  non-privatisation  sample  does 
not  change  the  results  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  IPO  valuation.  Another  set  of 
sensitivity  analysis  using  different  models  (the  model  keeps  all  the  fundamentals 
6  The  results  of  the  basic  valuation  model  (table  4.2)  shows  that  the  forecasted  earnings  (fE) 
response  coefficients  are  12.345  and  13.128,  on  the  offer  price  and  initial  market  price, 
respectively,  while  they  slightly  decrease  to  11.889  and  12.629  as  a  result  of  the  inclusion  of  the  ex- 
ante  risk  factors  and  signals  in  the  full  valuation  model  (table  4.5).  Meanwhile,  the  pro-forma  book 
value  coefficients  increase  significantly  from  0.280  and  0.347  on  the  offer  price  and  the  initial 
market  price,  respectively,  to  2.546  and  4.102. 
203 and  a  risk  factor  at  a  time  -  tables  A.  4.  la  and  4.1b)  also  demonstrates  the  similar 
result  to  the  ones  in  the  main  analysis. 
4.4.2.  Signalling  analysis 
Another  set  of  predictors  is  a  group  of  signals.  In  the  research  design 
chapter,  it  is  explained  that  signals  are  the  means  chosen  by  the  issuers  to  gesture 
the  firm's  value.  The  signalling  theory  argues  that  the  chosen  signal  could  be 
effective  if  it  could  separate  the  firm  from  others.  The  signals  employed  in  this 
study  have  been  widely  used  in  prior  IPO  studies.  In  the  UK,  a  number  of  studies 
(e.  g.,  Keasey  and  McGuiness,  1992,  Khurshed  et  al,  1999)  demonstrate  that  the 
three  signals  work  very  well  in  explaining  the  IPO  anomalies.  However,  only  few 
examine  them  directly  to  the  IPO  valuation.  Therefore,  this  study  contributes  to  the 
explanation  of  factors  influencing  IPO  prices. 
Despite  different  methods  used  to  measure  the  reputation  of  the 
underwriters,  prior  studies  in  US,  in  general,  conclude  that  the  prestigious 
underwriters  reduce  the  uncertainty  of  the  IPO,  which  results  in  lower  initial 
returns  in  the  early  days  of  IPOs.  However,  mixed  results  are  found  in  other 
markets,  including  the  UK.  Using  USM  data,  Keasey  and  McGuiness  (1991)  find 
no  evidence  of  a  negative  relationship  between  sponsor  reputation  and  the  degree 
of  underpricing,  while  Byrne  and  Rees  (1996)  using  the  UK  main  market  and  USM 
data  find  a  significant  association. 
In  this  study,  the  sponsor  reputation  is  measured  by  a  modified  proxy  used 
by  Keasey  and  McGuinness  (1991).  Using  the  KPM  `New  Issues  Statistics'  from 
1987-1997,  the  sponsor  is  classified  as  the  prestigious  sponsor  when  it  sponsors 
more  than  3  IPOs  in  the  quarter  prior  to  the  IPO  date,  and  as  the  less  prestigious 
204 one  when  less  than  3  IPOs  are  brought  to  the  market.  A  dummy  variable  for 
sponsor  reputation  (Spo)  is  used  in  the  valuation  model.  The  dummy  takes  1  for  the 
reputable  sponsors  and  0  for  the  less  reputable  ones.  The  expectation  is  that  the 
issuers  hire  the  reputable  sponsor  -  which  it  is  assumed  are  paid  more  than  the  less 
reputable  -  to  ensure  the  investors  that  the  firms  are  the  high-value  ones. 
Consequently,  the  investors  willingly  pay  higher  prices  for  such  IPOs.  Therefore,  a 
positive  coefficient  is  expected  for  the  dummy  Spo. 
The  result  in  tables  4.6  and  4.7  exhibit  the  positive  coefficients  of  Spo  on 
the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  This  suggests  that  the  IPOs  brought  to 
market  by  prestigious  sponsors  are  priced  higher  at  the  offering  date  and  the  first 
day  as  posited  in  the  working  hypothesis  HSa.  This  result  is  consistent  with  most  of 
the  previous  IPO  studies  on  agent  reputation  (e.  g.,  Beatty  &  Ritter,  1986;  Feltham 
et  al,  1991;  Carter  et  al,  1998).  Specifically  on  IPO  valuations,  this  result  also 
supports  the  findings  of  Klein  (1996).  However,  while  the  sign  of  the  coefficients 
are  as  expected,  they  are  statistically  insignificant.  Although  the  Spo  coefficient  on 
the  market  level  is  greater  than  the  one  on  the  offer  price,  the  magnitudes  of  the 
coefficients  are  very  small,  and  the  difference  between  the  coefficients  appears  to 
be  insignificantly  different  from  zero  (table  4.7). 
The  correlation  matrix  (table  4.1b)  demonstrates  that  there  is  a  significant 
positive  correlation  between  sponsor  reputation  and  privatisation,  but  it  appears  to 
be  a  weak  relationship.  Hence,  no  multicollinearity  problem  is  expected.  The 
valuation  model  analysis  using  the  non-privatisation  sample  shows  a  similar  result 
of  Spo  on  IPO  prices.  Positive  but  insignificant  Spo  coefficients  are  also  found  in 
the  valuation  model  that  includes  the  fundamentals  and  a  single  signal  at  a  time 
(see  appendix  tables  A.  4.  la  and  A.  4.  lb). 
205 The  inclusion  of  Age  as  a  signal  used  by  the  issuers  is  because  the  issuers 
have  options  as  to  when  they  go  public.  It  is  expected  that  the  older  (more  mature) 
firms  have  established  business,  so  they  have  lower  uncertainty  in  doing  the 
business.  The  decision  of  when  the  firms  go  public  is  used  by  the  issuers  to  signal 
the  firms'  value.  The  valuation  analysis  in  tables  4.6  and  4.7  shows  that  the  result 
of  the  Age  variable  is  positive.  This  implies  that  the  older  firms  are  priced  higher. 
Although  Klein  (1996)  uses  a  different  measure  for  Age,  the  result  of  this  study  is 
consistent  to  hers,  which  also  finds  a  positive  association  between  firm's  age  and 
the  IPO  prices.  However,  neither  result  appears  to  be  statistically  insignificant. 
Therefore  this  study  could  not  confirm  the  working  hypothesis  H5b. 
The  correlation  matrix  in  table  4.1b  exhibits  that  Age  is  significantly 
correlated  to  the  forecasted  earnings  variable,  the  negative  earnings  dummy,  the 
negative  earnings  interactive  term  and  the  capacity  risk.  However,  they  emerge  to 
be  low  relationships.  Therefore,  no  multicollinearity  problem  is  detected.  The 
sensitivity  analysis  using  the  non-PIPO  sample  demonstrates  the  similar  result  to 
the  main  analysis  (see  tables  4.8).  Furthermore,  other  sensitivity  analyses  confirm 
the  finding  in  the  main  analysis  (see  appendix  -  tables  A.  4.  la  and  A.  4.1b) 
The  most  popular  signal  used  in  the  IPO  studies  is  the  ownership  retained  at 
the  offerings.  Prior  studies  demonstrate  robust  results  of  the  impact  of  the 
ownership  retention  on  the  IPO  prices  and  performance.  In  this  study,  the 
ownership  retention  is  measured  by  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  admission 
(Eq).  The  greater  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  admission  signals  the  lower 
belief  of  the  old  shareholders  in  the  future  firm  values.  Therefore,  it  is  expected 
that  the  IPO  valuation  is  a  decreasing  function  of  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at 
the  admission,  as  hypothesised  in  H5c. 
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proportion  of  equity  sold  at  the  admission  and  the  IPO  valuations,  implying  that 
IPOs  selling  greater  percentage  of  equity  are  priced  lower.  This  is  completely 
consistent  to  the  retained  ownership  theory,  which  suggests  that  the  proportion  of 
equity  retained  by  the  old  shareholder  reflects  the  value  of  the  firms.  The  old 
shareholders  tend  to  retain  greater  fraction  of  equities  when  they  believe  in  higher 
firms'  value  in  the  future.  While  the  Eq  coefficient  is  significant  at  the  90%  level 
of  confidence  on  the  IPO  initial  market,  such  an  impact  appears  to  be  insignificant 
on  the  IPO  offer  price.  The  possible  explanation  could  be  the  multicollinearity 
problem  between  the  Eq  and  other  predictors. 
Table  4.1b  demonstrates  that  there  is  a  strong  correlation  (+0.705)  between 
the  Eq  and  Priv.  This  is  understandable  since  9  of  10  PIPOs  in  the  sample  offer 
100%  of  the  equity  for  sale  at  the  offerings.  Therefore,  it  is  reasonable  to  suspect 
multicollinearity  explains  the  lack  of  significance  of  the  Eq  coefficient  for  the  offer 
price,  when  the  model  includes  by  the  privatisation  dummy  (see  table  4.4). 
However,  the  result  using  the  non-PIPOs  sample  (table  4.6)  demonstrates  the 
similar  result.  The  impact  of  Eq  on  the  IPO  offer  price  remains  insignificant. 
Another  sensitivity  analysis  using  the  IPO  valuation  as  a  function  of  the 
fundamentals  and  another  single  predictor  (see  appendix  -  table  A.  4.1a)  shows  a 
robust  result  in  which  Eq  is  negatively  related  to  the  IPO  offer  price  and  significant 
at  the  99%  level  of  confidence.  This  is  to  confirm  the  evidence  that  the  lack  of 
significance  of  the  Eq  coefficient  in  the  full  valuation  model  is  because  of  the 
existence  of  multicollinearity  problem. 
The  result  of  Eq  is  consistent  to  Byrne  and  Rees's  (1996)  finding.  Using 
UK  data,  they  find  that  the  percentage  of  equity  retained  (sold)  in  the  offering  is 
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price  for  the  full  sample.  However,  when  they  split  the  sample  by  market,  the 
results  of  the  official  list  (now  called  the  main  market)  sample  show  similar  results 
to  the  ones  in  this  study  that  the  coefficient  of  the  equity  retained  appears  to  be 
statistically  insignificant  on  the  IPO  offer  price,  but  becomes  significant  on  the 
initial  market  price.  Using  US  data,  Klein  (1996)  finds  that  the  ownership  retention 
is  positively  and  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  offer  price  and  market  price.  Other 
prior  studies  (e.  g.:  Firth  et  al,  1995;  Firth,  1998)  find  a  significant  impact  of  Eq  on 
the  IPO  market  price. 
In  sum,  the  results  of  the  signal  variables  seem  to  be  consistent  theoretically 
and  empirically  to  previous  studies.  However,  only  the  impact  of  Eq  on  IPO 
valuations  is  found  to  be  statistically  significant.  Despite  mixed  results  found 
regarding  the  impact  of  the  individual  signals  on  the  IPO  prices,  the  Wald  statistics 
show  that  collectively  they  put  significant  impact  on  the  IPO  offer  price  (table  4.4) 
and  the  initial  market  price  (table  4.5)  when  the  model  does  not  include  the 
privatisation  dummy.  However,  the  joint  restriction  of  the  signals  becomes 
insignificant  when  the  privatisation  dummy  is  included  in  the  valuation  models. 
This  is  due  to  the  high  correlation  between  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO 
and  the  privatisation  dummy. 
4.5.  Privatisation 
The  last  variable  in  the  full  valuation  model  is  controlling  for  privatisations. 
It  is  used  as  a  control  variable  since  previous  studies  (e.  g.,  Dewenter  et  al,  1998) 
show  that  privatisation  IPOs  (PIPOs)  are  priced  differently  to  private  IPOs. 
Dewenter  et  al  (1998)  argue  that  governments  deliberately  underprice  the 
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that  PIPOs  in  the  UK  are  underpriced.  However,  they  do  not  find  evidence  of 
deliberation.  Other  studies,  with  different  motives,  also  demonstrate  robust  results 
of  the  PIPOs  underpricing.  Therefore,  a  negative  coefficient  of  the  privatisation 
dummy  on  the  IPO  values  is  expected  in  this  study. 
The  empirical  result  of  the  privatisation  dummy  is  of  the  expected  sign 
(negative),  indicating  that  PIPOs  are  underpriced  at  the  offer  and  the  initial  market 
prices.  However,  in  contrast  to  prior  findings,  the  impact  of  privatisation  dummy 
appears  to  be  statistically  insignificant. 
Having  observed  the  robust  correlation  coefficient  between  the 
privatisation  and  the  offer  and  initial  prices  in  the  univariate  analysis,  it  is 
surprising  here  that  the  privatisation  dummy  appears  to  be  insignificant  in  the 
multivariate  valuation  model.  However,  as  discussed  above,  the  correlation  matrix 
(table  4.1b)  exhibits  a  high  correlation  coefficient  between  the  privatisation 
dummy  (Priv)  and  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  offering  (Eq)  suggesting  that 
a  multicollinearity  problem  may  exist  between  the  two  predictors  Consequently,  at 
least  one  variable  could  appear  insignificant.  The  result  of  Eq  appears  to  be  mixed. 
The  impact  of  Eq  on  the  initial  market  price  is  significant,  but  loses  the 
significance  on  the  offer  price.  Here,  the  impact  of  Priv  appears  to  be  insignificant 
at  both  prices.  Therefore,  the  result  does  not  confirm  hypothesis  H6.  The  existence 
of  multicollinearity  is  also  supported  by  a  sensitivity  analysis  in  tables  A.  4.  la  and 
A.  4.1b  (appendix).  When  the  valuation  model  analyses  only  the  fundamentals  and 
a  single  other  predictors  (Priv),  the  result  shows  that  the  impact  of  privatisation  on 
both  prices  becomes  statistically  significant  at  least  at  the  10%  level  suggesting 
that  PIPOs  are  indeed  priced  differently.  As  the  Priv  coefficients  take  negative 
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initial  market  price. 
4.6.  Validity  of  the  IPO  valuation  model 
Tables  4.6  and  4.7  presents  the  Wald  statistics  of  the  full  valuation  model 
and  the  joint  restriction  of  the  predictor  groups  in  the  model.  The  Wald  statistics  of 
the  full  valuation  model  are  statistically  significant  across  the  IPO  prices  (the  offer 
and  initial  market  prices)  and  the  sensitivity  analyses.  It  implies  that  the  joint 
restriction  of  all  predictors  significantly  affecting  the  pricing  of  IPOs  on  both  the 
offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  The  model  is  predominantly  explained  by 
the  fundamentals. 
Despite  mixed  results  of  the  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  the  IPO 
prices,  the  Wald  statistics  for  the  joint  restriction  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors 
demonstrates  that  all  together  they  are  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  prices. 
Furthermore,  the  Wald  statistics  show  that  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  are  significantly 
relevant  in  pricing  the  IPOs  for  the  full  sample  and  the  reduced  using  non- 
privatisation  sample. 
As  discussed  above,  the  signals  relationship  to  the  IPO  prices  is  vague.  The 
joint  restriction  statistic  for  the  signals  shows  that  they  are  significantly  related  to 
the  IPO  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  However,  when  the  model  is 
controlled  for  the  privatisation  dummy,  the  signals  relationship  to  IPO  prices 
become  unclear.  This  is  confirmed  in  the  results  of  the  non-PIPO  sample,  which 
exhibits  the  insignificance  of  the  Wald  statistics  of  the  signals'  joint  restriction. 
In  sum,  all  predictors,  jointly,  are  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  prices  for 
the  full  sample  as  well  as  for  the  non-PIPOs  sub-sample.  Undoubtedly,  the 
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also  demonstrate  a  robust  relationship  to  the  IPO  prices,  the  signals  appear  to  have 
weak  relationship,  once  privatisations  are  controlled  for. 
Additionally,  the  researcher  also  attempts  to  run  the  model  using  the 
Stepwise  regression.  The  results  are  presented  in  the  appendix  (table  A.  4.2).  The 
results  of  the  Stepwise  regression  are  consistent  to  the  outcomes  of  the  OLS 
regression.  The  fundamentals  are  strongly  related  to  the  IPO  offer  and  initial 
market  prices  for  the  full  sample  and  the  non-PIPO  samples.  Mixed  results  are 
found  for  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  the  signals. 
4.7.  Sensitivity  analyses 
This  section  presents  a  number  of  robustness  tests  for  the  IPO  valuation 
main  analysis  presented  in  previous  sections.  Some  adjustments  have  been  made 
in  the  IPO  valuation  models  to  suit  the  IPO  firms'  characteristics,  such  as  the  use 
of  forecasted  earnings  rather  than  historic  ones,  the  use  of  proforma  book  value  as 
a  model  deflator  rather  than  realised  ones.  Therefore,  it  is  useful  to  check  whether 
the  use  of  competing  variables  results  in  different  outcomes. 
4.7.1.  Forecasted  earnings  vs.  historic  earnings 
The  main  analysis  of  the  basic  valuation  model  in  this  study  employs  the 
earnings  forecasts,  since  a  number  of  prior  IPO  studies  (e.  g.,  Firth  and  Liau-Tian, 
1998,  Chen  and  Firth,  1999,  How  and  Yeo,  2000)  finds  that  earnings  'forecasts 
provides  a  better  prediction  of  the  price  than  the  historic  earnings  does.  However, 
using  US  data,  Klein  (1996)  employs  the  earnings  from  the  last  audited  financial 
statement  prior  to  the  IPO.  With  the  tighter  legal  environment,  usually  the  US 
firms  do  not  provide  the  management's  earnings  forecast  in  the  prospectus. 
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usually  employ  the  realised  earnings.  Therefore,  as  a  robustness  check,  the  basic 
valuation  model  (equation  4)  is  analysed  using  the  historic  earnings.  The  results 
are  shown  in  table  4.8  below. 
Table  4.8.  Regression  results  on  the  basic  IPO  valuation  model 
using  the  historic  earnings  and  dividend 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  of  the  offer  price  and  initial  market  price 
scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (Po/pBV  and  P,  /pBP)  on  pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by 
pro-forma  book  value  (pBV/pBV),  Realised  earnings  pre-IPO  scaled  by  pro-forma  book 
value  (E/pBT),  a  dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term  of 
negative  earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (D*E/pBP),  and  dividend  scaled  by 
pro-forma  book  value  (Div/pBV).  All  variables  are  in  per  share  value.  Heteroscedasticity- 
adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variable  Expected  Po/pBV  P1/pBV 
sign  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
pBV/pBV  +  1.783***  2.015*** 
(5.18)  (5.37) 
E/pBV  +  6.142***  6.383*** 
(2.86)  (2.82) 
D+1.342*  1.274* 
(1.81)  (1.72) 
D*E/pBV  -  -7.835**  -8.066** 
(-2.60)  (-2.79) 
Div/pBV  +  1.915  2.869 
(0.79)  (1.02) 
N  157  157 
Adj.  R-square  0.285  0.253 
Wald  statistics  18.21  16.73 
(p-value)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1%;  **si  gnificant  at  5%;  *significant  at  10% 
First  of  all,  the  valid  case  for  the  analysis  is  reduced  from  161  IPOs  to  157, 
due  to  the  outliers  of  the  E/pBV  variable.  Overall,  the  results  are  similar  to  the  main 
results  reported  in  table  4.2  (p.  182).  All  the  fundamentals  have  the  expected  signs 
and  retain  their  significance.  The  earnings  coefficient  takes  a  positive  value,  which 
confirms  the  results  of  prior  study  by  Klein  (1996).  However,  it  takes  lower  values 
than  the  earnings  forecasts  coefficients  in  the  main  result.  Although  the  inference 
of  the  results  using  the  historic  earnings  is  similar  to  the  main  analysis  using  the 
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(28.5%  and  25.3%  for  the  offer  and  initial  market  prices,  respectively),  compared 
to  the  main  analysis  (72.9%  and  67%  for  the  offer  and  initial  market  prices, 
respectively).  This  confirms  that  the  main  analysis  has  more  information  content, 
although  the  overall  conclusions  are  the  same.  This  result  corroborates  Kim  and 
Ritter's  findings  (1999),  which  suggest  that  the  future  accounting  numbers  have 
higher  explanatory  power  in  explaining  the  IPO  values  than  the  historic  numbers. 
The  analysis  is  extended  by  including  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  signals  to 
the  model,  and  controlling  for  privatisation  IPOs.  The  results  are  shown  in  table 
4.9.  Similar  to  the  basic  valuation  analysis,  the  outcome  demonstrates  similar 
inferences  to  the  main  results  (table  4.4  and  4.5),  although  there  are  some 
differences.  The  historic  earnings  coefficients  take  lower  values  than  the  forecasted 
earnings,  which  confirm  the  greater  price  predictability  of  the  earnings  forecasts. 
The  dummy  for  negative  earnings  take  the  expected  positive  sign  although  appears 
to  be  insignificant.  However,  the  interactive  term  remains  highly  significant,  which 
firms,  as  is  also  implied  by  the  main  results. 
Another  difference  is  found  in  the  signal,  Eq  on  the  offer  price  analysis. 
The  main  result  shows  that  once  the  analysis  controls  for  privatisations,  the 
percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  (Eq)  becomes  insignificant  for  the  offer  price, 
although  it  remains  significant  for  the  initial  market  price.  Using  the  historic 
earnings,  Eq  retains  its  significance  for  both  prices,  although  it  is  marginally 
significant  for  the  offer  price.  Similar  to  the  findings  of  the  main  results,  the  Eq 
results  in  the  expected  negative  coefficient  suggesting  that  firms,  which  sell  higher 
213 Table  4.9.  Regression  analysis  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model 
using  the  historic  earnings  and  dividends 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression,  of  the  IPO  offer  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book 
value  (Po/pBV)  on  pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (pBV/pBV),  realised 
earnings  pre-IPO  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (E/pBV 
,a 
dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings 
(D),  an  interactive  term  of  negative  earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (D*E/pBV),  and 
dividend  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (Div/BV 
, 
leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk 
(Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy 
(Spo),  firm's  age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  and  privatisation  dummy  (Priv), 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  Expected 
sign 
Po/pBV 
(t-stat) 
Pl/pBV 
(t-stat) 
pBV/pBV  +  5.453***  5.400*** 
(3.53)  (3.87) 
E/pBV  +  6.091***  6.377*** 
(3.05)  (3.03) 
D  +  0.951  0.857 
(1.08)  (1.05) 
D*E/pBV  -  -6.929***  -7.901*** 
(-2.90)  (-3.08) 
Div/pBV  +  1.242  2.161 
(0.66)  (0.99) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -  0.181  0.174 
(0.79)  (0.74) 
Cap  +  0.132  0.135 
(0.57)  (0.51) 
Effr  -  -0.631*  -0.941  * 
(-1.84)  (-1.87) 
Cpy  -  -0.866**  -1.069** 
(2.49)  (-2.69) 
Ind  -  -2.061  -2.589 
(-1.35)  (-1.69) 
Signals: 
Spo  +  0.301  0.323 
(1.06)  (1.00) 
Age  +  0.083  0.191 
(1.31)  (1.64) 
Eq  -  -1.024*  -1.235* 
(-1.92)  (-1.79) 
Priv  -0.578  -0.167 
(-1.10)  (-0.27) 
N  157  157 
Adj.  R-sq  0.428  0.403 
Wald  regression  133.52(0.00)  127.67  (0.00) 
(p-value) 
Wald  fundamental  21.78  (0.00)  20.53  (0.00) 
(p-value) 
Wald  e-a  risk  ftrs  12.27(0.01)  19.30  (0.00) 
(p-value) 
Wald  signals  (p-value)  8.28  (0.03)  7.65(0.04) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1%;  **significant  at  5%;  *significant  at  10% 
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fraction  of  equities  at  the  IPOs,  are  expected  to  have  lower  IPO  values.  The  results 
also  confirm  the  findings  of  prior  studies  (e.  g.  Downes  and  Heinkel,  1982;  Firth  et 
al,  1995,  Klein,  1996,  Keasey  and  Short,  1997). 
The  explanatory  power  of  the  full  valuation  model  using  the  historic 
earnings  is  substantially  lower  than  the  main  analysis  based  on  the  forecasted 
earnings.  This  implies  that  the  use  of  earnings  forecasts  in  the  analysis  has 
increased  the  predictive  power  of  the  model.  All  the  Wald  statistics  confirm  that 
each  group  of  prospectus  information  (fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and 
signals)  are  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  offer  and  initial  market  prices. 
4.7.2.  Pro-forma  book  value  vs.  Pre-IPO  book  value  as  a  deflator 
Another  robustness  check  is  undertaken  by  considering  an  alternative  for 
the  scale  factor.  It  is  discussed  earlier  in  chapter  3,  that  book  value  is  chosen  as  the 
appropriate  scale  factor.  Some  IPO  studies  (e.  g.,  Kim  and  Ritter,  1999,  Firth  et  al, 
2000)  use  the  post  IPO  book  value  as  the  scale  factor,  while  non-IPO  studies  (e.  g. 
Danbolt  and  Rees,  2002;  Core  et  al,  2003)  employ  realised  book  value.  Therefore  a 
sensitivity  analysis  using  pre-IPO  book  value  is  undertaken  as  a  robustness  check 
to  the  results  of  the  main  analysis.  The  results  are  reported  in  table  4.10  below. 
In  this  sensitivity  analysis,  the  net  proceeds  per  share  scaled  by  book  value 
pre  IPO  is  also  included  to  capture  its  signalling  role  as  suggested  by  some  studies 
(e.  g.,.  Keasey  and  Short,  1997).  As  argued  by  Krinsky  and  Rottenberg  (1989)  net 
proceeds  as  indicated  in  the  offering  prospectus,  might  also  convey  the  insiders' 
private  information  regarding  the  future  planned  projects  in  the  firms.  Therefore,  it 
is  regarded  as  a  signal  to  the  firm's  future  value.  The  expectation  is  that  the  more 
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using  book  value  of  equity  pre-IPO  as  a  scale  factor 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  of  the  offer  price  and  initial  market  price 
scaled  by  pre-IPO  book  value  (Po/BVp,  and  Pj/BVpfe)  on  pre-IPO  book  value  scaled  by 
pre-IPO  book  value  (BVp,  e  /BV,,  ),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by  pre-IPO  book  value  (El 
BVp,  e),  a  dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term  of  negative 
earnings  scaled  by  pre-IPO  book  value  (D*E/BVp,  e),  and  dividend  scaled  by  pre-IPO  book 
value  (Div/  BVp,,  ).  All  variables  are  in  per  share  value.  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t- 
statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  Expected  sign  PQ/pBV 
(t-stat) 
Pj/pBV 
(t-stat) 
BVpreBVprc  +  0.212**  0.251** 
(2.61)  (1.98) 
fEBVprý  +  11.400***  13.187*** 
(10.14)  (9.26) 
DIE  +  6.887**  6.093** 
(2.55)  (2.10) 
DfE*  fEBVpp«  -18.962***  -19.430*** 
(-2.75)  (-3.18) 
DivBVp«  +  0.975  1.26 
(0.59)  (0.61) 
NetPrBVp«  +  1.495  2.247 
(0.65)  (0.76) 
Adj.  R-sq  0.589  0.544 
N  146  146 
Wald  statistics  128.53  97.48 
_ 
(p-value)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  ]Yo,  -  *  *significant  at  S%;  *significant  at  10% 
net  proceeds  received  from  the  IPOs,  the  more  projects  would  be  undertaken  in  the 
firms  to  raise  the  firms'  value.  Therefore  the  new  proceeds  is  expected  to  be 
positively  related  to  the  IPO  prices. 
The  analysis  is  based  on  smaller  sample  (146  IPOs).  There  are  15  out  of  the 
final  sample  of  161  IPOs  that  have  negative  pre-IPO  book  values;  hence  they  are 
excluded  from  the  analysis.  The  results  of  the  basic  valuation  model  demonstrate 
similar  inferences  to  the  main  analysis  (table  4.2).  All  fundamentals,  except  the 
dividends,  are  as  expected  and  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  offer  and  initial 
market  prices.  The  intercept,  which  is  considered  as  the  pre-IPO  book  value 
216 coefficient,  and  the  forecasted  earnings  coefficients  take  slightly  lower  values  than 
the  pro-forma  book  value  and  the  forecasted  earnings  in  the  main  analysis. 
However,  the  negative  forecasted  earnings  and  the  interactive  term  coefficients 
appear  to  be  higher  than  the  ones  in  the  main  analysis. 
The  net  proceeds  variable  appears  to  be  positively  related  to  the  IPO  prices, 
although  the  association  is  insignificant.  Therefore,  the  analysis  fails  to  prove  the 
signalling  role  of  the  net  proceeds. 
The  results  shows  that  the  coefficients  of  determination  of  the  model  using 
the  pre-IPO  book  value  as  a  deflator  are  58.9%  and  54.4%  for  the  offer  price  and 
the  initial  market  price,  respectively.  They  are  substantially  lower  than  the  main 
results  (72.9%  and  67.0%  for  the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price, 
respectively).  This  result  suggests  that  the  use  of  pro-forma  book  value  as  a  model 
deflator  explains  the  IPO  basic  valuation  model  better  than  the  use  of  realised  book 
value. 
The  full  valuation  analysis  using  the  pre-IPO  book  value  as  the  scale  factor, 
as  reported  in  table  4.11,  also  provides  similar  inferences  to  the  main  results  (table 
4.4  and  4.5).  The  fundamentals  are  of  expected  sign  and  maintain  their 
significance.  After  controlling  for  risk  factors,  signals,  and  the  PIPOs,  the  analysis 
still  finds  no  evidence  of  the  signalling  role  of  the  net  proceeds.  Similar  to  the 
results  of  the  basic  valuation  model,  the  full  valuation  models  show  that  the 
explanatory  powers  of  the  models  are  significantly  greater  when  the  models  use  the 
pro-forma  book  value  as  a  deflator. 
In  sum,  changing  the  pro-forma  book  value  to  the  pre-IPO  book  value  as  a 
deflator  for  the  IPO  valuation  model  does  not  change  the  main  results'  inferences. 
Yet,  the  explanatory  powers  of  the  models  are  better  when  the  pro-forma  book 
217 Table  4.11.  Regression  results  on  the  basic  IPO  valuation  model 
using  book  value  of  equity  pre-IPO  as  a  scale  factor 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression,  of  the  IPO  offer  price  scaled  by  pre-IPO  book  value 
(Pol  BVp,  e)  on  pre-IPO  book  value  scaled  by  pre-IPO  book  value  (B  Vpe  /  BVp,  e),  earnings  forecast 
by  pre-IPO  book  value  (EIBVp, 
e),  a  dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term 
of  negative  earnings  scaled  by  pre-IPO  book  value  (D*E/BVp1e),  and  dividend  scaled  by  pre-IPO 
book  value  (Div!  BVp,  e), 
leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr), 
capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age), 
percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  and  privatisation  dummy  (Priv),  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t- 
statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  Expected  sign  PoBVpTe 
(t-stat) 
PiBVpre 
(t-stat) 
BVpre  /  BVpre  +  2.056**  2.130 
(2.02)  (1.69) 
fE/  BVpre  +  10.753***  12.449 
(10.89)  (8.90) 
DE  +  6.901**  6.484 
(2.51)  (2.03) 
DfE*  fE/BVpre  -  -17.553***  -19.444 
(-3.15)  (-2.03) 
Div/  BVp,  e  +  1.107  1.394 
(1.56)  (1.39) 
NetPr/  BVp  e  +  1.456  2.233 
(0.93)  (1.62) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -  0.377  0.591 
(0.36)  (0.54) 
Cap  +  -0.389  -0.306 
(-0.98)  (-0.67) 
Effr  -  -1.451*  -3.257* 
(-1.77)  (-1.97) 
Cpy  -  -0.722*  -0.861* 
(-1.75)  (-1.83) 
Ind  -  -4.434  -5.093 
(-1.69)  (-1.69) 
Signals: 
Spo  +  0.205  0.664 
(0.37)  (1.51) 
Age  +  -0.169  -0.164 
(-0.76)  (-0.59) 
Eq  -  -2.765**  -3.143*** 
(-2.81)  (-3.35) 
Priv  -  0.067  0.309 
(-0.48)  (0.17) 
N  146  146 
Adj.  R-sq  0.633  0.617 
F-stat  18.87  17.69 
Note:  ***  significan  t  at  101o;  **significant  at  5%;  *significant  at  10% 
218 value  is  used  as  a  deflator.  The  results  also  fail  to  find  evidence  for  the  signalling 
role  of  the  net  proceeds. 
4.7.3.  Ex-ante  risk  factors  vs.  Risk  disclosure  index 
The  main  analyses  (table  4.4  and  4.5)  show  mixed  results  are  found  on  the 
relationship  between  5  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  IPO  prices.  Only  Efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  Capacity  risk  (Cpy),  and  Industry  risk  (Ind)  are  significantly  related  to  the 
IPO  prices.  Yet,  as  a  group,  they  have  significant  impact  on  the  IPO  prices  as 
shown  in  the  Wald  statistics  for  the  ex-ante  risk  factor  group. 
Having  discussed  the  content  analysis  of  the  offering  prospectus  using  the 
AABRM  framework  in  chapter  3,  another  sensitivity  analysis  is  undertaken  to 
examine  the  impact  of  the  amount  of  risk  factors  disclosed  in  the  prospectus.  The 
risk  disclosure  index  is  proxied  by  the  number  of  AABRM  risk  factor  disclosed  in 
the  prospectus,  regardless  of  whether  measures  of  the  level  of  risk  are  provided  or 
not.  Based  on  the  AABRM  classification,  this  study  comes  up  with  four  risk 
disclosure  indices;  the  environment  index,  the  process  index,  the  information 
index,  and  the  total  index.  The  descriptive  statistics  of  the  risk  disclosure  indices 
are  presented  in  appendix  table  A.  4.3. 
This  robustness  check  is  undertaken  with  two  analyses.  In  the  first  analysis, 
the  5  ex-ante  risk  factors  are  substituted  by  the  three  group  indices  (the 
environment  index,  the  process  index,  and  the  information  index).  Then,  in  the 
second  one,  the  total  index  is  used  as  a  substitute  to  all  ex-ante  risk  factors.  The 
results  are  shown  in  the  appendices  to  this  chapter  (chapter  4)  in  table  A.  4.4.  None 
of  the  indices  are  found  to  be  significant,  which  implies  that  how  many  risk  factors 
disclosed  in  the  prospectus  is  not  important  to  the  IPO  pricing.  Moreover,  the 
219 Wald  statistics  for  the  risk  disclosure  indices  show  that  the  indices  have 
insiginificant  impacts  on  the  IPO  prices.  The  main  results  show  that  the  ex-ante 
risk  factors  are  important  for  the  IPO  valuation,  however  the  sensitivity  analysis 
suggests  it  is  not  the  simple  number  of  risks  disclosed  that  matters,  but  more 
detailed  measures  of  the  individual  risk  factors. 
4.7.4.  Industry  fl  vs.  Industry  dummy 
Industry  8  is  included  in  the  IPO  valuation  model  as  a  proxy  for  industry 
risk  -a  risk  factor  that  is  identified  in  the  AABRM.  Moreover,  since  there  is  no 
market  valuation  for  the  firms'  shares  prior  to  the  IPO,  a  proxy  to  the  firm's  6  is 
not  available  at  the  IPO,  therefore  the  industry  it  is  also  used  as  a  proxy  to  the 
firm's  8.  The  hypothesis  is  that  the  higher  the  /3,  the  riskier  the  industry,  and  the 
lower  the  IPO  prices.  The  main  results  show  mixed  results.  The  industry  risk  (Ind) 
coefficent  is  of  the  expected  sign.  However,  it  is  only  significantly  related  to  the 
initial  market  price  (Pt),  while  its  relationship  with  the  offer  price  (Po)  is  unclear. 
Many  IPO  studies  use  industry  dummy  to  examine  the  impact  of  industry 
on  the  IPO  valuation  (e.  g.,  Keasey  and  Short,  1997;  Beatty  et  al,  2002).  Therefore, 
another  sensitivity  analysis  is  undertaken  to  examine  whether  different  proxies  for 
industry  effect  could  make  a  different  impact  on  the  IPO  valuation. 
As  discussed  earlier  in  Chapter  3,  the  research  sample  is  classified  into  5- 
industry  groups  based  on  the  1995  FTSE  Actuaries  industry  classification. 
Therefore,  4  industry  dummies  (DM; 
fl,  Dc,,,  DGen  Dser)  are  included  as  a  substitution 
to  Ind  in  the  IPO  valuation  model.  The  results  are  reported  in  the  appendix  (table 
A.  4.5). 
220 The  results  show  similar  outcomes  to  the  main  results.  All  other  predictors 
(the  fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  the  signals)  are  of  expected  sign 
and  maintain  their  significance.  All  industry  dummies  are  positively  related  to  the 
IPO  prices,  however  only  a  dummy  for  service  industry  has  a  significant  impact  on 
the  IPO  prices. 
4.7.5.  Rank  regression  analysis 
As  explained  in  the  Research  sample  section,  the  treatment  for  the  outliers 
has  been  undertaken  by  deletion  of  IPOs  with  extreme  values.  However,  to  make 
sure  that  there  is  no  more  outliers  that  could  still  significantly  affect  the  results,  the 
rank  regression  analysis  is  undertaken.  The  results  are  reported  in  the  appendix 
(tables  A.  4.6) 
To  test  the  robustness  of  the  IPO  full  valuation  model  results  to  the  outliers, 
the  rank  regression  analysis  is  run.  The  results  are  presented  in  the  appendix  table 
A.  4.6.  The  rank  regression  analysis  demonstrates  that  there  is  no  substantial 
differences  in  the  coefficients  that  could  potentially  alter  the  inferences  of  the  main 
results.  Therefore,  it  could  be  concluded  that  there  is  no  outliers  problem  and  the 
main  results  are  robust. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  investigates  the  impact  of  the  fundamental  accounting  (pro- 
forma  book  value,  forecasted  earnings,  and  pro-forma  dividend),  the  ex-ante  risk 
factors,  and  the  signals  on  the  IPO  valuation.  The  IPO  values  are  examined  at  the 
offer  price  and  the  closing  price  on  day  1.  The  analysis  is  based  on  the  accounting- 
based  valuation  model.  The  model  hypothesises  that  the  IPO  price  is  an  increasing 
221 function  of  the  fundamentals  and  signals,  but  a  decreasing  function  of  the  ex-ante 
risk  factors.  The  analysis  is  divided  into  two  empirical  models.  The  first  model  is 
called  the  basic  valuation  model.  It  analyses  the  interaction  between  the 
fundamentals  and  the  IPO  prices.  The  second  model  is  the  extended  valuation 
model,  including  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  the  signals.  Since  the'sample  includes 
10  privatisation  IPOs  (PIPOs)  and  prior  studies  show  robust  results  on  the  PIPOs 
pricing  being  different  to  that  of  other  IPOs,  the  full  valuation  model  includes  a 
privatisation  dummy  variable. 
The  analysis  on  the  basic  valuation  model  demonstrates  that  the 
fundamental  accounting  variables  play  a  vital  role  in  valuing  IPOs.  The  IPO 
valuations,  both  at  the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price,  heavily  depend  on 
those  accounting  numbers,  which  results  in  a  high  explanatory  power  of  the  model. 
This  result  is  consistent  to  previous  valuation  studies  using  non-IPO  cases  that  also 
find  accounting  valuation  models  to  work  well.  Particularly,  pro-forma  book  value 
and  forecasted  earnings  appear  to  be  strongly  and  significantly  related  to  the  offer 
price  and  the  initial  market  price.  The  basic  valuation  model  analysis  also  confirms 
the  significant  impact  of  negative  earnings  on  the  IPO  valuations.  This  is  also 
consistent  to  the  findings  from  prior  studies  (Hayn,  1995;  Rees,  1999)  using 
seasoned  stocks. 
The  analysis  on  the  full  valuation  model  exhibits  mixed  result.  All  risk 
factors  appear  to  be  consistent  to  the  theoretical  foundation,  except  leverage  risk. 
While  leverage  appears  to  have  a  signal  role  rather  than  being  a  risk  factor,  the 
other  results  show  that  the  IPO  price  is  a  decreasing  function  of  the  ex-ante  risk 
factors.  The  riskier  IPOs  are  priced  lower  at  the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market 
price.  Only  two  risk  factors,  efficiency  risk  and  capacity  risk,  have  statistically 
222 significant  influence  the  IPO  valuations.  However,  the  Wald  statistic  of  the  ex-ante 
risk  factors  as  a  group  shows  that  the  group  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  IPO 
prices. 
Similar  to  the  analysis  on  risk  factors,  the  results  of  the  signals  show  that 
sponsor  reputation,  firm  age,  and  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  offering 
induce  the  movement  of  IPO  prices  as  expected.  It  implies  that  the  IPO  price  is  an 
increasing  function  of  the  signals.  However,  only  the  impact  of  the  percentage  of 
equity  sold  on  the  initial  market  price  appears  to  be  significant.  Therefore  the 
results  could  not  confirm  the  working  hypotheses  relating  to  the  sponsor  reputation 
and  firm  age.  A  sensitivity  analysis  confirms  there  is  a  multicollinearity  problem 
between  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq)  and  the  privatisation  dummy,  which 
results  in  the  lack  of  significance  of  the  Eq  on  the  initial  market  price.  While  the 
privatisation  dummy  coefficients  have  the  expected  sign,  the  result  shows  that  the 
impact  of  privatisation  on  the  valuation  appears  to  be  statistically  insignificant. 
This  could  be  explained  by  the  multicollinearity  problem  between  the  Priv  and  the 
Eq  variables,  as  the  sensitivity  analysis  confirms  that  the  variables  are  significant 
separately,  but  becomes  insignificant  when  both  variables  are  included  in  the 
regression. 
Despite  mixed  results  regarding  the  influence  of  ex-ante  risk  factors  and 
signals  on  the  IPO  valuation,  the  inclusion  of  those  predictors  to  the  valuation 
models  increases  the  adjusted  R-square  by  1.9  and  2.5%  respectively  for  the  offer 
price  and  the  initial  market  price  implying  that  to  some  extent  the  ex-ante  risk 
factors  and  the  signals  do  explain  parts  of  the  variations  in  the  IPO  prices.  The 
Wald  statistics  show  that  collectively  all  predictors  have  a  significant  impact  on  the 
IPO  prices.  It  is  also  shown  that  the  joint  restriction  of  the  fundamentals  and  the 
223 Appendices 
for 
Chapter  4 ex-ante  risk  factors  are  significant  and  valid  to  predict  the  IPO  prices,  while  the 
joint  restriction  of  the  signals  becomes  insignificant  once  the  model  control  for 
privatisations. 
Finally,  a  number  of  sensitivity  analyses  demonstrate  that  the  main  IPO 
valuation  models  are  not  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  predictors  (fundamentals  and 
risk  factors).  Confirming  prior  IPO  studies  (e.  g.  Firth,  1998;  Kim  and  Ritter, 
1999),  the  sensitivity  analyses  show  that  the  future  accounting  numbers,  such  as 
forecasted  earnings,  explain  the  IPO  valuation  better  than  the  historic  numbers. 
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I'D Table  A.  4.2  Stepwise  regression  full  valuation  model 
The  table  contains  output  form  the  Stepwise  regression,  of  the  IPO  offer  (initial  market) 
price  on  prospectus  information  (fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  signals)  and  control 
variables  (privatisation  dummy) 
Panel  A-  Full  sample;  Po  as  dependent  variable 
Variable  Step  1  Step  2  Step  3  Step  4 
pBV/pBV  0.280  0.909  1.306  1.567 
fE/pBV  12.35  11.98  12.04  12.01 
(18.47)  (18.12)  (18.35)  (18.40) 
D  2.52  2.44***  2.44***  2.44*** 
(5.29)  (5.25)  (5.29)  (5.33) 
D*fE/pBV  -15.9***  -15.00***  -14.80***  -14.8*** 
(-7.93)  (-7.61)  (-7.53)  (-7.61) 
pDiv/pBV  1.50  1.10  0.90  0.40 
(0.93)  (0.67)  (0.56)  (0.23) 
Eq  -  -1.22***  -1.09**  -1.18*** 
(-3.08)  (-2.74)  (-2.95) 
Effr  -  -  -0.69*  -0.74** 
(-1.95)  (-2.14) 
Cpy  -  -  -  -0.41  * 
(-1.68) 
Adj  R-sq  0.73  0.74  0.74  0.75 
Note:  *"significant  at  1  %;  "significant  significant  at  5%,;  *  significant  at  10%, 
Panel  B-  Full  sample;  Pl  as  dependent  variable 
Variable  Step  1  Step  2  Step  3  Step  4  Step  5 
pBV/pBV  0.35  1.10  1.56  1.93  2.35 
FE/pBV  13.13  12.70  12.76  12.72***  12.85*** 
(15.72)  (15.32)  (15.50)  (15.57)  (15.79) 
D  3.10***  3.00  3.00  3.00***  2.98*** 
(5.19)  (5.14)  (5.18)  (5.23)  (5.23) 
D*fE/pBV  -15.90***  -14.90  -14.60***  -14.70***  -14.70*** 
(-6.35)  (-6.02)  (-5.92)  (-6.01)  (-6.06) 
pDiv/pBV  3.10  2.50  2.30  1.60  1.80 
(1.52)  (1.28)  (1.18)  (0.81)  (0.90) 
Eq  -  -1.45***  -1.30**  -1.42***  -1.42*** 
(-2.99)  (-2.61)  (-2.89)  (-2.93) 
Effr  -  -  -0.80*  -0.90**  -0.85* 
(-1.80)  (-2.33)  (-1.94) 
Cpy  -  -  -  -0.58*  -0.62** 
(-1.88)  (-2.14) 
Ind  -  -  -  -  -2.70* 
(-1.87) 
Adj  R-sq  0.67  0.69  0.69  0.69  0.70 
227 Panel  C-  Non-privatisation  sample;  Po  as  dependent  variable 
Variable  Step  1  Step  2  Step  3  Step  4 
pBV/pBV  0.35  0.88  1.19  1.48 
fE/pBV  12.22***  12.30***  12.21***  12.12*** 
(17.75)  (18.08)  (18.10)  (17.97) 
D  2.76***  2.78***  2.79***  2.73*** 
(5.49)  (5.60)  (5.68)  (5.57) 
D*fE/pBV  -15.00***  -14.70***  -14.70***  -14.40*** 
(-7.34)  (-7.23)  (-7.32)  (-7.19) 
pDiv/pBV  1.20  1.00  0.30  0.20 
(0.73)  (0.59)  (0.16)  (0.14) 
Effr  -  -0.81**  -0.88**  -0.83** 
(-2.21)  (-2.42)  (-2.27) 
Cpy  -  -  -0.54**  -0.48* 
(-2.07)  (-1.84) 
Eq  -  -  -  -0.83 
(-1.48) 
Adj  R-sq  0.72  0.73  0.74  0.74 
Note:  ***  significant  at  I  ? lo;  **  significant  at  5%,;  *  significant  at  I0%, 
Panel  D-  Non-privatisation  sample;  PI  as  dependent  variable 
Variable  Step  1  Step  2  Step  3  Step  4  Step  5 
pB  V/pB  V  0.42  1.07  1.60  1.87  2.16 
fE/pBV  13.03  12.86  12.96***  12.88***  13.00*** 
(15.07)  (-14.98)  (15.22)  (15.24)  (15.41) 
D  3.42***  3.33***  3.35***  3.37***  3.30*** 
(5.42)  (5.32)  (5.41)  (5.49)  (5.39) 
D*fE/pBV  -14.90***  -14.40***  -14.00***  -14.10***  -14.20*** 
(-5.79)  (-5.63)  (-5.52)  (-5.60)  (-5.68) 
pDiv/pBV  2.80  2.50  2.30  1.50  1.60 
(1.33)  (1.24)  (1.12)  (0.73)  (0.79) 
Eq  -  -1.50**  -1.38*  -1.19*  -1.19* 
(-2.13)  (-1.97)  (-1.69)  (-1.70) 
Effr  -  -  -0.90*  -0.99**  -0.95** 
(-1.96)  (-2.16)  (-2.13) 
Cpy  -  -  -  -0.62*  -0.66** 
(-1.89)  (-2.11) 
Ind  -  -  -  -  -2.60 
(-1.62) 
Adj  R-sq  0.66  0.67  0.67  0.68  0.69 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1  %;  **  significant  at  5%,;  *  significant  at  10%, 
228 Table  A.  3.  Descriptive  statistics  of  the  disclosure  index  of  AABRM 
Index  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
Environmental  risk  1.329  1.000  0.545  1.000  3.000 
Process  risk  9.683  10.000  1.539  5.000  14.000 
Information  risk  4.733  5.000  1.435  3.000  8.000 
Total  disclosure  15.745  16.000  2.335  10.000  22.000 
229 Table  A.  4.4a.  Regression  änälysis  results  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model  for 
the  offer  price  (Po/pBV  )  using  the  disclosure  index  of  AABRM. 
Variables  Expected  Po/pBV  Po/pBV 
sign  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Fundamental 
pBV/pBV  +  1.475**  1.531** 
(2.28)  (2.30) 
fE/pBV  +  11.744***  11.908*** 
(16.83)  (16.28) 
D  +  2.608***  2.504*** 
(3.19)  (3.00) 
D*fE/pBV  -  -14.919***  -14.992*** 
(-4.59)  (-4.45) 
PDiv/pBV  +  0.855  0.908 
(0.43)  (0.45) 
Disclosure  index: 
Env.  risk  0.076  - 
(0.52) 
Process  risk  -0.085  - 
(-1.12) 
Inf.  risk  0.004  - 
(0.07) 
Total  disclosure  index  -  -0.052 
(-1.58) 
Signals: 
Spo  +  0.049  0.062 
(0.34)  (0.41) 
Age  +  0.053  0.051 
(0.80)  (0.72) 
Eq  -  -1.118*  -1.118** 
(-1.73)  (-2.05) 
Priv  -  -0.238  -0.612 
(-0.56)  (-0.36) 
N  161  161 
Adj.  R-sq  0.743  0.755 
Walds  regression  510.64(0.00)  478.61  (0.00) 
Walds  fundamentals  315.29(0.00)  296.21(0.00) 
Walds  risk  disclosure  4.85(0.18)  2.51(0.11) 
index 
Walds  signals  6.85(0.10)  6.75(0.10) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  I  ? lo,  significant  at  5%;  *  significant  at  10%, 
230 Table  4..  4b.  Regression  analysis  results  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model  for 
the  initial  market  price  (P1/pBV)  using  the  disclosure  index  of  AABRM. 
Variables  Exp.  sign  P1/pBV  P1/pBV 
(t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Fundamental 
pBV/pBV  +  1.932**  1.846** 
(2.42)  (2.28) 
fE/pBV  +  12.396***  12.345*** 
(14.57)  (14.38) 
D+  3.200***  3.177*** 
(2.95)  (2.92) 
D*fE/pBV  -  -15.007***  -15.121*** 
(-3.65)  (-3.68) 
pDiv/pBV  +  2.397  2.471 
(0.98)  (0.99) 
Disclosure  index: 
Env.  risk  0.003  - 
(0.01) 
Process  risk  -0.087  - 
(-0.73) 
Inf.  risk  -0.012  - 
(-0.16) 
Total  disclosure  index  -  -0.051 
(-1.32) 
Signals: 
Spo  +  0.051  0.026 
(0.38)  (0.15) 
Age  +  0.059  0.060 
(0.73)  (0.74) 
Eq  -  -1.554**  -1.602** 
(-2.38)  (-2.38) 
Priv  -  -0.127  -0.306 
(0.23)  (0.59) 
N  161  161 
Adj.  R-sq  0.692  0.695 
Walds  regression  379.26  (0.00)  370.46  (0.00) 
Walds  fundamentals  228.41  (0.00)  222.57  (0.00) 
Walds  risk  disclosure  index  3.17  (0.37)  1.76  (0.19) 
Walds  signals  6.33  (0.10)  6.43  (0.10) 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1  %;  "significant  significant  at  5%,;  *  significant  at  10%, 
231 Table  A.  4.5.  Regression  analysis  results  on  the  full  IPO  valuation  model 
using  the  industry  dummy 
Variables  Expected  Po/pBV  Po/pBV 
sign  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Fundamental 
pBV/pBV  +  1.830*  1.675* 
(1.98)  (1.89) 
fE/pBV  +  11.761***  10.397*** 
(16.44)  (14.40) 
D  +  2.698***  2.341*** 
(3.43)  (3.33) 
D*fE/pBV  -  -13.904***  -12.411*** 
(-3.76)  (-2.98) 
pDiv/pBV  +  0.245  1.579 
(0.13)  (0.69) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -  0.176  0.232 
(0.95)  (0.96) 
Cap  +  0.136  0.189 
(0.80)  (0.84) 
Effr  -  -0.670*  -0.799* 
(-1.87)  (-1.70) 
Cpy  -  -0.521  **  -0.667** 
(-2.11)  (-2.21) 
Industry  dummy: 
DMi,,  0.576  0.660 
(1.22)  (1.20) 
Dcon  0.723  0.657 
(1.28)  (1.26) 
Doe￿  0.852  0.931 
(1.37)  (1.29) 
Dscr  1.399**  1.716** 
(1.99)  (2.08) 
Signals: 
Spo  +  0.296  0.306 
(0.22)  (0.30) 
Age  +  0.089  0.098 
(1.21)  (1.15) 
Eq  -  -0.945*  -1.344* 
(-1.79)  (-1.94) 
Priv  -  0.476  0.802 
(1.02)  (1.20)) 
N  161  161 
Adj.  R-sq  0.721  0.665 
Walds  regression  531.73  (0.00)  497.01  (0.00) 
Walds  fundamentals  216.18(0.00)  212.21(0.00) 
Walds  e-a  risk  8.96(0.06)  10.31(0.05) 
Walds  signals  3.65(0.30)  4.35(0.22) 
232 Table  A.  4.6  -  Rank  regression  result  for  full  valuation  model 
The  table  contains  output  from  Rank  regression,  of  the  IPO  offer  price,  the  initial  market  price,  and 
the  differential  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (Po/PBV  and  PI/PBV,  and  (PO-Pl)/PBVý  on 
pro-forma  book  value  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (PBV/PB),  forecasted  earning  scaled  by 
pro-forma  book  value  (E/PBV),  a  dummy  variable  for  negative  earnings  (D),  an  interactive  term  of 
negative  earnings  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  (D*E/PBP),  pro-forma  dividend  scaled  by  pro- 
forma  book  value  (Div/PBV),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age), 
percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  and  privatisation  dummy  (Priv),  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t- 
statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Panel  A-  Full  IPO  sample 
Variables  Expected  sign  Po/pBV 
(t-stat) 
Pj/pBV 
(t-stat) 
Fundamentals: 
pBV/pBV  2.005**  3.136** 
(2.09)  (2.61) 
fE/pBV  11.892***  12.700 
(21.53)  (18.36) 
D  2.329***  2.475*** 
(5.98)  (5.07) 
D*fE/pBV  -13.757***  -14.189*** 
(-8.10)  (-6.67) 
pDiv/pBV  -0.345  0.241 
(-0.26)  (0.15) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  0.143  0.161 
(1.00)  (0.90) 
Cap  0.063  0.101 
(0.45)  (0.58) 
Effr  -0.471  *  -0.677 
(-1.82)  (-1.89) 
Cpy  -0.357**  -0.530** 
(-2.13)  (-2.27) 
Ind  -1.178  -2.745* 
(-1.21)  (-1.91) 
Signals:  - 
Spo  0.062  0.011 
(0.42)  (0.06) 
Age  0.027  0.014 
(0.41)  (0.17) 
Eq  -0.785  -1.194* 
(-1.07)  (-1.73) 
Priv  -0.425  -0.425 
(-1.05)  (-0.84) 
N  161  161 
Note:  ***  signific  ant  at  1%;  **  significant  at  5%,;  *  significant  at  10%, 
233 Panel  B-  Non-privatisation  sample 
Variables  P(/PBV 
(t-stat) 
P1/PBV 
(t-stat) 
PIPdPBV 
(t-stat) 
pBV/pBV  1.932*  3.132**  0.926** 
(1.92)  (2.40)  (2.32) 
fE/pBV  11.847***  12.717***  0.701*** 
(21.185)  (17.57)  (3.16) 
D  2.766***  2.99***  0.228 
(6.68)  (5.58)  (1.39) 
D*fE/pBV  -12.260***  -12.618***  -0.640 
(-7.07)  (-5.62)  (-0.93) 
pDiv/pBV  -0.307  0.170  0.835 
(-0.233)  (0.10)  (1.60) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  0.261  0.283  0.021 
(1.73)  (1.45)  (0.35) 
Cap  0.080  0.115  0.007 
(0.56)  (0.63)  (0.13) 
Effr  -0.517*  -0.754*  -0.132 
(-1.74)  (-1.96)  (-1.11) 
Cpy  -0.418*  -0.608**  -0.164* 
(-1.90)  (-2.13)  (-1.89) 
Ind  -1.128  -2.018  -0.625 
(-1.10)  (-1.52)  (-1.54) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.077  0.001  -0.078 
(0.52)  (0.01)  (-1.32) 
Age  0.069  0.060  -0.005 
(0.97)  (0.66)  (-0.17) 
Eq  -0.442  -0.494  -0.172 
(-0.97)  (-0.84)  (-0.96) 
N  150  150  150 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1%;  **  significant  at  S%;  *  significant  at  10%, 
234 Table  A.  4.7.  The  summary  of  IPO  valuation  hypothesis  testing 
othesis  H  V  i  bl 
Expected  Evidence 
yp  ar  a  e 
sign  PO  P1 
Hla 
There  is  a  positive  relationship 
BV  BV/  +  ￿  ￿  between  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices  p  P 
and  proforma  book  value  of  equity 
Hlb 
There  is  a  positive  relationship 
E/  BV  +  ￿  ￿  between  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices  p  J 
and  forecasted  earnings 
H2 
The  negative  earnings  dummy  is  D/pBV  + 
￿  ￿ 
positively  related  to  the  IPO 
prices,  while  negative  interactive 
￿  ￿ 
term  is  expected  to  be  negatively  D*JE/pBV  - 
related  to  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H3 
There  is  a  positive  relationship 
between  IPO  offer  (market)  prices  PDIV/pBV  +  k  ýC 
and  proforma  dividend 
H4a 
There  is  a  negative  relationship 
between  firm's  pre  IPO  leverage  Lev  -  k  jC 
and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H4b 
There  is  a  positive  relationship 
between  firm's  pre-IPO  capital  Cap  +  x  x 
availability  risk  and  IPO  offer 
(initial)  prices 
H4c 
There  is  a  negative  relationship 
'  E  - 
￿  ￿ 
s  pre-IPO  efficiency  between  firm  ffr 
risk  and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H4d 
There  is  a  negative  relationship 
'  C  - 
￿  ￿ 
s  pre-IPO  capacity  between  firm  PY 
risk  and  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
235 Hypothesis  Variable 
Expected 
Evidence 
H4e 
There  is  a  negative  relationship 
between  industry  risk  and  IPO  Ind  -  X  ￿ 
offer  (initial)  prices 
H5a 
Sponsor  reputation  is  positively  Spo  +  XC 
related  to  IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H5b 
Firm  age  is  positively  related  to  Age  +  )C 
IPO  offer  (initial)  prices 
H5c 
Percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the 
E  -  x  ￿  IPO  is  negatively  related  to  IPO  q 
offer  (initial)  prices 
H6 
Privatisation  IPOs  are  priced  Priv  -  x  x 
lower  than  private  IPOs 
236 Chapter  5 Chapter  5 
IPO  initial  returns  analysis 
Introduction 
The  previous  chapter  presents  and  discusses  the  results  relating  to  the  IPO 
valuation  analysis.  The  analysis  tries  to  answer  whether  the  prospectus  information  is 
useful  to  price  the  IPOs.  The  prospectus  information  is  categorised  into  three  groups:  the 
fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  the  signals.  The  model  used  in  the  analysis  is 
based  on  the  accounting-based  valuation  model,  which  then  is developed  to  two  empirical 
models:  the  IPO  basic  valuation  model  and  the  full  valuation  model. 
The  evidence  shows  that  the  basic  IPO  valuation  model  works  well  with  both  the 
offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value.  The  basic  model 
was  extended  to  include  other  prospectus  information,  such  as  the  ex-ante  risk  factors, 
signals  and  a  privatisation  dummy  as  control  variable.  The  empirical  results  show  that  two 
ex-ante  risk  factors,  the  efficiency  risk  and  capacity  risk  factors,  appear  to  be  consistent 
with  the  working  hypotheses.  Industry  risk  is  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  initial  market 
price,  although  its  impact  on  the  IPO  offer  price  is  insignificant.  The  results  relating  to  the 
signalling  variables  support  the  findings  from  previous  studies.  However,  only  the 
ownership-retained  variable,  which  is  proxied  by  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO, 
is  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  valuation.  The  results  relating  to  the  control  variable 
(privatisation  dummy)  is  unclear.  The  sign  of  the  Priv  coefficients  is  as  expected,  but  is 
found  to  be  insignificant. 
The  prospectus  information  variables  seem  to  interact  in  a  similar  way  towards  the 
offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  However,  a  number  of  variables  (forecasted 
earnings,  dividends,  capacity  risk,  industry  risk,  and  the  percentage  of  equity  sold)  appear 
to  have  significantly  different  impacts  on  the  IPO  offer  and  initial  market  prices,  which 
may  lead  to  the  well-documented  IPO  underpricing  anomaly. This  chapter  presents  and  discusses  the  empirical  results  relating  to  the  IPO  underpricing 
analysis.  As  explained  in  the  research  design  chapter,  the  short-run  return  or  initial  return 
is  defined  as  the  rate  of  return  received  by  the  `initial'  investors,  by  the  close  of  the  first 
trading  day.  In  the  IPO  literature,  the  initial  return  is  also  identified  as  the  underpricing 
phenomenon.  In  this  study,  both  terms  are  used  interchangeably. 
The  IR  analysis  tries  to  answer  the  second  research  question:  Does  the  prospectus 
information  have  a  predictive  power  towards  the  IPO  performance  in  the  short  run?  The 
analysis  also  examines  whether  there  is  `mispricing'  of  IPOs  which  results  in  a  significant 
positive  initial  return,  as  referred  to  in  the  IPO  literature  as  the  underpricing  anomaly.  An 
empirical  model  has  been  developed  to  undertake  the  IPO  initial  returns  analysis.  The 
model  includes  the  prospectus  information  variables,  the  control  variable  (privatisation 
dummy),  and  the  valuation  residual  as  a  proxy  for  the  unobservable  pricing  variable. 
The  diagram  in  figure  5.1  below  presents  the  main  hypotheses  in  this  empirical 
chapter.  As  discussed  in  the  research  design  chapter,  to  simplify  the  IPO  performance 
models  (the  initial  returns  models  and  the  long  run  performance  models),  the  fundamental 
variables  are  reduced  to  two  variables:  the  proforma  book  to  offer  price  ratio  (pBV/Po),  and 
the  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  (fE/Po).  Moreover,  the  results  of  the  regression 
of  the  IR  and  the  basic  fundamentals,  as  shown  in  table  4.3  (p.  188)  in  the  previous  chapter, 
shows  that  those  proxies  for  the  fundamentals  have  very  low  explanatory  power  to  explain 
the  IR' 
It  has  been  discussed  in  the  research  design  chapter  that  the  pro-forma  book  value 
to  offer  price  and  the  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  are  expected  to  be  positively 
related  to  the  IRs.  The  rationale  for  each  of  the  working  hypotheses  relating  to  IPO 
performance  and  the  relationship  to  each  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  have  been  based  on  the 
theoretical  positive  risk-return  relationship.  Hence,  in  general  a  positive  relationship 
between  each  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  the  IRs  is  expected.  Based  on  IPO  signalling 
Column  3  of  table  4.3  (p.  188)  shows  the  OLS  regression  results  of  IR  and  fundamentals  (/E,  Dummy  and 
Interactive  term  for  negative,  /E,  and  Dividends,  all  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value).  None  of  the  fundamentals 
are  significantly  related  to  the  IRs. 
238 theory,  it  has  been  posited  that  the  signals,  which  are  sponsor  reputation,  and  firm  age  will 
be  negatively  related  to  the  IPO  initial  returns,  while  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the 
IPO  is  positively  related  to  the  IPO  IRs.  In  line  with  previous  studies,  it  is  also 
hypothesised  that  the  privatisation  variable  will  be  positively  related  to  the  IPO  initial 
returns.  Finally,  to  capture  the  impact  of  other  unobservable  factors  in  the  IPO  valuation, 
the  residuals  (Rest)  variable2  is  included  in  the  IR  model.  The  inclusion  of  Resi  into  the  IR 
models  has  a  similar  motivation  to  the  Beaty  et  al's  (2002)  study.  A  negative  relationship 
is  expected  between  the  IPO  initial  return  and  the  residuals.  More  detailed  working 
hypotheses  regarding  the  IR  analysis  has  been  presented  in  the  research  design  chapter 
table  A.  3.2  (appendix) 
2  The  Resi  variable  is  the  standardised  residuals  from  the  IPO  valuation  model  with  the  P//BV  as  the  dependent 
variable. 
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'IT N The  structure  of  this  chapter  is  as  follows.  After  the  introductory  section, 
descriptive  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  the  IR  models  are  presented.  As  the 
descriptive  statistics  of  the  main  predictors  has  been  discussed  in  the  IPO  valuation 
chapter,  the  descriptive  statistics  analysis  in  this  chapter  focuses  on  the  IPO  short  run 
performance  (IRs),  and  the  Resi  variables.  This  is followed  by  discussions  of  the  results  of 
the  fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  the  signals,  the  control  variables,  and  the 
residuals.  Finally,  a  brief  summary  of  the  chapter  is  presented. 
5.1  Data 
The  data  used  in  the  IR  models  is  from  the  sample  of  161  IPOs  used  in  the 
valuation  analysis.  Similar  to  the  valuation  analysis,  the  IR  analysis  also  employs  data 
from  the  IPO  prospectus.  Moreover,  the  prospectus  information  is  also  classified  into  the 
similar  groups  (fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals).  However,  as  it  is 
explained  in  the  research  design  chapter,  different  proxies  are  used  for  the  fundamentals3. 
Additionally,  the  IR  models  include  the  standardised  residuals  from  the  valuation  model  as 
a  proxy  for  the  unobservable  factors  on  the  pricing. 
Table  5.1  below  contains  the  descriptive  statistics  of  IPO  IRs,  pBY/P0  and  fE/Po  as 
proxies  for  fundamentals,  and  the  residuals  (Resi).  The  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  signals 
data  is  not  presented  in  table  5.1,  as  the  same  figures  from  table  4.1  in  previous  chapter  are 
used. 
5.1.1.  IPO  initial  returns 
As  mentioned  above,  the  initial  returns  are  the  returns  for  the  initial  investors  on 
the  closing  of  the  first  trading  day.  Table  5.1  shows  that  IR  has  a  mean  (median)  positive 
value  of  0.089  (0.067),  and  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  99%  levels  of 
3  In  the  IPO  valuation  model,  five  proxies  for  fundamentals  (proforma  book  value  of  equity,  forecasted 
earnings,  negative  earnings  dummy,  the  interactive  term  of  negative  earnings  dummy,  and  proforma  dividends) 
are  employed.  To  simplify,  fewer  and  different  proxies  for  fundamentals  (proforma  book  value  to  offer  price, 
and  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price)  are  used  in  the  IPO  IR  analysis. 
241 confidence,  indicating  the  existence  of  underpricing  in  the  research  sample.  It  implies  that 
on  average,  investors,  who  buy  the  IPOs  at  the  offer  prices  and  sell  them  at  the  closing 
prices  of  the  first  trading  day,  are  better  off  by  8.9%  from  their  investments. 
Table  5.1.  Descriptive  statistics  for  initial  return  analysis 
The  table  contains  descriptive  statistics  for  IPO  sample  of  variables  in  the  IPO  performance  analysis.  IR  to  IPO 
initial  returns,  which  is  measured  by  the  percentage  of  the  difference  of  the  closing  price  on  day  I  and  the  offer 
price  to  the  offer  price  [(Pi-P0)/Po,  pBV/Po  to  proforma  book  value  to  offer  price,  JE/P,  to  forecasted  EPS  to 
offer  price,  and  Resi  to  standardised  residuals  from  the  IPO  valuation  model  with  PdBV  as  the  dependent 
variable. 
Variable  N  Mean  Median  StDev  Min  Max 
IR  161  0.095***  0.068  0.110  -0.171  0.700 
pBV/Po  161  0.454  0.366  0.281  0.108  1.165 
fE/Po  161  0.064  0.075  0.046  -0.120  0.149 
Resi  161  0.003  -0.182  1.022  -2.413  3.843 
Note:  ***significant  at  1% 
Most  of  the  IPOs  (155  IPOs)  in  the  research  sample  are  underpriced,  18  IPOs  are 
overpriced,  and  6  IPOs  are  accurately  priced.  The  maximum  IR  is  53.1  %  (Virtuality  Group 
plc)  and  the  minimum  is  -18.7%  (Betacom  p1c). 
Levis  (2001)  documents  a  higher  average  first  day  return  of  60.1%  for  the  LSE  in 
2001.  These  figures  include  all  IPOs  for  all  three  UK  markets.  However,  the  figure  is 
much  lower  for  the  main  market,  which  records  an  average  of  5.9%  for  the  first  day  return. 
Since  the  research  sample  is drawn  from  IPOs  on  the  UK  main  market,  it  appears  that  the 
research  sample  has  a  higher  average  initial  return  than  the  recent  figures  documented  by 
Levis  (2001). 
The  research  sample  of  this  study  includes  10  privatisations.  Prior  studies 
conclude  that  PIPOs  are  priced  differently,  which  results  in  the  higher  IRs  of  PIPOs  than 
the  private  IPOs.  Table  5.2  below  presents  the  comparison  of  IPO  IR  of  the  non- 
privatisation  and  privatisation  sub-samples.  The  privatisation  sub-sample  shows  that  PIPO 
prices  closed  at  an  average  of  13.7%  higher  than  the  offer  price  on  the  first  trading  day. 
The  non-privatisation  IPOs  shows  that  they  are  less  underpriced.  Further  statistical 
242 analysis  reveals  that  the  initial  returns  (IRs)  of  PIPOs  are  significantly  different  to  the 
initial  returns  (IRs)  of  non-privatisation  IPOs  at  the  99%  level  of  confidence4. 
It  is  also  known  that  over  the  next  3  years  after  the  admission,  17  IPOs  of  the 
research  sample  have  not  survived  to  their  3`d  anniversary'.  Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to 
examine  further  the  comparison  of  the  performance  between  the  survivors  and  non- 
survivor  IPOs. 
Table  5.2  The  descriptive  statistics  of  IRs  across  the  research  sub-samples 
The  table  contains  the  JPO  initial  returns  of  privatisation,  non-privatisation,  survivors,  and  non-survivors  sub- 
samples. 
IPO  sub-sample  N  Mean  Median  StDev  Min  Max 
Privatisation  10  0.137***  0.147  0.094  -0.025  0.302 
Non-privatisation  151  0.080***  0.064  0.087  -0.187  0.351 
Survivors  144  0.086***  0.069  0.089  -0.187  0.351 
Non-survivors  17  0.058**  0.064  0.084  -0.082  0.307 
Note:  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1% 
Table  5.2  above  also  includes  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  IRs  of  the  survivors 
and  non-survivors  sub-samples.  Like  other  IPOs,  the  non-survivors  shows  a  significant 
positive  initial  returns,  suggesting  that  the  non-survivors  are  also  underpriced  on  the  first 
day  although  they  are  less  underpriced  than  their  counterparts  (survivor  IPOs).  However, 
the  difference  of  IR  means  between  the  two  groups  appears  to  be  insignificant  statistically. 
IPO  studies  have  also  documented  the  third  anomaly  called  the  hot  market.  During 
the  research  period,  there  is  a  sub-period  when  the  UK  economy,  in 
-general, 
was  in 
recession  (early  1990s).  Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  see  the  IPO  performance  during 
different  economic  states.  Table  5.3  below  presents  the  distribution  of  average  initial 
returns  (IR)  for  the  research  sample  by  year  when  the  IPOs  took  place.  The  maximum 
average  IR  per  year  is  20.1%  in  1987,  and  the  lowest  is  2.5%  in  1992.  All  years  show  that 
IRs  take  positive  values  significantly  different  to  zero,  except  for  IRs  in  1990.  Although 
the  IR  distribution  over  the  years,  as  demonstrated  in  figure  5.2  (see  Appendix  A.  5.1.  ), 
°  The  hypothesis  testing  of  the  mean  difference  between  two  populations  is  undertaken.  The  t-test  results  in  a 
rejection  of  the  hypothesis  of  equal  means  of  IRs  between  the  PIPOs  and  the  non-PIPO  at  1%  level. 
S  More  detailed  information  regarding  the  17  non-survivor  IPOs  in  the  research  sample  will  be  explained  in  the 
IPO  long-run  performance  chapter. 
243 does  not  show  any  clear  pattern  throughout  the  research  period6,  it  could  be  inferred  that 
during  the  recession  phase  (early  1990s),  few  firms  went  public  (cold  market)  and  the 
market  demand  also  appears  to  have  been  low,  which  is  shown  in  the  low  IRs.  Then,  the 
market  peaked  again  on  the  mid  1990s  up  to  the  Internet  bubble  era.  The  distribution 
shows  that  an  increasing  number  of  firms  went  public  and  so  did  the  market  demand, 
which  is  shown  in  the  increasing  IRs. 
Table  5.3  The  IR  of  all  sample  by  year 
The  table  consists  of  the  average  of  initial  returns  (IR)  of  the  research  sample  by  year  when  the  IPO  took  place. 
Year  No.  of  IPO  sample  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
1987  7  0.201***  0.229  0.124 
1988  13  0.048**  0.046  0.087 
1989  6  0.128**  0.153  0.107 
1990  2  0.040  0.040  0.161 
1991  6  0.098**  0.071  0.095 
1992  10  0.025**  0.039  0.078 
1993  17  0.111***  0.093  0.164 
1994  31  0.085***  0.063  0.083 
1995  19  0.109***  0.096  0.097 
1996  29  0.112***  0.078  0.117 
1997  21  0.072***  0.066  0.094 
Note:  **  significant  at  5%;  ***significant  at  1% 
5.1.2.  Fundamental  and  Residual  Analyses 
As  many  studies  using  return  models  employ  a  number  of  fundamental  accounting 
ratios,  such  as  the  book  to  market  ratio,  this  study  also  uses  proforma  book  value  of  equity 
to  the  offer  price  (pBY/Po)  ratio  and  forecasted  EPS  to  the  offer  price  (JE/Po)  ratio. 
Additionally,  the  standardised  residuals  from  the  valuation  model  are  included  as  a 
predictor  in  the  performance  models  as  a  proxy  for  the  ex-ante  unobservable  factors. 
The  descriptive  statistics  shown  in  table  5.1  above  demonstrates  that  the  pro-forma 
book  to  market  ratio  of  the  sample  has  a  mean  (a  median)  of  0.454  (0.366),  which  means 
6  The  research  sample  shows  a  correlation  coefficient  of  0.002  between  the  number  of  IPOs  and  the  IRs,  which 
is  statistically  insignificant. 
244 that  on  average,  the  IPOs  were  offered  at  more  than  twice  their  net  book  value  of  equity 
per  share,  suggesting  that  the  expectations  regarding  the  future  possible  earnings  plays  an 
important  role  in  IPO  pricing  as  well  as  the  net  asset  of  the  firm.  However,  the  numbers 
are  higher  than  the  ones  in  the  US  market',  implying  that  the  US  IPO  pricing  depends  even 
more  on  the  expected  future  earnings. 
Fama  and  French  (1995)  argue  that  the  book  to  market  ratio  contains  the 
information  of  the  shares  riskiness.  Moreover,  they  argue  that  the  firms  with  high  book  to 
market  ratios  tend  to  be  persistently  distressed.  Conversely,  firms  with  low  book  to  market 
ratios  are  associated  with  sustained  strong  profitability.  Therefore,  the  implication  of  such 
information  to  the  IPO  initial  investors  is  that  IPOs  with  the  higher  pBV/P0  are  riskier; 
therefore  greater  IRs  are  expected  to  compensate  for  the  additional  risk.  On  the  other  hand, 
IPOs  with  lower  pBV/Po  are  less  risky,  hence  lower  IRs  are  expected.  To  examine  that 
relationship,  the  research  sample  is divided  into  the  low  and  high  pro-forma  book  value  to 
offer  price  groups  based  on  the  median.  Then  the  average  of  initial  returns  of  each  group  is 
examined.  Table  5.4  below  presents  the  comparison  of  IPO  initial  returns  between  the  pro- 
forma  book  value  to  offer  price  groups. 
Table  5.4.  The  IPO  performances  of  Fundamentals  groups 
The  table  contains  the  IPO  IRs  of  the  low  and  high  pBV/P0  groups 
Fundamentals  IR 
pBV/Po  Low  0.0974*** 
High  0.0695*** 
Note:  ***  significant  at  1% 
Surprisingly,  the  result  shows  the  opposite.  The  low  pBY/Po  group  demonstrates  a 
significant  higher  average  initial  return  (IR).  Further  examination  shows  that  the  IRs  of  the 
IPOs  with  pBY/Po  is  statistically  different  to  the  IRs  of  the  IPOs  with  high  pBV/P  8.  The 
result  implies  that  IPOs  that  are  offered  at  the  higher  price  relatively  to  the  book  value 
7  Using  US  data  for  1980-1991  period,  Klein  (1996)  finds  the  mean  (median)  of  pro-forma  book  value  to  offer 
price  is  0.3241  (0.2967). 
The  hypothesis  testing  of  mean  difference  between  two  populations  is  undertaken.  The  t-test  results  in  a 
rejection  of  hypothesis  of  the  equal  means  of  IRs  between  the  low  pBV/Po  IPOs  and  high  pBV/Po  IPOs  at  the 
5%  level. 
245 (lower  pBV/Po)  are  priced  higher  in  the  market,  which  results  in  greater  IRs.  On  the  other 
hand,  IPOs  that  are  seemingly  `underpriced'  relatively  to  the  book  value  (higher  pBV/Po) 
are  valued  lower  in  the  market,  which  results  in  lower  subsequent  IRs.  This  suggests 
market  momentum. 
Referring  to  the  Fama  and  French's  proposition  regarding  the  information  content 
of  the  book-to-market  ratio,  the  result  shows  that  the  market  favours  the  low  pBV/P0  IPOs 
(less  risky  IPOs)  than  the  high  pBV/Po  IPOs  (riskier  IPOs),  so  that  it  pushes  the  demand 
for  low  pBV/Po  IPOs  up,  which  results  in  higher  price  and  higher  IRs.  Therefore,  it  could 
be  inferred  that  in  the  short-run  the  initial  demand  for  the  IPOs  drives  the  IRs  more  than 
the  risk-return  relationship. 
Another  fundamental  used  in  the  IR  models  is  the  forecasted  earnings  to  price 
ratio.  Similar  to  the  book  to  market  ratio,  prior  studies  (e.  g.,  Fama  and  French,  1988)  show 
that  the  earnings/price  ratio  captures  information  about  stocks  risk  and  has  the  ability  to 
predict  stocks  returns.  Table  5.1  above  exhibits  that  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio 
of  the  sample  has  a  mean  (a  median)  of  0.064  (0.075). 
The  standardised  residual  of  the  IPO  valuation  model  (Resi)  has  an  average  value 
of  0.003.  By  construction,  the  mean  of  Resi  is  expected  to  be  zero;  further  examination 
confirms  that  the  mean  value  is  not  statistically  different  to  zero.  However,  the  negative 
value  of  the  median  is  significantly  different  to  zero  at  the  90%  level  of  confidence.  It  also 
shows  that  Resi  is  not  normally  distributed. 
5.2.  Univariate  analysis 
Table  5.5  below  exhibits  the  correlation  coefficients  between  each  of  the  research 
variables  in  the  IR  models.  This  section  analyses  on  a  one-to-one  basis  the  relationship 
between  the  predictors  and  the  IPO  short  run  performance  (IRs)  that  are  statistically 
significant. 
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N Overall,  it  could  be  said  that  the  correlation  matrix  shows  that  generally,  na- 
multicollinearity  problem  exist  among  the  research  variables,  except  a  high  correlation 
between  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  and  the  privatisation  dummy. 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  the  working  hypothesis  posits  a  positive 
association  between  the  pBVIPO  and  the  IRs.  However,  the  correlation  matrix  (table  5.5) 
shows  that  pBY/Po  is  negatively  and  significantly  related  to  the  IRs.  This  implies  that  the 
IPOs,  which  were  valued  higher  relatively  to  this  fundamental  at  the  admission,  are  valued 
higher  on  the  first  trading  day,  suggesting  the  investors'  over  optimism  on  the  earning 
potential  of  the  `hot'  IPOs. 
The  other  fundamental  variable  is  the  earning-price  ratio,  which  is  proxied  by  the 
forecasted  EPS  to  offer  price  (fE/Po).  Prior  research  suggests  that  such  a  variable  contains 
information  regarding  the  shares  risk.  Therefore,  a  positive  association  between  the  fE/P0 
and  the  IPO  returns  is  expected.  Table  5.5  exhibits  a  negative  correlation  between  fE/Po 
and  IRs,  although  statistically  insignificant. 
In  the  research  design  chapter  (chapter  3),  it  is  argued  that  the  hypotheses  of  the 
ex-ante  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  performance  are  developed  on  the  general  risk-return 
relationship.  Therefore,  this  study  posits  positive  relationships  between  the  ex-ante  risk 
factors  and  the  IPO  short-run  and  long  run  returns.  However  the  correlation  matrix  shows 
all  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  to  be  negatively  related  to  the  IRs,  implying  that  riskier  IPOs 
are  less  underpriced.  Nonetheless,  only  2  out  of  5  ex-ante  risk  factors  (Capacity  risk  and 
Industry  risk  factors)  are  significantly  related  to  the  IRs.  All  signal  variables  in  the  model 
(Spo,  Age,  and  Eq)  turn  out  to  be  insignificantly  related  to  the  IRs. 
Many  studies  document  evidence  of  underpricing  of  privatisation  IPOs  (PIPOs). 
Prior  sections  demonstrate  that  the  PIPOs  in  the  research  sample  are  more  underpriced 
than  the  rest  of  the  sample.  The  univariate  analysis,  here,  shows  that  the  dummy  for 
privatisation  (Priv)  is  positively  related  to  the  IR,  confirming  that  PIPOs  are  more 
underpriced  than  ordinary  IPOs.  Moreover,  the  descriptive  statistics  analysis  also 
248 demonstrates  that  in  the  long  run,  PIPOs  perform  significantly  different  to  their  private 
IPO  counterparts. 
It  is  argued  in  the  research  design  chapter  that  the  inclusion  of  the  standardized 
residuals  (Res)  into  the  performance  model  is  to  capture  the  unobservable  factors 
affecting  the  IPO  pricing.  Theoretically,  the  greater  Rest  means  the  IPOs  are  more 
overpriced  relatively  to  the  fundamentals,  hence  lower  IRs  are  anticipated.  Thus,  Resi  is 
expected  to  be  negatively  related  to  the  IRs,  assuming  that  the  market  does  not  misprice 
the  IPOs  on  the  first  trading  day.  However,  the  correlation  coefficient  between  the  IRs  and 
Resi  turns  out  to  be  positive  and  statistically  significant,  suggesting  that  the  IPOs  with 
greater  residuals,  meaning  those  that  are  more  overpriced  relatively  to  the  fundamentals, 
are  valued  higher  on  day  1.  This  corroborates  with  the  pBV/P0  univariate  analysis, 
suggesting  market  momentum  on  the  first  trading  day.  This  is  in  line  with  Beatty  et  al.. 
(2002),  who  find  that  the  offer  price  residuals  are  positively  related  to  the  standard 
deviation  of  the  IPO  returns  for  the  first  5  days  as  a  measure  of  the  IPO  risk.  They  also 
find  that  the  IPO  risk  is  positively  related  to  the  offer  price,  which  result  in  higher  IRs. 
Hence,  they  conclude  that  `hot'  IPOs  appear  to  be  priced  higher  on  the  first  day  and 
generate  greater  IRs. 
In  sum,  the  univariate  analysis  suggests  that  the  IPO  short-run  performance  is 
affected  by  the  investors'  over  optimism.  The  analysis  also  indicates  that  only  some  of  the 
ex-ante  risk  factors  (Cpy,  Ind)  appear  to  be  correlated  to  the  IPO  IRs,  but  none  of  the 
signals  are  individually  related  to  IRs.  It  also  confirms  the  evidence  of  the  PIPOs 
underpricing. 
5.3.  The  IPO  initial  returns  analysis 
Table  5.6  below  demonstrates  the  results  of  the  IPO  initial  return  model  for  the 
full  IPO  sample.  The  results  of  the  IPO  valuation  models  in  the  previous  chapter 
demonstrate  that  the  behaviour  of  each  predictor  is  similar  for  both  Po/pBV  and  Pl/pBV.  It 
249 is,  therefore,  unsurprising  that  those  predictors  do  not  help  much  in  explaining  the  IRs. 
However,  there  are  a  number  of  interesting  findings  in  the  results  of  the  IR  models. 
Table  5.6  presents  the  OLS  regression  results  of  three  IR  models.  The  first  model 
includes  the  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals.  It  is  then  extended  by 
including  a  dummy  for  PIPOs  into  the  second  model.  Finally,  the  third  model  includes  all 
variables  in  the  second  model  and  the  standardised  residual  variable  (Resi). 
The  presentation  of  the  analysis  is  split  into  to  the  separate  predictor  variable 
groups.  The  next  sub-section  analyses  the  result  of  IR  models  on  the  fundamentals, 
followed  by  the  analysis  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  signals,  privatisation,  standardised 
residuals,  and  finally,  the  model  as  a  whole.  A  number  of  sensitivity  analyses  to  the  result 
of  the  IR  model  are  also  presented  at  the  end  of  this  section. 
5.3.1.  Fundamental  analysis 
The  constant  coefficients  of  all  the  IPO  initial  return  models  are  positive  and 
significant.  This,  again,  confirms  the  underpricing  anomaly  of  the  research  sample  as  an 
addition  to  the  evidence  demonstrated  in  the  descriptive  statistics  of  IR.  The  IR  model 
result  shows  the  persistence  of  the  underpricing  of  the  research  sample  after  adjusting  and 
controlling  for  other  variables. 
One  conclusion  of  the  IPO  valuation  analysis  is  that  although  the  fundamental 
variables  are  priced  similarly  on  the  IPO  offer  and  initial  prices,  it  is  found  that  there  are 
significant  impacts  of  pro-forma  book  value  and  forecasted  earnings  on  the  price 
differences  between  day  1  and  day  0,  scaled  by  pro-forma  book  value  [(P1-  P0) 
pBV 
Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  both  fundamental  variables  could  explain  the  variations  in  the 
IRs.  The  working  hypothesis  posits  a  positive  coefficient  ofpBV/P0. 
250 Table  5.6  Regression  analysis  on  the  IPO  initial  return  model 
The  table  contains  output  from OLS  regression  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  initial  return  (IR)  on  pro  forma  book 
value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBVIP0),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by  the  offer  price  ((E/Po),  leverage  risk 
(Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor 
reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  privatisation  dummy (Priv),  and 
standardised  residual  from  the  valuation  model  (Resi).  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in 
brackets. 
Variables  Model  I  Model  II  Model  iII 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  0.329***  0.350***  0.356*** 
(3.62)  (3.49)  (3.65) 
pBV/Po  -0.054*  -0.071**  -0.056 
(-1.93)  (-2.41)  (-1.63) 
n/po  0.09  0.041  0.115 
(0.06)  (0.26)  (0.72) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.012  -0.009  -0.004 
(-0.75)  (-0.64)  (-0.25) 
Cap  0.011  0.007  0.012 
(0.73)  (0.47)  (0.71) 
Effr  -0.010  -0.011  -0.016 
(-0.34)  (-0.35)  (-0.48) 
Cpy  -0.44*  -0.031  -0.031 
(-1.91)  (-1.38)  (-1.08) 
Ind  -0.239**  -0.232**  -0.370** 
(-2.58)  (-2.25)  (-2.42) 
Signals: 
Spo  -0.013  -0.016  -0.011 
(-0.79)  (-1.03)  (-0.60) 
Age  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
(-0.57)  (-0.42)  (-0.38) 
Eq  0.048  -0.014  -0.036 
(1.16)  (-0.29)  (-0.57) 
Priv  -  0.091**  0.084** 
(2.07)  (2.01) 
Resi  -  -  0.015** 
(2.18) 
N  161  161  161 
Adj.  R-sq  0.044  0.065  0.088 
Wald  regression  26.43***  41.38***  49.85*** 
Wald  fundamental  3.30  5.32*  2.74 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  15.40***  9.91*  10.18* 
Wald  signals  2.20  1.65  1.72 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1% 
251 It  has  been  explained  in  the  research  design  that  the  higher  pBV/Po  implies  that  the 
IPOs  are  more  underpriced  relatively  to  the  fundamentals;  therefore  a  greater  IR  is 
expected.  Additionally,  Fama  and  French  (1995)  argue  that  the  book-to-market  ratio 
contains  information  regarding  the  shares  riskiness.  Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986)  also  conclude 
that  the  greater  uncertainty,  the  greater  the  degree  of  IPO  underpricing.  Based  on  those 
arguments,  the  working  hypothesis  posits  a  positive  relationship  between  the  pBV/Po  and 
. 
the  IPO  IRs.  However,  the  evidence  in  table  5.6  demonstrates  that  the  impact  of  the 
pBY/P0  on  IR  is  negative.  The  result  means  that  IPOs  with  higher  pBV/Po  result  in  greater 
IRs.  While  the  result  corroborates  the  univariate  analysis,  it  rejects  the  working  hypothesis 
(H7a).  As  suggested  in  the  univariate  analysis,  s  the  explanation  for  this  appears  to  be 
down  to  the  investors'  optimism  on  such  `hot'  IPOs. 
As  argued  by  Fama  and  French  (1995),  high  book-to-market  ratios  are  typical  of 
firms  that  are  relatively  distressed,  that  signals  sustained  low  earnings  on  book  equity. 
Conversely,  low  book-to-market  is  typical  of  firms  with  high  average  returns  on  capital. 
Therefore,  the  result  implies  that  IPOs  with  low  book-to-market  (signalling  potential  high 
growth)  are  valued  higher  in  the  market  as  a  reflection  of  the  investors'  optimism  on  the 
potential  earnings  growth  of  the  firms. 
The  impact  of  pBY/Po  on  the  IRs  is  significant  in  model  I  and  II,  yet,  it  loses  its 
significance  when  Resi  is  introduced  in  model  III.  Although  the  correlation  coefficient 
between  pBV/Po  and  Resi  is  significant,  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  suggests  a  weak 
correlation  (-0.269).  Therefore,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  there  is  no  multicollinearity 
problem. 
The  working  hypothesis  expects  that  the  earnings  forecast  is  positively  related  to 
the  returns  as  the  earnings  forecast  is  usually  used  as  a  signal  to  the  firm's  value,  as 
demonstrated  in  the  IPO  valuation  chapter.  Moreover,  the  IPO  valuation  analysis  also 
concludes  that  the  impact  of  forecasted  earning  is  significant  on  the  IPO  pricing 
differences  [(P1-  PO) 
pBV 
252 The  result  in  table  5.6  above  shows  a  positive  association,  although  the  impact 
appears  to  be  insignificant  in  all  IR  models.  Using  the  USM  data,  Keasey  and  McGuiness 
(1991)  find  that  the  disclosure  of  the  forecasted  earnings  in  the  prospectus  reduces  the 
information  asymmetry,  which  in  turn  results  in  the  lower  IRs.  However,  the  proxy  for  the 
forecasted  earnings  applied  in  their  study  is  different  to  that  adopted  in  this  study.  They 
employ  a  dummy  variable  for  the  forecasted  earnings.  The  dummy  takes  a  value  of  1  when 
the  forecasted  earnings  is  disclosed  in  the  offering  prospectus.  Other  IPO  studies 
examining  the  prospectus  forecasted  earnings  tend  to  focus  on  the  association  between  the 
accuracy  of  the  earning  forecasts  (the  forecast  error)  and  the  underpricing  (e.  g.  Firth,  1998, 
How  and  Yeo,  2000).  This  study  examines  a  direct  impact  of  the  earnings  forecast  on  the 
IPO  initial  returns  based  on  the  information  available  to  the  market  at  the  admission. 
Moreover,  it  does  not  only  analyse  whether  the  voluntary  disclosure  of  the  earnings 
forecast  in  the  prospectus  has  a  different  impact  on  the  IPO  initial  returns,  but  also 
provides  more  information  on  the  explicit  association  between  the  earnings  forecasts  and 
the  IPO  initial  returns. 
In  sum,  the  impact  of  the  fundamentals  on  the  IPO  initial  returns  is  not  as  robust 
as  it  is  on  the  IPO  valuation.  The  proforma  book  value  of  equity  to  offer  price  ratio  is 
negatively  related  to  the  IRs,  suggesting  market  momentum.  The  impact  of  earnings 
forecast  to  offer  price  on  the  IRs  appears  to  be  insignificant.  Moreover,  the  Wald  statistics 
in  table  5.6  demonstrates  that  the  joint  restriction  of  the  fundamentals  as  a  group  is  mixed. 
The  fundamental  group  only  has  significant  impact  on  IRs  in  model  II,  when  the 
privatisation  dummy  is  included  in  the  model.  However,  the  impact  loses  significance 
once  the  model  includes  the  valuation  residuals. 
5.3.2.  Ex-ante  risk  factors  analysis 
As  explained  in  the  research  design  chapter,  the  general  hypothesis  regarding  the 
relationship  between  the  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  return  is  in  line  with  the  traditional  risk- 
253 return  relationship,  which  posits  a  positive  association.  However,  it  is  noted  here;  since  the 
IR  is  the  one-day  return,  the  expected  risk-returns  relationship  in  the  short-run  may  not  be 
as  strong  as  expected  in  the  long-run  window  of  returns. 
Row  4  to  8  of  table  5.6  above  indicate  the  estimated  coefficients  on  the  ex-ante 
risk  factors  in  relation  to  the  IR.  As  shown  in  the  univariate  analysis,  each  ex-ante  risk 
factor  appears  to  be  negatively  correlated  to  the  IR,  which  is  contrary  to  the  testable 
hypotheses.  After  controlling  for  other  variables  (fundamentals,  signals,  privatisation,  and 
residuals),  these  associations  remain  unchanged.  For  example,  the  results  of  all  IR  models 
(model  I,  II,  and  III)  show  that  the  leverage  risk  factor  (Lev)  is  negatively  related  to  IR, 
implying  that  IPOs  with  higher  leverage  tend  to  have  lower  returns  on  day  1.  This  appears 
to  be  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis  (H8a).  However,  it  is  in  line  with  the  results  of 
Hedge  and  Miller  (1996),  which  examine  the  signalling  role  of  debt  in  IPO  pricing  and 
find  a  negative  association  between  the  debt  ratio  and  the  degree  of  underpricing. 
However,  the  coefficients  are  insignificant. 
The  second  risk  factor  examined  is  the  capital  availability  (Cap).  The  result 
shows  positive  coefficients  of  Cap  in  all  the  IR  models,  implying  that  the  more  internal 
capital  is  available  to  the  firms,  the  less  risky  the  IPOs,  and  the  higher  the  initial  returns. 
This  is  contrary  to  the  working  hypothesis  (H8b)  regarding  the  Cap-IR  relationship.  It 
could  be  argued  that  there  is  a  higher  demand  for  the  IPOs  with  greater  capital  availability, 
which  results  in  higher  IRs.  However,  the  results  are  statistically  insignificant  across  the 
IR  models. 
The  efficiency  risk  (Effr)  appears  to  be  negatively  related  to'IR,  suggesting  that  the 
IPO  firms  with  lower  operating  efficiency  tend  to  have  lower  IR.  In  other  words,  the  less 
efficient  the  firm's  operating  system,  the  riskier  the  firm,  the  lower  the  IR.  This  result 
rejects  the  general  hypothesis  of  a  risk-return  relationship,  which  in  turn  also  does  not 
support  the  working  hypothesis  (H8c).  Yet,  it  shows  the  investors'  favour  towards  less 
risky  IPOs.  However,  the  impact  appears  to  be  statistically  insignificant. 
254 Capacity  risk  (Cpy)  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  investment  proposed  in  the 
prospectus  over  the  net  IPO  proceeds.  It  is  hypothesised  that  IPOs,  which  disclose  in  the 
prospectus  that  the  usage  of  the  net  proceeds  is  mainly  for  investment  activities,  are 
considered  as  riskier  IPOs.  Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  such  IPOs  produce  higher  returns, 
in  the  short  run  and  the  long  run.  However,  the  evidence  in  the  IR  models  shows  that  Cpy 
is  negatively  related  to  IR,  implying  that  the  more  proceeds  are  used  for  the  investment 
activities,  the  riskier  the  IPOs,  the  lower  the  IR  on  day  1.  The  result  appears  to  be 
inconsistent  to  the  working  hypothesis  (H8d).  However,  after  controlling  for  privatisations 
(model  II)  and  the  valuation  residual  (model  III),  Cpy  loses  its  significance.  The 
correlation  matrix  (table  5.6)  demonstrates  a  low  but  significant  correlation  between  Cpy 
and  Priv.  Thus,  the  impact  of  Cpy  on  IR  becomes  weaker,  once  privatisations  are  taken 
into  consideration. 
Another  risk  factor  that  appears  to  have  a  significant  relationship  to  IR, 
consistently  throughout  all  IR  models,  is  the  Industry  risk  (Ind).  The  Ind  is  measured  by 
industry  Beta  in  the  quarter  when  firms  go  public.  Higher  beta  reflects  higher  industry  risk. 
The  working  hypothesis  (H8e)  regarding  the  Ind  IR  relationship  posits  a  positive 
association.  Table  5.6  above  presents  negative  coefficients  of  Ind  for  all  models.  This 
result  implies  that  IPOs  from  riskier  industries  tend  to  have  lower  initial  returns.  Hence,  it 
does  not  support  the  working  hypothesis,  yet  it  confirms  the  higher  market  short  run 
demands  for  the  IPOs  in  the  less-risky  industry. 
In  sum,  the  empirical  results  on  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  impact  on  IRs  appear  to  be 
contrary  to  the  general  hypothesis  of  a  risk-return  relationship.  Despite  the  general  lack  of 
statistical  significance,  the  results  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  suggest  a  negative 
relationship  between  IPO  riskiness  and  the  IRs.  This  suggests  that  in  the  short  run, 
investors  favour  the  less  risky  IPOs,  which  pushes  up  the  market  price,  and  thus  results  in 
higher  IRs  for  the  less  risky  IPOs.  This  suggestion  is  consistent  with  the  fundamentals-IR 
association  that  has  been  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  However,  regarding  the 
statistical  matter,  only  industry  risk  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  IRs,  while  the  impact  of 
255 capacity  risk  vanishes  when  the  model  is  adjusted  by  the  privatisation  dummy  and  the 
valuation  residuals. 
Despite  mixed  results  regarding  the  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  the  IRs, 
the  Wald  statistics  (see  table  5.6)  shows  that  the  joint  restriction  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors 
group  is  consistently  significant  across  the  IR  models.  This  implies  that  as  a  group,  they 
are  significantly  related  to  the  IRs. 
5.3.3  Signalling  analysis 
The  relationships  between  the  signals  examined  in  this  study  and  IPO  initial 
returns  have  been  discussed  widely  in  the  prior  IPO  literature.  In  general,  3  working 
hypotheses  regarding  the  signals  IR  relationship  are  based  on  expected  positive 
associations.  The  evidence  presented  in  table  5.6  above  shows  that  the  results  are  in  line 
with  the  hypotheses  as  well  as  previous  findings.  However,  unexpectedly,  none  of  the 
signals  appear  to  be  statistically  significant. 
The  sponsor  reputation  (Spo)  coefficients  are  negative,  which  implies  that  IPOs 
sponsored  by  prestigious  investment  bankers  appear  to  have  lower  returns.  The  result 
corroborates  the  working  hypothesis  (H9a),  which  sustain  that  prestigious  investment 
bankers  price  the  IPOs  more  accurately  than  less  prestigious  bankers.  It  also  suggests  that 
prestigious  investment  bankers  choose  to  sponsor  the  less  risky  firms,  which  results  in 
lower  IR  (or  less  underpricing).  This  means  that  less  prestigious  investment  bankers  are 
left  with  the  riskier  IPOs,  which  in  turn  results  in  higher  IR  (or  more  underpricing) 
(Johnson  and  Miller  (1988),  Carter  and  Manaster  (1990)).  Compared  to  prior  UK  studies, 
the  result  does  not  confirm  the  findings  by  Byrne  and  Rees  (1994)  who  find  a  significant 
relationship  between  the  sponsor  reputation  and  the  IPO  initial  returns;  however  it  is  in 
line  with  results  in  Keasey  and  McGuiness  (1992)  and  Keasey  and  Short  (1992).  Using 
WO  data  from  the  USM,  they  find  an  insignificant  impact  of  sponsor  reputation  on  the  IRs.. 
Moreover,  the  result,  here,  fails  to  corroborate  with  the  recent  paper  by  Logue  et  al.  (2002) 
based  on  the  US  market. 
256 The  testable  hypothesis  regarding  the  Age-IR  relationship  posits  that  older  firms 
are  expected  to  have  lower  IR.  The  evidence  seems  to  support  the  testable  hypothesis 
(H9b).  The  negative  Age  coefficient  implies  that  the  more  experienced  IPO  firms  tend  to 
have  lower  IR.  This  confirms  the  results  from  a  previous  study  by  Ritter  (1984)  that  also 
finds  a  negative  relationship  between  firm  age  and  the  level  of  underpricing.  However,  this 
study  finds  that  the  relationship  is  statistically  insignificant.  It  is  in  line  with  the  findings 
from  previous  UK  studies  (e.  g.,  Keasey  and  Short,  1992)  that  find  no  evidence  of  an  Age- 
IR  association.  The  ownership  variable  is  the  most  popular  signalling  variable  used  in 
IPO  studies  to  explain  the  abnormal  return  in  the  short-run  and  long  run.  The  IPO 
signalling  hypothesis  (Welch,  1989)  shows  strong  support  for  a  positive  association 
between  ownership  retention  and  IPO  valuation,  and  a  negative  relationship  between  the 
ownership  retention  and  the  IPO  abnormal  short-run  performance.  However,  prior 
evidence  demonstrates  mixed  results  (e.  g.,  Jegadeesh  et  al.,  1993).  In  the  IPO  valuation 
analysis,  this  study  finds  support  for  the  IPO  signaling  theory.  As  explained  in  the 
Research  design  chapter,  this  study  uses  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPOs  as  a 
proxy  to  the  ownership.  Therefore,  a  positive  relationship  between  the  percentage  of 
equity  sold  at  the  IPO  dates  and  IR  is  expected.  However,  table  5.6  demonstrates  mixed 
results,  although  none  of  the  Eq  coefficients  are  statistically  significant.  In  model  I, 
without  controlling  for  privatisation  and  valuation  residuals,  the  Eq  coefficient  turns  out 
positive.  The  suggestion,  here,  is  that,  the  higher  percentage  of  the  enlarged  share  capital 
that  is  sold  at  the  admission  means  the  less  confidence  old  shareholders  of  the  firm  have  in 
its  future  value,  which  results  in  more  underpricing  in  the  market.  Consequently,  the 
higher  IR  is  expected.  This  result  appears  to  be  consistent  to  the  findings  from  prior  UK 
studies  (e.  g.,  Keasey  and  Short,  1992).  However,  after  introducing  the  privatisation 
variable  in  model  II  and,  then,  the  valuation  residuals  in  model  III,  the  Eq  coefficients 
change  to  negative,  which  suggests  that  the  higher  the  percentage  of  the  enlarged  share 
capital  sold  at  the  admission,  the  lower  the  IRs.  The  explanation  for  this  is  down  to  the 
Eq-Priv  relationship.  Although  the  univariate  analysis  concludes  there  is  generally  no 
257 multicollincarity  problem  among  the  research  variable,  the  correlation  matrix  (table  5.5) 
does  record  a  correlation  coefficient  of  0.705  between  Eq  and  Priv,  which  is  statistically 
significant  at  the  95%  level  of  confidence.  A  further  investigation  of  the  PIPOs  in  the 
research  sample  shows  that  all  I11POs  sold  100%  of  the  enlarged  number  of  shares  at  the 
admission.  'Therefore,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  changing  sign  of  Eq  in  model  II  and  III 
is  due  to  the  Eq-!  'riv  correlation.  Nonetheless,  Eq  is  statistically  insignificant  in  all  IR 
models. 
In  sung,  despite  the  lack  of  statistical  significances,  the  results  of  the  signalling 
analysis  show  that  in  general,  the  impact  of  signals  (Spo,  Age,  Eq)  on  the  IRs  is  as 
predicted.  I  lowever,  the  role  of  the  ownership  retention  variable,  which  is  measured  by  the 
pcrccntagc  of  the  enlarged  number  of  shares  sold  at  the  admission,  in  explaining  the  IR 
variations  becomes  unclear,  when  the  model  is  adjusted  to  privatisations.  The  proposed 
explanation  to  this  matter  is  due  to  the  significant  relationship  between  the  ownership 
retention  variable  and  the  privatisation  dummy.  Moreover,  the  Wald  statistics  in  table  5.6 
also  dcmonstratcs  that  the  joint  restriction  of  the  signals  as  a  group  have  insignificant 
impact  on  the  IRs. 
5.3.4.  Analysis  In  respect  of  the  control  variable  -  Privatisation 
Prior  studies  show  robust  cvidcncc  of  the  underpricing  of  privatisation  IPOs 
(PII'Os).  Somehow,  PIPOs  appear  to  be  more  underpriced  (higher  IR)  than  private  JPOs 
(Martin  and  Parker,  1997;  Dcwcntcr  and  Malatesta,  1997;  Florio  and  Manzoni,  2004). 
Based  on  findings  from  other  studies,  this  research  posits  a  positive  relationship  between 
Prly  and  the  IR.  The  role  of  privatisation  in  the  IR  models  is  presented  in  models  II  and  III. 
The  results  in  table  5.6  shows  positive  and  significant  Priv  coefficients,  suggesting  that 
I'IPOs  tend  to  have  higher  !  X,  i.  e.,  they  are  more  underpriced.  This  result  confirms  the 
descriptive  statistical  analysis  that  also  finds  PIPOs  are  more  underpriced  by  5.7%9. 
Table  5.2  presents  that  the  non-privatisation  IPOs  records  an  average  of  8.0%  IRs,  while  the  PIPOs  have  an 
average  of  13.7%  IRs. 
258 In  their  research,  Dewenter  and  Malatesta  (1997)  raise  the  question  of  whether 
PIPOs  in  several  countries  are  deliberately  undepriced.  However,  their  research  sample, 
including  some  UK  PIPOs,  cannot  conclude  the  underpricing  deliberation  of  the  PIPOs.  In 
this  study,  having  argued  that  government  wants  to  ensure  the  participation  of  investors  in 
the  subsequent  PIPOs,  there  is  an  incentive  to  underprice  the  PIPOs.  The  results  of  model 
II  and  III  of  the  IR  models  confirms  that  PIPOs  are  more  underpriced  than  their 
counterparts.  Moreover,  the  result  in  the  IPO  valuation  model  shows  a  negative  association 
between  Priv  and  the  IPO  offer  price,  although  this  result  appears  to  be  statistically 
insignificant.  Therefore,  despite  the  robust  result  of  the  IR  model  regarding  the  role  of 
privatisation,  this  study  cannot  conclude  that  PIPOs  are  deliberately  underpriced. 
In  the  main  IR  analysis,  the  IR  models  are  adjusted  by  the  inclusion  of  the 
privatisation  dummy  in  model  II  and  model  III  to  control  for  the  PIPO  effect.  However,  to, 
check  whether  other  predictors'  behaviours  towards  the  IRs  are  similar  between  the  PIPOs 
and  their  counterparts,  it  is  valuable  to  perform  a  sensitivity  analysis.  Therefore,  the  IR 
models  are  applied  once  more  using  the  non-privatisation  sub-sample. 
Table  5.7  below  presents  the  results  of  the  IR  model  for  the  non-privatisation  sub- 
sample.  Consequently,  the  privatisation  dummy  is  dropped  from  the  models,  leaving  only 
model  I  and  model  III  to  perform  the  analysis. 
The  analysis  shows  a  number  of  interesting  results.  Firstly,  the  constants  show  a 
robust  result  of  the  underpricing  of  the  non-PIPOs.  The  constant  variables  magnitudes  are, 
on  average,  lower  than  the  ones  for  the  full  sample.  This  is  understandable,  as  the  full 
sample  includes  the  PIPOs  that  are  proven  to  have  higher  IRs,  as  concluded  in  the 
descriptive  analysis. 
259 Table  5.7  Regression  analysis  on  the  IPO  initial  return  model 
for  non-privatisation  IPOs 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  for  non-privatisation  sub  sample,  of  the  initial  return 
(IR)  on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBV/Pa),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by  the 
offer  price  (/E/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr), 
capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age), 
percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  privatisation  dummy  (Priv),  and  standardised  residual  from  the 
valuation  model  (Resi).  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  Model  I  Model  III 
(t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  0.307***  0.319*** 
(2.99)  (3.33) 
pBV/Po  -0.064**  -0.046 
(-2.13)  (-1.36) 
fE/po  -0.089  0.006 
(0.51)  (0.03) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.006  -0.005 
(-0.42)  (-0.31) 
Cap  0.005  0.005 
(0.34)  (0.34) 
Effr  -0.012  -0.013 
(-0.39)  (-0.44) 
Cpy  -0.034  -0.035 
(-1.46)  (-1.46) 
Ind  -0.193*  -0.201** 
(-1.86)  (-1.99) 
Signals: 
Spo  -0.017  -0.015 
(-1.06)  (-0.99) 
Age  -0.001  -0.002 
(-0.12)  (-0.23) 
Eq  -0.011  -0.021 
(-0.23)  (-0.38) 
Resi  -  0.0  14* 
(1.94) 
N  151  151 
Adj.  R-sq  0.027  0.045 
Wald  regression  26.46***  33.80*** 
Wald  fundamental  5.01  *  1.86 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  6.06*  6.79* 
Wald  signals  1.53  1.63 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%  **  significant  at5  %4  ***significant  at  1% 
The  fundamentals  perform  similarly  to  the  main  result.  The  pro-forma  book  value 
to  offer  price  is  significantly  related  to  the  IRs  (model  I),  but  this  relationship  fades  once 
the  model  controls  for  the  valuation  residuals.  The  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio 
remains  insignificant. 
260 An  interesting  outcome  is  found  in  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  result.  For  the  full 
sample  (table  5.6),  the  capacity  risk  (Cpy)  is  significantly  related  to  the  IRs  in  model  I,  but 
this  impact  becomes  unclear  in  the  subsequent  models  after  controlling  for  the 
privatisation  dummy  and  the  valuation  residuals.  The  result  of  Cpy  for  the  non- 
privatisation  sub-sample  demonstrates  the  insignificance  impact  of  such  risk  factors  on  the 
IRs.  Although,  it  seems  to  be  inconsistent  to  the  main  results  of  model  I,  it  corroborates 
the  result  of  model  II  for  the  full  sample.  Therefore,  this  result  does  not  differ  after  all, 
since  the  results  of  model  I  for  the  non-privatisation  sub-sample  is  equivalent  to  the  results 
of  model  II  for  the  full  sample.  The  industry  risk  (Ind)  shows  consistent  results,  although 
the  impact  of  Lid  on  the  IRs  is  weaker  for  the  non-privatisation  sub-sample  than  it  is  for 
the  full  sample. 
The  signalling  results  remain  unchanged.  Sponsor  reputation  (Spo)  performs 
slightly  better,  but  the  impact  is  still  insignificant,  while  the  impact  of  firm  age  is,  literally, 
close  to  zero.  The  coefficient  of  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  offering  (Eq)  appears 
to  be  of  the  opposite  sign  and  insignificant.  The  residuals  variable  demonstrates  a  stable 
result,  which  confirms  the  momentum  of  the  IPOs. 
In  sum,  this  study  demonstrates  that  PIPOs  are  priced  differently  to  private  IPOs, 
so  that  on  the  first  trading  day  the  PIPOs  record  a  significant  higher  IRs  compared  to  the 
non-PIPOs.  This  confirms  findings  from  previous  studies.  However,  the  impact  of  PIPOs 
is  limited  as  shown  by  the  similar  result  found  in  the  main  analysis  and  the  sensitivity 
analysis  using  the  non-PIPO  sub-sample. 
5.3.5.  Analysis  of  offer  price  underpricing  (residual) 
Column  4  in  table  5.6  above  presents  the  result  of  model  III  of  the  IR  models,  in 
which  the  residual  from  the  IPO  valuation  model  (Resi)  is  included.  This  variable  refers  to 
other  missing  (unobservable)  variables  that  are  assumed  to  affect  the  IPO  valuation  at  the 
offer  price.  It  has  also  been  presented  in  the  earlier  section  of  this  chapter  that,  by 
construction,  the  average  of  Resi  should  be  nil  and  the  descriptive  statistics  show  that  on 
261 average,  Resi  is  almost  zero  (0.003).  The  sign  of  Resi  in  model  III  is  expected  to  be 
negative.  Since  the  greater  Resi  arise  when  IPOs  are  priced  higher  relatively  the  firm's 
fundamentals,  in  turn,  lower  IRs  are  expected. 
The  empirical  evidence  shows  that  the  Resi  coefficient  appears  to  be  positive  and 
significant,  which  rejects  the  working  hypothesis  H11.  The  result  implies  that  IPOs,  which 
are  offered  at  higher  prices  relatively  to  their  fundamentals,  continue  to  get  even  more 
`overvalued'  on  the  first  day  of  trading,  suggesting  market  momentum.  This  verifies  the 
findings  of  the  impact  of  pBV/Po  on  the  IRs. 
Another  possible  implication  as  suggested  by  Purnanandam  and  Swaminathan 
(2002)  is  that  the  issuers/sponsors  price  these  IPOs  at  a  premium  given  their  private 
information  about  the  future  growth  prospects  of  the  firms.  If  the  market  agrees  with  the 
issuers/sponsors,  their  prices  would  run-up  further  in  the  after-market. 
Additionally,  further  analysis  shows  that  IPOs  offered  at  higher  prices,  on 
average,  result  in  higher  IRs.  Table  5.8  below  exhibits  the  distribution  of  the  average  of  IR 
based  on  Po  quartiles. 
Table  5.8  The  IR  average  and  the  offer  price  (Po)  distribution 
Quartile  Po  range  (p)  IR  average  (%) 
I<  178.26  7.24 
2  178.26  -  283.02  7.01 
3  283.02  -  414.27  9.77 
4>  414.27  10.87 
The  table  shows  the  pattern  of  IR  average  distribution  based  on  P0.  In  the  research 
sample,  the  greatest  IR  average  is  found  for  Q4  or  in  the  IPOs  with  Po  greater  than  414.27p 
per  share,  while  the  minimum  IR  average  is  found  in  the  Q2.  This  suggests  higher  Po  IPOs 
tend  to  be  more  underpriced.  This  result  supports  prior  evidence  found  in  the  UK  main 
market  and  USM  during  the  period  1980-1988  (Levis,  1993)  as  well  as  in  the  Singaporean 
market  (Firth,  1998). 
262 If  the  IPOs  are  underpriced  relatively  to  their  fundamentals,  the  Resi  is  expected  to 
be  lower  and  the  IRs  is  greater,  hence  a  negative  coefficient  of  Resi  is  predicted.  However, 
since  the  evidence  shows  the  opposite  result,  this  study  cannot  confirm  that  the  IPO  are 
underpriced  at  the  offer  price.  Rather,  it  suggests  that  the  IPOs  with  greater  Resi  are 
surrounded  by  higher  uncertainty,  which  results  in  the  greater  IRs.  This  suggestion  is  in 
line  with  the  findings  in  Beatty  and  Ritter  (1986). 
5.4  Validity  of  the  IPO  short  run  performance  models 
Prior  sub-sections  analyse  the  impact  of  each  predictor  on  the  IRs.  The  predictors 
are  categorised  based  on  their  roles  in  explaining  the  IRs  (fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk 
factors,  signals,  control  variables).  However,  it  is  also  important  to  examine  the  model  as  a 
whole.  The  result  of  model  I  shows  that  the  prospectus  information,  which  is  represented 
by  fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals,  explains  4.4%  of  the  variation  in  the 
IRs.  For  cross-sectional  research  the  adjusted  R-square  is  quite  low,  yet  as  a  whole  the 
model  is  statistically  significance  at  the  1%  level  (Wald  statistics  of  26.43,  and  p-value  of 
0.00). 
The  inclusion  of  control  variables,  such  as  a  dummy  for  privatisation  in  model  II 
shows  a  marginal  improvement  to  the  explanatory  power  and  model  validity.  The  adjusted 
R-square  of  model  II  increases  to  6.5%,  showing  that  the  privatisation,  itself,  could  explain 
an  additional  2.1%  of  IR  variations.  Moreover,  model  II  turns  out  to  have  higher  and 
significant  Wald  statistics  that  confirms  the  validity  of  the  model. 
Similarly,  the  last  IR  model  demonstrates  that  introducing  the  valuation 
standardised  residuals  increases  the  model's  explanatory  power.  Along  with  the 
fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  signals,  and  the  privatisation  dummy,  the  residuals 
explain  about  8.8%  variation  in  IRs.  The  Wald  statistic  also  attests  the  statistical  fitness  of 
the  model  at  the  99%  level  of  confidence. 
As  discussed  earlier  in  the  corresponding  sections,  the  Wald  statistics  for  the 
fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  the  signals  demonstrate  mixed  results.  While 
263 the  ex-ante  risk  factors  group  show  consistent  joint  restrictions  across  the  IR  models, 
mixed  results  are  found  in  the  fundamental  group,  and  finally,  the  joint  restriction  of  the 
signal  group  is  statistically  insignificant. 
A  similar  result  is  found  for  the  non-PIPOs  sub-sample  (table  5.7).  The 
explanatory  powers  of  the  IR  models  for  the  non-PIPOs  sub  sample  are  lower  than  the 
ones  for  the  full  sample.  Only  2.7%  of  the  variations  in  IRs  could  be  explained  by  the 
prospectus  information  for  the  non-privatisation  IPOs.  This  result  confirms  the  substantial 
explanatory  power  of  the  privatisation  dummy  (Priv)  to  explain  the  variation  of  the  IRs  in 
the  full  sample.  Adding  the  valuation  residuals  variable  in  model  III  does  improve  the 
explanatory  power  to  4.5%.  The  Wald  tests  for  the  regression  are  robustly  significant  at 
the  99%  level  of  confidence.  The  joint  restriction  of  the  fundamentals  is  significant  at  the 
10%  level  for  model  I,  although  the  significance  disappear  when  the  model  includes  the 
valuation  residuals.  Similar  to  the  results  of  the  full  sample,  the  non-PIPOs  demonstrate 
that  the  joint  restriction  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  is  significant  at  the  10%  level  across  the 
IR  models,  yet  the  Wald  test  fails  to  confirm  the  significance  of  the  signal  joint  restriction 
on  the  IRs. 
5.5  Sensitivity  analysis 
A  number  of  sensitivity  analyses  have  been  performed  to  test  whether  the  results 
of  the  IR  models  presented  above  are  sensitive  to  other  factors.  In  the  earlier  section 
regarding  the  impact  of  privatisations  on  the  IPO  initial  returns,  a  sensitivity  analysis  is 
undertaken  using  the  non-PIPOs  sub-sample.  The  overall  result  is  similar  to  that  reported 
in  the  main  analysis.  Additionally,  the  analysis  confirms  the  substantial  impact  of  PIPOs 
on  the  IRs. 
In  this  section,  another  sensitivity  analysis  is  performed.  To  examine  whether  the 
main  results  are  sensitive  to  outliers,  a  robust  regression  analysis  is  carried  out,  and  thq 
results  are  presented  in  table  5.9  below. 
264 Table  5.9  Robust  Regression  analysis  on  the  IPO  initial  return  model 
The  table  contains  output  from  robust  regression  analysis  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  initial  return 
(IR)  on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBV/Po),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by  the 
offer  price  (JE/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr), 
capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age), 
percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  privatisation  dummy  (Priv),  and  standardised  residual  from  the 
valuation  model  (Resi). 
Variables  Model  I  Model  II  Model  III 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  0.278**  0.293**  0.296*** 
(2.76)  (2.88)  (2.95) 
PBV/Po  -0.052*  -0.042*  -0.042 
(-1.87)  (-1.89)  (-1.33) 
fE/P0  0.009  0.122  0.123 
(0.06)  (0.74)  (0.75) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.013  -0.006  -0.006 
(-0.82)  (0.39)  (-0.40) 
Cap  0.009  0.004  0.004 
(0.57)  (0.29)  (0.30) 
Effr  -0.010  -0.014  -0.014 
(-0.30)  (-0.43)  (-0.44) 
Cpy  -0.044*  -0.029  -0.029 
(-1.98)  (-1.26)  (-1.27) 
Ind  -0.184*  -0.185*  -0.187* 
(-1.84)  (-1.98)  (-1.83) 
Signals: 
Spo  -0.018  -0.017  -0.018 
(-1.14)  (-1.07)  (-1.10) 
Age  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003 
(-0.61)  (-0.36)  (-0.35) 
Eq  0.068*  -0.027  -0.028 
(1.81)  (-0.553)  (-0.56) 
Priv  -  0.086*  0.085* 
(1.95)  (1.90) 
Resi  -  0.017** 
(2.18) 
N  161  161  161 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%a  **  significant  at  S%a  *"significant  at  1% 
In  general,  the  results  of  the  robust  regression  analysis  are  similar  to  the  results  of 
the  main  analysis  (the  OLS  regression  analysis).  The  constant  estimation  is  consistent  with 
the  previous  results  and  confirms  the  underpricing  of  the  research  sample.  The  results 
relating  to  the  fundamentals  are  also  consistent  with  previous  findings  and  shows  that  the 
pro-forma  book  value  to  offer  price  ratio  (pBV/Po)  appears  to  be  more  influential  in 
explaining  the  IR,  while  the  explanatory  power  of  the  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price 
265 ratio  (%E/Po)  is  weak.  However,  once  the  model  is  augmented  by  the  inclusion  of  the 
residuals  (model  III),  the  impact  of  the  fundamentals  becomes  less  important. 
The  results  of  the  cx-antc  risk  factors  and  the  signals  are  also  consistent  with  the 
main  findings.  Only  the  capacity  risk  (Cap)  and  the  industry  risk  (bid)  are  significantly 
related  to  the  IRs,  although  Cap  loses  its  significance  when  the  IRs  models  are  controlled 
by  the  privatisation  dummy  and  the  residuals.  None  of  the  signals  appear  to  be 
significantly  related  to  the  IRs.  Confirming  the  main  findings,  the  result  for  the 
privatisation  dummy  remains  significant  in  the  robust  regression.  Additionally,  the 
residuals  also  exhibit  a  consistent  outcome  with  prior  result,  which  confirms  the  market 
momentum  on  the  first  trading  day. 
In  sum,  the  sensitivity  analyses  demonstrate  that  the  results  of  the  main  findings 
arc  robust  and  not  sensitive  to  issues,  such  as  outliers  and  the  privatisation  effect.  The 
impacts  of  the  predictors  on  the  IRs  arc  similar  to  the  main  findings.  However,  the  results 
of  non-I'IPOs  sub-sample  do  highlight  the  important  of  the  PIPOs  in  explaining  the  IR  of 
the  full  sample. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  presented  and  discussed  the  performance  of  the  research  sample 
in  the  short-run  (initial  day  returns).  IPO  initial  returns  have  been  defined  as  the  investors' 
returns  on  the  closing  of  the  first  trading  day.  The  descriptive  statistics  demonstrate  the 
persistence  of  the  underpricing,  which  is  reflected  by  the  significant  positive  initial  return. 
This  result  confirms  the  findings  from  prior  studies  in  the  UK  and  elsewhere. 
The  IR  models  produce  evidence  of  a  significant  impact  of  pBY/P0  on  the  IRs, 
when  the  model  includes  only  the  prospectus  information  (model  I)  and  when  a 
privatisation  dummy  is  introduced  to  the  first  model  (model  II).  Yet,  it  loses  its 
significance  when  Resi  is  introduced  into  model  III.  However,  the  impact  is  in  the  opposite 
direction  to  that  expected.  The  positive  coefficient  of  pBV/Pa  suggests  that  the  overvalued 
IPOs  at  the  offering  are  likely  to  be  valued  higher  in  the  first  trading  day,  suggesting  the 
266 market  momentum.  This  result  is  supported  by  some  findings  in  the  univariate  analysis. 
The  fE/Po  shows  no  evidence  of  its  relationship  with  the  IRs. 
Mixed  results  are  found  on  the  relationship  between  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and 
IPO  IRs.  The  results  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  generate  little  evidence  to  support  the 
working  hypotheses;  only  the  Industry  risk  factor  appears  to  be  consistent  with  the 
hypothesis.  Despite  the  signals  coefficients  having  the  expected  signs,  they  are 
statistically  insignificant,  hence  this  study  cannot  confirm  the  findings  from  prior  studies. 
The  descriptive  statistics  show  that  the  PIPOs  are,  on  average,  more  underpriced. 
Additionally,  both  the  univariate  and  cross  sectional  analyses  confirm  the  significant 
impact  of  PIPOs  on  the  IPO  initial  returns.  Therefore,  the  Priv  result  is  consistent  to  the 
findings  from  prior  studies. 
The  IR  model  also  includes  the  valuation  residual  (Resi)  to  capture  any  impact  of 
the  unobservable  variable.  Surprisingly,  the  result  shows  that  Resi  is  positively  related  to 
IRs,  suggesting  that  the  IPOs  that  are  overpriced  relatively  to  their  fundamentals  at  the 
time  of  issue  are  valued  more  highly  in  the  market  on  the  first  trading  day.  This  result 
corroborates  the  findings  in  the  pBV/Po,  suggesting  market  momentum.  Another 
implication  is  that  such  IPOs  are  priced  at  a  premium  as  a  signal  to  the  firms'  value. 
Despite  lack  of  significance  of  most  coefficient  (see  Appendix  table  A.  5.2)  and 
low  explanatory  powers,  the  results  show  that  the  IR  models  are  valid.  The  Wald  statistics 
demonstrate  that  all  predictors,  as  a  whole,  in  the  IR  models  are  related  to  the  IRs.  The 
joint  restriction  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  shows  a  consistent  result  across  the  IR  models. 
However,  mixed  results  are  found  on  the  impact  of  the  fundamentals  to  IRs,  while  the  joint 
restriction  of  the  signals  appears  to  be  insignificant.  The  sensitivity  analyses  show  that  the 
main  result  is  robust  to  the  privatisation  and  the  outlier  effects. 
In  sum,  this  chapter  provides  a  number  of  explanations  to  the  research  questions 
presented  in  the  introduction  section.  The  prospectus  information  has  some,  albeit  rather 
low,  predictive  power  to  the  IPO  initial  returns,  and  the  joint  restriction  of  the  ex-ante  risk 
factors  shows  a  significant  impact  on  the  IRs. 
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268 Table  A.  5.1  Summary  of  IR  analysis  hypothesis  testing 
Hypothesis  Variables  Expected  Evidence 
signs 
H7a 
The  pro-forma  book  value  of  equity  to  pBV/P0  + 
offer  price  ratio  is  positively  related  to  IPO 
initial  returns 
(a  negative  and 
significant 
coefficient  is 
found) 
H7b 
The  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio 
is  positively  related  to  IPO  initial  returns  JE/PO  +  x 
H8a 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  Lev  +  X 
firm's  pre-JPO  leverage  and  IPO  initial 
returns 
H8b 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between 
firm's  pre-IPO  capital  availability  risk  and  Cap  x 
IPO  initial  returns  - 
H8c 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
firm's  pre-IPO  efficiency  risk  and  IPO  Effr  + 
initial  returns 
H8d 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  Cpy  +  x 
firm's  pre-IPO  capacity  risk  and  IPO  initial 
returns 
H8e 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  Ind  +  x 
industry  risk  and  IPO  initial  returns 
(a  negative  and 
significant 
coefficient  is 
found 
269 Hypothesis  Variables  Expected  Evidence 
signs 
H9a 
Sponsor  reputation  is  negatively  related  to  Spo 
_  x 
IPO  initial  returns 
H9b 
Firm  age  is  negatively  related  to  IPO  initial  Age 
_  x 
returns 
H9c 
Percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  flotation  is  Eq  +  X 
positively  related  to  IPO  initial  returns 
H10 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
privatisation  dummy  and  IPO  initial  returns  Priv  +  ￿ 
H11 
There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  Resi 
_  x 
the  residuals  and  IPO  initial  returns 
(a  positive  and 
significant 
coefficient  is 
found 
270 Chapter  6 Chapter  6 
The  IPO  long  run  performance  analysis 
Introduction 
The  previous  chapter  discusses  the  short  run  IPO  performance,  which  is 
well  known  as  the  IPO  underpricing.  In  particular,  the  chapter  address  the  research 
question  whether  the  prospectus  information  has  predictive  power  towards  the  IPO 
underpricing.  In  general,  the  evidence  demonstrates  that  the  prospectus  information 
has  relatively  little  role  to  explain  the  IPO  underpricing.  The  fundamentals  provide 
an  interesting  finding  on  the  relationship  between  the  proforma  book  value  of 
equity  and  the  IPO  initial  returns  (IRs).  The  result  shows  that  IPOs  with  the  lower 
proforma  book  value  of  equity  to  offer  price  ratio,  tend  to  be  more  underpriced 
(higher  IRs).  The  result  implies  that  IPOs,  which  are  priced  highly  relatively  to  the 
pro-forma  book  value  of  equity,  continue  to  be  valued  more  highly  on  the  first  day 
of  trading,  suggesting  market  momentum.  This  result  is  supported  by  the  finding 
on  the  relationship  between  the  valuation  residual  and  the  initial  returns  (IRs).  The 
second  implication  is  that  the  issuers/sponsors  set  the  offer  prices  at  the  premium 
as  a  signal  to  the  firms'  true  value.  If  the  market  agrees,  they  push  up  the  prices  of 
such  IPOs  in  the  after-market. 
The  results  of  other  prospectus  information  (the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and 
the  signals)  are  mixed.  Although  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  coefficients  lack  of 
significance,  the  joint  restriction  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factor  as  a  group  is  robust 
across  the  IR  models.  The  signals  demonstrate  consistent  signs  of  coefficients, 
although  none  of  them  appear  to  be  significant. Although  the  main  purpose  of  the  prospectus  is  to  reduce  the  information 
asymmetry,  the  IR  analysis  shows  that  there  is  a  divergence  of  opinion  towards 
some  prospectus  information  among  the  market  participants  (the  issuers/sponsors 
and  the  investors)  on  the  first  day  of  trading.  Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  examine 
whether  a  divergence  of  opinion  towards  the  prospectus  information  is  still  found 
in  the  longer  period. 
This  chapter  is  aimed  to  answer  the  research  question:  Does  the  prospectus 
information  still  have  any  impact  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance?  As  explained 
in  the  Research  design  chapter,  the  IPO  long  run  performance  is  defined  as  the 
investment  abnormal  returns  for  the  `loyal'  investors,  who  buy  the  IPOs  on  day  2 
and  hold  them  up  to  the  IPOs'  subsequent  anniversaries.  In  this  study,  the  IPO 
long  run  performance  is  measured  by  the  buy  and  hold  abnormal  returns  (BHARs) 
as  suggested  by  Barber  and  Lyon  (1997).  Similar  to  the  two  previous  empirical 
chapters,  the  prospectus  information  is  defined  as  the  information  regarding  the 
accounting  fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  the  signals  that  are  disclosed 
in  the  offering  prospectus. 
In  this  analysis,  a  number  of  general  OLS  returns  models  are  developed, 
which  are  referred  to  as  the  IPO  long  run  performance  models.  Besides  the  main 
predictors  (the  fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  the  signals),  the  IPO  long  run 
performance  models  control  for  a  number  of  variables  such  as  size,  privatisation 
and  the  initial  `mispricing'  on  day  1.  The  initial  `mispricing'  variables  are  proxied 
by  the  valuation  residuals  and  the  initial  returns  (IRs)  on  the  first  trading  day. 
Research  methods  used  in  this  chapter  and  the  main  working  hypotheses  are 
summarised  and  presented  in  the  diagram  below  (see  Figure  6.1). 
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w The  structure  of  this  chapter  is  as  follows.  After  the  introduction  section, 
the  descriptive  statistics  of  variables  used  in  the  IPO  long  run  performance  (BHAR) 
models  are  presented.  As  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  main  predictors  has  been 
discussed  in  the  IPO  valuation  chapter,  the  descriptive  statistics  analysis  in  this 
chapter  focuses  on  the  BHARs  and  the  Resi  variables.  This  is  followed  by 
discussions  of  the  results  of  the  fundamentals,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors,  the  signals, 
and  the  control  variables.  The  sensitivity  analysis  is  presented  and  is  followed  by  a 
discussion  of  the  validity  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  models.  Finally,  a  brief 
summary  of  the  chapter  is  presented. 
6.1  Data 
As  explained  in  the  research  design  chapter,  the  long-run  performance 
measure  used  in  this  study  is  the  buy  and  hold  'return  (BHAR).  Although  there  are 
some  limitations  of  this  measure  compared  to  other  measures  for  long-run  return 
(e.  g.,  cumulative  abnormal  returns),  Barber  and  Lyon  (1996)  argue  that  BHAR  is 
still  better  than  others.  A  broad  discussion  of  this  matter  has  been  reviewed  in  the 
research  design  chapter. 
The  BHARs  employed  are  adjusted  by  the  market  index,  which  is  the  FTSE 
small  companies  index.  Hence,  the  result  of  BHARs  represents  the  market  adjusted 
abnormal  returns  for  investors,  who  buy  the  IPOs  on  day  1  and  hold  them  for  a 
specified  period  (in  this  study,  the  holding  periods  examined  are  1-year,  2-year, 
and  3-year  periods). 
274 Table  6.1.  Descriptive  statistics  for  long  run  return  analysis 
The  table  contains  descriptive  statistics  for  IPO  sample  of  variables  in  the  IPO 
performance  analysis.  BHARiy  refers  to  the  abnormal  buy  and  hold  returns  for  i=1,2,  and 
3  years  period,  pBV/Po  to  pro-forma  book  value  to  offer  price,  fE/Po  to  forecasted  EPS  to 
offer  price,  and  Resi  to  standardised  residuals  from  the  IPO  valuation  model  with  Po/BV  as 
the  dependent  variable. 
Variable  N  Mean  Median  StDev  Minimum  Maximum 
BHAR1y  161  0.115***  0.097  0.395  -1.011  1.105 
BHAR2y  161  0.006  0.008  0.823  -2.126  2.121 
BHAR3y  144  -0.033  -0.169  0.883  -1.769  2.359 
Size  161  3.841  4.361  1.099  3.002  8.429 
Note:  ***significantat  1% 
Table  6.1  demonstrates  that  investors  still  gain  positive  abnormal  returns  up 
to  2  years  after  the  admission,  suggesting  that  the  research  sample  outperforms  the 
market.  Then,  the  returns  decrease  and  on  the  third  listing  anniversary,  the 
abnormal  returns  become  negative,  implying  the  long-run  underperformance  of  the 
research  sample.  However,  statistically,  only  the  buy  and  hold  abnormal  returns 
(BHAR)  for  the  1-year  period  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%  level. 
The  statistical  tests  for  BHAR  year  2  and  3  fail  to  reject  the  alternative  hypothesis 
asserting  that  the  BHAR  for  years  2  and  3  are  significantly  different  from  zero. 
However,  the  median  of  BHAR3y  takes  a  value  of  -16.9%,  implying  that  half  of 
the  research  sample  underperforms  the  market  by  16.9%  or  more. 
The  sign  test  is  also  undertaken  for  the  BHARs.  The  result  shows  that  the 
median  of  BHARy1  is  positive  and  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1% 
level.  The  test  also  confirms  that  the  median  of  the  BHAR3y  is  negative  and 
significantly  different  from  zero.  However,  the  test  shows  that  the  median  of 
BHAR2y  is  statistically  insignificant. 
275 The  results  of  the  means  of  the  BHARs  appear  to  be  contrary  to  prior  UK 
studies  (Levis,  1993;  Espenlaub  et  al.,  1999)  that  find,  on  average,  UK  IPOs 
underperform  the  market  or  other  benchmarks  after  the  first  3  years.  However, 
both  studies  also  demonstrate  that  the  IPO  underperformance  is  less  severe  when 
using  the  FTA  index  as  a  benchmark.  Other  studies  using  the  BHAR  measure  and 
equally  weighted  market  index  show  similar  results  to  the  ones  found  in  this  study 
(Ben  Naceur,  2000;  Crutchley  et  al.,  2002). 
Moreover,  the  research  samples  of  both  Levis  (1993)  and  Espenlaub  et  al. 
(1999)  exclude  privatisations,  while  the  sample  of  this  study  includes  10  PIPOs. 
Table  6.2  below  presents  the  IPO  performances  of  the  non-PIPO  and  PIPO  sub- 
samples.  The  long-run  performance  measures  for  the  PIPOs  show  increasing 
significant  abnormal  returns  in  the  subsequent  years.  The  positive  BHARs  indicate 
that,  on  average,  PIPOs  outperform  the  market.  The  figure  for  BHAR3y  for  the 
PIPOs  means  that  investors,  who  buy  the  PIPOs  at  the  admission  and  hold  the 
shares  up  to  their  third  anniversary  of  listing,  are  better  off  by  54.0%,  on  average, 
compared  to  the  market. 
Table  6.2.  IPO  performance  of  PIPOs  and  non-PIPOs  sub-samples 
The  table  contains  the  IPO  performances  of  privatisation  sub-sample,  and  non- 
privatisation  sub-sample.  BHARiy  refers  to  the  abnormal  buy  and  hold  returns  for  i=1,2, 
and  3  year  period 
IPO  sample  No.  of  Average  Average  Average 
IPOs  BHAR1y  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
PIPOs  10  0.231**  0.439***  0.540** 
Non-PIPOs  151  0.107***  -0.023  -0.065* 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  *"significant  at  1% 
In  contrast  to  the  PIPOs,  the  non-PIPOs  exhibit  decreasing  abnormal 
returns  in  the  subsequent  periods.  The  average  of  the  BHAR  shows  a  positive  and 
significant  value  for  the  1-year  period  and  eventually  declining  to  a  negative  and 
276 significant  abnormal  return  in  year  3,  suggesting  that  non-privatisations 
underperform  the  market  after  3  years  trading.  The  figures  for  BHAR3y  of  the  non- 
privatisation  sub-sample  could  be  interpreted,  as  investors,  who  buy  non-PIPOs 
and  hold  them  until  their  third  anniversary  of  listing,  are  worse-off  by  6.5% 
compared  to  the  market.  This  result  confirms  the  UK  IPO  underperformance  found 
by  Levis  (1993)  and  Espenlaub  et  al.  (2000). 
Further  examination  also  confirms  that  the  differences  between  the  BHARs 
of  the  two  sub-samples  for  year  2  and  3  are  significant  at  the  1%  level.  However 
the  difference  in  13HARs  for  year  1  is  insignificant. 
Table  6.1  also  demonstrates  that  in  year  3,  the  sample  size  is  reduced  to 
144,  which  indicate  that  17  IPOs  did  not  survive  up  to  their  third  anniversaryl. 
Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  examine  whether  the  performance  of  the  survivor. 
IPOs  is  different  to  the  non-survivors'  performance.  Table  6.3  below  exhibits  the 
BHARs  in  year  1  and  year  2  for  the  survivors  and  non-survivors  sub-samples. 
Table  6.3.  IPO  performance  of  survivors  and  non-survivors  sub-samples 
The  table  contains  the  IPO  performances  of  survivors  sub-sample,  and  non-survivors  sub-sample. 
BIIAR1J'  refers  to  the  abnormal  buy  and  hold  returns  for  i=I  and  2  year  period 
IPO  sample  No  of  Average  BHARly  Average  BHAR2y 
firms 
Survivor  144  0.136***  0.157*** 
Non-survivor  17  -0.066  -1.275*** 
Note:  **significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1 
In  the  long  run,  the  two  sub-samples  show  big  differences  in  BHARs.  The 
non-survivor  sub-sample  shows  that  they  underperform  the  market  since  year  1  up 
to  year  2  before  they  exit  the  market,  while  the  survivor  sub-sample  show 
1  The  17  IPOs  that  have  not  survived  to  the  3`d  anniversary  of  listing  are  IPOs  from  year  1992 
onwards.  The  non-survivors  are  due  to  delisting  (3  IPOs),  taken-over/acquired  (11  IPOs),  merged  (2 
IPOs),  or  went  private  (1  IPO),  as  explained  in  more  detail  in  appendix  A.  6.1 
277 increasing  positive  abnormal  returns  during  those  periods.  Therefore,  further 
analysis  confirms  that  the  two  sub-samples  have  significantly  different  long-run 
2  returns. 
The  analysis  above  indicates  how  the  PIPOs  and  the  non-survivor 
performance  affect  the  figures  for  the  full  sample  performance.  Hence,  the 
performance  analyses  presented  in  this  chapter  include  separate  analyses  of  the  full 
sample  and  the  two  sub-samples  (i.  e.,  the  non  privatisation  sub-sample  and  the 
survivor  sub-samples). 
In  the  previous  chapter,  it  is  shown  that  the  IRs  varies  across  the  research 
period.  The  research  period  covers  different  economic  states  in  the  UK  (recession 
in  the  early  90s,  and  the  beginning  of  the  internet  boom  in  the  late  90s).  The  data 
could  not  conclude  a  significant  relationship  between  the  IRs  and  the  economic 
states.  Here,  the  examination  of  how  IPOs  perform  in  the  long  run  during  different 
economic  states  is  presented  in  table  6.4  below.  The  table  presents  the  distribution 
of  average  abnormal  returns  (BHARs)  for  the  research  sample  by  year  when  the 
IPOs  took  place.  In  general,  it  could  be  said  that  there  is  no  significant  correlation 
between  the  number  of  IPOs  that  took  place  in  a  particular  year  and  the  IPO  long 
run  returns3 
The  BHARs  of  IPOs  that  went  public  in  1987  demonstrate  that  on  average, 
the  IPOs  outperform  the  market  throughout  the  3-year  period,  while  the  sample  for 
1992  shows  long-run  underperformance  since  the  first  anniversary.  The  research 
Z  The  t-test  results  in  a  rejection  of  the  hypothesis  of  equal  means  ofBHARIy  and  BHAR2y  between 
the  survivor  and  non-survivor  sub-samples  at,  respectively,  the  5%  and  1%  level. 
3  The  correlation  coefficients  of  the  number  of  IPOs  and  BHARly,  BHAR2y,  BHAR3y,  respectively, 
are  -0.218,  -0.401,  and  -0.424.  None  of  the  coefficients  are  statistically  significant. 
278 Table  6.4.  Performance  of  full  sample  by  year 
The  table  consists  of  the  average  buy  and  hold  abnormal  returns  (BHAR)  for  periods  1- 
year,  2-year,  and  3-year  of  the  sample  by  year  when  the  IPO  took  place. 
Year  No.  of 
IPO 
sample 
Average 
BHAR1y 
Average 
BHAR2y 
Average 
BHAR3y 
1987  7  0.306*  0.602*  0.581 
1988  13  0.328***  0.258  0.301 
1989  6  0.368**  0.531***  0.831*** 
1990  2  -0.015  0.078  0.066 
1991  6  0.117  0.042  0.150 
1992  10  -0.034  -0.188  -0.266* 
1993  17  0.116  -0.008  -0.156 
1994  31  0.163**  0.223  0.102 
1995  19  0.096  -0.208  -0.642*** 
1996  29  0.025  -0.159  -0.228 
1997  21  -0.003  -0.314**  0.166 
Note:  *  significan  t  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  *  significant  at  1% 
sample  does  not  show  any  clear  pattern  of  abnormal  returns  over  the  period. 
However,  the  table  shows  that  there  is  no  sign  of  long-run  underperformance  for 
IPOs  that  taken  place  in  the  late  1980s,  in  fact  -  the  IPO  sample  for  1989  show 
surprising  positive  abnormal  returns  from  year  1  to  year  3.  On  the  other  hand,  IPOs 
that  took  place  in  the  mid  1990s  (1995  and  1996)  show  negative  abnormal  returns 
in  the  long.  Therefore,  it  could  be  inferred  that  IPOs,  which  come  to  the  market  in 
`hot'  period  tend  to  suffer  long  run  underperformance.  The  similar  notion  is  also 
found  in  the  non-PIPOs  and  the  survivor  sub-samples  (see  appendix  -  tables 
A.  6.2a.  and  A.  6.2b). 
279 Another  interesting  figure  is  the  relation  between  the  IRs  and  BHARs,  as  it 
is  shown  in  figure  6.2  below.  The  first  pattern  occurs  in  the  IPO  samples  that  come 
to  the  market  in  1987-1992.  IPOs  in  1992  show  the  lowest  IR  and  the  lowest 
BHAR3y,  while  IPOs  in  1987  shows  the  greatest  IR  and  the  second  best  BHAR3y. 
Therefore,  in  that  period  it  could  be  inferred  that  IPOs  that  are  less  underpriced 
tend  to  perform  worse  in  the  long  run.  On  the  other  side,  IPOs  that  are  more 
underpriced  tend  to  enjoy  better  long-run  performance. 
However,  this  notion  is  in  contrast  to  the  current  proposition  of  the  IPO 
underpricing  and  the  long-run  performance.  The  overoptimism  hypothesis  argues 
that  the  positive  IRs  are  the  results  of  investors'  optimism  in  the  IPO  early  days  of 
trading.  Then,  the  market  adjustment  brings  the  reversion  effect,  which  results  in 
the  declining  performance  in  the  long  run.  Nevertheless,  the  IPO  signalling 
hypothesis  argues  that  good  firms  deliberately  underprice  the  IPOs  to  reveal  their 
firm  value.  Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  good  firm  IPOs  are  more  underpriced  but 
perform  better  in  the  long  run. 
The  second  period  1993-1997  exhibits  a  different  pattern  of  the  IRs  and 
BHARs  movement  to  the  prior  period.  IPOs  in  this  period  show  a  reversion  effect  is 
taking  place  after  the  excitement  in  the  early  days  of  the  IPOs.  IPOs  in  1996  shows 
the  greatest  IRs  in  that  period,  then  3  years  after,  they  suffer  the  second  lowest 
abnormal  returns,  while  IPOs  in  1995  shows  the  second  highest  IRs,  yet  they 
produce  the  lowest  BHAR3y  during  the  research  period.  Unlike  the  full  sample,  the 
PIPOs  and  the  survivor  sub-samples  do  not  show  any  observable  pattern  of  the  IRs- 
BHARs  movement  (see  appendix,  figures  A.  6.2a  and  A.  6.2b). 
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00 N 6.2.  Univariate  analysis 
This  section  analyses  the  individual  correlation  between  the  predictors  in 
the  IPO  long  run  performance  models  and  the  IPO  BHARs.  However,  only  the  ones 
that  are  significantly  related  to  BHARs  are  discussed.  In  general,  it  could  be  said 
that  the  univariate  analysis  does  not  show  any  multicollinearity  problem,  apart  the 
Priv-Eq  correlation  as  discussed  earlier  in  the  IR  analysis. 
The  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  is  positively  related  to  the 
BHARs  as  expected,  although  the  correlation  coefficients  is  significant  only  for 
year  1.  The  Size,  which  is  measured  by  the  normal  log  of  the  market  capitalisation 
at  the  IPOs,  is  positively  related  to  the  BHARs,  but  the  relationship  is  insignificant 
in  year  1  and  2,  and  becomes  significant  in  year  3. 
A  positive  correlation  coefficient  is  expected  between  the  each  ex-ante  risk 
factor  and  the  BHARs.  Only  Industry  risk  (Inca)  appear  to  have  an  expected 
relationship,  yet  the  coefficients  are  insignificant.  Only  Efficiency  risk  (Effr)  is 
statistically  and  significantly  related  to  the  BHARs,  however,  the  correlation 
suggests  a  negative  relationship  between  Effr  and  the  BHARs. 
Only  the  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo)  appears  to  be  a  signal  factor  that 
has  a  significant  association  with  the  BHARs.  The  coefficient  suggests  that  IPOs 
that  are  sponsored  by  the  prestigious  investment  bankers  experience  better 
abnormal  returns  throughout  the  different  periods.  Another  consistent  result  is 
found  in  the  association  between  the  privatisation  dummy  (Priv)  and  the  BHARs. 
Positive  correlation  coefficients  of  the  Priv-BHARs  imply  that  PIPOs  perform 
better  in  the  long  run  than  the  non-PIPOs. 
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N Many  scholars  argue  that  the  IPO  underpricing  is  caused  by  investors' 
overoptimism  in  the  early  days  of  IPOs.  Eventually,  the  reversion  actions  take 
place  in  the  market,  resulting  in  the  long-run  underperformance.  It  implies  that  the 
IPO  IRs  are  negatively  related  to  their  long-run  returns,  which  in  this  study,  are 
proxied  by  BHARs.  However,  table  6.5  demonstrates  positive  correlation 
coefficients  between  IRs  and  BHARs,  although  such  coefficients  are  only 
significant  with  BHAR1y  and  BHAR2y,  and  it  appears  to  be  insignificant  with 
BHAR3y.  This  implies  that  IPOs,  which  are  more  underpriced,  are  valued 
significantly  higher  up  to  2  years  after  the  admission,  suggesting  the  market 
momentum  does  not  last  beyond  the  second  anniversary  of  the  IPO. 
6.3.  IPO  long-run  performance  analysis 
This  section  presents  the  results  and  the  discussions  of  the  IPO  long-run 
returns  models.  As  conversed  earlier  in  this  chapter,  the  IPO  long  run 
performances  are  proxied  by  the  adjusted  buy  and  hold  returns  for  1  year,  2  years, 
and  3  years  after  the  admission.  The  models  assume  that  prospectus  information, 
privatisation,  initial  and  day  1  valuation  have  impacts  on  the  IPO  pricing  in  the 
long-run,  which  in  turn  affect  the  IPO  performance.  Therefore,  3  nested  long-run 
returns  models  are  developed  to  analyse  the  behaviour  of  those  predictors  towards 
the  movement  of  IPO  prices  in  the  long  run. 
The  first  model  analyses  the  relationship  between  the  prospectus 
information  and  the  IPO  long  run  performance  (Model  1).  Then,  the  model  is 
extended  by  including  the  privatisation  dummy  (Model  II).  Finally,  to  examine  the 
impact  of  the  initial  `mispricing'  on  day  1,  the  valuation  residuals  (Resi)  and  the 
IPO  initial  returns  on  day  1  (IRs)  are  included  in  the  model  (Model  III). 
284 This  section  follows  the  structure  of  the  IR  analysis  in  the  previous 
chapter.  It  starts  with  the  presentation  of  the  results  for  the  IPO  long-run 
performance  models  (table  6.6,6.7,  and  6.8)  then  followed  by  a  series  of 
discussions  on  the  role  of  fundamentals,  signals,  privatisation,  initial  valuation, 
day  1  pricing,  in  determining  the  IPO  long-run  performance.  Then,  this  is 
followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  IPO  long-run  returns  models,  a  number  of 
sensitivity  analyses  are  presented,  and  finally  a  chapter  conclusion. 
6.3.1  IPO  abnormal  returns  analysis 
It  has  been  discussed  widely  in  the  descriptive  statistics  analysis  that, 
contrary  to  prior  studies,  the  research  sample  as  a  whole  does  not  underperform 
the  market  in  the  long  run,  up  to  3  years  after  the  admission.  The  constant 
coefficient  of  the  long-run  performance  models  represent  the  average  buy  and 
hold  abnormal  returns  for  corresponding  periods,  after  controlling  for  other 
information,  such  as  prospectus  information,  privatisation,  initial  and  day  1 
valuation  effect.  Table  6.6,6.7  and  6.8  exhibit  that  all  of  the  constant  coefficients 
appear  to  be  negative,  which  may  indicate  the  long  run  underperformance  of  the 
research  sample. 
6.3.2  Fundamental  analysis 
The  IR  model  shows  that,  to  some  extend  the  fundamental  -  in  this  case, 
the  pro-forma  book  value  to  offer  price  ratios  -  affects  the  determination  of  IRs. 
However,  the  results  of  the  long-run  returns  models  demonstrate  different 
outcomes.  The  working  hypothesis  maintains  that  the  IPO  long-run  performance 
is  an  increasing  function  of  the  fundamentals,  implying  that  positive  coefficients 
285 Table  6.6  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long-run  performances  on  the 
prospectus  information  (Model  I) 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  analysis  for  all  1PO  sample,  of  the  buy 
and  hold  abnormal  returns  for  1  year,  2  years,  and  3  years  (BHARly;  BHAR2y;  BHAR3y) 
on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBY/Po),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by 
the  offer  price  (fE/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's 
age  (Age),  and  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq).  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are 
reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  BHAR1y  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  -0.202  -0.337  -1.350 
(-0.52)  (-0.44)  (-1.57) 
pBV/Po  -0.051  0.425  -0.067 
(-0.32)  (1.62)  (-0.23) 
ON  1.99***  0.957  0.758 
(3.46)  (0.67)  (0.88) 
Size  -0.008  -0.041  0.081 
(-0.29)  (-0.09)  (1.32) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.077  -0.155  -0.259** 
(-1.12)  (-1.25)  (-2.41) 
Cap  -0.049  -0.120  0.0479 
(-0.83)  (-0.88)  (0.35) 
Effr  -0.349**  -0.822***  -0.975*** 
(-2.59)  (-2.88)  (-2.91) 
Cpy  0.046  -0.101  0.470** 
(0.45)  (-0.55)  (2.26) 
Ind  0.509  1.135  1.306 
(1.24)  (1.37)  (1.40) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.179*  0.191*  0.247** 
(1.81)  (1.87)  (2.21) 
Age  -0.011  -0.479**  -0.100 
(-0.39)  (-2.33)  (-1.67) 
Eq  -0.120  -0.479*  0.094 
(-0.72)  (-1.85)  (0.30) 
N  161  161  144 
Adj  R-square  0.049  0.058  0.086 
Wald  regression  32.50***  28.07***  39.34*** 
Wald  fundamental  11.98***  3.14  3.53 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  10.82*  10.86*  17.47*** 
Wald  signals  2.76  10.42**  6.82* 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1% 
286 are  expected  for  the  pBY/Po  and  fE/Po.  Table  6.2  above  shows  that  in  year  1, 
pBV/Po  appears  to  be  negatively  related  to  the  BHARly,  which  is  inconsistent  to 
the  theoretical  base.  In  year  2  and  year  3,  they  change  to  become  positive. 
However,  none  of  the  pBY/P0  coefficients  appear  to  be  statistically  significant. 
Hence,  this  study  is  not  able  to  confirm  the  impact  ofpBY/PO  on  the  IPO  long-run 
performance. 
In  the  subsequent  tables  (table  6.7,  page  302  and  table  6.8,  page  305), 
introducing  other  predictors  does  not  improve  the  impact  of  pBV/Po  on  BHARs. 
Even  more,  the  coefficients  in  year  3  alter  to  become  negative,  yet  remain 
insignificant.  Therefore,  it  could  be  inferred  that  in  the  long  run,  the  pro-forma 
book  value  is  no  longer  important  to  price  the  IPOs,  since  the  actual  book-value 
figures,  which  are  more  relevant,  have  been  available  to  the  market  at  that  time. 
As  prior  studies  have  revealed,  the  actual  book  value  to  market  ratio  is  robustly 
and  significantly  related  to  the  stock  returns. 
Nonetheless,  an  interesting  finding  is  the  relationship  between  the 
forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  and  the  BHARly.  Table  6.6  demonstrates 
that  the  forecasted  earnings  is  positively  and  significantly  related  to  the  BHARly, 
implying  that  the  IPOs  that  report  higher  forecasted  earnings  tend  to  have  greater 
returns  in  the  following  year  after  the  admission.  This  fact  is  understandable  since 
the  forecasted  earnings  figures  disclosed  in  the  offering  prospectuses  are  the  1- 
year  forecasts.  Therefore,  it  shows  the  relevancy  of  the  forecasted  earnings  to  the 
IPO  pricing  from  the  first  trading  day  up  to  a  year  after  the  offerings.  To  the 
researcher's  knowledge,  since  there  have  been  no  prior  studies  examining  the 
relationship  between  the  forecasted  earnings  and  IPO  long  run  performance,  this 
287 study  is  the  firsts  to  find  such  a  significant  relationship.  Moreover,  the  result  adds 
valuable  knowledge  about  the  usefulness  of  the  earning  forecasts  disclosures. 
The  results  of  the  extended  models  also  prove  that  the  impact  of  the 
forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  on  the  BHARIy  is  robust  to  the  inclusion  of 
any  additional  control  variable.  Even  more,  the  magnitudes  of  the  coefficients 
show  increasing  figures,  suggesting  that  when  the  models  are  controlled  for 
privatisation,  valuation  residuals,  and  initial  market  pricing  effects,  the  forecasted 
earnings  put  greater  weights  on  the  BHARIy. 
However,  the  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  loses  its  significance 
in  the  subsequent  years.  All  IPO  long-run  returns  models  fail  to  find  any  evidence 
of  the  forecasted  earnings  impact  on  BHAR2y  and  BHAR3y,  suggesting  that  for 
the  longer  periods,  such  information  is  not  relevant  any  more  to  the  IPO  returns. 
At  those  times,  the  actual  earnings  figures  have  been  made  available  to  the 
market,  which  presumably,  is  more  relevant  to  the  IPO  pricing  and  their 
performances. 
As  explained  in  the  research  design  chapter,  the  IPO  long  run  performance 
models  include  the  Size  variable  in  the  analysis.  The  inclusion  of  Size  is  purposed 
to  control  for  the  common  risk  factors  in  the  stock  returns  as  suggested  by  Fama 
and  French  (1992),  and  frequently  applied  in  long  run  returns  studies  (e.  g., 
Gleason  and  Lee,  2002). 
The  working  hypothesis  posits  a  negative  relationship  between  firm  size 
(Size)  and  the  IPO  long  run  performance.  The  results  of  model  I  demonstrate 
negative  coefficients  for  Size,  as  expected.  However,  none  of  the  Size  coefficients 
are  significant  in  model  I.  The  coefficients  gain  significance  for  year  1  when  the 
privatisation  dummy  is  introduced  into  the  model  (models  II  and  III).  However, 
288 the  significance  disappears  in  the  longer  periods.  The  results  imply  that  IPOs  with 
greater  market  capitalisation  at  the  IPO  tend  to  have  lower  abnormal  returns  on 
their  first  anniversary.  The  association  between  Size  and  the  IPO  abnormal  returns 
becomes  unclear  in  the  longer  period  (year  2  and  3),  which  is  possibly  because 
more  relevant  figures  of  the  market  capitalisation  is  available  to  the  market. 
In  sum,  mixed  results  are  found  regarding  the  association  between  the 
fundamentals  in  the  prospectus  and  the  IPO  long-run  performance.  The  pro-forma 
book  value  to  offer  price  ratio  appears  to  have  no  impact  on  the  IPO  long-run 
returns,  while  the  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  is  robustly  related  to  the 
BHARIy,  but  irrelevant  in  the  subsequent  years. 
6.3.3  Ex-ante  risk  factor  analysis 
Similar  to  the  testable  hypotheses  on  IRs,  the  working  hypotheses 
regarding  the  relationship  between  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  the  IPO  long  run 
performance  are  based  on  the  general  positive  risk-returns  association. 
Additionally,  it  is  also  expected  that  the  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  the 
IPO  performance  is  weaker  in  the  longer  period. 
The  results  of  model  I,  which  is  shown  in  table  6.6  exhibit  interesting 
findings.  While  little  evidence  is  found  to  explain  the  association  between  the  ex- 
ante  risk  factors  and  the  BHARly,  a  number  of  substantial  results  are  found  in 
year  3,  which  is  not  as  expected.  A  similar  pattern  is  also  found  in  the  successive 
IPO  long-run  performance  models  (Model  II  and  III). 
The  result  of  model  I  shows  that  Leverage  risk  (Lev)  is  negatively  related 
to  BHARs.  This  suggests  that  IPOs  with  higher  leverage  risk  tend  to  have  lower 
BHAR  up  to  3  years  after  the  admission,  which  contradicts  to  the  hypothesis. 
289 However,  it  is  in  line  with  the  result  of  Hedge  and  Miller  (1996),  who  argue  that 
instead  of  risk,  debt  is  often  used  as  a  signal  to  the  firm's  value.  It  implies  that 
high-quality  firms  deliberately  increase  firm's  debt  prior  to  IPOs  in  order  to  reveal 
its  true  value.  Therefore,  it  could  be  inferred  that  a  higher  debt  ratio  reflects  the 
higher  quality  of  the  firm,  which  is  then  expected  to  produce  higher  returns  in  the 
long  run.  Another  explanation  is  that  the  higher  debt  preceding  the  offering  date 
could  play  as  a  certification  of  firm's  quality  from  the  third  party,  such  as  banks. 
Slovin  and  Young  (1990)  argue  that  the  firms,  which  successfully  obtain 
borrowing  from  the  banks  prior  to  the  public  offering,  have  been  through  the 
extensive  assessment  on  their  qualities.  Such  firms  are  considered  as  good  firms. 
Therefore,  it  is  unsurprising  that  in  the  long  run  they  produce  greater  returns. 
However,  while  the  Lev-BHARs  relationship  is  statistically  significant  3 
years  after  the  admission,  the  coefficients  are  insignificant  during  the  1-year  and 
2-year  period.  It  suggests  that  it  takes  times  for  the  market  to  fully  take  Lev  into 
account  as  a  signal  to  the  firm's  quality. 
The  Lev  coefficients  remain  unchanged  in  model  II  and  III.  It  implies  that 
the  result  is  robust  to  any  additional  predictors  in  the  models.  However, 
controlling  the  models  for  the  privatisation,  valuation  residuals,  and  initial  market 
pricing  effects,  does  slightly  reduce  the  magnitudes  of  the  Lev  coefficients. 
The  impact  of  capital  availability  risk  (Cap)  to  BHARs  is  in  line  with  the 
hypothesis.  The  negative  coefficients  imply  that  the  more  internal  capital  available 
to  the  IPO  firms,  the  less  risky  the  IPOs,  then  it  results  in  the  lower  expected 
return.  However,  the  Cap-BHAR  relationship  is  statistically  insignificant. 
The  efficiency  risk  (Effr)  is  the  only  ex-ante  risk  factor  that  appears  to 
have  consistent  results  over  the  periods  and  across  the  BHAR  models.  The  Effr  is 
290 negatively  and  significantly  related  to  BHARs.  This  implies  that  the  less  efficient 
IPO  firms,  which  are  considered  as  riskier  IPOs,  tend  to  have  lower  returns.  This 
result  rejects  the  working  hypothesis,  which  expects  a  positive  association  based 
on  the  theoretical  risk-return  relationship.  As  defined  in  the  research  design 
chapter,  Effr  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  the  cost  of  goods  sold  over  sales. 
Therefore,  the  higher  Effr  could  be  understood  as  less  operating  efficiency,  which 
implies  the  firm  is  defined  as  more  risky.  However,  apparently,  the  investors  do 
not  interpret  the  Effr  as  a  common  risk.  It  seems  that  they  identify  the  operating 
efficiency  as  a  firm  performance  measure.  The  low  performance  firms  tend  to  be 
valued  lowly  in  the  market,  which  in  turn  result  in  lower  return.  Hence,  less 
efficient  firms  result  in  lower  BHARs. 
The  consistency  of  the  Effr  results  throughout  all  the  IPO  long  run 
performance  models,  after  controlling  for  the  privatisation,  valuation  residuals, 
and  initial  market  pricing  effects,  demonstrate  the  robustness  of  its  impact  on  the 
BHARs. 
Model  I  in  table  6.6  demonstrates  mixed  results  for  Capacity  risk  (Cpy). 
The  signs  of  the  coefficient  alter  in  every  period.  Cpy  is  positively  related  to 
BHARIy  and  BHAR3y,  but  it  turns  to  be  negatively  related  to  BHAR2y.  However, 
the  coefficient  becomes  more  consistent  in  other  extended  models  after  controlling 
for  the  privatisation,  valuation  residuals,  and  initial  `mispricing'  effects  (table  6.7 
and  6.8).  Yet,  the  Cpy-BHARs  relationship  appears  to  be  significant  only  in  year 
3. 
Since  Cpy  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  investment  plan  cost  over  the  IPO 
net  proceeds,  it  means  that  the  higher  the  investment  plan  cost,  the  lower  the 
capacity  risk,  the  greater  the  expected  long-term  returns.  The  result  presented  in 
291 table  6.6  suggests  a  positive  coefficient  of  Cpy.  This  result  rejects  the  testable 
hypothesis,  which  predicts  a  positive  relationship  between  capacity  risk  and  IPO 
long-run  performance.  Similar  to  the  explanation  to  the  efficiency  risk  (Effr),  the 
investors,  apparently,  interpret  such  information  differently.  From  the  issuer's 
point  of  view,  the  greater  the  investment  plan  cost  means  the  lower  the  probability 
that  the  firms  is  under  their  optimal  production  capacity,  which  indicates  the  lower 
capacity  risks.  However,  from  the  investors'  point  of  view,  the  greater  fraction  of 
net  proceeds  allocated  for  the  investment  means  greater  funds  go  to  uncertain 
project,  indicating  higher  risks.  Consequently,  from  the  investors'  perspective,  the 
greater  investment  cost,  relatively  to  IPO  net  proceeds,  the  riskier  the  IPOs,  and 
the  greater  IPO  long-run  returns  expected.  That  argument  could  explain  the 
positive  Cpy-BHARs  associations.  Additionally,  the  relationship  is  insignificant 
for  the  shorter  period;  perhaps,  as  the  investment  proposal  disclosed  in  the 
prospectuses  are  usually  long-term  projects.  Therefore,  it  needs  a  longer  period  to 
detect  its  impact  on  the  IPO  performance. 
Prior  studies  (e.  g.,  Klein,  1996;  Leone  et  al.,  2003)  examine  the  usefulness 
of  the  usage  of  IPO  net  proceeds  for  pricing  the  IPOs.  Although  using  different 
proxies  for  the  usage  of  the  proceeds,  they  find  similar  results  that  conclude  the 
value  relevance  of  such  information.  However,  to  the  researcher's  knowledge,  the 
result  from  this  study  is  among  the  first  to  find  a  significant  impact  of  the 
information  of  the  IPO  net  proceeds  usage  on  the  IPO  subsequent  performance. 
The  last  ex-ante  risk  factor  is  industry  risk  (Ind).  The  testable  hypothesis 
on  its  relation  to  IPO  long-run  performance  expects  positive  coefficients,  which 
suggests  the  IPOs  in  riskier  industries  are  expected  to  have  higher  long-run 
returns.  The  results  for  all  models  show  positive  Ind-BHARs  association;  however, 
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Ind  is  insignificantly  related  to  BHARs  when  the  models  only  include  the 
prospectus  information,  and  when  the  privatisation  dummy  is  included  as  a 
predictor  (model  II  and  III).  It  does,  however,  become  relevant  to  the  IPO  3-year 
performance  once  the  models  include  additional  control  variables,  such  as  the 
valuation  residuals  and  the  IRs. 
In  sum,  mixed  results  are  found  on  the  relationship  between  each  ex-ante 
risk  factor  and  the  IPO  long-run  performance.  Efficiency  risk  (Effr)  is  the  only 
risk  factor  that  demonstrates  consistent  results  throughout  the  periods  and  models, 
while  Capital  availability  risk  (Cap)  is  the  one  that  appear  to  have  no  significant 
impact  on  BHARs.  Among  the  market  participants,  there  is  evidence  of  different 
views  of  risk  recognition  in  a  number  of  ex-ante  risk  factor  examined,  such  as 
Leverage  risk  (Lev),  Efficiency  risk  (Effr),  and  Capacity  risk  (Cpy).  The  impacts 
of  most  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  take  longer  than  expected,  Leverage  risk  and 
Capacity  risk  appears  to  be  insignificant  during  the  1-year  and  2-year  periods  but 
eventually  turn  out  to  be  significantly  related  to  the  IPO  long-run  returns.  The 
results  of  Industry  risk  are  mixed.  They  appear  to  be  sensitive  to  the  model 
specifications.  The  impact  of  Industry  risk  on  the  BHARs  is  significant  once  the 
models  control  for  the  effects  of  privatisation,  valuation  residuals,  and  initial 
market  pricing. 
In  sum,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  demonstrate  mixed  results  throughout  the 
research  periods.  The  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  the  IPO  performance  is 
limited  in  the  shorter  period  (1-year  period),  but  it  is  more  influential  in  the  longer 
period  (3-year  period).  This  suggests  the  market  needs  a  longer  period  to  detect 
the  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  the  IPO  performance.  Moreover,  the  ex- 
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those  expected,  implying  that  those  proxies  are  perceived  as  signals  rather  than 
ex-ante  risk  factors.  The  results  of  Industry  risk  are  robust,  suggesting  that  IPOs 
in  the  riskier  industries  tend  to  have  greater  BHARs.  A  similar  result  is  found  for 
the  Capacity  risk,  however  the  impact  is  significant  in  the  longer  period  (3-year 
period).  No  evidence  is  found  to  support  the  Capital  availability  risk  having  an 
impact  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance. 
6.3.4  Signalling  analysis 
The  signals  used  in  this  study  have  been  used  widely  in  the  IPO  literature. 
Therefore,  the  working  hypotheses  on  each  signal  are  based  on  the  empirical 
evidence  found  in  prior  studies.  The  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo)  is  expected 
to  have  positive  coefficients,  implying  that  IPOs  brought  to  market  by  prestigious 
sponsors  tend  to  have  higher  long-run  abnormal  returns. 
In  all  models  and  all  periods,  Spo  appears  to  be  positively  related  to  the 
BHARs,  which  is  consistent  to  the  hypothesis.  However,  the  coefficients  are 
statistically  significant  only  for  the  3-year  abnormal  returns  for  all  models, 
implying  that  IPOs  brought  to  the  market  by  prestigious  sponsors  tend  to  show 
significant  higher  returns  after  3  years  traded  in  the  market.  In  terms  of  time,  the 
results  are  quite  surprising,  as  it  is  expected  that  the  role  of  sponsor  reputation  as 
the  third  party's  certification  of  the  firm's  value,  would  have  an  important  impact 
in  the  early  days  of  the  IPOs,  rather  than  in  the  longer  run. 
The  results  tend  to  go  along  with  another  implication  of  agent  reputation. 
Carter  and  Manaster  (1990)  refer  it  to  the  `picking'  game.  Having  robust  result  of 
the  impact  of  underwriter  reputation  on  both  IPO  initial  and  long  run  returns,  they 
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firms,  such  as  to  maintaining  their  reputation.  Meanwhile,  the  less  prestigious 
underwriters  are  left  with  `bad'  firms.  Consequently,  it  appears  that  IPOs  with  the 
prestigious  underwriter  are  expected  to  perform  better  than  ones  with  the  less 
prestigious  underwriter.  Based  on  this  argument,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  the 
delay  of  the  impact  of  Spo,  as  the  IPO  performance,  then,  is  as  a  result  of  `good' 
firms.  The  market  may  need  time  to  observe  the  firm's  quality  in  the  long  run. 
The  empirical  evidence  supports  the  working  hypothesis  H15a,  which 
claims  a  positive  relationship  between  sponsor  reputation  and  the  IPO  long  run 
performance.  It  also  corroborates  the  findings  from  previous  findings  (Hogue  et 
al.,  2002),  although  it  contradicts  the  result  from  other  studies  (e.  g.,  Carter  et  al., 
1998). 
Having  argued  that  older  firms  tend  to  have  more  experience  in  business, 
the  firm's  age  could  be  a  good  signal  to  reveal  the  firm's  value.  In  the  long  run  it 
is  also  expected  to  have  stable  operations,  which  is  eventually  reflected  in  the 
market  prices.  Therefore,  the  testable  hypothesis  expects  positive  coefficients  for 
Age. 
The  results  for  Age  are  mixed.  In  all  models,  it  appears  that  the  firm's  age 
is  insignificantly  related  to  BHAR1y.  Yet,  eventually,  the  empirical  evidence 
shows  that  firm's  age  is  negatively  related  to  IPO  abnormal  returns  in  year  2  and 
3,  implying  that  older  firms  tend  to  have  lower  returns.  The  result  is  contrary  to 
the  working  hypothesis  H15b. 
The  result  infers  that  younger  firms  are  likely  to  have  significantly  higher 
abnormal  returns  in  years  2  and  3.  This  could  be  explained  as  follows.  Most  of  the 
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young  firms  is  high  growth  of  earnings.  If  the  market  believes  on  the  high 
potential  earnings  growth  of  the  IPO  young  firms,  it  is  likely  the  young  firms  are 
valued  higher,  which  in  turn  results  in  higher  returns. 
Many  studies  attempt  to  examine  the  impact  of  firm's  age  at  the  IPO  on  its 
initial  and  subsequent  performance.  However,  most  of  them  fail  to  find  a 
significant  impact  of  firm's  age  on  the  IPO  performance.  Therefore,  this  study  is 
one  of  the  few  that  find  evidence  of  firm's  age  having  an  impact  on  the  IPO  long- 
run  returns. 
The  last  signal  examined  is  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  offerings 
(Eq).  It  could  be  argued  that  this  variable  is  the  most  used  signal  in  the  IPO 
literature,  since  it  shows  very  consistent  results  over  different  time  periods, 
markets,  and  regimes.  The  testable  hypothesis  posits  negative  coefficients  of  Eq, 
implying  that  the  greater  the  fraction  of  the  enlarged  shares  sold  at  the  offerings 
signals  inferior  firm  value.  The  signal  involves  the  old  shareholder's  perception  of 
the  firm's  value  in  the  future.  Therefore  the  Eq-BHARs  association  is  expected  to 
be  negative. 
The  results  show  interesting  findings.  In  model  I,  where  the  model  only 
includes  the  prospectus  information,  Eq  is  negatively  related  to  BHARs,  yet,  this 
relationship  appears  to  be  significant  only  in  years  2  and  3.  However,  in  the 
extended  models  (models  II,  III,  and  IV),  the  results  are  more  consistent.  Eq  is 
negatively  and  significantly  related  to  BHARs  for  all  periods.  It  indicates  that 
firms  that  sold  higher  percentages  of  equity  tend  to  have  lower  IPO  returns. 
°  The  mean  of  firm's  age  at  the  IPO  of  the  research  sample  is  approximately  9  years  after  they  are 
incorporated,  and  the  median  of  approximately  7.5  years. 
296 This  finding  implies  that  Eq  serves  as  an  efficient  signal  for  IPOs,  as  the 
more  equity  sold  at  the  IPOs  indicates  that  the  old  shareholders  have  lower 
expectations  regarding  future  firm  value.  Consequently,  investors  put  lower  values 
on  such  IPOs,  which  in  turn  results  in  lower  IPO  long-run  returns.  This  result 
corroborates  the  finding  from  previous  studies  (e.  g.,  Koh  et  al.,  1992;  Khurshed  et 
al.,  1999).  However,  it  contradicts  the  conclusion  of  another  study  (e.  g., 
Ljunggvist,  1996). 
In  sum,  mixed  results  are  found  on  the  relationship  between  the  signals 
and  IPO  long-run  performance.  The  results  of  sponsor  reputation  tend  to 
demonstrate  that  the  Sponsors  are  likely  to  pick  `good'  firms,  which  then, 
eventually  produce  higher  returns  in  the  long  run.  The  result  of  firm's  age  does 
not  support  the  testable  hypothesis.  The  evidence  shows  that  younger  firms  tend  to 
generate  higher  long-run  abnormal  returns.  The  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the 
IPO  turn  out  to  be  as  predicted  and  confirms  prior  studies. 
6.3.5  Privatisation  and  IPO  long  run  performance  analysis 
As  presented  earlier  in  the  descriptive  analysis  and  throughout  the  section,  in  the 
long  run  PIPOs  are  priced  differently  to  the  non-privatisation  IPOs,  and  as  such 
robustly  affect  the  results  for  the  full  IPO  research  sample.  One  attempt  to  control 
for  the  privatisation  effect  on  the  results  is  to  include  a  dummy  variable.  Model  II 
is  an  extended  model  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  that  considers  the 
privatisation  effect.  Based  on  prior  research,  it  is  predicted  that  the  coefficients  of 
the  privatisation  dummy  (Priv)  are  positive.  Table  6.7  and  6.8  exhibit  strong 
results  for  Priv,  which  support  the  testable  hypothesis  H16.  The  results  imply  that 
in  the  long  run,  PIPOs  perform  better  than  the  non-PIPOs. 
297 Table  6.7  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long-run  performance  on  the 
prospectus  information  and  privatisation  dummy  (Model  II) 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  analysis  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  buy 
and  hold  abnormal  returns  for  1  year,  2  years,  and  3  years  (BHAR1y;  BHAR2y;  BHAR3y) 
on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBVIPo),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by 
the  offer  price  (/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's 
age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  and  privatisation  dummy  (Priv) 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  BHAR1y  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  0.138  0.301  -0.799 
(0.35)  (0.39)  (0.89) 
pBV/Po  -0.095  0.342  -0.139 
(-0.60)  (1.30)  (-0.46) 
Alpo  2.223***  1.399  0.134 
(3.83)  (0.99)  (0.13) 
Size  -0.064*  -0.107*  -0.031 
(-2.04)  (3.95)  (-0.47) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.049  -0.104  -0.219** 
(-0.71)  (-0.91)  (-2.15) 
Cap  -0.092  -0.199  -0.047 
(-1.59)  (-1.48)  (-0.33) 
Effr  -0.382***  -0.886***  -1.017*** 
(-2.99)  (-3.26)  (-3.15) 
Cpy  0.126  0.019  0.635*** 
(1.27)  (0.25)  (3.08) 
Ind  0.570  1.250  1.557* 
(1.49)  (1.53)  (1.79) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.113*  0.206*  0.264* 
(1.77)  (1.94)  (1.86) 
Age  -0.005  -0.102**  -0.089 
(-0.18)  (-2.20)  (-1.52) 
Eq  -0.610**  -1.398***  -0.877** 
(3.09)  (3.96)  (-2.17) 
Priv  0.768***  1.442***  1.461*** 
(4.33)  (3.95)  (3.42) 
N  161  161  144 
Adj.  R-square  0.112  0.108  0.134 
Wald  regression  59.74***  61.11***  59.18*** 
Wald  fundamental  14.65***  2.84  4.61 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  18.12***  13.92**  22.37*** 
Wald  signals  11.42***  22.80***  10.63** 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1% 
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holding  them  in  the  long  run  result  in  higher  profit  than  if  they  invest  in  the  non- 
PIPOs.  For  example,  the  results  of  model  II  shows  that  the  Priv  coefficient  takes  a 
value  of  1.334,  meaning  that  after  controlling  for  other  characteristics  of  the  IPOs, 
investors,  who  buy  the  PIPOs  and  hold  them  until  the  PIPOs'  third  anniversary,  on 
average,  gain  133.4%  more  profits  than  if  they  buy  the  non-privatisation  IPOs. 
This  result  is  in  line  with  the  findings  of  previous  studies  (e.  g.,  Menyah  et  al., 
1995;  Dewenter  and  Malatesta,  1997;  Samat,  2000). 
Additionally,  the  magnitudes  of  the  coefficients  show  increasing  figures 
over  the  periods,  implying  that  for  the  longer  period  the  gap  between  PIPOs 
performance  and  their  counterparts  is  greater.  This  supports  the  descriptive 
statistics  analysis  that  exhibits  an  escalating  superiority  of  PIPOs  abnormal  returns 
to  the  non-privatisation  IPOs:  As  the  evidence  shows  the  important  effect  of  the 
privatisation  to  the  overall  results,  this  study  also  attempt  to  totally  isolate  such 
effects  by  splitting  the  research  sample  into  the  privatisation/non-privatisation 
sub-samples,  and  examine  whether  other  predictors  behave  differently.  The  results 
of  the  non-privatisation  IPOs  are  presented  later  in  the  Sensitivity  analysis  section. 
6.3.6  Valuation  residuals,  initial  returns  and  long-run  performance 
It  is  argued  here  that  the  valuation  residual  (Resi),  to  some  extend,  may 
affect  the  long-run  performance.  In  the  hypothesis  development,  it  is  discussed 
that  the  IPOs  with  higher  Resi  are  expected  to  have  lower  initial  returns  (IRs). 
Hence  a  negative  association  between  the  Resi  and  the  IRs  is  expected.  It  is  also 
assumed  that  if  the  markets  are  efficient,  any  `mispricing'  in  the  early  days  of 
IPOs  is  corrected  in  the  long  run.  Thus,  it  is  expected  that  IPOs  with  higher  IRs 
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relationship  between  IRs  and  BHARs  (H18).  Therefore,  if  the  valuation  residuals 
are  greater,  IRs  are  expected  to  be  lower,  and  in  turn,  higher  BHARs  are  expected. 
Hence,  the  valuation  residuals  are  expected  to  be  positively  related  to  the  BHARs 
(H17). 
However,  the  result  in  the  previous  chapter  (IR  analysis)  shows  that  Resi  is 
positively  related  to  the  IPO  IRs.  Two  possible  implications  have  been  discussed 
in  the  IR  analysis  chapter.  The  first  implication  refers  to  the  market  momentum, 
and  the  second  is  to  the  signalling  theory.  The  IPO  long  run  model  III  includes 
Resi  and  IRs  in  the  analysis,  which  is  presented  in  table  6.8  below. 
The  prediction  is  that  if  the  IRs  on  day  1  is  driven  by  the  market 
momentum,  the  market  corrects  the  IPO  prices  in  the  long  run  (reversion  effect). 
Thus,  the  results  are  expected  as  posited  in  the  working  hypothesis.  However,  if 
the  Resi  is  a  signal  to  the  firms'  true  value,  it  is  expected  the  greater  Resi  results  in 
the  higher  IRs  and  higher  BHARs. 
The  results  in  table  6.8  show  that  Resi  is  positively  related  to  the  BHAR  in 
year  1,  and  negatively  related  to  BHARs  in  the  longer  period.  The  result  in  year  1 
is  in  line  with  the  signalling  theory,  while  the  results  in  year  2  and  3  are  aligned 
with  the  reversion  effect.  However,  none  of  the  Resi  coefficients  are  statistically 
significant.  Therefore,  the  results  do  not  confirm  working  hypothesis  H17. 
In  contrast,  the  IRs  shows  more  robust  results.  Surprisingly,  the 
coefficients  on  the  IRs  are  positive  and  statistically  significant  for  the  1-year  and 
2-year  periods.  The  significance  during  the  3-year  period  disappears,  but  the 
coefficient  still  retains  the  positive  sign.  The  result  implies  that  on  average,  IPOs 
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prospectus  information,  privatisation  dummy,  valuation  residuals,  and  initial 
returns  (Model  III) 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  analysis  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  buy  and  hold  abnormal  returns  for  1  year, 
2  years,  and  3  years  (BJIARI  y;  BHAR2y;  BHAR3y)  on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBVIP0),  forecasted 
earnings  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (/E/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk  (Effr),  capacity 
risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ina),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's  age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq), 
privatisation  dummy  (Priv),  valuation  residuals  (Resi),  and  initial  returns  (IR).  Heterosccdasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are 
reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  BHAR1y  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  -0.769  -0.525  -1.289 
(-0.19)  (-0.64)  (-1.33) 
pBV/Po  -0.565  0.348  -0.135 
(-0.34)  (1.39)  (-0.41) 
f/Po  2.219***  0.969  0.818 
(3.769)  (0.69)  (0.92) 
Size  -0.057*  -0.072  -0.008 
(-1.79)  (-1.29)  (-0.12) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.044  -0.106  -0.223** 
(-0.64)  (-1.01)  (-2.25) 
Cap  -0.094  -0.203  -0.055 
(-1.61)  (-1.60)  (-0.41) 
Effr  -0.373***  -0.834***  -0.982*** 
(-2.97)  (-3.34)  (-3.19) 
Cpy  0.141  0.116  0.685*** 
(1.41)  (0.61)  (3.23) 
Ind  0.689*  1.739**  1.841* 
(1.75)  (2.07)  (1.92) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.119*  0.211*  0.263* 
(1.78)  (1.75)  (1.92) 
Age  -0.003  -0.098**  -0.089 
(-0.12)  (-2.13)  (-1.56) 
Eq  -0.591***  -1.261***  -0.801* 
(-3.07)  (-3.77)  (1.94) 
Priv  0.689***  1.161***  1.298*** 
(3.97)  (3.29)  (2.99) 
Resi  0.005  -0.067  -0.047 
(0.87)  (-0.85)  (-0.64) 
IR  0.546*  1.886**  1.108 
(1.72)  (2.56)  (1.39) 
N  161  161  144 
Adj.  R-square  0.114  0.134  0.133 
Wald  regression  67.09***  74.70***  64.03*** 
Wald  fundamental  14.49***  2.35  3.79 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  19.55***  17.04***  23.76*** 
Wald  signals  11.45***  21.52***  10.73** 
Note:  *significant  at  10%;  **significant  at  5%;  *significant  at  I% 
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to  the  working  hypothesis.  This  result  is  also  supported  by  further  analysis  of  the 
relationship  between  IRs  and  BHARs  as  shown  in  table  6.9  below.  The  table 
exhibits  the  average  of  BHARs  on  the  IR  quartile  distribution.  It  is  clearly  seen 
that  for  year  1,  IPOs  that  have  lowest  IRs  generate  the  lowest  abnormal  returns. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  IPOs  that  have  highest  IRs  produce  the  highest  average 
abnormal  returns  on  their  first  listing  anniversary.  In  fact,  that  pattern  continues  in 
the  following  years  up  to  the  third  listing  anniversary. 
Table  6.9  The  BHARs  averages  on  the  IR  distribution 
The  table  contains  the  average  of  BHARly,  BHAR2y,  and  BHAR3y  on  the  IR 
quartile  distribution. 
Quartile  JR  range  BHAR1y  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
1  IR<=2.23  -4.52  -9.76  -22.27 
2  2.23<IR<=6.70  -0.73  2.43  -16.23 
3  6.70<IR<=13.63  2.34  9.84  -1.03 
4  IR>13.63  8.74  17.20  -0.12 
Earlier  in  the  IR  analysis,  results  of  several  predictors  (pBVIPO  and  Resi) 
on  the  IRs  indicate  market  momentum  on  day  1  that  results  in  the  IPOs,  which  are 
overvalued  relatively  to  their  fundamentals  at  the  offering,  are  valued  even  higher 
on  day  1.  In  relation  to  that  finding,  the  IPO  long  run  performance  result  suggests 
that  the  market  momentum  that  may  drive  the  IRs  on  day  1,  still  continue  up  to 
year  2.  It  seems  that  the  momentum  does  not  stop  promptly,  rather  it  continues  at 
least  up  to  the  2"a  listing  anniversary.  Thus,  the  IPO  prices  still  go  up  until  their 
2  "a  listing  anniversary.  In  year  3,  the  momentum  may  start  to  diminish,  which 
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insignificant. 
Even  though  the  results  do  not  confirm  the  working  hypothesis,  which  is 
based  on  the  efficient  market  hypothesis,  the  results  are  in  line  with  the  prediction 
of  the  signalling  theory.  However,  while  Welch  (1989)  argue  that  the  issuers 
deliberately  underprice  the  IPOs  to  signal  the  firm's  `true'  value,  the  result  of  this 
study  may  imply  that  the  issuers/sponsors  of  `good'  firms  set  the  offer  price  at  a 
premium  as  a  signal  to  the  firm's  true  value,  which  results  in  higher  IRs  on  day  1, 
and  the  greater  abnormal  returns  in  the  long  run. 
The  result  cannot  confirm  the  findings  from  previous  studies  (e.  g.,  Ritter, 
1991;  Levis,  1993).  However,  there  are  a  number  of  differences  between  prior 
studies  and  this  one.  The  first  is  that  the  results  from  prior  studies  are  based  on  the 
relation  between  the  IRs  and  the  longer  windows  (long  run  performance  covering 
from  3  up  to  5  years  post  IPO).  A  recent  study  by  Purnanandam  and  Swaminathan 
(2003)  finds  that  after  4  Y2  years  listed,  IPOs,  which  have  higher  IRs  underperform 
the  IPOs  that  have  lower  IRs.  However,  they  do  not  find  such  an  evidence  for  the 
shorter  period  (up  to  1  year). 
The  second  difference  is  that  prior  studies  use  different  benchmarks  in 
calculating  the  long  run  abnormal  returns.  Although  Levis  (1993)  also  attempts  to 
calculate  the  long  run  performance  using  the  BHAR  measure  and  the  Hoare  Govett 
Index  as  the  benchmark,  he  uses  the  CAR  measure  and  the  matching  firm 
benchmark  in  the  cross-section  analysis.  However,  in  general,  he  finds  no 
evidence  of  a  significant  difference  between  the  different  benchmarks  used. 
Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  the  benchmark  employed  in  this  study  (FTSECO 
index)  is  not  the  cause  of  the  different  result. 
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study,  as  explained  earlier,  includes  10  PIPOs.  As  discussed  earlier,  the 
descriptive  statistics  demonstrate  that  on  average  the  BHARs  for  the  PIPOs  are 
significantly  higher  than  the  BHARs  for  the  non-PIPOs.  Therefore,  separate 
analysis  for  the  non-PIPOs  are  also  undertaken  and  reported  in  the  next  section. 
In  sum,  mixed  results  are  found  on  the  relationship  between  the  initial 
`mispricing'  (the  valuation  residuals  and  the  IRs)  and  the  IPO  long  run 
performance  (BHARs).  The  analysis  does  not  find  any  significant  impact  of  Resi 
on  BHARs,  although  more  robust  results  are  found  on  the  relationship  between  IRs 
and  BHARs.  In  contrast  to  the  working  hypothesis,  the  IRs  is  positively  related  to 
BHARs,  suggesting  that  IPOs  that  have  higher  IRs  on  day  1  continue  to  have 
greater  BHARs  after  1  and  2  years.  In  conjunction  to  the  findings  from  the  IR 
analysis,  there  are  two  possible  explanations  to  the  results.  Firstly,  it  may  imply 
that  the  market  momentum  on  day  1,  as  suggested  in  the  IR  analysis,  continue  up 
to  the  IPOs'  2"a  listing  anniversary.  Secondly,  it  may  also  imply  that  the 
issuers/sponsors  of  `good'  firms  price  the  IPOs  at  the  premium  to  signal  the  firms' 
true  value,  which  results  in  higher  IRs  on  day  1  and  greater  subsequent  BHARs. 
6.4  Sensitivity  analysis 
In  the  prior  section,  it  has  been  demonstrated  and  discussed  the  robust 
impact  of  PIPOs  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance.  In  the  main  analysis  using  the 
full  sample,  the  PIPOs  impact  is  controlled  for  by  including  the  privatisation 
dummy  (Priv)  in  the  model.  Another  way  to  test  the  robustness  of  the  results  of 
the  main  analysis  is  to  totally  exclude  the  PIPOs  in  the  analysis,  by  running  the 
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PIPOs  sub  sample. 
The  results  are  presented  in  tables  6.10  and  6.11  below.  Since  the  analysis 
uses  the  non-PIPOs  sub  sample,  there  will  be  no  sensitivity  analysis  for  model  II  - 
the  IPO  long  run  performance  model  that  examines  the  impact  of  the  prospectus 
information  and  the  privatisation  dummy  on  the  BHARs. 
Overall,  the  results  indicate  that  the  models  work  as  well  as  with  the  full 
sample.  The  constant  term  shows  negative  coefficients,  although  only  in  year  3  is 
it  statistically  significant  for  both  models  (I  and  III),  suggesting  that  after 
controlling  for  other  factors,  the  non-PIPOs  underperform  the  market  after  3  years 
trading. 
Another  improvement  is  observed  in  the  Eq  variable.  The  main  results  for 
model  I  show  that  Eq  is  insignificant  related  to  BHAR1y,  however  it  turns  out  to 
be  significant  in  the  non-PIPOs  sub-sample  (table  6.6).  Moreover,  the  Eq 
demonstrates  statistically  robust  results.  It  implies  that  the  impact  of  the  Eq  on  the 
IPO  BHARs  is  strong,  although  its  impact  in  the  main  analysis  is  influenced  by  the 
interaction  between  the  Eq  and  the  privatisation  dummy.  Therefore,  after 
excluding  the  PIPOs,  the  result  highlights  the  robust  impact  of  Eq  on  the  IPO  long 
run  performance.  Other  results  remain  unchanged. 
As  mentioned  above,  the  sensitivity  analysis  is  carried  out  in  order  to  test 
the  robustness  of  the  IPO  long-run  performance  models.  Although  the  data  has 
been  treated  for  outliers  (see  the  research  design  chapter  regarding  outliers 
treatment),  it  is  still  necessary  to  check  the  results  for  that  effect.  Therefore,  all. 
IPO  long  run  performance  models  are  tested  by  using  the  robust  regression. 
305 Table  6.10  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long-run  performances  on  the 
prospectus  information  (Model  I)  for  Non-PIPOs  sub-sample 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  analysis  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  buy 
and  hold  abnormal  returns  for  1  year,  2  years,  and  3  years  (BHARly;  BHAR2y;  BHAR3y) 
on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBV/Po),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by 
the  offer  price  (fE/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's 
age  (Age),  and  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq).  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are 
reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  BHAR1y  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  -0.267  -0.525  -1.517* 
(0.61)  (-0.63)  (-1.82) 
pBV/Po  -0.072  0.396  -0.108 
(-0.43)  (1.46)  (-0.35) 
fE/po  1.979***  0.525  0.165 
(2.93)  (0.34)  (0.35) 
Size  -0.064**  -0.104  -0.026 
(-2.04)  (-1.81)  (-0.38) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.040  -0.085  -0.221** 
(-0.55)  (-0.71)  (-2.05) 
Cap  -0.088  0.189  -0.056 
(-1.47)  (-1.37)  (-0.39) 
Effr  -0.373***  -0.889***  -0.989*** 
(-2.95)  (-3.20)  (-3.06) 
Cpy  0.122  0.035  0.643*** 
(1.22)  (0.18)  (3.15) 
Ind  0.726*  1.671*  2.274** 
(1.71)  (1.89)  (2.32) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.114*  0.201  *  0.261  * 
(1.69)  (1.74)  (1.80) 
Age  -0.007  -0.094*  -0.081 
(-0.25)  (-1.84)  (-1.31) 
Eq  -0.609  -1.369***  -0.847* 
(-3.07)***  (-3.84)  (-1.97) 
N  151  151  133 
Adj  R-square  0.097  0.098  0.133 
Wald  regression  47.07***  37.13***  37.74*** 
Wald  fundamental  8.64**  2.33  1.86 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  16.99***  13.92**  23.50*** 
Wald  signals  11.22***  20.53***  9.22** 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  S%;  *  significant  at  1% 
306 Table  6.11  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long-run  performances  on 
prospectus  information,  valuation  residuals,  and  initial  returns  (Model  III) 
for  Non-privatisation  sub-sample 
The  table  contains  output  from  OLS  regression  analysis  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  buy 
and  hold  abnormal  returns  for  1  year,  2  years,  and  3  years  (BHAR1y;  BHAR2y;  BHAR3y) 
on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBVIPo),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by 
the  offer  price  (/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's 
age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  valuation  residuals  (Resi),  and  initial  returns 
(IR).  Heteroscedasticity-adjusted  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets. 
Variables  BHAR1y  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  -0.196  -0.916  -1.951* 
(-0.43)  (-1.01)  (-1.95) 
pBV/Po  -0.047  0.349  -0.144 
(-0.27)  (1.34)  (-0.43) 
ON  2.001**  0.011  0.735 
(2.93)  (0.01)  (0.73) 
Size  -0.056*  -0.061  0.003 
(-1.71)  (-1.04)  (0.05) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.039  -0.095  -0.231** 
(-0.53)  (-0.87)  (-2.18) 
Cap  -0.088  -0.184  -0.054  (-1.53)  (-1.38)  (-0.39) 
Effr  -0.361**  -0.838***  -0.949*** 
(-2.73)  (-3.30)  (-3.09) 
Cpy  0.139  0.108  0.692*** 
(1.39)  (0.57)  (3.28) 
Ind  0.826*  2.146**  2.549** 
(1.87)  (2.36)  (2.45) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.119*  0.201  *  0.251  * 
(1.78)  (1.74)  (1.85) 
Age  -0.007  -0.087*  -0.080  (-0.24)  (-1.76)  (-1.33) 
Eq  -0.584**  -1.198***  -0.7444* 
(-2.98)  (-3.51)  (-1.77) 
Resi  -0.001  -0.093  -0.072 
(-0.03)  (-1.12)  (-0.94) 
IR  0.540*  1.861**  1.047 
(1.75)  (2.67)  (1.26) 
N  151  151  133 
Adj.  R-square  0.097  0.125  0.108 
Wald  regression  53.42***  48.43***  41.13*** 
Wald  fundamental  8.11**  1.79  1.34 
Wald  ex-ante  risk  factors  18.18***  16.91***  24.31*** 
Wald  signals  10.77**  17.76***  8.69** 
307 The  results  of  the  robust  regressions  are  presented  in  tables  6.12,6.13  and  6.14. 
Overall,  the  robust  regression  analysis  for  model  I  (table  6.8)  shows  similarity  to 
the  results  of  the  OLS  regression.  The  fundamentals  work  as  well  as  it  does  in  the 
OLS  regression  analysis,  suggesting  that  outliers  do  not  affect  the  impacts  of 
fundamentals  on  the  BHARs.  The  results  also  maintain  negative  coefficients  for 
Size,  as  predicted,  and  they  are  only  significant  for  year  1,  as  found  in  the  main 
analysis.  Overall,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  also  perform  similarly;  however, 
Capacity  risk  (Cpy)  demonstrates  a  slightly  different  performance.  While  it 
appears  to  be  insignificantly  related  to  the  BHARs  in  the  main  analysis,  the  robust 
regression  analysis  finds  a  robust  result  of  Cpy,  implying  that  IPOs  that  disclose  a 
higher  fraction  of  net  proceeds  for  the  investment  tend  to  have  greater  BHARs  in  3 
years.  The  different  results  found  in  the  main  analysis  and  the  robust  regression 
analysis  is  possibly  due  to  some  extreme  values,  in  which  some  IPOs  propose 
100%  of  net  proceeds  to  fund  an  investment  project. 
Other  differences  are  detected  in  results  for  the  signals:  firm's  age  (Age) 
and  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  (Eq).  In  the  main  results,  Age  appears 
to  be  significantly  related  to  the  BHAR2y  and  BHAR3y.  However,  the  rank 
regression  analysis  cannot  find  the  evidence  for  year  3.  The  similar  problem  is 
also  found  with  regard  to  the  Eq.  The  main  results  show  the  significant  Eq-BHARs 
relationship  in  years  2  and  year  3,  but  it  loses  significance  in  the  rank  regression. 
In  other  models,  the  robust  regression  analyses  highlight  the  same  changes 
in  the  results  with  regard  to  Cpy  and  Age.  However,  there  is  no  difference  found 
for  Eq,  once  the  models  are  controlled  for  privatisations,  or  in  the  subsequent 
models. 
308 Table  6.12  Robust  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long-run  performance  on 
the  prospectus  information  (Model  I) 
The  table  contains  output  from  robust  regression  analysis  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  buy 
and  hold  abnormal  returns  for  1  year,  2  years,  and  3  years  (BHARly;  BHAR2y;  BHAR3y) 
on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBVIPo),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by 
the  offer  price  (JE/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's 
age  (Age),  and  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq). 
Variables  BHARly  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  -0.295  -0.409  -1.125 
(-0.64)  (-0.42)  (-0.96) 
pBV/Po  -0.113  0.395  0.157 
(-0.87)  (1.46)  (0.48) 
ON  2.295***  1.531  0.784 
(3.21)  (1.02)  (0.58) 
Size  0.001  0.001  0.103 
(0.03)  (0.01)  (1.45) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.108  -0.156  -0.243* 
(-1.63)  (-1.13)  (-1.78) 
Cap  -0.047  -0.073  -0.011 
(-0.70)  (-0.52)  (-1.48) 
Effr  -0.315**  -0.779**  -0.880** 
(-2.21)  (-2.61)  (-2.30) 
Cpy  0.099  -0.147  0.337* 
(0.99)  (-0.70)  (1.79) 
Ind  0.494  1.111  1.362 
(1.05)  (1.13)  (1.12) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.076  0.203  0.294* 
(1.09)  (1.40)  (1.84) 
Age  -0.002  -0.128*  -0.124 
(-0.06)  (-1.89)  (-1.54) 
Eq  -0.066  -0.430  0.007 
(-0.38)  (-1.20)  (0.02) 
N  161  161  161 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1% 
309 Table  6.13  Robust  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long-run  performance  on 
the  prospectus  information  and  privatisation  dummy  (Model  II) 
The  table  contains  output  from  robust  regression  analysis  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  buy 
and  hold  abnormal  returns  for  1  year,  2  years,  and  3  years  (BHARly;  BHAR2y;  BHAR3y) 
on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBVIPo),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by 
the  offer  price  (fE/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Ind),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's 
age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  and  privatisation  dummy  (Priv). 
Variables  BHAR1y  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  -0.103  -0.124  -0.883 
(-0.57)  (-0.35)  (-0.97) 
nBV/Pn  -0.171  0.243  -0.187 
(-1.09)  (0.87)  (-0.81) 
fE/po  2.227***  1.422  1.190 
(2.94)  (0.93)  (1.23) 
Size  -0.055*  -0.111  -0.014 
(-1.85)  (1.72)  (-0.16) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.083  -0.136  -0.219* 
(-0.97)  (-1.42)  (-1.98) 
Cap  -0.073  -0.186  -0.012 
(-1.07)  (-1.47)  (-0.08) 
Effr  -0.322**  -0.790***  -0.906** 
(-2.37)  (-2.97)  (-2.54) 
Cpy  0.107  -0.157  0.391* 
(1.39)  (-0.51)  (1.93) 
Ind  0.666  1.011  1.329* 
(1.48)  (1.55)  (1.77) 
Signals: 
Spo  0.083  0.177  0.213* 
(1.29)  (1.71)  (1.93) 
Age  -0.002  -0.105*  -0.077 
(-0.15)  (-1.83)  (1.51) 
Eq  -0.322**  -0.780**  -0.807** 
(-1.99)  (-2.69)  (-2.42) 
Priv  0.543**  1.044**  1.371** 
(2.88)  (2.32)  (2.70) 
N  161  161  144 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1% 
310 Table  6.14  Robust  Regression  analysis  of  the  IPO  long-run  performances 
on  prospectus  information,  privatisation  dummy, 
valuation  residuals,  and  initial  returns  (Model  III) 
The  table  contains  output  from  robust  regression  analysis  for  all  IPO  sample,  of  the  buy 
and  hold  abnormal  returns  for  1  year,  2  years,  and  3  years  (BHARly;  BHAR2y;  BHAR3y) 
on  pro  forma  book  value  scaled  by  the  offer  price  (pBY/Po),  forecasted  earnings  scaled  by 
the  offer  price  (JE/Po),  leverage  risk  (Lev),  capital  availability  risk  (Cap),  efficiency  risk 
(Effr),  capacity  risk  (Cpy),  industry  risk  (Intl),  sponsor  reputation  dummy  (Spo),  firm's 
age  (Age),  percentage  of  equity  sold  (Eq),  privatisation  dummy  (Priv),  valuation  residuals 
(Rest),  and  initial  returns  (IR). 
Variables  BHARIy  BHAR2y  BHAR3y 
(t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Constant  -0.344  -0.866  -1.14 
(-0.78)  (-0.93)  (-0.96) 
pBV/Po  -0.154  0.253  -0.069 
(-1.16)  (0.91)  (-0.20) 
FE/Po  2.340***  1.250  0.968 
(3.39)  (0.87)  (0.77) 
Size  -0.059*  -0.069  0.003 
(-1.81)  (-1.06)  (0.03) 
Risk  factors: 
Lev  -0.083  -0.118  -0.201 
(-1.32)  (-0.90)  (-1.29) 
Cap  -0.078  -0.172  -0.124 
(-1.23)  (-1.30)  (-0.70) 
Effr  -0.312**  -0.789***  -0.851** 
(-2.35)  (-2.90)  (-2.40) 
Cpy  0.203**  0.133  0.616** 
(2.07)  (0.65)  (2.33) 
Ind  0.639  1.777*  1.643* 
(1.42)  (1.89)  (1.69) 
Sign  als: 
Spo  0.072  0.189  0.260* 
(1.08)  (1.37)  (1.78) 
Age  0.007  -0.119*  -0.109 
(0.21)  (-1.87)  (-1.41) 
Eq  -0.451  **  -1.124**  -0.904* 
(-2.19)  (-2.60)  (-1.70) 
Priv  0.494**  0.912**  1.321** 
(2.58)  (2.28)  (2.67) 
Resi  -0.001  -0.096  -0.052 
(-0.00)  (-1.49)  (-0.61) 
IR  0.592*  1.946**  1.033 
(1.69)  (2.62)  (1.09) 
N  161  161  144 
Note:  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1% 
311 Overall,  the  results  of  model  II  and  III  appear  to  be  more  consistent  to  the  main 
results. 
In  sum,  two  sensitivity  analyses  are  conducted  to  detect  any  problem  that 
may  affect  the  results  of  the  main  analysis.  The  first  analysis  is  to  test  whether  the 
models  perform  differently  when  the  non-privatisation  sub-sample  is  used.  The 
results  show  a  robust  effect  of  privatisations  influencing  the  models'  explanatory 
power.  The  rank  regression  analysis  indicates  a  slight  change  to  the  main  results 
with  regard  to  the  capacity  risk  and  firm's  age  variables,  which  become  less 
significant  than  in  the  main  analysis. 
6.5  Validity  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  models 
To  this  point,  there  have  been  several  interesting  findings,  although  a 
surprising  result  is  the  evidence  that  demonstrates  how  the  prospectus  information 
appear  to  be  irrelevant  in  years  1  and  2,  yet  they  turn  out  to  be  significant  related 
to  the  1311AR3y.  Therefore,  it  is  predictable  that  the  adjusted  R-square  of  all  IPO 
long-run  returns  will  be  highest  in  year  3.  This  result  is  contrary  to  the  findings  of 
Bhabra  and  Pcttway  (2003).  Using  Canadian  data,  they  find  the  adjusted  R- 
squares  declining  throughout  the  periods,  suggesting  that  the  prospectus 
information  is  less  relevant  for  the  longer  period. 
The  adjusted  R-square  for  model  I  (table  6.6)  ranges  from  4.9%  to  8.6%, 
meaning  that  the  prospectus  information  could  explain  4.9%  of  the  variation  in 
BHARIy  and  up  to  8.6%  of  the  variation  in  BHAR3y.  The  Wald  statistics  of 
model  I  shows  that  the  model  is  statistically  significant  across  the  different  time 
periods,  suggesting  that  the  prospectus  information  as  a  whole  has  a  significant 
impact  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance.  Moreover,  the  Wald  statistics  for  each 
312 classification  of  the  prospectus  information  show  that  the  joint  restriction  of  the 
fundamentals  information  is  significant  in  year  1,  but  loses  significance  in  the 
longer  periods.  In  contrast,  the  joint  restriction  of  the  signals  appears  to  be 
insignificant  in  year  1,  but  gains  significance  in  the  longer  period.  Meanwhile,  the 
more  robust  results  are  found  in  the  joint  restriction  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors, 
which  are  significant  throughout  the  different  time  periods. 
Model  II  is  the  extended  model  I  after  adding  the  privatisation  dummy  into 
the  model  (see  table  6.7).  The  explanatory  power  of  model  II  improves 
significantly  to  the  range  from  11.2%  to  13.4%.  Similar  to  the  previous  model,  the 
Wald  statistics  of  model  II  shows  that  it  is  a  valid  model  at  least  at  the  99%  level 
of  significance  across  the  different  periods.  The  joint  restriction  of  the 
fundamentals  shows  a  similar  pattern  to  the  previous  model.  However,  the  joint 
restriction  of  the  signals  improves  in  model  II  in  which  the  signals  as  a  unit  is 
significantly  related  to  the  BHARs  through  the  different  periods. 
Model  III  is  the  extended  model  II  after  the  inclusion  of  the  valuation 
residual  and  the  IPO  initial  returns  into  the  model  (see  table  6.8).  With  robust 
results  for  the  association  between  the  IRs  and  the  BHARs  in  years  1  and  2,  the 
explanatory  power  of  model  III  for  those  periods  slightly  increase.  However,  in 
year  3,  the  explanatory  power  of  model  III  is  virtually  similar  to  the  explanatory 
power  of  model  II.  The  joint  restrictions  of  each  group  of  the  prospectus 
information  are  similar  to  the  results  of  model  II. 
In  terms  of  the  model's  explanatory  power,  the  non-privatisation  sub- 
sample  exhibits  stronger  results  in  model  I.  For  example,  the  adjusted  R-square  of 
model  I  in  year  I  using  the  full  sample  is  4.9%,  while  the  non-PIPOs  sub-sample 
demonstrates  a  significantly  higher  explanatory  power  of  9.7%  (see  table  6.10).  It 
313 means  that  by  totally  isolating  the  privatisation  effect,  the  prospectus  information 
explains  higher  variations  in  BHAR1y.  Additionally,  it  confirms  the  robustness  of 
the  privatisation  effect  that  influences  the  performance  of  the  IPO  long-run  returns 
model. 
However,  the  privatisation  effect  does  not  appear  to  have  a  similar 
influence  for  the  subsequent  models.  The  results  of  model  III  (table  6.11) 
demonstrates  that  instead  of  increasing,  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model  is 
lower  than  the  ones  of  the  full  IPO  sample.  Yet,  the  outcomes  confirm  the  fact  that 
the  privatisation  effect  significantly  influences  the  IPO  long  run  returns  models. 
The  Wald  statistics  shows  that  using  the  non  PIPOs  sub  sample  does  not 
change  the  validity  of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  models.  The  models  are  valid 
across  the  different  periods.  The  joint  restrictions  of  the  prospectus  information 
classifications  for  the  non-PIPOs  sub  sample  perform  similarly  to  the  ones  for  the 
full  sample.  The  joint  restrictions  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  are  robust.  The 
fundamentals  joint  restriction  is  significant  only  in  year  1.  Meanwhile,  the  joint 
restrictions  of  the  signals  are  more  robust  for  the  non-PIPOs,  as  they  are 
statistically  significant  across  the  models  and  the  different  periods. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  presented  and  discussed  the  IPO  performance  of  the 
research  sample  in  the  long  run  (up  to  3  years  post-IPO).  IPO  long  run 
performance  has  been  defined  as  the  investors'  abnormal  returns  from  a  day  after 
the  IPOs  to  the  1St,  2nd,  and  3d  listing  anniversaries.  In  contrast  to  prior  studies 
(e.  g.,  Ritter,  1991;  Levis,  1993),  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  buy  and  hold 
abnormal  returns  (BHARs)  demonstrate  that  the  research  sample  outperform  the 
314 market  in  year  1.  The  BHARs  start  to  decrease  in  year  2,  and  have  a  negative  mean 
value  in  year  3,  yet  the  statistical  test  cannot  confirm  the  significance  of  the 
research  sample  underperformance. 
However,  when  the  research  sample  is  broken  down  into  the 
privatisation/non-privatisation  and  the  survivor/non-survivor  sub-samples,  the 
non-PIPOs  estimates  uncover  evidence  of  the  long-run  underperformance  in  year 
3,  and  so  do  the  non-survivors. 
Mixed  results  are  found  on  the  relationship  between  the  prospectus 
information  and  the  IPO  long  run  performance.  From  the  fundamentals  group, 
only  the  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price  ratio  is  significantly  related  to  the  IPO 
BIJARs  in  year  1,  but  loses  significance  for  the  longer  periods.  The  result  is 
understandable  as  the  earnings  figure  used  in  this  study  is  the  1-year  forecasted 
earnings,  therefore  this  information  is  relevant  to  the  IPO  pricing  after  1  year 
trading.  Additionally,  the  actual  figures  of  earnings  and  book  value  of  equity  have 
been  available  to  the  market,  which  are  more  relevant  in  pricing  the  IPOs  in  the 
longer  periods.  Since  the  analysis  only  finds  evidence  of  the  fundamentals  impact 
on  the  BHARs  for  year  1,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  joint  restriction  of  the 
fundamentals  is  significant  only  for  year  1. 
Mixed  results  are  found  on  the  relationship  between  the  ex-ante  risk 
factors  and  IPO  performance.  In  the  shorter  period,  the  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk 
factors  generates  little  evidence  to  support  the  working  hypotheses.  Nevertheless, 
the  impact  becomes  more  important  in  the  long  run,  particularly  over  3  years  after 
the  offering.  The  efficiency  risk  is  the  only  ex-ante  risk  factor,  which  shows 
consistent  results  throughout  the  periods.  An  interesting  finding  for  this  predictor 
group  is  that  seemingly  the  market  perceives  the  proxies  as  firm  performance 
315 measures,  rather  than  as  risk  measures.  Despite  mixed  results  for  the  individual 
ex-ante  risk  factors,  the  joint  restrictions  of  the  group  are  robust  across  the  models 
and  throughout  the  different  periods. 
The  signals  appear  to  perform  as  expected,  despite  the  lack  of  statistical 
significance  for  the  firm's  age  (Age)  variable.  The  sponsor  reputation  (Spo)  shows 
robust  results  across  the  models  and  the  different  periods.  The  result  implies  that 
IPOs  that  are  sponsored  by  the  prestigious  investment  bankers  perform  better  in 
the  long  run  than  IPOs  that  are  sponsored  by  the  less  prestigious  investment 
bankers.  The  evidence  for  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  (Eq)  appears  to 
be  weak  in  model  I.  However,  once  the  models  control  for  the  privatisations,  the 
impact  of  Eq  on  BHARs  becomes  significant  throughout  the  periods.  The  result 
implies  that  IPOs  that  sell  lower  percentages  of  the  enlarged  shares  at  the  offering 
perform  better  in  the  long  run  than  do  the  IPOs  that  sell  higher  percentages  of  the 
enlarged  share  capital.  Mixed  results  are  found  in  the  joint  restriction  of  the 
signals  across  the  models.  In  model  I,  it  is  significant  only  in  year  2  and  3, 
although,  it  becomes  more  consistently  significant  in  the  subsequent  models. 
A  robust  result  is  found  on  the  relationship  between  the  privatisation  and 
the  IPO  performances.  The  results  lend  further  support  to  the  prior  findings  that 
demonstrate  the  significant  impact  of  privatisations  on  the  IPO  long  run  returns. 
The  PIPOs  appear  to  have  better  performance  in  the  long  run  (up  to  the  3-year 
period).  Hence,  it  corroborates  the  prior  UK  studies  on  the  IPO  long-run 
performance. 
Another  interesting  finding  is  demonstrated  in  the  relationship  between  the 
initial  `mispricing'  (valuation  residuals  and  IRs)  and  the  BHARs.  There  is  no 
evidence  to  support  an  association  between  Resi  and  the  BHARs.  Prior  studies  find 
316 a  negative  relationship  between  the  IRs  and  the  BHARs,  suggesting  mean 
reversion.  However  the  result  in  this  study  suggests  differently.  The  positive  IR- 
BHARs  relationship  continues  up  to  year  2,  and  then  loses  the  significance  in  year 
3.  In  conjunction  to  the  findings  in  the  IR  analysis,  the  results  imply  that  the 
market  momentum  continues  up  to  the  IPOs'  2"d  listing  anniversary.  Another 
implication  is  that  the  higher  IRs  on  day  1  is  a  result  of  the  signalling  action  of  the 
issuers/sponsors  of  `good'  firms.  Therefore,  in  the  long  run,  such  IPOs  are 
expected  to  have  greater  BHARs,  which  results  in  a  positive  relationship  between 
the  IRs  and  the  BHARs. 
Despite  mixed  results  and  lack  of  significance  of  a  number  of  predictors 
(sec  appendix  -  table  A.  6.4),  all  IPO  performance  models  demonstrate  increasing 
explanatory  powers  throughout  the  periods.  The  Wald  statistics  shows  that  the 
models  are  valid.  The  sensitivity  analyses  demonstrate  that  the  results  of  the  main 
analysis  are  generally  robust. 
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Chapter  6 Appendix 
Table  A.  6.1.  The  reason  for  the  non-survivor  IPOs 
Company  name  Reason 
International  Food  Machinery  plc  Delisted 
Parkdran  Leisure  plc  Taken-over 
Parksidc  International  plc  Taken-over 
Unipalm  Group  pie  Merged 
GRT  Bus  plc  Taken-over 
Rainford  Group  plc  Taken-over 
Brunner  Mond  pie  Private 
Oliver  Ashwort  plc  Taken-over 
Car  Group  plc  Delisted 
Pcnna  Holdings  plc  Taken-over 
SDX  Business  System  pie  Taken-over 
Ushers  of  Trow  plc  Delisted 
Gremlin  plc  Merged 
Primesight  plc  Taken-over 
Newsquest  plc  Taken-over 
BCH  group  plc  Taken-over 
Tetra  Taken-over 
318 Table  A.  6.2a  Performance  of  non-privatisation  sub-sample  by  year 
Year  No.  of 
IPO 
sample 
Average 
BHAR1y 
Average 
BHAR2y 
Average 
BHAR3y 
1987  5  0.281  0.613  0.528 
1988  12  0.330**  0.248  0.228 
1989  4  0.292  0.524*  0.693** 
1990  2  -0.015  0.078  0.066 
1991  4  0.116  -0.201  -0.145 
1992  10  -0.034  -0.188  -0.266* 
1993  15  0.095  -0.039  -0.201 
1994  31  0.163**  0.223  0.102 
1995  19  0.096  -0.208  -0.642*** 
1996  28  0.043  -0.179  -0.242* 
1997  21  -0.003  -0.314**  0.166 
Table  A6.2b  Performance  of  survivor  sub-  sample  by  year 
Year  No.  of 
IPO 
sample 
Average 
BHAR1y 
Average 
BHAR2y 
Average 
BHAR3y 
1987  7  0.306*  0.602*  0.581 
1988  13  0.328***  0.258  0.201 
1989  6  0.368**  0.531***  0.831*** 
1990  2  -0.015  0.078  0.066 
1991  6  0.117  0.042  0.150 
1992  9  0.021  0.027  -0.266* 
1993  16  0.105  0.053  -0.156 
1994  28  0.157**  0.359**  0.102 
1995  17  0.126  -0.089  -0.642*** 
1996  24  0.042  0.064  -0.242* 
1997  15  0.057  0.099  0.166 
Note:  *significant  at  10%;  **significant  at  5%;  ***signfficant  at  1% 
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M Table  A.  6.4  Summary  of  long  run  performance  analysis 
hypothesis  testing 
Hypothesis  Variables  Expected  Evidence 
signs 
1-112a 
The  pro  -forma  book  value  of  equity  to 
offer  price  ratio  is  negatively  related  to  pBV/Po  +x  IPO  lang  run  abnormal  returns 
1.112b 
The  forecasted  earnings  to  offer  price 
ratio  is  positively  related  to  IPO  long  fE/Po  + 
(only 
abnormal  returns 
in  year  1) 
1.113 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  Size  - 
size  and  IPO  long  run  abnormal 
(only  in 
returns  year  1) 
1-I  14a 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
firm's  pre-IPO  leverage  and  IPO  long  Lev  + 
(a  negative  and  run  abnormal  returns 
significant 
coefficient  is 
found  in  year  3) 
H14b 
There  is  a  negative  relationship 
between  firm's  pre-IPO  capital  Cap 
availability  risk  and  long  run  abnormal 
returns 
I-i14c 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
firm's  pre-IPO  efficiency  risk  and  IPO  Effr 
long  run  abnormal  returns  (negative  and 
significant 
coefficients  are 
found  in  years 
1,2,  and  3) 
H14d 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
V/  firm's  pre-IPO  capacity  risk  and  IPO  Cpy  + 
long  riot  abnormal  returns 
(only  in  year  3) 
323 Hypothesis  Variables  Expected  Evidence 
signs 
HI4c 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  hid  + 
industry  risk  and  IPO  long  run 
abnormal  returns 
1-115a 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
sponsor  reputation  dummy  and  IPO  Spo  +  V/  long  run  abnormal  rcturus 
1-11  5b 
There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
V/  firm  age  and  IPO  long  riot  abnormal  Age  + 
returns 
(a  negative  and 
significant 
coefficient  is 
found  only  in 
year  2) 
1115c 
Tltcrc  is  a  ncgativc  rclationship 
bctºrccit  pcrccntagc  of  equity  sold  at  Eq 
the  flotation  and  IPO  long  run 
abnormal  returns 
1-i  16 
Privatisation  dummy  is  positively  prig  V/ 
related  to  IPO  abnormal  returns  + 
1-117 
Naluatior:  residuals  is  positively  related  Resi  +x 
to  IPO  abnormal  returns 
H18 
There  is  a  negative  association  between 
IPO  initial  returns  and  the  long  run  IR  -  V/ 
abnormal  returns.  (positive  and 
significant 
coeffients  are 
found  in  years  1 
and  2) 
324 Chapter  7 Chapter  7 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
This  chapter  aims  to  summarise  the  findings  from  the  research  that  is 
presented  in  the  prior  chapters.  It  also  presents  the  final  conclusion,  which  is  to 
address  the  main  research  question:  Can  investors  use  the  prospectus  information 
to  price  the  Initial  public  offerings  (IPOs)  in  the  short-run  and  the  long  run?  This 
question  leads  to  three  empirical  questions  analysed  in  this  study.  The  first  part  of 
the  research  is  to  examine  whether  issuers  and  sponsors  (the  investors)  use  the 
prospectus  information  to  set  the  IPO  offer  price  (the  initial  market  price).  The 
results  and  analysis  of  the  first  part  of  the  research  are  presented  in  chapter  4.  The 
second  part  of  the  research  is  presented  in  chapter  5,  which  is  to  observe  whether 
the  prospectus  information  offers  an  explanation  to  the  IPO  underpricing  anomaly. 
The  final  part,  which  is  presented  in  chapter  6,  is  to  address  the  impact  of  the 
prospectus  information  on  the  IPO  long  run  performance. 
The  main  focus  of  this  study  is  to  analyse  the  impact  of  the  prospectus 
information  on  the  IPO  valuation  in  the  short-run  and  their  long  run  performance. 
The  prospectus  information  is  believed  to  be  comprehensive  information  available 
to  the  market  at  the  admission;  therefore  it  is  interesting  to  examine  how  the 
market  participants  value  the  IPOs  given  such  limited  information. 
Operationally,  the  prospectus  information  is  classified  into  three  different 
groups  (fundamentals,  ex-ante  risk  factors,  and  signals).  Additionally,  this 
research  also  controls  for  a  number  of  research  sample  characteristics,  such  as  the 
privatisations,  that  may  play  an  important  role  and  influence  the  results. The  research  is  based  on  a  sample  of  161  IPOs  in  the  UK  main  market  that 
took  place  during  the  1987-1997  period.  An  accounting  valuation  method  is  used 
in  the  IPO  valuation  analysis.  This  is  a  unique  contribution  of  this  study  to  the  IPO 
research  area,  since,  to  the  researcher's  knowledge,  no  prior  IPO  valuation  study 
uses  the  accounting  valuation  model.  Very  limited  information  regarding  the  IPO 
finns  is  available  to  the  market  prior  to  the  admission,  which  makes  the  IPO 
valuation  more  difficult  than  the  valuation  for  the  seasoned  stock.  The  offering 
prospectus  is  believed  to  be  the  most  comprehensive  information  that  is  available 
at  the  admission.  The  advantage  of  using  the  accounting  valuation  model  is  its 
simplicity.  It  requires  limited  basic  information  included  in  the  offering 
prospectus,  while  other  valuation  methods  require  additional  information  -  such 
as  projected  cash  flow  -  which  may  not  be  available  to  investors  at  the  admission. 
A  review  of  the  major  IPO  literature  that  is  reasonably  associated  to  the 
research  is  provided  as  a  background  and  reference  to  the  empirical  investigation, 
and  is  presented  in  chapter  2.  The  research  design  is  explained  in  detail  in  chapter 
3.  It  presents  the  research  models,  which  are  the  IPO  valuation  and  the  IPO 
performance  models.  The  IPO  valuation  models  analyse  the  impact  of  the 
prospectus  information  on  the  IPO  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  The 
IPO  performance  models  analyse  the  impact  of  the  prospectus  information  on  the 
IPO  performance  in  the  short  run  and  long  run.  Chapter  3  also  presents  a  list  of  the 
working  hypotheses  of  the  research. 
The  structure  of  this  chapter  is  as  follows.  The  next  section  summarises  the 
findings  and  conclusions  of  the  IPO  valuation  analysis.  It  is  followed  by  a  section 
that  reviews  the  findings  and  conclusions  of  the  IPO  long-run  performance 
analysis.  Then,  the  limitations  of  the  research  are  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
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based  on  the  findings  of  this  research,  which  is  presented  in  the  following  section. 
And  finally,  the  thesis  is  concluded  in  the  last  section. 
7.1  IPO  valuation  analysis 
This  IPO  valuation  analysis  investigates  the  impact  of  prospectus 
information  on  the  IPO  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price.  The  prospectus 
information  is  categorised  as  fundamental  information  (pro-forma  book  value  of 
equity,  forecasted  earnings,  and  pro-forma  dividend),  ex-ante  risk  factors 
(leverage  risk,  capital  availability  risk,  efficiency  risk,  capacity  risk,  and  industry 
risk),  signals  (sponsor  reputation,  firm's  age  at  the  time  of  admission,  and  the 
percentage  of  ownership  that  is  sold  at  the  IPO)  and  various  control  variables, 
such  as  privatisation.  The  analysis  is  based  on  the  accounting-based  valuation 
model.  The  model  hypothesises  that  the  IPO  price  is  an  increasing  function  of  the 
fundamentals  and  signals,  but  a  decreasing  function  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors. 
The  results  show  that  the  fundamental  accounting  variables  play  a  vital 
role  in  valuing  IPOs.  The  IPO  valuations,  both  at  the  offer  price  and  the  initial 
market  price,  heavily  depend  on  those  accounting  numbers,  which  results  in 
impressive  explanatory  power  of  the  model.  Particularly,  pro-forma  book  value 
and  forecasted  earnings  appear  to  be  highly  and  significantly  related  to  the  offer 
price  and  the  initial  market  price.  However,  in  contrast  to  prior  findings  for  non- 
IPO  samples,  the  dividends  seem  to  have  an  insignificant  impact.  The  basic 
valuation  model  analysis  also  confirms  the  significantly  different  impact  of 
negative  earnings  on  the  IPO  valuations,  which  is  consistent  to  the  findings  from 
prior  non-IPO  studies  (Hayn,  1995;  Rees,  1999).  Overall,  the  fundamentals  seem 
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power  of  the  basic  valuation  models  (the  adjusted  R-square  of  72.9%  and  of 
67.0%,  respectively,  for  the  offer  priced  and  the  initial  market  priced  scaled  by  the 
pro-forma  book  value). 
The  analysis  on  the  full  valuation  model  exhibits  mixed  results.  Only  two 
out  of  five  ex-ante  risk  factors,  efficiency  risk  and  capacity  risk,  significantly 
influence  the  IPO  valuations  and  confirm  that  the  IPO  prices  are  a  decreasing 
function  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors.  The  results  of  such  prospectus  information  are 
robust,  as  a  number  of  sensitivity  analysis  exhibit  unchanged  results. 
Amongst  the  signals,  only  the  impact  of  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at 
the  IPO  on  the  initial  market  price  appears  to  be  significant.  The  result  implies 
that  the  IPOs,  where  a  higher  percentage  of  the  equity  is  sold  at  the  admission,  are 
valued  lower  in  the  market.  The  market  perceives  the  fraction  of  the  firm's  equity 
sold  at  the  offering  as  a  signal  to  the  firm's  true  value.  The  higher  the  percentage 
of  equity  offered  at  the  admission  reflects  the  management's  low  expectations 
regarding  the  firms'  future  value.  Meanwhile,  there  is  no  evidence  to  support  the 
signalling  role  of  the  sponsor  reputation  and  the  firm's  age.  Therefore,  this  study 
cannot  confirm  the  findings  from  previous  studies  that  find  a  robust  result  of  the 
signals,  particularly  the  sponsor  (underwriter)  reputation  (e.  g.,  Clarkson  et  al, 
1992).  However,  this  result  is  similar  to  results  from  a  number  of  UK  studies  (e.  g., 
Kcasey  and  Short,  1992). 
The  results  of  the  privatisation  dummy  show  no  empirical  evidence  of  its 
impact  on  the  IPO  prices.  Prior  studies  (e.  g.,  Menyah  et  al,  1995)  find  that  the 
PIPOs  are  priced  differently,  hence  resulting  in  a  significantly  greater  degree  of 
underpricing.  However,  the  IPO  valuation  analysis  in  this  study  fails  to  find 
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privatisation  dummy  and  the  percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  is  suspected  to 
be  the  cause  of  lacking  statistical  significance  in  this  case,  as  the  univariate 
analysis  records  a  correlation  coefficient  of  0.705  between  the  two  variables. 
Despite  mixed  results  of  the  influence  of  ex-ante  risk  factors  and  signals  on 
the  IPO  valuation,  the  inclusion  of  those  predictors  to  the  valuation  models 
increases  the  adjusted  R-square  for  the  offer  price  and  the  initial  market  price  to  a 
maximum  of  74.8%  and  69.5%,  respectively,  implying  that  to  some  extent  the  ex- 
ante  risk  factors  and  signals  do  explain  parts  of  the  variations  in  the  IPO  prices.  A 
number  of  sensitivity  analyses  also  show  that  the  main  results  are  robust  and  the 
model  is  not  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  measures  (proxies)  of  the  predictors,  such 
as  the  use  of  forecasted  earnings  as  a  predictor,  and  the  pro-forma  book  value  as  a 
model  deflator.  Additionally,  the  Wald  test  demonstrates  that  the  IPO  valuation 
models  are  statistically  valid. 
7.2  IPO  performance  analysis 
The  IPO  performance  analysis  aims  to  address  two  IPO  anomalies:  the 
underpricing  and  the  long  run  underperformance.  Therefore,  the  analysis  is 
divided  into  two  empirical  analyses.  The  first  analysis  examines  the  investors' 
returns  on  the  closing  of  the  first  trading  day.  This  is  referring  to  as  the 
underpricing  phenomenon  in  the  IPO  market.  The  second  analysis  is  to  observe 
the  investors  returns  at  subsequent  IPO  listing  anniversaries. 
The  results  of  the  first  analysis  show  robust  evidence  of  the  underpricing 
in  the  research  sample.  Even  when  the  sample  is  separated  to  the  privatisation 
IPOs  (PIPOs)  and  non-PIPOs  sub-sample,  the  undepricing  fact  significantly  exists 
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run  performance,  this  study  does  not  find  a  support  for  the  hypothesis  of  the 
underperformance  of  the  IPOs  based  on  the  full  sample.  In  contrast,  the  results 
suggest  that,  on  average,  the  research  sample  outperforms  the  market  during  the 
first  two  years  of  their  lives,  which  is  shown  by  the  positive  and  significant  means 
of  the  1-year  buy  and  hold  abnormal  returns  (BHARs).  In  turn,  the  average  of  the 
BI-HARs  in  year  2  is  also  positive,  but  statistically  insignificant,  while  in  year  3,  the 
average  of  the  BHARs  takes  a  negative  value,  although  does  not  significantly 
different  to  zero.  Further  analysis  is  undertaken  by,  splitting  the  research  sample 
into  the  PIPOs/non-PIPOs  and  the  survivor/non-survivor  sub-samples.  The  above 
results  seems  to  have  been  driven  by  the  privatisations,  as  analysis  of  the  non- 
PIPOs  sub-  sample  finds  evidence  of  the  long-run  underperformance  in  year  3,  as 
is  also  the  case  for  the  non-survivors. 
While  the  fundamental  accounting  variables  are  found  to  be  substantially 
influencing  the  IPO  prices,  their  impact  is  weaker  in  explaining  the  IPO 
performance.  An  interesting  finding  is  the  relationship  of  the  pro-forma  book 
value  of  equity  to  offer  price  ratio  and  the  Initial  returns  (IRs),  which  demonstrates 
a  significant  result  but  in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  predicted.  This  study 
posits  a  positive  coefficient  of  the  proforma  book  value  to  offer  ratio  variable, 
however  the  result  shows  a  negative  sign,  which  implies  that  the  IPOs  that  are 
priced  more  highly  compared  to  their  book  value  at  the  offering  are  likely  to  be 
valued  even  more  highly  on  the  first  trading  day.  Another  possible  explanation 
offered  in  this  study  is  that  the  issuers/sponsors  priced  the  `good'  IPOs  at  the 
premium  to  signal  the  firms'  true  value.  If  the  market  agrees  with  the 
issuers/sponsors,  the  market  demand  push-up  the  prices,  which  in  turn  results  in 
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valuation  residuals  on  the  IRs.  However,  the  impact  of  the  pro-forma  book  value 
to  offer  price  ratio  disappears  for  the  longer  period. 
While  weak  evidence  is  found  on  the  relationship  between  the  forecasted 
earnings  and  the  IPO  short  run  performance  (IRs),  its  impact  on  the  IPO  1  year 
performance  (BHARI  y)  is  significant.  This  is  understandable,  since  the  forecasted 
earnings  figures  disclosed  in  the  prospectus  is  a  1-year  forecast.  Therefore,  the 
figures  is  relatively  relevant  in  pricing  the  IPOs  after  1  year  listed.  The  impact  of 
the  forecasted  earnings  disappears  over  the  longer  periods,  since  the  actual 
earnings  figures  are  available  to  the  market  in  the  subsequent  years. 
The  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  on  the  IPO  short  run  performance 
generate  little  evidence  to  support  the  working  hypotheses;  only  Industry  risk  is 
significantly  related  to  the  IRs.  However,  the  Industry  risk  coefficient  is  of  the 
opposite  sign  to  that  predicted,  which  implies  the  IPOs  in  riskier  industries 
experience  lower  IRs.  Nevertheless,  the  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  becomes 
more  important  in  the  long  run,  particularly  over  the  3-year  period  after  the 
offering.  The  efficiency  risk  is  the  only  ex-ante  risk  factor,  which  shows 
consistent  results  throughout  the  periods.  The  leverage  risk  also  appears  to  be 
significantly  related  to  BHAR3y.  However,  the  coefficients  of  the  two  variables 
take  the  opposite  signs  to  those  hypothesised.  This  means  that  the  riskier  IPOs 
perform  worse  in  the  long  run.  This  suggests  that  the  market  perceives  the  ex-ante 
risk  proxies  as  firm  performance  measures,  rather  than  as  risk  measures.  The 
results  of  the  other  ex-ante  risk  factors  are  mixed.  While  the  Capital  availability 
risk  appears  to  have  no  impact  to  the  IPO  performance,  the  impacts  of  Capacity 
risk  and  Industry  risk  become  significant  in  year  3. 
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found  to  support  the  expectation  of  a  negative  association  between  the  signals  and 
IRs.  However,  the  analysis  shows  more  robust  results  in  the  long  run.  Both  the 
Sponsor  reputation  and  the  Percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  IPO  are  consistently 
and  significantly  related  to  IPO  long  run  performance  throughout  different 
periods.  To  the  researcher's  knowledge,  this  study  is  among  the  first  UK  studies  to 
document  evidence  of  an  association  between  the  Sponsor  reputation  and  the 
percentage  of  equity  sold  at  the  admission  and  the  IPO  long  run  performance. 
Weak  evidence  is  found  on  the  relationship  between  the  firm's  age  and  the  IPO 
performance. 
The  privatisation  variable  shows  robust  results  in  explaining  the  IPO 
performance.  The  evidence  supports  the  claim  that  the  PIPOs  tend  to  be  more 
underpriced  (have  greater  IRs  on  day  1)  but  have  better  performance  in  the  long 
run  up  to  the  3-year  period.  Hence,  it  corroborates  the  findings  from  prior  UK 
studies  on  the  privatization  IPOs  (e.  g.,  Menyah  et  al.,  1995;  Dewenter  and 
Malatesta,  1997) 
Another  interesting  finding  is  demonstrated  on  the  relationship  between 
the  IR  and  the  BHARs.  Prior  studies  find  a  negative  relationship  (e.  g.,  Levis, 
1993),  however  the  results  in  this  study  suggests  differently.  The  positive  IR- 
BHARs  relationship  continues  up  to  year  2,  and  then  loses  the  significance  in  year 
3.  The  results  imply  that  the  overvalued  IPOs  at  the  offering  are  valued  higher  in 
the  market  from  day  1  up  to  at  least  their  second  listing  anniversary.  Two  possible 
explanations  have  been  discussed  in  the  IPO  long  run  performance  analysis.  The 
first  explanation  is  down  to  the  market  momentum.  In  the  IR  analysis,  it  is  found 
that  the  IPOs  that  are  priced  higher  relatively  to  their  fundamentals  (greater 
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explained  by  the  market  momentum  for  such  IPOs.  The  results  in  the  long  run 
analysis  shows  that  such  IPOs  perform  significantly  better  up  to  their  2°a 
anniversary,  suggesting  the  momentum  continues  up  to,  at  least,  year  2.  The 
second  explanation  is  related  to  the  signaling  theory.  In  conjunction  to  the  IR 
analysis,  it  is  suggested  that  `good'  IPOs  are  priced  at  a  premium  at  the  offering  as 
a  signal  to  the  firms'  true  value.  When  the  market  concurs  with  the  signal,  it 
pushes  up  the  demand  for  `good'  IPOs  that  results  in  higher  IPOs  returns.  Since 
such  IPOs  are  `good'  firms,  it  is  expected  they  perform  better  in  the  long  run. 
Therefore,  the  positive  JR-BHARs  relationship  is  explained. 
All  IPO  performance  models  are  statistically  valid.  The  tests  of  the  joint 
restriction  of  the  predictors  show  mixed  results.  The  fundamentals  have  a 
significant  impact  only  in  year  1,  the  signals  significantly  predict  the  IPO  long  run 
performance  for  year  2  and  3,  while  the  joint  restrictions  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors 
are  consistently  significant  across  the  different  models  and  periods.  The 
explanatory  power  of  the  models  increases  when  control  variables  are  introduced 
into  the  model.  The  sensitivity  analyses  demonstrate  that  the  main  results  are 
generally  robust. 
7.3  Research  limitations 
The  main  source  of  data  for  this  research  is  the  offering  prospectus. 
Therefore,  the  accomplishment  of  the  research  depends  on  the  ability  to  obtain  the 
prospectus.  With  limited  financial  resources,  the  researcher  manages  to  attain  180 
IPO  prospectuses  during  the  1987-1997  periods.  Moreover,  to  analyse  the 
prospectus  manually  is  reasonably  time  consuming.  Some  missing  data  and 
deletion  of  extreme  cases  reduce  the  sample  to  161  valid  cases.  For  an  empirical 
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a  few  econometric/statistical  problems  in  producing  better  results,  when  further 
analysis  is  needed.  In  particular,  this  study  cannot  pursue  the  sensitivity  analysis 
for  the  non-survivor  sub-sample,  since  only  17  IPOs  of  the  research  sample  are 
found  to  be  Lion-survivors  IPO.  However,  the  research  sample  sufficiently 
represents  the  population,  as  there  are  only  492  appropriate  IPOs  in  the  UK  main 
market  during  the  research  period.  Therefore,  the  research  sample  is 
approximately  32.7  %  of  the  population.  Moreover,  a  comprehensive  analysis  of 
the  research  sample  has  been  undertaken  and  the  results  show  that  the  sample  is 
representative  of  the  population  of  IPOs  during  the  sample  period. 
As  presented  in  the  thesis,  there  is  limited  information,  which  is 
consistently  disclosed  in  the  prospectuses,  such  as  the  risk  factors.  However,  a 
robustness  check  shows  that  the  main  results  are  robust. 
Similar  to  the  prior  studies  examining  the  IPO  long-run  performance,  the 
measures  of  IPO  abnormal  returns  may  be  sensitive  to  the  benchmarks  employed. 
Since  most  IPOs  in  the  research  sample  are  small  firms,  it  is  sensible  to  use  the 
small  companies  market  index,  as  employed  in  this  study.  Moreover,  Espenlaub  et 
al.  (2000)  re-examine  the  UK  IPO  long-run  performance  using  5  different 
benchmarks,  yet  they  cannot  conclude  which  one  is  the  best  benchmark. 
Therefore,  it  could  be  said  that  using  different  benchmarks  in  calculating  the  IPO 
long  run  abnormal  returns  does  not  certify  the  free-bias  results.  Finally,  as  applied 
by  other  studies  (e.  g.,  Gleason  and  Lee,  2002),  the  risk  element  in  calculating  the 
long  run  returns  is  controlled  by  including  firm  size  variable  in  the  right  hand  side 
of  the  IPO  long  run  performance  models. 
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could  not  be  generalized  for  other  UK  markets. 
7.4  Possible  future  research 
A  number  of  interesting  findings  in  the  two  empirical  sections  of  this  study 
lead  to  several  opportunities  for  future  research.  This  study  provides  evidence  of 
the  association  between  the  prospectus  information  and  the  IPO  valuation.  It  also 
presents  evidence  on  the  undepricing  anomaly  to  the  research  sample.  Based  on 
the  economic  law  of  supply  and  demand,  the  underpricing  could  be  seen  as  the 
results  of  the  offering  excess  demand.  Prior  studies  also  confirm  that  the 
oversubscribed  IPOs  tend  to  produce  higher  initial  returns.  Therefore,  it  would  be 
interesting  to  analyse  whether  the  prospectus  information  has  the  ability  to  predict 
the  subscription  of  IPOs. 
This  study  also  demonstrates  that  the  performances  of  IPOs,  which  survive 
to  their  third  listing  anniversary,  are  significantly  different  to  the  non-survivors. 
Therefore,  it  would  be  interesting  to  observe  whether  the  prospectus  information 
can  be  used  to  predict  the  company  failures. 
This  study  demonstrates  the  strong  impact  of  the  prospectus  forecasted 
earnings  on  the  IPO  valuation  and  the  buy  and  hold  abnormal  returns  in  year  1. 
However,  it  loses  the  significance  in  the  following  years,  as  the  actual  earnings 
figures  are  already  available  in  the  market  at  that  time.  Prior  studies  using  non- 
IPO  data  provide  evidence  of  the  influence  of  the  earnings  forecast  errors  to  the 
stock  returns.  Therefore,  a  study  concerning  the  effect  of  the  prospectus  earnings 
forecast  errors  on  the  IPO  valuation  and  performance  in  the  long  run  could  be  a 
worthwhile  area  of  research. 
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This  thesis  consists  of  two  main  parts.  The  first  part  examines  the 
usefulness  of  the  prospectus  information  to  the  IPO  offer  price  as  well  as  the 
initial  market  price.  The  results  show  that  the  prospectus  information  is  useful  in 
the  pricing  process.  In  particular,  the  `future'  fundamental  information  performs 
an  important  role  in  the  IPO  pricing.  Moreover,  such  information  explains  almost 
75%  of  the  variation  in  the  IPO  prices.  Furthermore,  while  the  results  somewhat 
mixed,  this  study  also  demonstrates  some  impact  of  the  ex-ante  risk  factors  and 
signals,  which  are  also  parts  of  the  prospectus  information,  on  the  IPO  prices. 
The  second  part  of  the  empirical  analysis  investigates  whether  the 
prospectus  information  still  have  significant  impacts  on  the  long-run  IPO 
performance.  The  evidence  shows  mixed  results.  As  expected,  the  `future' 
fundamental  information  is  found  to  be  related  to  the  IPO  1  year  performance  and 
becomes  irrelevant  in  the  longer  period.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ex-ante  risk  factors 
do  not  show  any  significant  impact  on  the  first  two  years  of  the  IPOs,  but  becomes 
significant  in  year  3.  Meanwhile,  the  results  of  signals  are  more  consistent. 
Confirming  prior  studies,  this  part  of  the  study  also  proves  the  distinction  of  the 
pricing  of  the  PIPOs.  They  are  significantly  underpriced  on  the  first  trading  day, 
but  perform  far  better  in  the  long  run. 
This  thesis  offers  a  number  of  contributions  to  the  research  area.  The  first 
one  is  to  give  empirical  evidence  of  the  robustness  of  the  accounting-based 
valuation  model.  This  model  is  widely  used  in  the  non-IPO  literature.  This  study 
demonstrates  that  it  works  well  in  the  case  of  IPO  as  well.  Secondly,  to  some 
extent,  the  prospectus  information  can  be  used  to  price  the  IPOs.  Some 
336 information  is  relevant  for  predicting  the  short-run  prices;  others  are  more 
appropriate  for  longer  period  returns. 
While  many  IPO  studies  present  cross-sectional  analysis  of  the  IPO 
underpricing,  very  few  have  been  done  for  the  IPO  long  run  performance. 
Therefore,  this  study  provides  a  new  explanation  of  the  factors  affecting  the  IPO 
long  run  performance.  Lastly,  this  thesis  provides  additional  evidence  of  the 
peculiarity  of  the  pricing  of  the  privatisation  IPOs'  pricing. 
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